1. By consent of parties, the main writ petition itself has been taken up for final hearing.

2. The petitioner is employed as a driver under the respondent-corporation, which is a public sector undertaking of the Government of Tamil Nadu. His service conditions are governed by the regulations framed in this behalf. By order, dated 19 September, 1992, he was placed under suspension on the allegation that on 19 September, 1992 at about 3-15 P.M, he had driven the tipper vehicle bearing registration No. TAY 6482 in a negligent manner resulting in a road accident, as a consequence of which two employees who travelled in the vehicle died. On the very same day, First Information Report was lodged with Kayalarbath Police Station by one A. Srinivasan, Mines Manager of the respondent/corporation. The substance of the First Information Report is that one Tamil Selvan, an employee of the respondent who travelled in another vehicle, had reported that the petitioner had driven his vehicle in high speed as a result of which the tipper lorry overturned and two employees were caught under the load of lime stone and died.

3. The matter has been investigated by the police. The petitioner was taken into custody on 19 September, 1992 and subsequently released on bail. While so, the respondent issued a chargememo, dated 10 October, 1992, to the petitioner alleging that by reason of the occurrence that took place on 19 September, 1992, the petitioner had contravened the Standing Orders 18, 34, 35 and 39, which read as follows:

18. Breach of any of the rules and regulations of the establishment.

34. Wilful damage due to negligence or carelessness to the working process or to any other property of the company.

35. Failure to observe duly notified safety instructions of interference with any safety device or equipment installed in the establishment.

39. Negligence or wilful neglect of work.

4. The petitioner submitted his explanation and made a request to the management that inasmuch as the prosecution is pending against him for the occurrence said to have taken place on 19 September, 1992, the disciplinary proceedings sought to be taken against him may be postponed until the prosecution is over. However, the management has refused to stay the disciplinary proceedings and has indicated its mind to proceed with the enquiry against the petitioner. In the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the petitioner, an enquiry officer has been nominated.

5. According to Sri K.T Palpandian, the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the petitioner are based on the occurrence said to have taken place on 19 September, 1992, and on the same facts and circumstances. The occurrence in respect of which the prosecution has been lodged is the same relating to which the disciplinary proceedings have been commenced, the witnesses cited are the same before the criminal Court as well as before the Disciplinary Authority. Hence, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the ending prosecution, the petitioner is disabled from setting up his defence before the disciplinary authority. According to Sri K.T Palpandian, the management has a legal obligation to defer the disciplinary proceedings until the criminal prosecution is completed against the petitioner. However, the management is bent upon proceeding with the disciplinary matter. Hence, the petitioner has filed the wirt petition to forbear the respondent from taking disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to the chargememo, dated 10 October, 1992, pending criminal prosecution against him for an ofence under S. 304-A I.P.C, relating to Crime No. 140 of 1992 on the file of Kayalarbath Police Station.

6. According to the respondent/corporation, as the accident was likely to have been caused by rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the petitioner and the vehicle also suffered heavy damage, the respondent has to satisfy itself whether the petitioner could be entrusted with the driving of any tippers in future or whether he should be retained in employment at all. It was in that context, the petitioner was charged with the following acts of misconduct:

(i) Breach of any of the rules and regulations of the establishment.

(ii) Wilful damage due to negligence or carelessness to the working process or to any other property of the company.

(iii) Failure to observe duly notified safety instructions or interference with any safety device or equipment installed in the establishment.

(iv) Negligence or wilful neglect of work.

7. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the charges against the petitioner were about his negligence in driving the vehicle and not for the resultant injury occasioned to the occupants of the tipper. Therefore, the offences under Ss. 279, 337 and 304-A I.P.C, with which the petitioner is charged, have nothing to do with the degree of negligence of the petitioner in the dischage of his work as a heavy duty driver. Sri Ibrahim Kalifulla, in reply to the submission of Sri K.T Palpandian that the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal prosecution were based on the same facts and circumstances, submits that the disciplinary action against the petitioner is about his negligence in driving the vehicle in a manner causing damage to the vehicle, while the criminal case relates to the death of the two occupants of the vehicle. According to him, the charges of misconduct against the petitioner to be enquired into in the departmental proceedings and the offences he is charged with in the criminal case are entirely different and, therefore, the departmental enquiry should not be interdicted at this stage. In other words, he submits, that the domestic enquiry is concerned only with the question whether the petitioner had driven the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner causing damage to the vehicle. Even though such rash and negligent driving may have led to woeful consequences having involved the vehicle in a serious accident, the respondent is not in a position to utilise his services as a heavy duty driver until he is cleared of the charge of misconduct in the domestic enquiry. It is further argued that the trial of the criminal case may take a long time, and if the domestic enquiry is to be deferred till the completion of the criminal trial, then, it will cause serious prejudice to the respondent. It is then stated that the defence of the petitioner in the domestic enquiry would not cause him prejudice in the criminal case because the offences against him are different from the charges in the domestic enquiry. It is, therefore, argued by Sri Ibrahim Kalifullah, that the domestic enquiry into the charges against the petitioner should be allowed to proceed in the normal course and the petitioner will have to indicate his stand in the domestic enquiry. Hence, the domestic enquiry should not be stopped.

