JUDGMENT

1. In these batch of writ petitions, the managements of beedi industries, Tamil Nadu, have challenged the impugned notification issued by the first respondent, the Government of Tamil Nadu in exercise of its power conferred by Cl. (b) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 and Sub-sec. (1)(b), Sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, revising the minimum wages of the schedule Part I, entry (3) relating to employment in any tobacco (including beedi-making) manufactory, in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Government had fixed the minimum wages for employment in beedi making in April 1991 as follows:

SCHEDULE

S. No. Class of work Basic rates of wages (1) For rolling 1,000 jadi beedies irrespective of size Rs. 13.25 (2) For rolling 1,000 sada beedies irrespective of size (including Mukkudal type of beedies) Rs. 13.05

The impugned notification has revised the minimum wages as follows:

SCHEDULE

S. No. Class of work Minimum rates of wages (1) For rolling 1,000 jadi beedies irrespective of size Rs. 16.25 (2) For rolling 1,000 sada beedies irrespective of size (including Mukkudal type of beedies). Rs. 16.05

In all these batch of writ petitions, the petitioners have not impleaded the workers or the unions representing the beedi industry. In Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 297 of 1994, in Writ Petition No. 7923 of 1993 and Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 776 of 1994 in Writ Petition No. 7923 of 1993, the District Beedi Workers Union, represented by its General Secretary and the Jolarpettai Beedi Workers Union represented by its President respectively were impleaded as per order of this Court on 25 April, 1994 and they have been impleaded as R2 and R4 respectively and they have filed counter-affidavits.

2. The learned counsel for the respective writ-petitioners submitted their contentions, on the interpretation of S. 5(1)(b) and Sub-sec. (2) of the Minimum Wages Act referred to as the Act. On the other hand, Sri Chandru, the learned counsel for the impleaded parties in the Writ Petitions Nos. 7923 and 7925 of 1993 has raised preliminary objections regarding maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that the respective workers or their unions have not been impleaded as parties to the proceedings. In all other writ petitions, there is no representation on behalf of the employees or their unions from the respective beedi industries and, therefore, he submitted that the writ petitions ought to be dismissed as not maintainable by this Court on the preliminary ground itself.

3. The learned Additional Government Pleader also has taken the same point that the writ petitions are not maintainable for non joinder of necessary parties, viz., the employees or their unions and as such the writ petitions ought to be dismissed in limine as not maintainable. In support of the above contentions Sri Chandru, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 4 cited the ruling of Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1985 — II L.L.N 585], wherein it is observed as follows, in Para. 28, at page 598:

“Before we address ourselves to this question, we would like to point out that the writ petition filed by the Sangh suffered from two serious, though not incurable, defects. The first defect was that of non-joinder of necessary parties. The only respondents to the Sangh's petition were the State of Uttar Pradesh and its concerned officers. Those who were vitally concerned, namely, the reserve pool teachers, were not made parties not even by joining some of them in a representative capacity considering that their number was too large for all of them to be joined individually as respondents. The matter, therefore, came to be decided in their absence. A High Court ought not to decide a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least by some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large and, therefore, the Allahabad High Court ought not to have proceeded to hear and dispose of the Sangh's writ petition without insisting upon the reserve pool teachers being made respondents to that writ petition, or at least some of them being made respondents in a representative capacity, and had the petitioners refused to do so, ought to have dismissed that petition for non-joinder of necessary parties.

50. To summarize our conclusions:

(1) A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large to join them as respondent individually and if the petitioners refused to so join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary parties [vide Para. 50 at 1985 — II L.L.N 608].”

He also referred to a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Writ Petition No. 300 of 1977, wherein it is observed as follows:

“We may also point out that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on a very narrow ground as well. The petitioners have not impleaded the respective employees or the representatives of the employees as parties to the writ petitions. In the event of the petitioners succeeding in the writ petitions, the persons who will be really affected will be the employees, and they have not been impleaded as parties and in their absence, no relief can be given to the petitioners herein we are referring to this as an additional ground for dismissing the writ petitions.”

