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B.P Samiappan (Died) 4 Others v. Arunthavaselvan And 3 Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Srinivasan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit for specific performance instituted by the appellant (plaintiff in the trial court). The appellant's case was that under Ex. A1 dated 12.4.1971 the first and second defendants agreed to sell suit properties at Rs. 4,500 per acre and the appellant paid advances totaling Rs. 39,000 (including Rs.10,000 initially and further payments and receipts as evidenced). Time for completion was originally one year and was extended by endorsements up to 13.8.1972; thereafter there were no further extensions. A third party (Thirumalaiappa) filed O.S. No. 1670 of 1971 claiming tenancy and sought injunction; the fourth defendant filed O.S. No. 845 of 1972. The litigation between these parties produced various decrees, appeals and second appeals (including SA 2001 of 1978 and S.A. 2335 of 1978 disposed on 10.8.1979), with mixed results: the appeal arising out of Thirumalaiappa's suit was dismissed, while the appeal arising out of the fourth defendant's suit was allowed and the decree set aside, resulting in dismissal of O.S. No. 845 of 1972.
After appeals were disposed, the plaintiff gave notices to defendants 1 and 2 to execute the sale deed (notice dated 22.9.1972 received 26.9.1972, and another on 24.7.1978). The defendants replied on 31.7.1978 denying liability to execute the sale deed. The present suit was filed by the plaintiff on 4.12.1980.
The third defendant claimed under an earlier agreement dated 19.2.1970. The plaintiff denied awareness of that agreement and contended defendants 1 and 2 were bound to execute the sale deed on payment of the balance; he also claimed continued possession as a tenant. The defendants raised multiple defences, including that the plaintiff knew of the prior agreement, that the plaintiff's agreement was conditional (only if the third defendant failed), a plea of limitation, and that the agreement was hit by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act, 1961.
The trial court found factual issues in favour of the plaintiff (including that he was unaware of the third defendant's agreement and that he had paid Rs. 39,000) and held the suit was not barred by limitation because time was not the essence. However, the trial court held the agreement was void under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act (58 of 1961) and dismissed the suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit for specific performance is barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act.
- Whether the agreement of sale is enforceable or void under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act (58 of 1961) and its amendments.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant relied on Ex. A1 dated 12.4.1971 evidencing an agreement to sell at Rs. 4,500 per acre and paid advances totalling Rs. 39,000 with endorsements extending time up to 13.8.1972; therefore defendants 1 and 2 were bound to execute the sale deed on payment of the balance.
- The appellant asserted he continued in possession as a tenant and that he was not aware of any prior agreement in favour of the third defendant.
- The appellant contended (in pleadings) that time was not the essence of the contract, and that performance was first refused by defendants only by their reply dated 31.7.1978, so the cause of action arose then (arguing the suit was within limitation).
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants contended the plaintiff was aware of the earlier agreement in favour of the third defendant and that the plaintiff's agreement was conditional — effective only if the third defendant failed to complete the transaction.
- They raised a plea of limitation, arguing the suit was time-barred.
