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N. Anandan v. Ayyanna Gounder And Others

Madras High Court
Jun 30, 1993
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The underlying suit is O.S. No. 1217 of 1990 on the file of the Sub Court, Coimbatore. The 1st defendant in that suit is the appellant in these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. The suit was filed under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), seeking to settle a scheme for administration of the 1st plaintiff-Trust (the 1st respondent in the appeals). The 2nd and 3rd respondents in the appeals are also plaintiffs in the suit and claim to be trustees of the trust.

The two Civil Miscellaneous Appeals challenge a common order dated 21-4-1993 in three interlocutory applications (I.As) in the suit, including I.A. Nos. 1511 and 1513 of 1990. One appeal (described in the opinion as C.M.A. 495 of 1993) challenges the temporary injunction in I.A. No. 1511 of 1990 that restrained the appellant from leasing trust properties or collecting income as Managing Trustee. The other appeal (described as C.M.A. No. 497 of 1993) challenges the appointment of a Receiver in I.A. No. 1513 of 1990 to take possession and manage the trust properties.

An antecedent petition, L.A. No. 604 of 1989, seeking leave of the Court under Section 92, C.P.C. to institute the suit, was filed on 29-3-1989 and remained pending before the trial court without a final order granting or refusing leave. The respondents filed a counter to that petition on 13-6-1989. The trial court repeatedly adjourned the hearing of L.A. No. 604 for "enquiry" on multiple dates up to 20-4-1993, and no express grant of leave under Section 92 appears on the record prior to the challenged interlocutory orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether leave under Section 92, C.P.C. is a condition precedent to the institution of a suit against a public trust and, if so, whether such leave can be treated as having been granted by implication when the formal petition for leave remains pending.
  2. Whether interlocutory orders (specifically a temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, C.P.C., and the appointment of a Receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C.) passed while a Section 92 leave petition is pending are valid and enforceable.
  3. If interim orders passed while Section 92 leave is still pending are invalid, whether the specific interlocutory orders in I.A. No. 1511 (temporary injunction) and I.A. No. 1513 (appointment of Receiver) should be set aside.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The petition for leave (L.A. No. 604 of 1989) under Section 92, C.P.C. was still pending and no express order granting leave had been passed; hence the suit could not be deemed to have been properly instituted and interim orders could not validly be passed in I.A. Nos. 1511 and 1513 of 1990.
  • The petition for leave was filed on 29-3-1989 and the respondents filed their counter on 13-6-1989, after which the trial court repeatedly posted the matter for "enquiry" and had not applied its mind to grant leave; these facts preclude any inference that leave was granted by implication.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The court below implicitly granted leave by conduct: the suit was numbered in 1990; the court issued notices and ordered amendments and allowed amendment petitions; no express objection was taken in the interlocutory applications that those I.As could not be heard before the leave petition was decided.
  • Relying on authorities concerning representative suits under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C., and on prior decisions (including judgments treating Section 92 suits as similar to Order 1, Rule 8 suits), it was argued that permission/leave can be inferred in appropriate circumstances and therefore the interlocutory orders should stand, particularly in the interest of protecting the trust.
  • Reference was also made to the proposition (as held in some authorities) that in considering an application for leave under Section 92, notice to the respondents may not be mandatory, and thus the steps taken by the court (including ordering notice in the present case) could be consistent with implied grant of leave.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 356; AIR 1990 SC 444 Observation that suits under Section 92 and under Order 1, Rule 8 are both representative suits and share certain common features. The court cited the passage but emphasised that the observation only indicates similarity insofar as representative character is concerned and does not mean the two procedures are identical in all respects.
Executive Officer, Vadakku Valliyur Town v. M. Mattar Mohideen, (1990) I Law Weekly 638 Held in an Order 1, Rule 8 context that where the court ordered publication of notice, conditional permission may be inferred by implication. The opinion relied on this decision to explain how the inference was drawn in Order 1, Rule 8 cases, but distinguished its applicability to Section 92 cases.
Sannkiah v. Vadakasi, 1980 TNLJ 86 (DB) Presumption that permission under Order 1, Rule 8 can be inferred from circumstances such as court-ordered publication of notice. Used as supporting authority for the proposition applicable under Order 1, Rule 8, but the court held it cannot be applied to Section 92 matters.
Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Paramanand, AIR 1977 All 421 When a court issues notice on an application under Order 1, Rule 8, it may be inferred that conditional permission has been granted. Cited as precedent supporting an implication-of-permission approach for Order 1, Rule 8 applications; the court reiterated that this reasoning does not translate to Section 92 cases because of statutory differences.
R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, (1991) 1 SCC 48; AIR 1991 SC 221 Held that leave of the Court under Section 92, C.P.C. is a condition precedent for institution of suits against public trusts (emphasis on statutory language). The court relied on this Supreme Court holding to conclude that leave under Section 92 must be granted before a suit can be regarded as instituted and so cannot be treated as impliedly given where the petition remains pending.
Mookka Pillai v. Valavanda Pillai, AIR 1947 Mad 205 Permission under Order 1, Rule 8 may be granted even after institution of the suit, or on amendment at an appellate stage if nature of suit not materially changed. Cited to demonstrate a difference between Order 1, Rule 8 procedure and Section 92; used to explain why in Order 1, Rule 8 the timing of permission is more flexible.
Muthukaruppa Ethandar v. Appavoo Nadar, AIR 1943 Mad 161 Similar principle concerning the granting of permission under Order 1, Rule 8 after institution or by amendment. Cited alongside other Madras decisions to contrast Order 1, Rule 8 practice with Section 92 requirements.
AIR 1988 Ori 100 Contains a passage stating that where a suit has been registered or interim orders passed prior to granting of leave under Section 92, the same shall be held incompetent, invalid and non est. The court noted this statement but held that it could not be applied to an interim order appointing a Receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C. and therefore did not follow it as a bar to the Receiver order.
Sulaiman v. S.M. Jama Ath, (Ker LT 790) (1982) Held that an application for appointment of a Receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C. can be entertained and disposed of even while Section 92 leave proceedings are pending. Relied upon by the court to support the proposition that a Receiver may be appointed to protect property despite Section 92 leave being undecided.
Mohammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan, AIR 1945 All 261 (1945 ALJ 492) (FB) Recognised that a court which has cognisance in any form of a dispute concerning administration of assets has jurisdiction (and duty) to protect property, including appointing a Receiver. Cited to support the court's view that jurisdiction to protect property (by appointment of a Receiver) exists even when jurisdictional or leave questions are pending.
Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani, AIR 1948 Bom 139 (DB) Held that a Receiver could be appointed in proceedings in forma pauperis pending decision on the leave to sue as pauper. Used to demonstrate that Order 40, Rule 1 enables appointment of a Receiver in proceedings other than a registered suit and so supports upholding a Receiver order despite leave under Section 92 being pending.
AIR 1925 Lahore 489; AIR 1929 Nag 119 Instances showing a Receiver may be appointed during proceedings for appointment of a guardian; cited to illustrate that Order 40 has broad scope beyond suits per se. Referred to in explanation of the breadth of Order 40, Rule 1 and to justify the court's willingness to uphold a Receiver order even where Section 92 leave had not been finally granted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in several clearly articulated steps:

  1. The court first accepted and relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar that, by the plain language of Section 92, C.P.C., leave of the court is a condition precedent to the institution of a suit against a public trust. The statutory phrase quoted ("having obtained leave of the Court, may institute a suit") was treated as determinative that Section 92 leave must be granted before the suit can be regarded as properly instituted.
  2. The court distinguished the statutory and procedural regime governing representative suits under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C. from the Section 92 procedure. It noted that permission under Order 1, Rule 8 has been held not to be a condition precedent and that permission under that rule may be granted even after institution or by amendment. Decisions that permit an inference of implied permission in Order 1, Rule 8 cases (for example, where publication of notice was ordered) therefore do not automatically apply to Section 92 proceedings.
  3. The court examined whether, in the present case, leave under Section 92 could be inferred as having been granted by implication. The respondents pointed to several features (suit numbering, court-ordered notice, absence of specific objection in interlocutory proceedings, allowance of amendment petitions) as supporting an inference. The court rejected that inference on the concrete facts: L.A. No. 604 remained pending and had been repeatedly adjourned for "enquiry" over an extended period, showing the trial court had not finally applied its mind to grant or refuse leave. The pattern of adjournments was taken to indicate that no conclusive decision (express or implied) had been made.
  4. The court analysed the interplay between the two interlocutory remedies involved. It observed that Order 39, Rule 1, C.P.C. (temporary injunction) refers expressly to "Where in any suit..." and thus contemplates a suit already instituted. Because Section 92 leave had not been granted (and could not be inferred as granted), the court held that the temporary injunction order in I.A. No. 1511, founded on Order 39, Rule 1, was legally vulnerable and had to be set aside.
  5. By contrast, the court assessed Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C. (appointment of a Receiver) differently. It reviewed authorities (Kerala, Bombay and All-India precedents) demonstrating that Order 40, Rule 1 is framed broadly and permits appointment of a Receiver in proceedings other than registered suits. The court relied on these authorities to conclude that a Receiver may be appointed to protect and preserve property even pending disposal of an application for leave under Section 92. On that basis, and since no substantive challenge to the merits of the Receiver order was made by the appellant, the court declined to set aside the Receiver order in I.A. No. 1513.
  6. The court also addressed an apparent contrary passage in AIR 1988 Ori 100, which declared that interim orders passed prior to grant of Section 92 leave shall be held incompetent and non est. The court held that the Oriya decision could not be applied to invalidate an interim order appointing a Receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, and so it did not follow that reasoning in the present context.
  7. Finally, having drawn these legal distinctions and applied them to the facts of the case (pending L.A. No. 604; multiple adjournments; absence of express grant of leave), the court concluded that the interlocutory injunction must be set aside but the Receiver order should be confirmed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court's operative disposition is that the interlocutory order granting temporary injunction in I.A. No. 1511 of 1990 is set aside, while the interlocutory order appointing a Receiver in I.A. No. 1513 of 1990 is confirmed. The opinion records the final appellate disposition in these terms: Accordingly, C.M.A No. 496 of 1993 is allowed and C.M.A No. 497 of 1993 is dismissed. No costs.