To meet the above contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan [1992 Supp (2) SCC 351 : A.I.R 1992 S.C 1277], wherein, it is held by the Supreme Court, as follows:

“98. The contention of Sri Shanthi Bhusan that the failure to implead Chauhan will be fatal to the writ petition does not seem to be correct. He relied on A.I.R 1978 Ker. 176. That case related to admission to medical college whereby invalidating the selections vitally affected those who had been selected already. Equally, the case Padmaraj Samrendra v. State of Bihar [A.I.R 1979 Pat.266], has no application. This was a case where the plea was founded in Art. 14 and arbitrary selection. The selected were vitally affected. The plea that the decision of the Court in the absence of Chauhan would be violative of principle of natural justice as any adverse decision would affect him is not correct.

99. On the contrary, we think we should approach the matter from this point of view, viz., to render an effective decision whether the presence of Chauhan is necessary? We will in this connection refer to A. Janardhana v. Union of India [1983 — II L.L.N 310], it is held as under, in Para. 36, at page 327:

“…. Approaching the matter from this angle, it may be noticed that relief is sought only against the Union of India and the concerned Ministry and not against any individual nor any seniority is claimed by any one individual against another particular individual and, therefore, even if technically the direct recruits were not before the Court, the petition is not likely to fail on that ground ……”

4. With regard to the infirmities in the impugned notification, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted as follows:

(1) The impugned notification ex facie shows that there was no consultation with the Advisory Board as required under S. 5(2) of the Act.

(2) The very reading of the impugned notification shows that the first respondent the Government of Tamil Nadu has not consulted the Advisory Board.

5. In this connection the learned counsel invited the attention of the Court to proviso to S. 5(2) of the Act to show that where the appropriate Government proposes to revise the minimum rate of wages by the mode specified in Cl. (b) of Sub-sec. (1), the appropriate Government shall consult the Advisory Board also. The learned counsel stressed the point that consultation shall be made before the final notification is made by the first respondent, after the receipt of all the objections till the last date. The learned counsel pointed out that on 5 January, 1993 preliminary notification was issued and it was published in Tamil Nadu Gazette on 13 January, 1993 giving two months' time for objections and suggestions. The writ-petitioners in Writ Petition No. 7923 of 1993 submitted their objections on 9 February, 1993 but the Government consulted the Advisory Board on 27 January, 1993 and the final notification was issued on 30 March, 1993. Therefore, it was contended that the objections of the above two writ-petitioners were not before the Advisory Board when the first respondent consulted the Advisory Board before issuing the final impugned notification dated 30 March, 1993. It is contended that the consultation with the Advisory Board is mandatory as per the proviso to S. 5(2) of the Act before the final notification is issued revising the minimum wages of the beedi workers.

6. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited the following rulings:

(1) In Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State Of Ajmer [A.I.R 1955 S.C 25], the Supreme Court observed the follows:

“As regards the procedure for the fixing of minimum wages, the appropriate Government has undoubtedly been given very large powers. But, it has to take into consideration before fixing wages, the advice of the committee if one is appointed, or the representation on its proposals made by persons who are likely to be affected thereby. Consultation with advisory bodies has been made obligatory on all occasions of revision of minimum wages…:”

(2) In Ramakrishna Ramnath v. State of Maharashtra [1963 - II L.L.J.548 at 560], Bombay High Court, observed as follows:

“The whole idea behind specifying a date as required by S. 5(1)(b) is that the person likely to be affected by the drafts proposals should be in a position to make a representation against the drafts proposals and know till what date they have to make it, so that the Government is precluded from taking a decision upon the draft proposals until the expiry of the date specified. There is however nothing in the statute which requires that Government should consider it on that very date and not thereafter.”

(3) In Bijoy Krishnan Paul v. State of Assam [1969 L. & I.C 260 at 261], it is observed by Division Bench of Assam High Court as follows:

“It is necessary to remember that the object of the minimum wages legislation is to fix minimum rates of wages for the schedule industry and in that behalf these wages legislation are more or less reasonable restrictions imposed in the way of the employers in conducting their business. In this view of the mater, an elaborate procedure has been prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act, which has got to be strictly complied with before minimum wages of this description arc fixed. It is noteworthy that if the employer, who is under a legal obligation to pay the prescribed minimum wages to his employees in accordance with the provisions of the Act, disobeys these directions, he can be prosecuted under the law.

It is, therefore, clearly necessary that the Government in making those notifications for prescribing the wages under the Act, punctiliously follows the letter of the law and strictly complied with all the procedure laid down in the Act.”

