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Special Officer, Per... v. Smt. Ayyammal And An...

Madras High Court
Feb 22, 1994
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Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Abdul Hadi, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This civil miscellaneous appeal challenges an award of Rs. 52,052 granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai, in W.C. No. 72 of 1992 under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The respondents (the parents of the deceased) had claimed Rs. 76,885.20 as compensation. The deceased, Panchavarnam, was employed by the appellant industrial co-operative society. She died on 22 April 1990 from stab injuries allegedly inflicted by her husband while she was at the appellant's workplace. It was alleged that she received a monthly wage of Rs. 900 and was 27 years old at death. The appellant disputed that the death was an employment accident, maintained it resulted from a private motive of the husband, and disputed the stated wage and age. The Deputy Commissioner had held that the death was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment; this decision was challenged by the appellant in this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of the deceased was an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment" within S. 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
  2. Whether the claimants (the parents of the deceased) were "dependants" within the meaning of S. 2(1)(d) of the Act and thus entitled to compensation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The death was not an accident attributable to employment; it was a murder carried out by the husband for private reasons and thus lacked the requisite causal connection with employment (challenge under S. 3(1)).
  • The claimants are not dependants within S. 2(1)(d) because the deceased was a married daughter; accordingly, the claimants failed to plead or prove dependency and are not entitled to compensation.
  • The appellant relied on precedents (discussed in the opinion) in support of these submissions.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents supported the reasoning and conclusion of the authority below (Deputy Commissioner), that the death arose out of and in the course of employment and thus merited compensation.
  • The respondents relied on certain decisions (referenced in the opinion) in support of the Deputy Commissioner's decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagubhai v. General Manager, Central Railway [A.I.R 1955 Bom. 105] Set out the three essentials a claimant must prove under the Act: (1) that there was an accident; (2) that it arose in the course of employment; and (3) that it arose out of the employment. Once claimant shows he was at a place because of employment and met with an accident because he was there, the proximate connection is established; thereafter employer may show the peril was personal to employee or self-created. The Court applied this framework to hold that the claimants had not discharged their initial burden to show a proximate causal connection; further, it accepted the employer's showing that the peril was personal or self-created by the deceased.
Thompor Simpson v. Sinclair [1917 A.C. 127] The expression "arising out of the employment" is wide, encompassing the nature, conditions, obligations and incidents of the employment; if by reason of these the workman is brought within a zone of special danger and injured, the statute applies. The Court cited this as an articulation of the broad meaning of "arising out of employment" but found facts inconsistent with those principles because the peril was personal to the deceased.
Pluab v. Colidan Flour Mills Co. [1914 A.C. 62 (B)] and Barnes v. Sunnery Colliery Co. [1912 A.C. 44] (Referenced in Thompor Simpson) Instances where an employee added or extended the peril and thus cases where "arising out of employment" would not apply. Cited as authorities illustrating when an employee's own conduct may exclude compensation; the Court used the principle to support its conclusion that the peril here was brought about by the deceased herself.
Ramabrahmam v. Traffic Manager, Visakhapatnam Port [A.I.R 1943 Mad. 353] Accident must have some relation to employment and be due to a risk incidental to employment (not a risk to which all public are equally exposed); facts showing usual practice and connivance may support finding an employment risk. Court noted the principle but distinguished on facts, observing present facts did not show a risk incidental to employment like in that case.
Mcicullwm v. Horthurbhian Shipping Co., Ltd. [1932 147 L.T. 136] (Relied on in Ramabrahmam) Support for the proposition that risk incidental to employment can make an accident compensable. Used as part of the doctrinal background supporting the requirement that the risk be incidental to employment; distinguished on facts.
P.W.D., Bhopal v. Kausa [A.I.R 1966 M.P. 297] Where a workman was murdered while going to collect salaries (an act occasioned by employment), the death arose out of employment because it would not have happened but for his leaving to fulfil that employment-related task. Distinguished: Court found no evidence here that the death would not have happened but for the deceased being at work in the particular place and condition.
Parawatibhai v. Rajkumar Mills [A.I.R 1959 M.P. 281] Where death resulted from a condition (heart disease) without evidence it was caused by the work, the death was not an accident arising out of employment; principle that if a particular accident would not have happened but for the employment in a particular place and condition, it arises out of employment. Cited to underline that mere occurrence of death during employment is insufficient; Court held the present facts do not establish that the death would not have occurred but for the employment.
Salama Begam v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Land Development Bank [1990 — I L.L.N 65] A driver assaulted while taking bank officers on duty: the fact that the driver was on duty taking officers had an incidental connection to employment and supported compensation. Distinct facts; Court determined the reasoning in that case could not be applied here.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hirabal [1987 A.C.J 949] A bus driver stabbed when required to be at a specific place and time as part of duty: the stabbing was a proximate consequence of duties and thus a risk incidental to employment. Distinguished on facts: the Court noted unlike that case, evidence here showed the deceased by her own conduct added to the peril.
Mackinon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohammed Issak [1969 A.C.J 422] "Arising out of employment" means injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service such that, but for engagement in duty, the workman would not have suffered. The Court applied this test and found it not satisfied on the facts of the present case.
Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh [(1984) 4 SCC 246 : A.I.R 1984 S.C. 1737] Definition of "accident": an occurrence which is unforeseen and startling — the happening of the unexpected; something not inherent in the normal course of events. The Court applied this definition and concluded that, given the habitual quarrels and the deceased's conduct, the stabbing was not an unforeseen or unexpected event for the purposes of S. 3(1).
D.M. Habeebullah Maricar v. Periaswami [1977 — II L.L.N 370] (Full Bench) Only a "dependant" can claim compensation; for categories specified in sub-clause (iii) of S.2(1)(d) (which include parents), dependence (partial or whole) must be pleaded and proved by the claimants. Applied to hold that the parents, as claimants, bore the burden to plead and prove dependency and had failed to do so in the claim petition.
St. Joseph A & M. Works v. Soosai [A.I.R 1953 Mad. 206] Dependency is a question of fact and must be specifically pleaded and proved. Cited to support the proposition that absence of pleaded or proved dependency defeats the parents' claim under S.2(1)(d).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, staying within the factual record and established precedents cited in the opinion.