- They contended the sale agreement was hit by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act, 1961 (the Act), and therefore unenforceable / void.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mrs. Chandinee Widya Vati Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial, AIR 1964 SC 978 | Contract depending on governmental permission may still be binding between parties where the stipulation is not a condition precedent (i.e., a contingent stipulation does not necessarily render a contract unenforceable between parties). | The court held this authority inapplicable: where a statute declares a transaction void in rem, the transaction cannot be treated as merely unenforceable against a statutory officer; the statutory declaration of voidness applies to all purposes, so the Chandinee principle does not rescue the agreement here. |
| Shankarlal v. Jagadishwar Rao, AIR 1980 A.P. 181 (Full Bench, Andhra Pradesh) | As between private parties, an agreement (here tenancy) may remain valid even if statutory formalities (notice of vacancy) were not complied with, and any statutory allottee could displace a private occupant — i.e., statutory consequences do not always render the private agreement void as between the parties. | The court observed this ruling has no application to the present case because the present statute (as amended) declares the transaction void ab initio (in rem) rather than merely permitting a statutory officer to ignore it. |
| Mariamma Verghese v. K.V. Balasubramanian and others (A.S. No. 862/1981), Judgment dated 11.1.1990 | Where a statutory provision (S.6 of Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act) declares transactions null and void, a court should not grant specific performance as the resulting transfer would be void. | The court relied on this precedent to support the proposition that legal impediments in ceiling legislation prevent courts from granting specific performance because the transaction would be nullified by statute. |
| Enavat Ullah v. Khali Ullah, AIR 1938 All. 432 | A decree for specific performance merely declares the decree-holder's right to have a transfer executed; the sale deed executed by the Court is a transfer by the Court on behalf of the judgment-debtor, and if the judgment-debtor is precluded from transferring the property by statute, the Court cannot execute such a sale deed in violation of that statute. | The court applied this principle to hold that a sale executed by the Court pursuant to specific performance is a transfer and therefore subject to statutory restrictions; supports the conclusion that the Court cannot effect transfers prohibited by the Land Reforms Act. |
| Mrs. Christine Pais v. K. Ugappa Shetty and another, AIR 1966 Mysore 299 | The sale deed made pursuant to a contract enforced by decree is a transfer by the Court with the characteristics of an inter vivos transfer; it is not an involuntary transaction escaping statutory prohibitions. | The court cited this case to reinforce that a court-executed sale in specific performance is effectively an inter vivos transfer and thus subject to statutory prohibitions on transfers. |
| Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas Govinddas and others, AIR 1980 S.C. 1334 | Events and changes in law occurring during the pendency of an appeal against a decree for specific performance must be taken into account and the decree moulded accordingly to give effect to applicable statutory provisions. | The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to justify considering changes in law (such as enactment/amendment of ceiling legislation) that would prevent a decree resulting in a prohibited transfer. |
| T.K. Singaram v. The Urban and Land Ceiling Tribunal, Chepauk, Madras-5 and others, 1992 Writ L.R. 389 | The Urban Land Ceiling Act (S.43) overrides other laws, customs, agreements or decrees; proceedings pending when the Urban Land Ceiling Act comes into force may have to cease to the extent the Act applies. Similar overriding provision exists in S.4 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act. | The court used this authority to support the view that ceiling legislation overrides private agreements and judicial proceedings to the extent of its operation, strengthening the conclusion that agreements falling within the Act's mischief cannot be enforced by courts. |
| CRP Nos. 1491 and 1502 of 1983 (Judgment dated 2.4.1983) — this Court | The authorised officer's view that the agreement Ex. B3 was void under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act was affirmed by this Court. | The court noted this prior judgment as confirming that the agreement in favour of the third defendant was held void under the Act and that the Supreme Court dismissed special leave, indicating that the Land Reforms Act applied to the subject transactions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court declined to re-evaluate the numerous factual findings of the trial court and instead focused on two pure questions of law: limitation (Article 54 of the Limitation Act) and the applicability of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act. The Court's step-by-step legal analysis follows.
1. Limitation (Article 54 of the Limitation Act)
- The Court recited Article 54: a suit for specific performance is governed by a three-year limitation period running from the date fixed for performance, or, if no date is fixed, from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
- In the present case the agreement originally fixed time for performance at one year and endorsements extended it up to 13.8.1972. Thereafter, there was no extension. The receipt Ex. A.5 for Rs. 19,000 (dated 3.8.1972) is merely a receipt and does not extend the performance period; it was paid before expiry under the earlier endorsement dated 13.5.1972.
- The plaint contained no averment that time was extended between the parties either expressly or by implication. Specific paragraphs in the plaint were quoted to show the plaintiff's contention that time was not of the essence and that performance was first refused by the defendants on 31.7.1978; nonetheless, the Court observed these allegations do not amount to an extension of time as required by Article 54.
- Applying Article 54 literally, because a date for performance was fixed (up to 13.8.1972) the three-year limitation period ran from that date. The suit filed on 4.12.1980 was beyond the three-year period; therefore the suit is barred by limitation. The Court rejected the trial court's conclusion that "time is not the essence" as a basis for avoiding the limitation bar: “It is one thing to say that time is not the essence... and it is another thing to say that the suit is barred by limitation.” The Court concluded the suit was governed by Article 54 and barred.
2. Applicability of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act
- The Court examined S.23 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act, as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974. The amended section (quoted in the opinion) declares certain transfers and sub-divisions effected on or after the notified date and before the relevant notification to be void and to be deemed always to have been void; it instructs the authorised officer to include such land within the ceiling area of the transferor as if no such transfer or sub-division had taken place.