(4) In V.K Samaiom v. State of Kerala [1972 L.&I.C 398 at 401], it is observed by the Kerala High Court as follows:

“A Division Bench of this Court in Vasudevan v. State of Kerala [A.I.R 1960 Ker.67], held that S. 5(1)(b) is mandatory and its non-compliance would vitiate the fixation of the rates of minimum wages. The decision of this Court referred to above is binding on me. I also agree with the view that S. 5(1)(b) of the Act is mandatory and its non-compliance would vitiate the fixation of or revision of minimum wages if it is done by adopting the methods provided under the said section.”

(5) In Malayalam Plantation, Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1976 - I L.L J.114], it is observed by Full Bench of Kerala High Court as follows:

“The duty of the Government to consider such representation before finally deciding upon the question of fixing or revising the minimum wages appears to us to be the main contest of the procedural requirement of S. 5 when resort is made to the procedure prescribed under S. 5(1)(b).

Of course there is a further requirement that the Advisory Board should be consulted. Such consultation must necessarily be on the proposals and, therefore, cannot be at a stage prior to publication of the proposals.

There is no reason to assume either on the language of the section or on its scheme that the consultation with the Advisory Board must be prior to the receipt of the representations.”

(6) In Aspinwal and Company, Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [69 F.J.R 15 at 27], it is observed Kamataka High Court as follows:

“In my opinion, what should be the procedure for consultation, must necessarily depend upon the object and language of the statute requiring consultation.

Section 5(2) provides that the Government before revising the wages, after its proposal to revise the wages is published as required under Cl. (b) of S. 5(1) should consider all the representations received before the prescribed data. The proviso to S. 5(2) imposes another condition before revising the wages, namely consultation with the Board.

Therefore, if the State Government forwards its proposal to revise the wages and the representations received within the time specified, to the Board and seek its advice in that behalf and considers the representations and the advice tendered, it would satisfy the requirements of S. 5(2) proviso. The Government if it so desired might also express its views on the representations received and send them along with the proposals published to the Board and seek its advice and take a decision in the light of the advice tendered. Both these procedures in my opinion, constitute valid consultation. This is the content of natural justice incorporated in the statute itself.”

(6) In H.B Verma & Ors.… v. Union Of India & Ors.… [1992 L. & I.C 1039 at 1043], it is observed by Delhi High Court as follows:

“As seen above a detailed procedure has been prescribed for revising the minimum wages.

The minutes reproduced abvoe do not show as to how the Advisory Board considered various objections of the petitioners.

We feel perhaps the Advisory Board was under too much pressure both on account of various Supreme Court orders and the award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and was rather overwhelmed on that account. Whatever may be the Advisory Board has to perform its statutory function in a manner which would appear to be fair, reasonable and just. The impugned notification issued on the basis of any such recommendation or opinion of the Advisory Board, cannot, therefore, stand.”

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the principle of zoning has not been followed in revising the wages of the beedi workers. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel cited the ruling of the Supreme Court Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore [(1969) 3 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 2042], wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“The fixation of minimum wages depends on the prevailing economic conditions, the cost of living in a place, the nature of work to be performed and the conditions in which the work is performed.”

He has also cited a ruling of Division Bench of this Court in T.K Sukumaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (1979 L.&.I.C.1077], wherein it is observed as follows:

“The cost of living in a particular area will certainly have a bearing on the minimum wages to be fixed for the area. Cost of living is one thing, cost of living index is another. What is relevant is the former and not the later. The latter depends on the Base Year, which is not the same in all the towns and the prices of certain selected goods in each town … is likely to differ from town to town. The concept of minimum wage is likely to undergo a change with the growth of our economy and with the change in the standard of living. It is not a static concept. It is likely to differ from place to place and from industry to industry. That is clear from the provisions of the Act itself and is inherent in the very concept.”

The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that if the principle of zoning is applied different minimum wages have to be fixed for the beedi, workers in different parts of the State of Tamil Nadu and criterion taken by the first respondent, viz., the settlement arrived at between the representatives of the beedi workers and the employers of the beedi workers union on 28 November, 1992 relating to Madras, North Arcot, Chengalpattu and Tiruchirapalli is not the proper method. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the factories of the writ-petitioners were mainly located in Tirunelveli District and the settlement relating to the other districts will have no bearing on the same.

8. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the first respondent contended that there is no infirmity in the impugned notification and the procedure prescribed under S. 5(1) (b) and Sub-sec. (2) of the Minimum Wages Act has been complied with. In this connection, the learned Additional Government Pleader referred to the decision Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore [(1969) 3 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 2042] (vide surpa), wherein the nature of the power conferred under S. 5 of the Act is considered by the Supreme Court. In the abvoe ruling, the Supreme Court held that the nature of the power given under S. 5 of the Act is merely to collect data.

9. The learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that since the Act is a social welfare legislation any interpretation given to Ss. 5(1)(b) and 5(2) should be to fulfill the object of the welfare legislation and not to defeat the same. The object of the Act, as per the preamble, is to provide for fixing minimum rates of wages in certain employment. It is then contended by the learned Additional Government Pleader that when the Legislature in its wisdom has provided two methods for revising the minimum wages and when the concerned Government has enough time to collect the data required for revising the minimum wages, it can proceed to follow the procedure given under S. 5(1)(a) of the Act. On the other hand, if the concerned Government has no sufficient time to collect the data, it can follow the procedure given under Ss. 5(1)(b) and 5(2) subject to the proviso.

10. The learned Additional Government Pleader then submitted that there is nothing in Sub-cl. (2) of S. 5 of the Act to show that the Government should wait for all the representations to be received before the dates specified in the preliminary notification and then consult the Advisory Board. The proviso to S. 5(2) of the Act merely states that the Government shall consult the Advisory Board also before revising the minimum rates of wages. Though the consultation by the Government with the Advisory Board is mandatory, there is nothing in the section to show, when the consultation should be made by the appropriate Government with the Advisory Board and, therefore, the learned Additional Government Pleader contended that there is no duty cast on the appropriate Government to wait for the last date for objections to be received and then consult the Advisory Board and issue final notification. He further submitted that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Government has complied with the procedure given under Ss. 5(1)(b) and 5(2) read with the proviso to the Act and there has been consultation with the Advisory Board before the final impugned notification was issued by the Government.

11. The learned Additional Government Pleader further contended that there are two obligations on the part of the Government, viz.

(1) Consideration of all the objections and representations sent within the said period of two months; and

(2) consultation of the Advisory Board before passing the final notification fixing the minimum wages.

The contention of the petitioners is misconceived because the petitioners are trying to club together these two different aspects. He further submitted that the Government has taken into consideration all the data collected including that of the writ-petitioners and the revised minimum wage taking into consideration wages fixed on the basis of settlement arrived at under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the workmen of the beedi industries and the management in the districts of Madras, North Arcot Ambedkar Tiruvannamali, Sambuvarayar, Chengalpattu M.G.R and Tiruchirapalli. According to him the minimum wages fixed to the beedi workers and given in the impugned notification correctly reflects the minimum wages in Tamil Nadu regarding the beedi workers. The learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that the various rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners will not apply to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

12. Sri K. Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the impleaded party/respondent in Writ Petition No. 7923 of 1993 and Writ Petition No. 7925 of 1993 reiterated his objections regarding the maintainability of the writ petitions in the absence of the necessary parties, viz., the beedi workers or their unions and contended that the writ petitions filed by the petitioners ought to be dismissed in limine on that ground, without prejudice to the above preliminary objection, Sri K. Chandru learned counsel submitted that there are no infirmities in the impugned notification issued by the first respondent. Sri K. Chandru, in particular, referred to the nature of the power given under S. 5 of the Act and as stated by the Supreme Court in the decision in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore [(1969) 3 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 2042] (vide supra), the nature of the power is merely to collect data to aid the Government to revise or fix the minimum wages. The nature of power given under S. 5 of the Act should not be confused with the nature of power given under special enactments such as National Security Act and the appointment of Judges to the High Courts given under Art. 217 of the Constitution. The object of the National Security Act relates to preventive detention before a crime is committed, which is injurious to the State and there were certain safeguards provided before the personal liberty of an individual is curtailed. Therefore there are stringent provisions in that Act that the grounds of detention should be given to the detenu and the same should be communicated to the concerned detenu add the same materials should be placed before the Advisory Board, and if there is any defect in the matter, the detenu is entitled to be set at liberty. In this connection, Sri K. Chandru, referred to a ruling of Division Bench of this Court in Foundation Garments (Private), Ltd. v. Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu [1987 W.L.R 463], wherein Sri M. Srinivasan, J., speaking for the Bench, while dealing with a case under the Minimum Wages Act has observed as follows:

“The principle laid down in the Judge's Transfer case S.P Gupta v. President of India [1981 Supp SCC 87 : A.I.R 1982 S.C 149], does not help the petitioners in any manner in the present case. The interpretation of the word, ‘consultation’ as found in Art. 217 of the Constitution of India has relevance to the facts of the resent case.”