  1. Fact finding: The Court noted unassailed evidence (R.W.1) that while the deceased was at the appellant's premises her husband entered, asked her to accompany him, the deceased struck her husband, and he then stabbed her; it was also on evidence that the husband and wife quarrelled often and the society had warned them not to enter together.
  2. Legal framework: The Court set out S.3(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the three-part test (accident; arising in the course of employment; arising out of employment) as explained in Bhagubhai (Bombay). The Court emphasized the burden on claimants to show the proximate connection and noted the employer's ability to rebut by showing the peril was personal or self-created.
  3. Principles distilled from authorities: The Court identified two key principles from precedents — (1) the peril must not be personal to the employee, and (2) the event must have some relation to the employment and be due to a risk incidental to employment (not a general public risk).
  4. Application to facts: Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the peril in this case was personal to the deceased (recurrent domestic quarrels; the deceased struck the husband and thereby provoked the stabbing). The Court held that the employer had established that the peril was brought about by the employee herself (i.e., self-created or personal peril). Further, the claimants had not discharged the initial burden to establish that but for the deceased being at the workplace in that condition she would not have been stabbed.
  5. On the nature of "accident": Relying on Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh's definition of accident as an unforeseen and startling event, the Court found the stabbing not to be "unexpected" in the circumstances of frequent quarrels and the physical altercation immediately preceding the stabbing; hence it did not fit S.3(1)'s concept of accident.
  6. On dependency: The Court turned to S.2(1)(d) and Full Bench authority (D.M. Habeebullah Maricar v. Periaswami) to conclude that parents, being within sub-clause (iii), must plead and prove that they were wholly or partly dependent on the deceased's earnings. The claim petition contained only the bare allegation that the applicants were the parents; there was no pleading or evidence of dependency. The Court therefore held the claimants failed to establish dependency.
  7. Result of analysis: Because the ingredients of S.3(1) were not satisfied on the facts and because the claimants failed to prove dependency under S.2(1)(d), the Court held the Deputy Commissioner's award could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner is set aside; W.C. No. 72 of 1992 is dismissed and the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed.