- The appellant argued the amended provision invalidates only transfers and not mere agreements, and that an agreement of sale (short of a transfer) is not hit by the section. The Court rejected this argument: if a Court were to grant specific performance and thereby effect a sale deed, that sale would be void under the Act and deemed always void. The Court held it cannot assist in producing a transfer which the statute declares void.
- The Court addressed a related argument that the statute only permits the authorised officer to ignore the transaction but leaves the private agreement valid inter partes (relying on Chandinee and Shankarlal). The Court distinguished those authorities: Chandinee dealt with a contractual stipulation for governmental permission and not with a statutory declaration of voidness in rem; Shankarlal involved a different statutory scheme where private transactions remained valid inter partes. Here, the amendment introduced a statutory fiction that the transfer/sub-division is void ab initio and applies to all purposes, not merely to the authorised officer's consideration.
- The Court relied on authorities holding that a sale executed pursuant to a decree for specific performance is a transfer (Enavat Ullah; Mrs. Christine Pais) and that changes in law occurring during the pendency of proceedings must be respected (Bai Dosabai), as well as Division Bench decisions (e.g., Mariamma Verghese; T.K. Singaram) and earlier relevant decisions of this Court (CRP Nos. 1491 and 1502 of 1983) which affirmed that agreements in the factual matrix were void under the Land Reforms Act.
- Given there was no dispute that defendants 1 and 2 held lands in excess of the ceiling and that Ex. B3 (agreement in favour of the third defendant) had already been held void in statutory proceedings affirmed by this Court, the Court concluded the appellant's agreement (being later in time) is also hit by the Act and is void. Therefore, the agreement cannot be enforced in court.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED — The appeal is dismissed and the trial court's judgment and decree dismissing the suit are affirmed.
Implications and direct effects:
- The Court held the suit for specific performance is barred by limitation under Art. 54 of the Limitation Act because the three-year period ran from the last date fixed for performance (13.8.1972) and the suit filed on 4.12.1980 was beyond that period.
- The Court held the agreement of sale is void under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act (as amended) and, therefore, cannot be enforced. The Court emphasized that where the statute declares certain transfers void ab initio, courts cannot facilitate a transfer that the statute forbids.
- No broader favourable remedy for the appellant is available: the agreement cannot be converted into a valid sale by decree because the sale would be void under the Act. The opinion notes that no new legal principle overturning existing ceiling-act jurisprudence was created; instead, the Court applied existing statutory provisions and precedents to the facts and affirmed earlier rulings.
- The Court also dismissed the Memorandum of Cross-Objections by defendants 1 and 2 (which challenged the trial court's refusal to grant costs) and affirmed the trial court's approach on costs.
- Practical consequence for the deposited balance: the deceased plaintiff had deposited the balance of consideration in Court (invested per Court directions). The Court permitted the legal representatives (appellants 2 to 5) to withdraw the amount deposited in Court toward the balance of sale consideration now that the suit has been dismissed.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
Srinivasan, J.
This appeal arises out of a suit for specific performance instituted by the appellant herein. It is the case of the appellant that under Ex. A1 dated 12.4.1971 defendants 1 and 2 agreed to sell the suit properties at the rate of Rs. 4500 per acre. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid as advance on the date of agreement. The total consideration works out to Rs. 66040/-. Initially, it was agreed that the sale should be executed within a period of one year. On 5.4.1972, an endorsement was made extending the Period for completion of the transaction till. 5.5.1972 On 3.5.1972 another endorsement was made by which the period was extended to 15.5.1972 On 13.3.1972 an endorsement was made evidencing payment of Rs. 10,000/- by way of further advance and extending the time to 13.8.1972 Thereafter, there was no extension of time as such. On 3.8.1972 a sum of Rs. 19000/- was paid and a receipt was executed by the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs. 39,000/- in all. One Thirumalaiappa filed a suit O.S No. 1670 of 1971 for injunction restraining the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 from interfering with his alleged possession. He claimed to be a tenant of the suit properties. The fourth defendant herein, who is the son of the plaintiff, filed O.S No. 845 of 1972 for an injunction against Thirumalaiappan and the Second defendant as well as the present plaintiff. The Fourth defendant had purchased 1/4th share in the suit properties earlier. The plaintiff claimed that he was a tenant of the property even before the suit agreement was entered. The suit filed by Thirumalaiappa was dismissed and the suit filed by the fourth defendant was decreed. The appeals against the decrees were dismissed and the Second Appeals in this Court, viz., SA 2001 of 1978 and S.A 2335 of 1978 were disposed on 10.8.1979 The Second Appeal which arose out of Thirumalaiappa's suit was dismissed, but the second appeal which arose out of the fourth defendant's suit was allowed and the decree was set aside with the result that O.S No. 845 of 1972 was also dismissed.