8. Sri K.T Palpandian cites Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd., [1988 - II L.L.N 912], wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the judicial opinion in matters like this appeared to be conflicting. In the above decision, the Supreme Court has also referred to the authorities in support of the position that there is nothing wrong in parallel proceedings being taken-one by way of disciplinary proceedings and the other in the criminal Court. Reference was made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969 (1) S.C.R 134] and some decisions of the High Courts such as Rama P.C v. Suprintendent of Police, Kolar, [A.I.R 1967 (54) Mys. 220] Ali Mohammed v. Chairman T.A, and Company, Udhampur, [1981 (2) S.L.R 255], Moulindra Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, [1973 — L & I.C 1564] and Shaikh Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Offices, Chengleput., [1965 — I L.L.J 197]. The Supreme Court further referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [1960 — I L.L.J 520 at 521] and Tata Oil Mills Company v. Workmen, [1964 — II L.L.J 113] and the observations made by the Supreme Court in this regard viz:

“It is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal Court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case.”

9. It is pertinent to refer to Para 7, at page 914 of the judgment in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Cooking Coal, Ltd., [1988 — II L.L.N 912] (vide supra), which is reproduced hereunder:

“The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated, that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not intend to lay down any general guidelines.”

10. In the light of the observations of the Supreme Court, this Court will have to see whether in the instant case the criminal action and the disciplinary action are grounded upon the same set of facts. As stated above, the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the petitioner are based on the occurrence said to have taken place on 19 September, 1992 and on the same facts and circumstances. In the complaint to the police lodged on 19 September, 1992, the Mines Manager of the respondent has cited three witnesses claiming that they were the eye witnesses and they are, Tamil Selvan, Sambandamorthi and V. Palaniswami. In the documents furnished to the petitioner by the management, there is one report said to have been filed by one Tomy Edwin, Assistant Mines Manager, who has stated in his report that he received information from Tamil Selvan. It is, however, significant that even in his report the Assistant Mines Manager has stated that the tipper lorry was involved in a road accident. Thus, it is seen, that the occurrence in respect of which the prosecution has been launched is the same relating to which the disciplinary proceedings have been commenced. The witnesses cited are the same before the criminal Court as well as before the disciplinary authority. In view of the pending prosecution, I am of the view, the petitioner will be disabled from setting up his defence before the disciplinary authority. I am also of the view that the management has a legal obligation to defer the disciplinary proceedings until the criminal prosecution is completed against the petitioner. If the disciplinary proceedings were allowed to continue, the petitioner's right to have a fair hearing both before the criminal Court as well as before the disciplinary authority will stand impaired. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the law does not cast any obligation on an accused to subscribe any statement in writing. It is for the prosecution to prove the case independent of any statement from the accused. This legal right is sought to be eroded by compelling the petitioner to disclose his defence, which is against law. Hence, I am of the view, that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Cooking Coal, Ltd, [1988 — II L.L.N 912] (vide supra), cited and heavily relied on by Sri K.T Palpandian is directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. As stated by the Supreme Court it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation and the Court will have to see whether the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts in each and every case which is referred to it. On facts, I am of the view that both the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings in the instant action are grounded upon the same set of facts and hence I am of the opinion that the disciplinary proceedings should be stayed till the criminal case is disposed of by the criminal Court. Fairplay requires the postponing of the disciplinary proceedings.

11. Sri Ibrahim Kalifullah, learned counsel for the respondent/management, has cited the decision in I.E.L Ltd., Giridh v. Labour Court, Dhanbad, [1993 — I L.L.N 287], Nelson Motis v. Union of India, [1992 — II L.L.N 1059] and M. Ramachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [(1993) 2 LLN 149]. As observed by the Supreme Court in Kusheshwar Dubey case, [1988 — II L.L.N 912] (vide supra), the judgment in those cases depended upon the facts and circumstances of those cases. In the instant case, since I have on facts held that the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts, I am not adverting to the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. There is also no dispute or quarrel with regard to the proposition laid down in the above cases. The Supreme Court has cautioned that each case has to be decided on its peculiar facts. It is also not disputed that even if the writ-petitioner is acquitted in the criminal case the departmental proceedings can be initiated against him and therin he may be found guilty. Hence, the right of the respondent is not affected in any manner because of the stay of the departmental proceedings till the disposal of the criminal case.

12. It is stated by Sri K.T Palpandian that the petitioner has denied the charges before the criminal Court and that the trial has already commenced on 25 May, 1993, and postponed to 6 June, 1993, 15 June, 1993 and finally 29 June, 1993. According to Sri K.T Palpandian, the case was adjourned for production of witnesses, four of whom are employees of the respondent/corporation. Since the witnesses were not produced by the respondent/corporation, the matter was adjourned twice. Since the trial has already commenced, I direct the respondent/corporation to co-operate and produce the witnesses before the criminal Court without any further loss of time and prosecute its action before the said Court. The Judicial Magistrate, Ariyalur, before whom the case is pending, is directed to dispose of the case witin four months from to-day. Till the disposal of the criminal prosecution, the departmental proceeding initiated by the respondent/corporation is stayed. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.