Consequences and implications:

  • Direct effect: The award of compensation (Rs. 52,052) to the claimants is vacated and the claim petition is dismissed; the respondents (parents) are not entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act on the facts and pleadings before the Court.
  • Reasoning-based limits: The decision turned on the facts (evidence of repeated quarrels and the deceased's own conduct provoking the husband) and on the absence of pleaded/proved dependency; the Court expressly distinguished several authorities on their factual matrices.
  • Precedential effect: The Court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities; the judgment resolves the appeal on its facts and on established tests under the Act rather than announcing a novel legal rule.
  • Costs: There is no order as to costs.
Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Abdul Hadi, J.:— This civil miscellaneous appeal is against the award of Rs. 52,052 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai, in W.C No. 72 of 1992 under the Workmen's Compensation Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as against the claim for compensation for a sum of Rs. 76,885.20. The compensation was claimed by the respondents, parents of the victim, who was working under the appellant-industrial co-operative society.

2. The case of the claimants is briefly as follows: Their daughter Panchavarnam the deceased, received stab injuries from her husband during the course of her employment under the appellant and died on 22 April, 1990. She was getting a monthly wages of Rs. 900 and was aged 27 years at the time of the death.

3. The appellant in its counter-statement stated as follows: The deceased was no doubt a worker working under the appellant, but her husband has murdered her after entering into the work place. The murder was due to his private motivation and cannot be construed as an employment injury. The death is not due to risk incidental to the work of the victim. It is not an accident. There was no causal connection between her employment and the occurrence, which resulted in her death. It is only due to private enmity between her and her husband. The deceased was not getting a monthly wage of Rs. 900. The allegation that her age was 27 years is disputed.

4. After referring to several decisions, the Deputy Commissioner came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the death of the deceased was not at all due to an accident and that even assuming it was due to an accident, it cannot be said that the accident arose out of and in the course of her employment. Therefore, according to him, S. 3(1) of the Act is not satisfied. The second submission of the said learned counsel is that the claimants are not dependants of the deceased, who was a married daughter. Thus, according to him, S. 2(d) of the Act, which defines the term “dependant” is not satisfied in the present case and, therefore, also, the claimants are not entitled to any compensation. He also points out that this aspect, of claimants not being dependants, was not considered by the authority below. These are the only two submissions made by the said learned counsel. He also relied on certain decisions, which will be presently considered.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-claimants reiterates the reasoning of the authority below and contends that the decision arrived at by the authority below is correct. He also relied on certain decisions, which will be presently considered.

7. Dealing with the first of the above said two submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, we shall, before going into the legal position and the authorities cited by the said learned counsel, point out one factual point noted by the authority below. It is as follows:

“One Smt. Kanchana Mala who was examined as R.W I has deposed that while the deceased was in the society (appellant), her husband came and asked her to accompany him, that the deceased beat her husband and that the latter has stabbed her. It was also her evidence the husband and wife used to quarrel often and the society has warned them not to enter into the society like this.”

The above said observation of the authority below has not been in any way assailed by the learned counsel for the respondents.

8. Now, coming to the legal position as such, we may first of all point out S. 3(1) of the Act, which says, “if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. So, it has only to be seen whether in the present case, the death of the victim was caused by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.” In Bhagubhai v. General Manager, Central Railway [A.I.R 1955 Bom. 105], a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising of Chagla, C.J, and Dixit, J., held thus:

“Now, there can be no doubt that before an applicant under the Workmen's Compensation Act can succeed he must discharge the burden of proving—

(1) that there was an accident;

(2) that the accident arose in the course of the employment; and

(3) that the accident arose out of the employment.”

Further, in the said decision, after observing that the first two of the above said three requirements were satisfied in the said case, the Court dealt with the third requirement as follows:

“The question is whether the applicant has discharged the burden with regard to the third ingredient and also that is the burden that the law places upon him with regard to that ingredient. In our opinion, once the applicant has established that the deceased was at a particular place and he was there because he had to be there by reason of his employment, and he further establishes that because he was there he met with an accident, he has discharged the burden which the law places upon him. The law does not place an additional burden upon the applicant to prove that the peril which the employee faced and the accident which arose because of that peril which was not personal to him, but was shared by all the employees or the members of the public. Once the peril is established, it is for the employer then to establish either that the peril was brought about by the employee himself, that he added or extended the peril, or that the peril was not a general peril but a peril personal to the employee. It is because of this that the authorities have made it clear that the casual connection between the accident and the employment which the applicant has to establish is not a remote or ultimate connection, but a connection which is only proximate.”