2. Soon after the disposal of the appeals in the first appellate court, the plaintiff issued notice to defendants 1 and 2 under Ex. A15 dated 22.9.1972 calling upon them to execute the sale deed. They were received by the defendants on 26.9.1972 as evident from the postal acknowledgments. There was no reply thereto. The plaintiff issued another notice on 24.7.1978 under Ex. A.18 To that a reply was sent by defendants 1 and 2 on 31.7.1978 under Ex. A.20 They denied their liability to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. It is not necessary to go into the details of the reply notice. Thereafter, the present suit was filed by the plaintiff on 4.12.1980
3. The third defendant claims under a prior agreement dated 19.2.1970 by which the second defendant for herself and as guardian of the first defendant agreed to sell the suit properties to him. It is the case of the plaintiff that he Was not aware of the alleged agreement in favour of the third defendant and in any event it was not a valid one. According to the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 are bound to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance amount. It is the case of the plaintiff that he continues to be in possession as he was a tenant previously and even after the agreement he continues to be a tenant till the execution of the sale deed.
4. The defendants contested the suit on several grounds. It is again not necessary to set out the details of the defence. Suffice it to point out that the defendants contended that the plaintiff was aware of the earlier agreement in favour of the third defendant and his agreement was itself only on the footing that in case the third defendant fails to complete the transaction, the plaintiff could have a sale deed in his favour. A plea of limitation was raised by the defendants that the suit was barred. It was also contended that the suit agreement was hit by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act 58 of 1961 and it was not enforceable.
5. The trial Court found on all factual issues in favour of the plaintiff and held that he was not aware of the agreement in favour of the third defendant. It was also held that the plaintiff had paid the sum of Rs. 39,000/- as claimed by him and he was liable to pay only the balance which had been deposited in Court. On the question of limitation the trial court held that time was not the essence of the contract and the suit as such was not barred by limitation. However, the trial court held that the agreement was affected by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act (58 of 1961) and could not be enforced in a Court of law as it was void. Consequently, the suit was dismissed.
6. After hearing counsel on both sides, we are of the view that it is not necessary to consider the various issues of facts, which were considered by the Court below. We are taking up for consideration the two questions of law, one on limitation and the other on the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act. In so far as the Limitation is concerned, Art. 54 of the Limitation Act is very clear in its terms. The period of limitation fixed for a suit for specific performance of a contract is three years from the date fixed for the performance, or, if not such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. In the present case, time was originally fixed in the agreement for a period of one year. Subsequently it was extended by endorsements upto 13th August, 1972. Thereafter, there was no extension as such. Ex. A.5 in only a receipt for payment of Rs. 19,000/- and it does not extend the period for performance. In fact, that payment was made on 3.8.1972 before the expiry of the period fixed under the earlier endorsement dated 13.5.1972 It is not the case of the plaintiff in the pleadings that time was extended as between the parties by implication. In paragraph 8 it is stated as follows:—
“The plaintiff states, the time’ of one year for performance stipulated in the agreement to sell is not the essence of contract for one reason that the agreement is with regard to agricultural immovable properties and for the second that parties themselves never regarded or intended that time should be of essence of contract. The subsequent conduct of the parties and turn of events also will show that time was not regarded as essence of contract.”
Again in Paragraph 23 it is stated,
“The Plaintiff states that the suit is in time. Performance of suit agreement was refused by defendants 1 and 2 only on 31.7.78 (i.e) for the first time through their reply notice, which gives plaintiff cause of action to sue and hence, the suit is not barred by limitation.”