Sri P.V Bakthavatchalam, learned counsel appearing for the concerned trade union, adopts the arguments of Sri Chandru.

13. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. In the instant case, the appropriate Government, viz., the first respondent issued a preliminary notification before revising the minimum wages of the beedi workers by G.O (D) No. 1, dated 2 January, 1991, and called for objection from the beedi industries concerned. Several representations were received from 27 industries including that of the petitioners, both from the management as well as from the workers and after collecting the data for revising the minimum wages in the beedi industry and after consultation with the Advisory Board, the first respondent issued the impugned notification, dated 30 March, 1993, revising the minimum wages as follows:

(1) For rolling 1,000 jadi beedies irrespective of size Rs. 16.25

(2) For rolling 1,000 sada beedies irrespective of size (including mukkudal type of beedies) Rs. 16.05

14. The cardinal point for consideration in these batch of writ petitions is whether the procedure prescribed under S. 5(1)(b) and Sub-sec. (2) read with the proviso of the Act has been complied with by the appropriate Government. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is an infirmity in the impugned notification as the procedure given under S. 5(1)(b) and Sub-sec. (2) read with the proviso has not been complied with and in particular, it was submitted that the appropriate Government ought to have waited till the expiry of the two months given in the preliminary notification and only later ought to have consulted the Advisory Board. It is contended that the instant case, as the appropriate Government has consulted the Advisory Board without waiting for the last date, it vitiates the final notification itself. On the other hand, both the learned Additional Government Pleader and Sri K. Chandru, submitted that the contentions of the petitioners are not sustainable.

15. The Supreme Court in the decision in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Loding, Bangalore v. State of Mysore [(1969) 3 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 2042] (vide supra), has clearly staled the nature of power given under S. 5 of the Act as one to collect data to aid the appropriate Government to revise the minimum wages in a particular industry. Any interpretation of S. 5 of the Act must not only take into account the object of S. 5 of the Act, viz., collecting data to aid the appropriate Government to revise the minimum wages, but the object of the enactment also has to be taken into consideration, viz., the Act is a social welfare legislation and any interpretation to S. 5 should be to fulfill the object and not to defeat the same.

16. In the instant case, it was pointed out by Sri K. Chandru, that the object of the Act is to fix only minimum wages to different industries and minimum wages reflect only wages below the subsistence level and not necessarily reflect the actual wages in a particular industry and the Act ensures that at least the workers in a particular industry may be ensured with a minimum wages. The wage that is revised by the impugned notification is actually based upon a settlement under S. 12(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which broadly reflects the prevailing minimum wages in the beedi industry in Tamil Nadu and there is no reason why this prevailing rate should not be taken into account for fixing the minimum wages. It is further pointed out from the rulings cited by the learned counsel either side, that the object of the proviso to S. 5(2) of the Act, viz., consultation by the appropriate Government with the Advisory Board is to prevent arbitrary exercise of the power by the appropriate Government while revising the minimum wages. While the appropriate Government can resort to the procedure given in S. 5(1)(a) of the Act when there is sufficient time to collect the data to aid the revision of the wages, S. 5(1)(b) of the Act is resorted it when there is a short of time to collect the data. Therefore, a period of two months is fixed for getting the objections from the industry, both from the management as well as the employees, and safeguard is provided by consultation of the appropriate Government with the Advisory Board so that the Act of the appropriate Government is free from attack of arbitrariness. In this connection, the learned counsel for the respondents pointed out S. 9 of the Act, which reads as follows:

“Composition of committees, etc.— Each of the committees, sub-committees and the Advisory Board shall consist of persons to be nominated by the appropriate Government representing employers and employees in the scheduled employments, who shall be equal in number and independent persons not exceeding one third of its total number of members; one of such independent persons shall be appointed the Chairman by the appropriate Government.”

It is clear from a reading of the above section that the Advisory Board consists of persons representing employers and employees in relation to the scheduled employment and also representatives of the Government. In effect, the Advisory Board is well balanced and the interest of the management, employees and the Government are represented in the advisory body and once the appropriate Government carries out the procedure of consultation, there is sufficient safeguard.