(emphasis supplied)

In that Bombay case the deceased was employed in the Central Railway at a station and he lived in the railway quarters adjoining the railway station. It was found as a fact that the only access for the deceased from his quarters to the railway station was through the compound of the railway quarters. One night the deceased left his quarters a few minutes before midnight in order to join duty and immediately thereafter he was stabbed by some unknown person. In this connection, the Bench also observed thus:

“In our opinion there is not an iota of evidence in this case that the employee was done to death because some one was interested in murdering him. Nor is there any evidence that the employee was bound to be murdered, whether he was on the spot in the course of his employment or anywhere else.”

In the above context, the Bombay High Court held that the ingredients of the above said S. 3(1) were satisfied and granted compensation.

9. The above said Bombay decision also relied on the following observations in the leading English case in Thompor Simpson v. Sinclair [1917 A.C 127]:

“In short, my view of the statute is that the expression ‘arising out of the employment’ is not confined to the mere ‘nature of the employment.’ The expression, in my opinion, applies to the employment as such to is nature, its conditions, its obligations, and its incidents. If by reasons of any of these the workman is brought within the zone of special danger and so injured or killed, it appears to me that the broad words of the statute ‘arising out of the employment’ apply. If the peril which he encountered was not an added peril produced by the workman himself, as in the case of Pluab v. Colidan Flour Mills Company [1914 A.C 62 (B)] and Barnes v. Sunnery Colliery Company [1912 A.C 44], in this House, then a case for compensation under the statute appears to arise.”

(emphasis supplied)

10. Earlier, a Division Bench of this Court in Ramabrahmam v. Traffic Manager, Visakhapatnam Port [A.I.R 1943 Mad. 353], also laid down the principle almost in the same line. There, a contractor of the port authorities employed the workmen for loading manganese ore into ships at a dump within the harbour premises. After having worked for over five hours, they left the harbour premises in order to drink some coffee. The workmen having partaken of the coffee returned to the harbour premises to resume their work. They took a short cut which necessitated their crossing certain railway lines. While they were crossing these lines a railway engine ran into them and both were killed. There was a notice prohibiting persons from crossing the railway lines but it was usual for workmen in the harbour premises to cross the lines in spite of the prohibition. In the circumstances this Court held that the accident which befell the workmen arose “out of and in the course of their employment.” The Division Bench therein observed after relying on another English decision of Lord Macmillan in Mcicullwm v. Horthurbhian Shipping Company, Ltd. [1932 147 L.T, 136], thus:

“This at least, however, could be said, that the accident in order to give rise to a claim for compensation must have some relation to the workmen's employment and must be due to a risk incidental to the employment as distinguished from a risk to which all members of the public were alike exposed. In leaving their work to take refreshment at 7.30 P.M these workmen did what they were entitled to do. In fact it would manifestly be impossible for them to do this heavy work from 2 P.M to 10 P.M without some break. They left the harbour premises and returned and having entered the premises they sought the nearest way to the place where the manganese ore was being loaded. In crossing the railway lines they were following the usual practice of the workmen engaged in the harbour, the prohibition was not an effective prohibition. The responsible officials of the harbour in fact connived at it being disregarded. In other words, the notice might never have been there. Having entered the harbour premises and having met with an accident in the circumstances which we have related we consider their dependants are entitled to compensation. The risks which they ran was incidental to their employment and arose out of it.”

(emphasis supplied.)

Thus two principles emerge:

(1) The peril should not be personal to the concerned employee;

(2) It must have some relation to the employment.

Applying those principles to the present facts, we have necessarily to come to the conclusion that the claimants herein are not entitled to compensation since the death of the victim in the present case cannot be said have been caused “by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.

11. As already pointed out, it is in evidence that when the husband entered into the premises of the appellant-society, where his wife, the victim, was working and asked her to accompany him, the victim beat him and the husband then stabbed her. It is as in evidence, as already pointed out, that the husband and wife used to quarrel often. In the above circumstances, it is clear that not only the death was due to quarrels between the victim and her husband and the husband's animosity against the wife, but the victim-wife initially beat her husband and thereby provoked her husband to stab her. In the above circumstances, it is not difficult to hold that the appellant-employer has established that the “peril was brought about by the employee himself (herself) that he (she) added or extended the peril or that the peril was not a general peril, but a peril personal to the employee” as observed in the above referred to Bombay decision. That apart, it cannot be said in the present case that the claimants themselves have discharged their initial burden by establishing that because the deceased was at the work spot in question, she met with the above referred to stabbing by her husband and the resultant death. This initial burden of the claimants was also pointed out in the above referred to Bombay decision, as indicated above. Further, in the light of the above said Madras Bench decision also, it cannot be said that on the facts of the present case, the occurrence in question “has some relation to the workmen's employment” and was “due to a risk incidental to that employment as distinguished from a risk to which all members of public were alike exposed.” The event would not have taken place if there was some other employee in the place of the deceased.

