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R. Rajagopal v. M.P Chellamuthu

Madras High Court
Jul 26, 1993
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Judgment Summary — Somasundarm, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The first respondent had been granted leases to quarry sand from the Amaravathi river poramboke area during various periods. An order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 12459/89 dated 7.3.1990 had extended a lease until 30.6.1990 (with conditions) and stated that no further extension would be granted by virtue of that order. Subsequently, the Collector issued a lease dated 23.9.1991 (23.9.1991 to 6.1.1992) which was the subject of W.P. 15116/91; interim reliefs and appeals followed and the Division Bench directed continuation of stay pending disposal.

On 14.2.1992 the Single Judge modified the 7.3.1990 order in W.M.P. 2822/92 to specify a quarrying period from 15.2.1992 to 31.5.1992 (three and a half months). That order was confirmed by the Division Bench on appeal (W.A. 1422/92).

The first respondent then filed Contempt Application No. 507 of 1992 under Ss. 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, alleging that respondents (including the appellant who sought to be impleaded) and various private parties obstructed his quarrying and thereby prevented him from enjoying the benefit of the court orders. The learned Single Judge found respondents 2 to 4 had not committed contempt but, while disposing of the Contempt Application (order dated 8.4.1993), directed respondents 1 to 3 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand from 1.5.1993 for three and a half months and to provide necessary police protection; respondents 4 to 9 were given up in the proceedings.

The appellant (who had sought to be impleaded as respondent 8 in the Contempt Application but was later lawfully impleaded) challenged the directions in a Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A) under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 is maintainable against the order made in the Contempt Application (given the provisions of S. 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971).
  2. Whether the learned Single Judge had jurisdiction, when disposing of a Contempt Application, to grant a fresh extension of lease (to quarry sand for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993) which, on the material, arose from a separate cause of action — namely inability to quarry due to obstruction by third parties — after the writ proceedings had been finally disposed.
  3. Whether, on the facts, the directions to respondents 1 to 3 to permit quarrying from 1.5.1993 (and to provide police protection) were legally permissible and/or liable to be set aside.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Contempt Application's subject matter was whether respondents disobeyed the order of 14.2.1992; the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction in contempt proceedings or miscellaneous petitions to grant an extension of lease beyond what had been finally determined.
  • The Single Judge could not grant a fresh or further extension in a contempt petition after the writ petition had been finally disposed of; the extension granted (3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993) was therefore without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.
  • The extension would cause serious harm to the appellant's interests (lowering of the water table, damage to coconut groves and agricultural operations) — i.e., the appellant would be adversely affected by the grant.

First Respondent's Arguments

  • Because respondents 2 to 4 were discharged and nobody was punished under the Contempt Act, an appeal under S. 19(1) was not maintainable; however, the Single Judge's order granting permission to quarry was in the nature of a judgment and thus a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would lie.
  • The 14.2.1992 order (W.M.P. 2822/92) modified the earlier order and was confirmed by the Division Bench (W.A. 1422/92); accordingly the first respondent was entitled to quarry sand for three and a half months as per those orders, and the Single Judge was justified while disposing of the Contempt Application in directing respondents to permit quarrying from 1.5.1993 for that period.
  • The order directing respondents to permit quarrying was in accordance with law, equity and good conscience and should not be interfered with in the Letters Patent Appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association (C.A. No. 5 of 1990 and L.P.A. No. 123 of 1990) (judgment dated 14.8.1990) An appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would lie against any order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court provided such an order is a "judgment" and satisfies the other requirements of Clause 15; S. 19(1) of the Contempt Act does not necessarily oust the right to appeal under Clause 15 except insofar as the Act occupies the field. The court relied on this authority to hold that the present L.P.A. was maintainable under Clause 15 because the Single Judge's order declaring entitlement to quarry for 3 1/2 months and directing respondents to permit quarrying constituted a "judgment" for the purposes of Clause 15.
Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (AIR 1992 S.C. 256) Example of cases where statutory provisions expressly prohibit or exclude appeals under other laws (here concerning S. 39(2) of the Arbitration Act) — used as a contrast to show situations where letters patent are not available. Cited in the course of distinguishing the present case: the court observed that since the Contempt Act did not expressly exclude Clause 15 appeals in the manner of such statutes, S. 19(1) cannot be read as destroying the right of appeal under Clause 15.
A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1442 (case dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act and S.100A of the Code of Civil Procedure) Another example where recourse to the Letters Patent was held not permissible because of express statutory exclusion. Used similarly as an instance of statutory exclusion of letters patent appeals and relied upon to frame the scope of Vidya Charan Shukla's reasoning; the court noted the Contempt Act contains no such exclusion.
Brij Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 S.C. 943) Principle that when a writ petition has been finally disposed of, the High Court cannot reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provides a fresh cause of action; a separate petition would be the proper remedy. The court applied this ratio to hold that, because the earlier writ and modification orders had become final, it was impermissible for the Single Judge to reopen the issue in the Contempt Application (or by way of a W.M.P.) and grant a further extension of lease based on a separate cause of action (inability to quarry due to third-party obstruction).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main stages: first addressing the preliminary objection on maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal, and second examining whether the Single Judge had jurisdiction to grant the 3 1/2 month extension while disposing of the Contempt Application.