Implications (direct, as stated in the opinion):

  • The temporary injunction founded on Order 39, Rule 1, C.P.C. cannot stand where the statutory condition precedent (leave under Section 92, C.P.C.) had not been granted and could not be inferred to have been granted.
  • An order for appointment of a Receiver under Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C. may be validly made to protect trust property even when the Section 92 leave petition is pending and undecided; therefore the Receiver order was affirmed.
  • The court did not purport to lay down a novel or binding departure from existing precedent generally; it applied and reconciled existing authorities to the statutory distinction between Section 92 and Order 1, Rule 8. The decision's immediate effect is limited to the parties (setting aside the injunction and confirming the Receiver appointment) rather than declaring a broad new precedent beyond the reasoning already present in cited authorities.

Additional Observations by the Court

The court expressed regret at the delay in disposing of L.A. No. 604 of 1989 by the Judges who presided over the court below between 1989 and 1993. The opinion emphasised that unnecessary delay in deciding an application for leave under Section 92 may prejudice the public trust if mismanagement occurs and interim relief is not available promptly. The court stressed that judicial officers should apply their mind and promptly determine Section 92 leave applications by assessing whether applicants have an interest in the trust, whether the trust is public, and whether prima facie grounds of breach of trust exist.

Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No information not present in the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

1. The 1st defendant in O.S No. 1217 of 1990 on the file of Sub Court, Coimbatore is the appellant in both these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. The said suit is one under Section 92, C.P.C for settling a scheme for the administration of the 1st plaintiff-Trust, the 1st respondent in both the appeals. The 2nd and 3rd respondents herein who are also plaintiffs in the suit, claim to be trustees of the abovesaid trust. These two C.M.As are against the common order dated 21-4-1993 in three I.As in the said suit including I.A Nos. 1511 and 1513 of 1990. C.M.A 495 of 1993 is against the temporary injunction order in the abovesaid I.A No. 1511 of 1990 in the said suit restraining the appellant from leasing out the trust properties or collecting the income thereof, as Managing Trustee of the said Trust. C.M.A No. 497 of 1993 is against the order in the abovesaid I.A No. 1513 of 1990 appointing a Receiver to take possession of the suit trust properties and manage them.

2. Respondents-1 to 3 in the C.M.As appeared even as caveators and since only a point of law is involved in these two appeals as is indicated below, the appeals themselves have been taken up for disposal.

3. The only submission by the learned Counsel for the appellant in both the Appeals is that LA. No. 604 of 1989 filed in the suit seeking leave of the Court under Section 92, C.P.C for instituting the abovesaid suit is still pending and no order has been passed thereon so far, granting the said leave and that therefore, the suit itself cannot be deemed to have been already instituted (even though it has been wrongly numbered) and that hence no interim order could have been passed in the said I.A Nos. 1511 and 1513 of 1990. Even though the said I.A No. 604 of 1989 was filed as early as 29-3-1989 and after the appellant herein filed counter therein as early as 13-6-1989 the Court below has adjourned the hearing of the said I.A “for enquiry” very many times, admittedly so far no order has been passed therein granting or refusing the said leave.

4. But, what the learned Counsel for the respondents-1 to 3 urges is that it should be inferred from certain features of the case that the said leave has been granted by the Court below by implication and that there is no necessity for any formal or express order granting the said leave. According to him, one of the abovesaid features is that the Court itself thought fit to number the suit in 1990. Another feature pointed out is that in the abovesaid I.As, no specific objection was taken stating that the said I.As could not be ordered before leave is expressly granted pursuant to the abovesaid I.A 604 of 1989. Yet another feature pointed out is that there was also amendment petition in the suit pursuant to the death of some of the parties of the suit and that the said petitions were also ordered. While so, all that he contends is that it should be inferred that the Court below has impliedly granted the abovesaid leave. Further, the said counsel points out that at this late stage, in the interest of the trust, the appellant should not be allowed to set at naught the just interim orders that have been passed in the abovesaid I.As to protect the interests of the trust. He also submits that Section 92 — suit is similar to a suit under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C wherein it has been held that interim orders could be passed pending disposal of the petition under the abovesaid Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C seeking permission of the Court to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest. In this connection, he drew my attention to the following passage in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 356 : AIR 1990 SC 444 at page 447 (R. Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities).