In the cause of action paragraph (Paragraph 25) it is stated that the cause of action for the suit arose on 12.4.1971, the date of suit agreement to sell, on 15.5.1972 and 13.8.1972 when the time was extended, on 29.6.1978 when the plaintiff requested performance through a notice and on 31.7.1978 when defendants 1 and 2 for the first, time disowned their duties under the contract and refused to execute the sale. Thus, there is absolutely no whisper in the plaint that the parties either by express agreement or by implied agreement extended the time for performance of the contract. Hence, by the terms of Art. 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit is filed beyond the period prescribed therefor. Admittedly it is beyond the Period of three years from the date fixed for performance in the agreement. Hence, the suit is barred by limitation. The view taken by the Court below that time is not the essence of the contract, and, therefore, the suit is in time, is unsustainable. It is one thing to say that time is not the essence of the contract and it is another thing to say that the suit is barred by limitation. In the present case, the suit is governed by Art. 54 of the Limitation Act and it is barred by limitation.
7. The only ground on which the Court below has dismissed the suit is that the agreement is void in as much as it is against the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act (58 of 1961). S. 23 of the Act, as it stood prior to the amendment in 1974, provided that the Authorised Officer shall not take into consideration any transfer, whether by sale or by gift, exchange, surrender, settlement or otherwise effected on or after the notified date and before the date of the publication of the final statement under S. 12 or 14. By Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974 the Section was amended and after amendment it reads, in so far as it is relevant in this case, thus:—
(1) Subject to the provisions of S. 20 for the purpose of fixing, for the first time after the properties Act. The area of the date of the commencement of this Act, the ceiling area of any person holding land on the date of the commencement of this Act in excess of 30 standard acres (a) any transfer, whether by sale (including sale in execution of a decree or order of a civil court of an award or order of any other lawful authority) or by gift (other than gift made in contemplation of death), exchange, surrender, settlement or otherwise; or (b) any sub-division (Including Sub-Division by a decree or order of a civil court or any other lawful authority) whether by partition or otherwise; effected on or after the notified date and before the publication of a Notification under sub-S. (1) of S. 18 shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, void and accordingly the authorised officer shall calculate the ceiling area of such person as if no such transfer of sub-division had taken place.
Explanation:— This sub-Section shall, on and from the 15th day of February, 1970 have effect as if for the figures and words 30 standard acres, the figures and words 15 standard acres had been substituted.
(2) It shall be the duty of the authorised officer to include the land so transferred or sub-divided, within the ceiling area of the transferor the person who held the land immediately before such sub-division, as the case may be, as if no such transfer or sub-division had taken place.”
8. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the provisions of the Act will invalidate only a transfer and will not affect an agreement of sale. According to him an agreement is not a transfer and, therefore, the Section does not come into play. We are unable to accept this argument. The plaintiff seeks to have the agreement enforced by a Court of law and get a sale deed in pursuance thereof. If the Court grants a decree in favour of the plaintiff and it leads to a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, either by the party or by the Court, that sale is automatically void and it is deemed to be void always as per the provision of the Act. The Court cannot be a party to a transaction which would be void in law. Hence, there is no substance in the contention that the agreements are not affected by the provisions of the Act.
9. It is next argued that the agreement is valid as between the parties and it is only the Authorised Officer who is not bound by the transaction and who is entitled to ignore the same. In this connection reliance is placed upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Chandinee Widya Vati Madden v. Dr. C.L Katial (AIR 1964 SC 978). In that case a contract of sale was entered with reference to a house belonging to the defendant on the plot granted by the Government. One of the terms of the contract was that the vendor shall obtain necessary permission of the Government for the same within two months of the agreement and if the permission was not forthcoming, it was open to the vendees to extend the date or to treat the agreement as cancelled. The vendor made an application for permission but for the reasons of her own, withdrew the same. The vendees filed a suit for specific performance of the contract or in the alternative for damages. The Court found that the vendor had wilfully refused to perform her part of the contract and the vendees were entitled to get specific performance. The contention that unless the Government granted permission, the contract was unenforceable was negatived. The Court pointed out that the stipulation in the agreement was not a condition precedent and that the contract was not a contingent one. Hence, the Court held that the contract was binding as between the parties and enforceable as such. The ruling has nothing to do with the present case. Hence a provision in a statute declares a transaction to be void. It is a declaration in rem. The transaction is void for any purpose. It cannot be said that it is void any purpose. It cannot be said that it is void only as against the Authorised Officer and valid as between the parties. The very purpose of the amendment is to declare the entire transaction as a nullity from the inception. The difference in the language between the Section as it stood before the amendment and the Section as it stands after the amendment is very significant. Before the amendment the authorised Officer shall not take into consideration certain transactions, but after the amendment, the statute itself declares the transaction to be void from the inception and a fiction is introduced that it is deemed to be always void.