On maintainability: The court accepted the position in Vidya Charan Shukla that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent permits an appeal against an order or decision in exercise of contempt jurisdiction provided the order is a "judgment" and satisfies other conditions of Clause 15. The court considered and distinguished authorities where statutes expressly exclude alternative appeals (e.g., Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co.; the AIR 1965 S.C. 1442 matter) and concluded that S. 19(1) of the Contempt Act did not operate to bar a Letters Patent Appeal in the circumstances of the present case. Given that the Single Judge's order declared an entitlement to quarry for 3 1/2 months and directed respondents to permit quarrying, the court treated the order as a "judgment" for Clause 15 purposes and held the L.P.A. maintainable.

On jurisdiction and merits of granting extension in Contempt Application: The court carefully reviewed the history of the writ proceedings (the 7.3.1990 order, its explicit statement that no further extension would be granted as part of that order, the 14.2.1992 modification to 15.2.1992–31.5.1992, and confirmation by the Division Bench in W.A. 1422/92). It observed that the Contempt Application alleged that third parties obstructed quarrying during the relevant period, and that the Single Judge found respondents 2 to 4 had not committed contempt (i.e., they had not disobeyed any court order).

Applying the principle in Brij Mohan Singh that a High Court cannot reopen finally disposed writ proceedings by means of a miscellaneous petition to adjudicate matters constituting a fresh cause of action, the court concluded that the Single Judge erred in reopening the entitlement issue in the Contempt Application and granting a fresh extension (from 1.5.1993) to the first respondent on the basis of obstructions by third parties. The court emphasized that the appropriate remedy for interference by third parties lay in separate proceedings against those third parties rather than by reviving or re-opening the terminated writ proceedings. Because the Single Judge had himself found respondents 2 to 4 had not disobeyed any court order, there was no legal justification for granting the further lease extension in the contempt proceedings.

On these bases the court held the directions in the 8.4.1993 order to be impermissible in law and liable to be set aside, while noting that the Single Judge's finding discharging respondents 2 to 4 of contempt was not disturbed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is allowed in part: the directions issued by the learned Single Judge directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the Amaravathi river area for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 are set aside.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The grant of a fresh extension (from 1.5.1993 for 3 1/2 months) contained in the Single Judge's order dated 8.4.1993 is annulled.
  • The Single Judge's finding discharging respondents 2 to 4 of contempt is left intact (the order discharging respondents 2 to 4 is not disturbed).
  • No costs were awarded.

Implications beyond the parties: The court framed its decision strictly on the basis that finality of writ proceedings cannot be undermined by using a miscellaneous or contempt petition to obtain relief based on a fresh cause of action (relying on Brij Mohan Singh). The opinion does not purport to establish a novel principle beyond applying established authorities; it confines relief to the direct effects stated above.

Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT — Somasundarm, J.

This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the order dated 8.4.1993 made in Contempt Application No. 507 of 1992 filed by the first respondent herein, directing respondents 2 to 4 herein to permit the first respondent herein to quarry sand in Amaravathi river for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993

2. In Sub Application No. 133 of 1992 in Contempt Application 507 of 1992, the appellant along with 5 others were sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in Contempt Application 507 of 1992. However, Sub Application 133 of 1992 was not pressed by the first respondent herein in the course of the proceedings in Contempt Application 507 of 1992 and the parties proposed to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 were given up. The appellant got leave of this Court to file this L.P.A in C.M.P No. 8488 of 1993.

3. Brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal are the following; the first respondent herein was granted lease of lands in the Amaravathi river poramboke area for the purpose of quarrying sand For the period from 1.7.1987 to 30.6.1988 After the expiry of the lease period, the first respondent obtained an order dated 7.3.1990 from the learned Single Judge in W.P 12459/89 in the following terms:

“In the circumstances of the case, though the petitioner is not entitled to renewal of licence for three years as prayed for by him yet, extension can be granted till the end of this fasli 1389, that is, upto 30th June 1990 subject to paving 25 per cent more than the original lease amount along with L.C and L.C.S amount.

In the result, it is hereby ordered in the writ petition that the petitioner is granted extension of lease on the same condition from 15.3.1990 to 30.6.1990 on condition of paying the proportionate lease amount. Originally fixed plus 25 per cent increased thereon plus L.C and L.C.S amount and that he should pay the entire lease amount as aforesaid on or before 15.2.1990 It is made clear that on no account further extension of time would be granted by virtue of this order and that this extension is granted by way of concession as a special case only taking into account the hardship expressed by the petitioner.

Pursuant to the order of the learned Single Judge, the Collector of Periyar District in his proceedings dated 23.9.1991 granted a lease in favour of the first respondent for quarrying sand in the area in question for the period from 23.9.1991 to 6.1.1992 Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Collector of Periyar District, one Sivabalakrishnan filed W.P 15116/91 before this Court to quash the order dated 23.9.1991 and pending disposal of the writ petition, he obtained an order of interim stay. However, the first respondent was able to get the interim stay vacated on 2.12.1991 As against the order vacating the interim stay, the said Sivabalakrishnan preferred W.A 1465/91 and a Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 10.12.1991 allowed the writ appeal and directed the continuation of the stay of the operation of the order dated 23.9.1991 till the disposal of W.P 15116/91. While allowing the writ appeal the Division Bench has observed as follows:

“Mr. T.N Vallinayagam, learned counsel for the third respondent puts forth the plea that in case his client succeeds in throwing out the writ petition, there has got to be a working out of the period of the extension of the lease. That is a matter exclusively to be adverted to before the learned Single Judge and it is for the learned Single Judge to decide the question taking note of the relevant facts. This Writ Appeal is allowed.”

When the W.P 15116/91 came for final disposal before Bakthavatsalam, J. on 10.2.1992, the period for which permission to quarry sand was given by the Collector, i.e, the period from 23.9.1991 to 6.1.1992 was over and therefore, Bakthavatsalam, J. dismissed the writ petition as infructuous with the following observation.

“It is open for third respondent to take any other suitable action against the petitioner or the Government for any loss he had incurred in view of the pendency of the Writ Petition.”

Then, the first respondent filed W.M.P 2822/92 in W.P 12459/89 requesting the learned single judge to modify the order dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P 12459/89. On 14.2.1992, the learned Single Judge passed the following order in W.M.P 2822/92.

“Heard both. In view of the difficulty which had been expressed in the affidavit filed in support of this petition in enjoying the fruits of the orders passed try this court in W.P No. 12459/89 and in the view of the direction given by this court in a connected writ petition to ask for extension of time only in these proceedings and in view of the fact that the Government is also prepared to comply with the directions given by this court on account of the inconvenience for the period to be specified by this court, the order already passed on 7.3.1990 in W.P No. 12459/89 granting the period for quarrying sand in Amaravathi River from 23.9.1991 to 6.1.1992 is modified to one from 15th February 3992 to 31st May, 1992 or for a period of three and half months, which is convenient to the respondent.”