17. The various rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. From the foregoing it is clear in the instant case, that the first respondent, Government of Tamil Nadu has issued preliminary notification for collecting data to revise the minimum wages relating to beedi workers before amending the entry (3) of the schedule relating to employment in any tobacco (including beedi making) manufactory. As I have already stated the Supreme Court in the case in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore [(1969) 3 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 2042], has observed as follows:

“The legislative policy is enumerated with sufficient clearness. The Government is merely charged with the duty of implementing that policy. There is no basis for saying that the Legislature had abdicated any of its legislative functions. The Legislature has prescribed two different procedures for collecting the necessary data, one contained in S. 5(1)(c) and the other in S. 5(1)(b). In either case, it is merely a procedure for gathering the necessary information. The Government is not bound by the advice given by the committee appointed under S. 5(1)(a). Discretion to select one of the two procedures prescribed for collecting the data is advisedly left to the Government. In the case of a particular employment, the Government may have sufficient data in its possession to enable it to formulate proposals under S. 5(1)(b). Therefore, it may not be necessary for it to constitute a committee to tender advice to it but in the case of another employment it may not be in possession of sufficient data. Therefore, it might be necessary for it to constitute a committee to collect the data and tender its advice. If the Government is satisfied that it has enough material before it to enable it to proceed under S. 5(1)(b), it can very well do so. Which procedure should be adopted in any particular employment depends on the nature of the employment and the information the Government has in its possession about that employment. Hence the powers conferred on the Government cannot be considered as either unguided or arbitrary. In the instant case as seen earlier the question of fixing wages for the various categories of employees in residential hotels and eating houses was before the Government from 1960 and the Government had taken various steps in that regard. It is reasonable to assume that by the time, the Government published the proposals in pursuance of which the impugned notification was issued, it had before it adequate material on the basis of which it could formulate its proposals. Before publishing those proposals, the Government had consulted the Advisory Committee constituted under S. 7. Under those circumstances we are unable to accede to the contention that either the power conferred under S. 5(1) is an arbitrary power or that the same had been arbitrarily exercised.

The validity of some of the provisions in the Act including S. 5 came up for consideration by this Court in Edward Mills Company, Ltd., Beawar v. State of Ajmer [A.I.R 1955 S.C 33] and in Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State Of Ajmer [A.I.R 1955 S.C 25]. In the former case, it was observed that the legislative policy is apparent on the face of the enactment. What it aims at is the statutory fixation of the minimum wages with a view to obviate the chances of exploitation of labour. It is to carry out the purpose of the enactment that power has been given to the appropriate Government to decide with reference to local conditions whether it is desirable that minimum wages should be fixed in regard to a particular trade or industry. In the latter case, the validity of S. 5 was assailed on the ground that it is violative of Art. 19(1)(g). That challenge was negatived by this Court. Dealing with S. 5(1) this is what the Court observed therein:

‘As regard the procedure for the fixing of minimum wages, the ‘appropriate Government’ has undoubtedly been given very large powers. But it has to take into consideration, before fixing wages, the advice of the Committee if one is appointed or the representations on proposals made by persons who are likely to be affected thereby. Consultation with advisory bodies has been made obligatory on all occasions of revision of minimum wages and S. 8 of the Act provides for the appointment of a Central Advisory Board for the purpose of advising the Central as well as the State Governments both in the matter of fixing and revision of minimum wages. Such Central Advisory body is to act also as a co-ordinating agent for co-ordinating the work of the different advisory bodies. In the committees or the advisory bodies, the employers and the employees have an equal number of representatives and there are certain independent members besides them who are expected to take a fair and impartial view of the matter. These provisions in our opinion constitute an adequate safeguard against any hasty or capricious decision by the ‘appropriate Government.’ In suitable cases the ‘appropriate Government’ has also been given the power of granting exemptions from the operation of the provisions of this Act.’

It is true in those cases, the validity of S. 5 was not challenged as being ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. But the observations quoted above afford an answer to the plea that the power granted to the Government is not an arbitrary power.”