12. Hence, we told that the ingredients of S. 3(1) of the Act are not satisfied in the present case. Likewise, the other decision cited before us, viz. P.W.D, Bhopal v. Kausa [A.I.R 1966 M.P 297], also turned on its facts. In the said decision Public Works Department gang jamadar who along with other workmen were carrying on repair work in a road, started from his place of work for collecting the salaries of the workmen from the office and was then murdered by an unknown person on the way. In that context, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that his death arose out of his employment. One finding in the said case was that the death would not have happened but for the fact that he had left, for proceeding to office, for collecting salaries. No such situation has been established in the present case.

13. In contrast, in the order decision cited before us, viz., Parawatibhai v. Rajkumar Mills [A.I.R 1959 M.P 281], compensation claim was rejected on the ground that the death of the victims was not caused by an accident arising out of his employment. There, all that was known was that the deceased workmen died of heart failure during his employment and that he was suffering from heart disease but there was no evidence to show that he got heart disease as a result of the work he was engaged in. In that context only, the Court held that his death was not caused by an accident arising out of his employment. The following observations in the said decision is relevant:

“Thus if a particular accident would not have happened to a workman had he not been employed to a work in the particular place and condition, then it would be an accident arising out of the employment.”

But, in the present case, from what has been elicited in evidence, as pointed out earlier, it cannot be concluded that the death of the victim in question would not have happened to her, had she not been employed in the particular place and condition, in which she was working.

14. One other Bombay decision, which was cited before us, considered many of the above referred to earlier decisions including Ramabrahmam v. Traffic Manager, Visakhapatnam Port [A.I.R 1943 Mad. 353] (vide supra), and Salama Begam v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Land Development Bank [1990 — I L.L.N 65]. There, a jeep driver was employed with a bank. He took the officers of the bank to a village in connection with recovery proceedings. After parking the jeep in the rest house, he had gone to the market, where he was assaulted by some persons in the crowd and he died and compensation was claimed in lieu of his death under the above said Act. In that context, the learned Judge observed as follows in Para. 7, at pages 67 and 68:

“The only question that calls for consideration is whether it can be said that the accident arose out of the employment or whether there was any connection, causal or otherwise, between the death and the employment of the workmen. In this respect, the appellants' contention was that there was incidental connection by the very fact that the deceased Sk. Abdullah was on duty of the bank and but for his performing the duty of taking the bank officers in the jeep to Renapur on that day, the accident could not have taken place. In other words had he not been on duty of the bank on that day and had he not taken the jeep any where, he would not have met with any accident, much less a fatal one like his death. This contention has much force.…”

(emphasis supplied.)

In view of this reasoning, the Bombay High Court, in the above said case, upheld the claim for compensation. But the facts in the present case are different and the same reasoning cannot be applied in the present case.

15. Another decision cited before us was United India Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Hirabal [1987 A.C.J 949]. It is also distinguishable. It cannot also be applied to the present case, as the facts therein are distinguishable. There, no doubt, the driver of a bus was stabbed to death while on duty and compensation awarded to him was confirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The reasoning of the said Court for holding that the above said stabbing arose out of the above said driver's employment, can be gathered from the following observation in the said decisions:

“From the evidence and the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner it is clear that the deceased Omprakash Singh was required to take the bus to the railway station at a particular time. This was a circumstance attending his employment because at that time and place Omprakash Singh had to take the bus at railway station where he was stabbed by one Munnalal in consequence of which he died. The deceased had to take the bus to the railway station as part of his duty where he was given a fatal blow. The incident of inflicting knife injury at the time and place when the deceased was on duty was a proximate cause. The injury had resulted to the deceased from the risk incidental to the duties of his service and unless he was engaged in the duty owing to his master, in all probability the workman that is the deceased Omprakash Singh would not have otherwise suffered the injury. In these circumstances, it can well be said that a causal connection was established between the accident and the employment and the accident had occurred on account of the risk which was an incident of the employment. There is neither any pleading nor any suggestion that the deceased by his own act added to the said incident or the same was brought about by himself.”