As against the order dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P 2822/92 the said Sivabalakrishnan filed writ appeal 1422/92 and a Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 28.10.1992 dismissed the writ appeal in the following terms;

“On a careful perusal of the papers placed before us, we find the order in W.P 12459 of 1989 enabling the first respondent to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months has become final as the same has confirmed by the Division Bench, and no further appeal was filed. Therefore, the first respondent is entitled to the benefit of that order. The order under appeal has only reiterated that order, and so, it cannot be said that the learned Judge has in any way exceeded the jurisdiction or granted a relief more than what was prayed for.”

4. Thereafter, the first respondent filed contempt Application 507 of 1992 under Ss. 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to punish respondents 2 to 4 herein and others for having disobeyed the order dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P No. 2822 of 1992 in W.P No. 12459 of 1989. The case of the first respondent herein in Contempt Application 507 of 1992 is that, though the second respondent gave an order to the first respondent for quarrying sand in the river in question, on 21.8.1992 certain private parties who were sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in Contempt Application 507 of 1992 by filing Sub Application 133 of 1922 by their acts of commission and omission and by initiating certain legal proceedings against the first respondent herein, prevented him from quarrying sand in the area in question for the period of 3 1/2 months as per the orders made in W.M.P 2822/92 as confirmed in W.A 1422/92. The further case of the first respondent in the Contempt Application is that when he approached the second respondent for relief, he directed the first respondent to go to the third respondent and when he approached the third respondent, he was not as co-operative as he was earlier and he in turn directed the first respondent to get the Revenue Officials to the spot in order to enable him to carry on his quarrying operation without any obstruction by third parties. The first respondent further contended in the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt Application that he was driven from pillar to post and the ultimate result was that the fruits of the order of this Court were sought to be taken away from the first respondent by the deliberate, wilful and wanton efforts and actions of all the respondents, and therefore, they are liable to be punished under Ss. 10 and 12 of the Act. Respondents 2 to 4 filed separate counter affidavits denying the various allegations contained in the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt Application. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Single Judge found that respondents 2 to 4 herein have not disobeyed any order of court and committed any contempt. However the learned Single Judge by the order dated 8.4.1993 while holding that respondents 2 to 4 have not committed any contempt of any order of the court, issued the following directions:

“Hence the order granted by this court, which was upheld by the Division bench of this Court, admittedly was not implemented so far, and that the petitioner is entitled to quarry sand for 3 1/2 months. This Court directs the respondents 1 to 3 to permit the petitioner to quarry sand from 1.5.93 for 3 1/2 months as already ordered by this court and respondents 1 to 3 are directed to grant necessary adequate police protection to the petitioner and do necessary things and see that the quarrying operations by the petitioner are carried on peacefully without any difficulty by any interference of third parties. The petitioner is also directed to pay all the necessary charges, if any, for the protection to be afforded to him by the police. The petitioner is also directed to comply with all the conditions regarding the permission to be granted by the first respondent. This petition is ordered accordingly The respondents 1 to 3 are discharged. The respondents 4 to 9 are given up since they are not parties in the impugned order.”

Aggrieved by the said directions given by the learned Single Judge in C.A 507 of 1992, the appellant who originally sought to be impleaded as 8th respondent in the Contempt Application but lawfully impleaded with the leave of this Court has filed the present L.P.A

5. Mr. N.G.R Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant contended that when the subject matter of the Contempt Application was whether the respondents therein had disobeyed the order of this Court dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P 2822/92 in W.P 12459 of 1989, the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to give a further period of lease in favour of the first respondent for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993, that this court in a Contempt Application or for that matter in a miscellaneous petition cannot grant extension of lease after the writ petition has been finally disposed of and that when the order dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P 12459 of 1980 granting lease for the period from 15.3.1990 to 30.6.1990 and the order dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P 2822/92 have become final, the first respondent herein cannot get further extension of lease by filing a contempt Application. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the order of the learned Single Judge granting extension of lease for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 is totally without jurisdiction and it is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that by the grant of extension of lease, by the order under appeal, for 3 1/2 months, the appellant would be seriously affected because the water table in the area will come down and the coconut grove in and around the places and the agricultural operations will be seriously affected.