10. Reliance is placed upon the Judgment of a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shankarlal v. Jagadishwar Rao (AIR 1980 A.P 181). The case arose under the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act and Andhra Pradesh Buildings) (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. The question was whether an agreement of tenancy between the landlord and an individual was void because the landlord failed to give notice of vacancy to the authority under the Act. As per the provisions of the Act, every landlord was bound to give a notice of vacancy to the Controller as soon as the building fell vacant. The Act also enabled the Controller to allot the vacant premises to a person and such allottee could disposses any unauthorised occupant. The contention before the Court was that in as much as no notice of vacancy was given under the Act, the agreement of tenancy was void and it was against the public policy. That contention was negatived by the Court and it was held that as between the parties, the transaction was valid. It was pointed out that if and when the controller allots the premises to any person under the Act, such person could dispossess the tenant under the private lease and that does not invalidate the transaction as such between the parties thereto. The ruling has no application to the present case.
11. The question has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Mariamma Verghese v. K.V Balasubramanian and others (A.S No. 862/1981 Judgment dated 11.1.1990)(1). The appeal was against a decree dismissing a suit for specific performance. The dismissal was on the ground that the agreement of sale was cancelled by the agreement-holders. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that there was a legal impediment to the grant of specific performance. It was held that by virtue of S. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 24 of 1978, the agreement could not be enforced. The Bench observed thus:—
“The impediment is that the transaction, assuming it could fructify through the hands of the court, will come within the mischief of S. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 24 of 1978, hereinafter referred to as the Act. That provision inhibits the coming into existence of any such transaction as the present one and further says that such transaction will be null and void. The Court is not supposed to lend its hand for the purpose of arriving at this result, assuming that the plaintiff has got a case on merits otherwise.”
12. One of us sitting singly dealt with the question in detail in Hansraj Bokaria v. Government of Tamil Nadu (W.P No. 4807 of 1985 Judgment dated 13.1.1993)(2). The relevant passage in the judgment reads thus:—
“18. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that a sale in pursuance of a decree for specific performance is not a voluntary sale and it would not fall within the scope of S. 6 of the Act. According to learned counsel it is a sale executed by the Court and it cannot be governed by S. 6 of the Act. There is no merit in this contention. In Enavat Ullah v. Khali Ullah (AIR 1938 Allahabad 432), a Division Bench of the Court held that decree for specific performance only declares the right of the decree-holder to have a transfer of the property covered by the decree executed in his favour and so long as the sale deed is not executed in his favour by the Judgment-debtor in the suit or by the Court the title to the property remained vested in the Judgment-debtor and till the execution of the sale deed, the decree-holder has no right to possession of the property. It was wither held that the sale deed executed by a Court in pursuance of a decree for specific performance is a transfer by the Court on behalf of the judgment-debtor and it is the title of the judgment-debtor to the property that is transferred by the sale deed executed by the Court and if the Judgment-debtor is precluded by any enactment from transferring the property, the Court cannot in violation of that provision execute a sale deed of that property. In that case, there was a decree for specific performance and an application was filed for execution. But, by that time, U.P Encumbered Estates Act (25 of 1934) had come into force. S. 7(3) of the said Act precluded any transfer by the owner of the property. The contention urged before the Bench was that it prevented only the owner of the property and not the Court from transferring the property. That contention was rejected by the Court and it was observed that if the Judgment-debtor was precluded from transferring the property, the Court cannot in violation of that provision execute a sale deed of that property.
19. In Mrs. Christine Pais v. K. Ugappa Shetty and another (AIR 1966 Mysore 299) the contention for specific performance is an involuntary sale and not inter vivos was rejected. The court held that the sale deed based on a contract of sale, which came into existence pursuant to the decree was a transfer by the Court on behalf the Judgment-debtor and the sale deed had all the characteristics of a transfer inter vivos. Reference was also made to the Judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Enavathullah's case (AIR 1938 All. 432).