18. It is clear from the observations of the Supreme Court that the object of S. 5 of the Act, is to collect data to aid the appropriate Government to revise the minimum wages unlike any enactments relating to preventive detention where the object of the enactment is to prevent a crime before it is committed by depriving the personal liberty of a person and, therefore, stringent provisions are in-built in the preventive detention enactment to safeguard the fundamental rights given under Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the same test regarding consultation cannot be applied to a social welfare legislation. The principles applied for interpreting Art. 217 of the Constitution or appointing of a Judge of the High Court and the term used therein, viz., consultation and the meaning assumed to the term, “Consultation” cannot be applied to interpreting S. 5 of the Minimum Wages Act. Sri Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the two impleaded parties invited the attention of this Court to a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Foundation Garments (Private), Ltd. v. Commissioner and Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu [1987 W.L.R 463] (vide supra), wherein this Court has observed as follows:

“The principle laid down in the Judge's Transfer Case S.P Gupta v. President of India [1981 Supp SCC 87 : A.I.R 1982 S.C 149], does not help the petitioners in any manner in the present case. The interpretation of the word, ‘consultation’ as found in Art. 217 of the Constitution of India has no relevance to the facts of the present case.”

19. The leaned counsel for the petitioner referred to proviso to S. 5(2) of the Act and submitted that the object of the proviso is to make an exception. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the only exception that proviso to S. 5(2) is that there should be a consultation by the appropriate Government before the final notification is made and there is nothing in the proviso to show the stage at which the Board has to be consulted and the procedure to be followed during such consultation. There is force in the contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader that S. 5 of the Act is concerned mainly with the procedure to be followed by collecting data before revising minimum wages and there is no hard and fast rule of particular procedure. In answer to the said contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Sub-cl. (2) and in particular that all representatives received by the Government before the date specified. The learned counsel for the petitioner emphasizes on the term, “all the representations.” I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appropriate Government should wait till the last date when representations are received and then alone consult the Advisory Board before issuing the final notification. As the Minimum Wages Act is a social welfare legislation and as the Supreme Court has interpreted the object of S. 5 in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore [(1969) 3 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 2042] (vide supra), to one of collecting data for the purpose of revising and fixing the minimum wages under the Act and if the appropriate Government has sufficient data to formulate its proposals and the time is short, I am of the view it is not necessary for the appropriate Government to wait for the last date of the preliminary notification to expire before consultation with the Advisory Board once procedure under S. 5(1)(b) and Sub-sec. (2) of he Act is resorted to by the Government.

20. A perusal of the record shows that the procedure under S. 5(1)(b) and Sub-sec. (2) of the Act is complied with in the instant case and the Advisory Board has been consulted as per the proviso to S. (5)(2) of the Act by the first respondent before the issue of final impugned notification. The mere fact that the appropriate Government did not wait for the last date to expire will not in any way vitiate the procedure given under S. 5(1)(b) and Sub-sec. (2) of the Act. Therefore, for the above reasons, I reject the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to this aspect of the matter.

21. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the principle of zoning was not followed before the minimum wages of the beedi workers were revised by the first respondent. In this connection, the learned counsel referred to the annexure to the affidavit, in the main writ petition and pointed out the principle of “zoning” has been followed with regard to hotels, cinemas and other industries whereby different wages have been fixed for industries falling in different areas. The learned counsel contended that the wages of beedi workers vary in different districts of Tamil Nadu State and, therefore, the principle of “zoning” ought to have been followed by the first respondent in different zones. In this connection, he pointed out that the respondents have taken into consideration the wages prevailing mainly in the districts of North Arcot, Trichy and Madurai whereas the factories of the petitioners herein all are located in Tirunelveli where the wages are not so high and this aspect of the matters has not been considered by the first respondent. On the other hand, the learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the principles of “zoning” will not apply to beedi industry. Sri Chandru appearing for the impleaded parties submitted that the principle of “zoning” will not apply to the beedi industries and in this connection, he referred to the ruling in Kaley Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1993 — II L.L.N 786], wherein as Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court considering the principle of zoning has observed as follows, in Para. 10, at page 791:

“In Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore [(1969) 3 SCC 84 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 2042], the Supreme Court held as thus:

‘The fixation of minimum wages depends on the prevailing economic conditions, the cost of living in a place, the nature of the work to be performed and the conditions in which the work is performed. The contention that it was impermissible for the Government to divide the State into several zones is opposed to S. 3(3) as well as to the scheme of the Act.’”