6. Per contra, Mr. T.N Vallinayagam, learned counsel for the first respondent, contended that in as much as by the order made in Contempt Application 507 of 1992 respondents 2 to 4 herein were discharged and nobody was punished under the provisions of the Act, the appeal filed against such an order of the learned Single Judge is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the first respondent, further contended that by the order dated 14.2.1992 in W.M.P 2822/92 in W.P 12459/89 the learned Single Judge has modified the order dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P No. 12450/89 by extending the time for sand quarrying by the first respondent for the period from 15.2.92 to 31.5.92, or for a period of 3 1/2 months which is convenient to the first respondent, that the said order of the learned Single Judge made in W.M.P 2822/92 has been confirmed in Writ Appeal 1422 of 1992, that as per the said orders, the first respondent is entitled to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months which is convenient to the first respondent and therefore, the learned Single Judge while disposing of the Contempt Application is justified in directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the river in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 The learned counsel also contended that the order of the learned Single Judge directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 is in accordance with law, equity and good conscience and therefore, it is not liable to be interfered with in this L.P.A

7. Let us first examine the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent with regard to the maintainability of this L.P.A The contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent is that in as much as by the order under appeal, respondents 2 to 4 have been discharged and nobody is punished under the provisions of the Act, the appeal filed against such an order is not maintainable under S. 19(1) of the Act. The learned counsel further contended that if an appeal against the order made in Contempt Application 507 of 1992 does not he under S. 19(1) of the Act, it does not follow that Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent could be invoked and therefore, the present appeal filed under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent is also not maintainable. An identical contention regarding the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olymic Association and another (C.A No. 5 of 1990 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 123 of 1990). The Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 14.8.1990 in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association No. 5 of 190 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 123 of 1990) while holding that an appeal under Cl. 15 of Letters Patent would lie against any order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court provided such an order or decision is a ‘judgment’ and satisfied the other requirements of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, has observed as follows;

“Various judgments, where recourse to an appeal under the Letters Patent has not been permitted, dealt with cases where the Act provided an express prohibition or exclusion of an appeal under any other law. That was the petition in Union Of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. AIR 1992 S.C 256 which concerned with the provisions contained in S. 39(2) of the Arbitration Act, and A.I.R 1965 S.C 1442 dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act. S. 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure is again one of such instances where recourse to the letters Patent cannot be had. Since, in our opinion S. 19(1) of the Act cannot be construed to be destructive of the valuable right of an appeal granted by Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and there is no provision contained in the contempt of Courts Act alerogating or excluding the provisions of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, we hold that except to the extent of the occupied field covered by S. 19(1) of the Act, an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent would lie against any order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court, provided such an order or decision is a ‘judgment’ and satisfied the other conditions laid down in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and does not fall in any of the excluded categories. We therefore, overrule the preliminary objection relating to the non-maintainability of the appeal under Cl. 15 of the letters Patent on the facts of the instant case.”

We are in entire agreement with the above view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association No. 5 of 1990) and Letters Patent Appeal No. 123 of 1990). In as much as by the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge has declared that the first respondent is entitled to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months and directed respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent, to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 We are inclined to hold that such an order is a ‘Judgment’ for the purpose of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and that the order under appeal satisfies the conditions prescribed in Cl. 15 or the Letters Patent. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the present appeal is maintainable under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent.