20. In Bai Dosabai v. Mathurdas Govinddas and others (AIR 1980 S.C 1334), the Apex Court held the events and changes in law occurring during the pendency of an appeal against decree in a suit for specific performance have to be taken into consideration and the decree has to be moulded accordingly. They gave effect in that case to the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienations) Act, 1972 besides the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
21. A Division Bench of this Court refused to grant specific performance in Mariamma Verghese v. K.V Balasubramanian and others (AS. 862 of 1981 Judgment dated 11.1.1990). The appellant in that case was the plaintiff who prayed for specific performance. The trial Court dismissed the suit and she preferred the appeal. But, the agreement of the sale was dated 29.6.1978 The Division Bench held that there was a legal impediment to the grant of specific performance in the provisions of the Act and consequently dismissed the appeal. On the same day, i.e, 11.1.1990 the Division Bench also dismissed a Writ petition (WP 1963 of 1984) preferred by the same person, reported in Mariamma Verghese v. The Commissioner of Land Reforms and two others (1990 Writ L.R 279). Claiming right under the agreement dated 29.6.1978, the petitioner in the Writ Petition wanted exclusion of the lands which were subject matter of the agreement in her favour from the proceedings under the Act and filed the Writ Petition against the authorities under the Act. Taking note of the rigour of the language of S. 6 of the Act, the Bench dismissed the Writ Petition.
22. In T.K Singaram v. The Urban and Land Ceiling Tribunal, Chepauk, Madras-5 and others (1992 Writ L.R 389). another Division Bench of this court had occasion to consider the provisions of S. 43 of the Act. The Bench after extracting the section, observed as follows:—
“As would be seen from a plain reading of the Section, the Urban Land Ceiling Act overrides the other lands for the time being in force or any custom, usage, or agreement or decree or order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. In view of S. 43 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the Urban Land Ceiling Act has to be given a full play and any proceedings which are pending on the date when the Urban Land Ceiling Act comes into force would have to cease in case Urban Land Ceiling Act applies to those proceedings, to the extent of such application and declaration of the excess land. A provision similar to S. 43 of the Urban Ceiling Act is available in S. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961.”
13. In the present case, there is no dispute that defendants 1 and 2 have lands in excess of the ceiling limit. The plaintiff as P.W 1 has admitted in his deposition that the defendants had lands in excess of the ceiling limit. It is also brought to our notice that the agreement in favour of the third defendant which is marked as Ex. B3 was subject matter of proceedings initiated under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act. The Authorised Officer had taken the view that it was hit by the Act and was a void transaction. That view was affirmed by this Court in CRP. Nos. 1491 and 1502 of 1983 by its Judgment dated 2.4.1983 It is stated by learned counsel for the respondents that the special leave petition filed against that judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Thus, there is no dispute that the provisions of the Land Reforms Act would apply to the present case and it goes without saying that the agreement in favour of the plaintiff is as much hit by the provisions of the Art as the agreement in favour of the third defendant. In fact, the agreement in favour of the plaintiff is much later than that of the third defendant and, therefore, it is automatically hit by the Act. We have no hesitation in holding that the agreement is void and the plaintiff cannot get any relief in this suit in view of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act. The view taken by Court below in this regard is correct.
14. In the result, we confirm the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court and the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
15. The Memorandum of Cross-Objections filed by defendants 1 and 2 is against the refusal of the trial court to grant costs. We do not find any merit therein. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we affirm the conclusion of the trial court in the matter of costs. Hence, the Memorandum of Cross-Objections is dismissed. No costs.
16. It is represented by leaned counsel for the appellants that the deceased plaintiff deposited the balance of consideration in court and it has been invested in fixed deposit in State Bank of India, Bangalapurdur as per directions of this Court. Now that the dismissal of the suit is confirmed, the plaintiff will be entitled to get back the amount deposited. The plaintiff is no more and his legal representatives have already come on record. The legal representatives of the plaintiff, viz., appellants 2 to 5 are permitted to withdraw the amount deposited in court towards balance of sale consideration.
KA/RR/VCS
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