22. There is force in the connection of the learned counsel for the respondents that the principle of “zoning” will not apply to the instant case. In this connection, a reference may be made to S. 3 of the Act which reads as follows:

“3 Fixing of minimum rates of wages.— (1) The appropriate Government shall, in the matter hereinafter provided—

(a) fix the minimum rates of wages payable to employees employed in an employment specified in Part I or Part II of the schedule and in an employment added to either party by notification under S. 27:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, in respect of employees employed in an employment specified in Part II of the schedule instead of fixing minimum rates of wages under this clause for the whole State, fix such rates for a part of the State, or for any state specified class or classes of such employment in the whole state or part thereof:

Provided that where for any reasons the appropriate Government has not reviewed the minimum rates of wages fixed by it in respect of any scheduled employment within any interval of five years, nothing contained in this clause shall be deemed to prevent it from reviewing the minimum rates after the expiry of the said period of five years and revising them, if necessary and until they are so revised the minimum rates in force immediately before, the expiry of the said period of five years shall continue in force.

(1-A) …..

(2)…….

(2A)…….

(3) in fixing or revising the minimum rates of wages under the section—

(a) different minimum rates of wages may be fixed for—

(i) different scheduled employments.

(ii) different classes of work in the same scheduled employment

(iii) adults, adolescents, children and apprentices;

(iv) different localities;

(b) minimum rates of wages may be fixed by any one or more of the following wage-periods, namely:

(i) by the hour;

(ii) by the day;

(iii) by the month; or

(iv) by such other larger wage-period as may be prescribed.

and where such rates are fixed by the day or by the month, the manner of calculating wages for a month or for a day as the case may be may be indicated:

Provided that where any wage period have been fixed under S. 4 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936) minimum wages shall be fixed in accordance therewith.”

23. It is clear that S. 3(3) of the Act specified different classification for fixing or revising minimum rates of wages under the section. In the instant case, the appropriate Government has chosen in revising minimum rates of wages to beedi workers under category given in S. 3(3)(c)(i) of the Act, viz., “different scheduled employment and not S. 3(3)(iv) “different localities” In view of this specific provision contained in S. 3(3)(a)(i) of the Act, there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the principle of “zoning” has not been applied by the first respondent before revising the minimum wages of the beedi industry. Thus while fixing the minimum wages for the employees, it is not necessary that the criteria of region basis alone should be adhered to as the minimum wages depend on the prevailing economic conditions, the cost of living in a place, and other factors. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned notification cannot be said to suffer from infirmity on the ground that the principle of region or zonal has not been applied while fixing minimum ages for the employees engaged in beedi making industry. Accordingly, I reject the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

24. It is well settled by rulings of Supreme Court that notifications fixing minimum wages in a country where wages are already minimal should not be interfered with in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution except on most substantial grounds.

25. The Supreme Court in Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation v. Tiffin's Barytes Asbestos and Paints, Ltd. [1985 — II L.L.N 611], observed as follows, in Para. 3, at page 615:

“…..A notification fixing minimum wages, in a country where wages are already minimal should not be interfered with under Art. 226 of the Constitution except on the most substantial of grounds. The legislation is a social welfare legislation undertaken to further the Directive Principles of State Policy and action taken pursuant to it cannot be struck down on mere technicalities.”

Beedi industry is in an unorganized sector and the condition of work and wages of beedi workers are below subsistence level. The minimum wages fixed by the impugned notification is fair and just and by no means arbitrary and no substantial grounds have been made out by the petitioners. As a matter of fact, the impugned minimum wages have been laid by most of the employers in the beedi industry in Tamil Nadu and except the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 7923 of 1993 and 7925 of 1993, all other employers have paid the enhanced minimum wages. Further after the admissions of the above two writ petitions, the other writ-petitioners in the batch have filed the writ petitions.

26. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view, that there are no infirmities in the impugned notification issued by the first respondent revising the minimum wages of the employees in the beedi industry and the impugned notification is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and in particular S. 5(1)(b) and Sub-sec. (2) of the Act. On the above view of the matter, all the writ petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.

27. With regard to preliminary objections taken by the respondents that the petitioners have not impleaded the necessary parties and, therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in limine, there is force in the said contention in view of the Supreme Court ruling in Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1985 — II L.L.N 585], referred to above and the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court in T.K Sukumaran v. State of Tamil Nadu [Writ Petition No. 300 of 1977, dated 21 August, 1978]. The ruling cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan [1991 L & I.C 1371], (vide supra), is not applicable to facts and circumstances of the case. On this ground also the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. However, since the writ petitions have been decided on merits, the other writ petitions are also accordingly dismissed.