8. The next question we have to examine is, whether the learned Single Judge is right in issuing directions to respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the river in question for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993, while disposing of Contempt Application 507 of 1992. It is seen from the order in W.P 12459/89, originally, the second respondent in his order dated 15.6.87 granted a lease in favour of the first respondent to quarry sand in Amaravathi river for the period from 1.7.87 to 30.8.89 The learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P 12459/89 filed by the first respondent, for the issue of writ of mandamus directing the respondents therein not to interfere with his quarry operations in Amaravathi river Poramboke during faslis 1399 and 1400, directed extension of lease till the end of June 1990 as a special case. By the order dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P 12459/89, the learned single judge has further observed that it is made clear that on no account further extension of time would be granted by virtue of the said order and that extension is granted by way of concession as a special case. Again by the order dated 14.2.1992, made in W.M.P No. 2822/92, the learned Single Judge modified the original order made in W.P No. 12459/89 and directed the extension of lease in favour of the first respondent, for quarrying sand for the period from 15.2.1992 to 31.5.1992 The said order made in W.M.P 2822/92 was confirmed in W.A 1422/92. Since the order in W.M.P 2822/92 has been confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A 1422/92, we need not go into the correctness or otherwise of the order of the learned single judge made in W.M.P No. 2822/92 modifying the period specified in the original order made in W.P 12459/89. However, the question is, in the Contempt Application, which is in the nature of a miscellaneous petition can the learned Single Judge reopen the issue whether the first respondent is entitled to further extension of the lease for sand quarrying for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 and grant such relief to the first respondent. As already stated, the case of the first respondent in the Contempt Application is that, though the second respondent gave an order in favour of the first respondent for quarrying sand on 21.8.1992, certain private parties who were sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in the Contempt Application, by their acts of omission and commission and by initiating legal proceedings against the first respondent prevented him from quarrying sand in the area in question for the period of 3 1/2 months, as per the orders of this Court. The grievance of the first respondent against the third parties is stated in paragraph 14 of the affidavit filed in support of Sub Application 133/92 in Contempt Application 507 of 1982 in the following terms.

“By now the time granted was slowly running out. After 2 1/2 months' fight in courts and before the Police authorities and the Collector, when I was about to quarry sand on 20.10.1992, apprehending that his appeal is likely to be dismissed, the 4th respondent again obstructed my quarrying, along with respondents to 9 and other rowdy people. Actually on the first day some 25 rowdies were taken into custody and then released. Again another fifty persons were taken into custody and released on bail. Now for a third time, the 4th respondent has set up his own people and obstructed my removal of sand.”

Again the grievance of the first respondent, against respondents 2 to 4 is expressed in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the affidavit in the following terms:

“When I approached the 1st respondent, viz., the Collector of Erode, for relief, he directed me to go to the 2nd respondent, viz., Superintendent of Police, Erode. But the 2nd respondent was not as cooperative as he was earlier and he had directed me to get a Revenue Official, viz., either the Tahsildar or the Sub Collector, to be on the spot in order to enable me to carry on my quarrying operation without any obstruction by other people.

15. Thus I am being driven from pillar to post and vice versa and the ultimate result is the fruits of the order of this Hon'ble Court are sought to be taken away from me by the deliberate, wilful and wanton efforts, action and attempts made by all the respondents. At the same time, time is also running short. This Hon'ble Court has given clear mandate that I shall be permitted to quarry sand for 105 days, i.e 3 1/2 months. Now the authorities are making out some reason or other and are trying to thwart the effect of this-order thus depriving me of the benefit of the special concession, at the instance of my competitive contractor, viz., 6th respondent. Thus all the respondents have committed contempt of the orders of this Hon'ble Court. The Order of this Hon'ble Court was in full force and virtue on the dates of commission and omission on the part of the respondents and violation thereof has been committed by the respondents in the above manner.”

The learned single judge on a consideration of the materials on record found that respondents 2 to 4 have not committed any contempt in the following terms:

“It is seen from the various averments stated in the counter filed by respondents 1 to 3 that though the permission and protection were granted, in view of the obstructions by some interested persons, the petitioner could not enjoy the fruits of the order that was passed and it is not responsible for the failure to implement the order and it cannot be said that the respondents, 1 to 3 have disobeyed the order and committed any contempt proceedings.”