It is evident that the said reasoning will not be applicable at all to the present facts. Further, we may also point out that in the present case, unlike in the above said Madhya Pradesh decision, there is evidence to show that the deceased, by her own act, added to the said incident or the same was brought by herself.

16. The said Madhya Pradesh decision has also relied on the following observation of the Supreme Court in Mackinon Mackenzie and Company, Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohammed Issak [1969 A.C.J 422]:

“The words ‘arising out of employment’ are understood to mean that during the course of the employment. Injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workmen would not otherwise have suffered.…”

In the present case, from what has been stated above, it is clear to us that the abovesaid test laid down by the Supreme Court has not been satisfied.

17. We may also point out that the definition of the term “accident” as explained by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh [(1984) 4 SCC 246 : A.I.R 1984 S.C 1737]. In the said decision, the relevant observation of the Supreme Court is as follows:

“An accident is an occurrence or an event which is unforeseen and startless one when it takes place but does not startle one when it does not take place. It is the happening of the unexpected, not the happening of the expected, which is called an accident… But the happening of something which is not inherent in the normal course of events, and which is not ordinarily expected to happen or occur, is called a mishap or an accident.”

Now in the present case, as already pointed out, according to R.W 1's evidence, the deceased beat her husband and the latter stabbed her and that the husband and wife used to quarrel often. In such a situation, the death that has taken place due to stabbing by the husband, cannot be called the “happening of the unexpected.” or “the happening of something which is not inherent in the normal course of events and which is not ordinarily expected to happen or occur.” When the husband and wife quarrel often and when the wife beat the husband, it cannot be said that the stabbing of the wife by the husband is something unexpected or not inherent in the normal course of events. Therefore, the present case will not come under the term “accident,” spoken to in S. 3(1) of the Act. Therefore, the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner has necessarily to be set aside.

18. There is also one other reason for dismissing the above said claim petition and allowing this appeal. This refers to the above referred to second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, viz., that the claimants herein were not dependents of the victim as per S. 2(1)(d) of the Act. Admittedly the claimants are parents of the victim, who is a married daughter of them. Section 2(1)(d)(iii) of the Act inter alia defines “dependant” as follows:

‘dependant’ means any of the following relatives of a deceased workmen, namely:

(iii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workmen at the time of his death.

(a) ….

(b) a parent other than a widowed mother.”

As laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in D.M Habeebullah Maricar v. Periaswami [1977 — II L.L.N 370], only a dependent can claim compensation under the Act, in the light of what is contained in Ss. 2(1)(n) and 8(4) of the Act. The Full Bench also points out, in the light of S. 2(1)(d) of the Act, that a distinction has been made as to the categories of relations whose dependence is presumed by law, vis-à-vis the deceased workman while in the case of categories of other relations, the dependency partially or wholly, coupled with the relationship has to be established by the claimants. Thus, for example, in the case of relations mentioned in Sub-cl. (iii) of S. 2(d) to which alone, the present case is concerned the burden is on the claimants, viz., the parents of the deceased workman in the present case, to prove that they are either wholly or partially dependent on the earnings of the said workman at the time of her death. It goes without saying that before proving so, there must be necessary pleading in that regard. But, in the present case, there is no such pleading. Nor any such proof has been demonstrated before us by learned counsel for the respondents. Regarding plea, the only relevant allegation in Para. 5 of the claim petition is. “The applications are the mother and father of the deceased.” In St. Joseph A and M. Works v. Soosai [A.I.R 1953 Mad. 206], also, this Court held that this dependency question is a question of fact. So it follows that it has to be specifically pleaded and proved. In A.I.R 1953 Mad. 206, the earnings of the deceased workman, far from being an asset of the family, were not sufficient to maintain him and the father, the claimant for compensation, had to spend considerable portions of his earnings on the maintenance of his deceased son. The father was not dependent wholly or partially on the earnings of the deceased workman. So it was held that father was not dependent within the meaning of the definition in S. 2(2)(d) of the Act. In the present case, the respondents' counsel no doubt contends that the appellant did not plead that the claimants were not dependants, but this argument has no merit. It is the duty of the claimants to plead that they were dependants. When they have not chosen to plead so, it is not for the appellant to plead that they were not dependents.

19. In the result, the impugned order is set aside, W.C No. 72 of 1992 is dismissed and the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.