The learned single judge also found that the first respondent could not quarry sand pursuant to the orders of this Court on account of obstructions by the third parties. Even assuming the third parties have interfered with the quarrying operations of the first respondent, and prevented him from carrying on quarrying operations during the relevant period, the proper course open to the first respondent is to take appropriate legal action against the third parties before appropriate forum. In fact, Bakthavatsalam, J., while dismissing the W.P 15116/91 has observed that it is open for the first respondent herein to take any other suitable action against the petitioner in W.P 15116 of 1991 or the Government for any loss he had incurred in view of the pendency of W.P 15116/91. As already pointed out, the first respondent also filed Sub Application 133 of 1992 to implead the third parties who obstructed the first respondent from quarrying sand, as parties in the Contempt Application, but however, the first respondent gave them up subsequently on the ground that they were not parties to the order dated 14.2.1992 In these circumstances, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant there is absolutely no justification for the learned single Judge to grant further extension of lease and direct the respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for a period or 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 particularly, when the learned single judge has found that respondents 3 to 4 have not disobeyed any order of the court. Again the order of the learned single Judge dated 7.3.1990 made in W.P No. 12459/80 of 1989 extending the quarry lease in favour of the first respondent, till 30.6.1990 has become final after the said order was confirmed in W.A 365/90. Similarly, the order dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P No. 2822/92 extending the period of lease up to 31.5.1992 has also become final when the said order was confirmed in W.A 1422/92. When the said proceedings stand terminated by the final disposal of W.P 12459 of 1989 and by the modification order dated 14.2.1992 made in W.M.P No. 2822/92 as confirmed in W.A 1422/92, it was not at all permissible in law for the learned single Judge to reopen the issue whether the first respondent was entitled to further extension of lease by 3 1/2 months for sand quarrying, in the Contempt Application and acceding to the request of the first respondent, which was based on a separate cause of action, i.e, the inability of the first respondent to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months on account of obstruction by third parties and directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993

9. In Brij Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1987 S.C 943) the Apex Court while laying down the principle that when the writ petition is disposed of finally, it is not open to the Court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous petition in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause or action, observed thus:

“The High Court's order is not sustainable for yet another reason. Respondent's writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had been finally disposed of on 10.8.1984, thereafter nothing remained pending before the High Court. No miscellaneous application could be filed in the writ petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events after two years. If the respondent was aggrieved by the notice dated 29.1.1986 he could have filed a separate petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notice as it provided a separate cause of action to him. The respondent was not entitled to assail validity of the notice before the High Court by means of a miscellaneous application in the writ petition which had already been decided. The High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application as no proceedings were pending before it. The High Court committed error in entertaining the respondent's application which was founded on a separate cause of action. When proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition it is not open to the Court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. If this principle is not followed there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning.”

Applying the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that when the order passed by the learned single judge in W.P No. 12459/89 as modified in W.M.P No. 2822/92 has become final as such in law, it was not at all open to the learned single judge to reopen the issue in the Contempt Application or for that matter even by way of W.M.P and consider whether the 1st respondent is entitled to a further extension of lease by 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 for sand quarrying and granting such a relief to the first respondent on the ground that he could not quarry sand as per the earlier orders of this court on account of obstruction by third parties, particularly when the learned single judge has found that respondents 2 to 4 have not disobyed any order of the court. Therefore, the order of the learned, single judge directing respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 is liable to be set aside. On the facts and circumstances of the case. We are also not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent, that the order of the learned single judge is in accordance with the equity and good conscience and therefore it is not liable to be interfered with in this letters Patent Appeal, as the order passed by the learned single judge is not permissible in law.

10. For all the reasons stated above, we allow the Letters Patent Appeal in part and set aside the directions issued by the learned single Judge to respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand in the area in question for 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993 The order of the learned single judge discharging respondents 2 to 4 is not disturbed. No costs.

RR/VCS