“He has also argued that a suit under Section 92 of Civil Procedure Code is different from a suit filed under Order 1, Rule. 8 of Civil Procedure Code. We do not agree with the learned Counsel.”

5. He also drew my attention to my own Judgment reported in (1990) I Law Weekly 638 (Executive Officer, Vadakku Valliyur Town v. M. Mattar Mohideen), which was also a case under Order 1, Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code, holding that where the Court has ordered publication of the notice of the application under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C, it can be presumed, in view of the rulings in 1980 TNLJ 86 (DB), (Sannkiah v. Vadakasi) and AIR 1977 All 421 (Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Paramanand that a conditional permission contemplated under the said rule) has been given by implication. He also points out that in (1991) 1 SCC 48 : AIR 1991 SC 221 (R.M Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakhsmanan Chettiar), it has been even held that in deciding the application for leave under Section 92, C.P.C, even notice of the application to the respondent is not necessary. While so, the Court below has ordered the said notice in the present case after hearing the petitioners in the I.A and according to the said counsel, from this also it could be inferred that the Court had granted leave by implication.

6. I have considered the rival submissions. First of all, it must be stated that in (1991) 1 SCC 48 : AIR 1991 SC 221 (R.M Narayana Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar), the Supreme Court has held, taking into consideration the language used in Sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, that leave of the Court is a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a public trust for the reliefs set out in the said Section (Para 17 therein). Section 92(1), C.P.C says “……………… having obtained leave of the Court, may institute a suit ……………………….”. So, it is clear that leave is a condition precedent for the institution of such a suit. The language used in Order 1, Rule 8(1)(a) is as follows:

“One or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue …… …… ………”.

7. It must also be noted that the permission spoken to in Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C is not and has also not been held to be condition precedent as in the case of leave under Sec. 92, C.P.C Permission under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C may be granted even after the institution of the suit and even at the appellate stage by allowing an amendment, if such amendment does not materially change the nature of the suit (AIR 1947 Mad 205, Mookka Pillai v. Valavanda Pillai and AIR 1943 Mad 161, Muthukaruppa Ethandar v. Appavoo Nadar).

8. The above referred to observation of the Supreme Court in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 356 : AIR 1990 SC 444 at page 447 does not mean that the suit or procedure with reference to it under Section 92, C.P.C and that with reference to a suit under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C are same in all respects. It only means the said suits are common insofar as they both are representative suits. That is why, the Supreme Court also observes immediately after the above-quoted passage cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent as follows:—

“A suit whether under Section 92 of Civil Procedure Code or under Order 1, Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code is by the representatives of large number of persons who have a common interest. The very nature of a representative suit makes all those who have common interest in the suit as parties. We, therefore, conclude that all persons who are interested in Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities which is admittedly a public trust are parties to the original suit and as such can exercise their rights under clauses 13 and 14 of Scheme decree dated September 9, 1910.”

9. In the said Supreme Court case relating to a suit under Section 92, C.P.C some persons who were not parties to the said suit filed objection to the permission granted by the Court earlier to sell the suit trust properties and sought to set aside the said permission. In that context only, the Supreme Court held that even though they were not really eo nominee parties they were held to be parties to the suit just as in the case of a suit under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C Only in that context, the Supreme Court observed the similarity between Section 92 suit and suit under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C both being representative suits. The abovesaid observation by the Supreme Court in the said decision cannot at all lead to the inference that in all respects, the suit under Section 92, C.P.C and the suit under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C are the same.

10. Since thus it is clear that the leave under Section 92, C.P.C is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit itself, now it is to be seen whether it could be inferred in the present case that the said leave has been granted by the court below by implication in view of the abovereferred to features pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent. The learned Counsel for the appellant points out that despite the abovesaid features there is absolutely no scope at all for any such inference. According to him, the reason is that not only the abovesaid I.A 604 of 1989 is still pending the Court below thought fit to order notice to the respondents (despite the fact that it is not incumbent on the Court to issue notice to the respondents in the said I.A) and after the counter has been filed by the respondents herein the Court as stated above, had been adjourning the case for “enquiry” several times, right from 13-6-1989 till 20-4-1993, as found in the copy of the said I.A Petition and orders thereon, shown to me. I concur with this argument since it is clear that the court below has yet to apply its mind as to whether it should grant or not, the leave under Section 92, C.P.C The fact that the Court is posting the said I.A for “enquiry” number of times, shows that it has yet to apply its mind on the question at issue. Therefore, I agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that despite the abovereferred to features pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents, there is no possibility at all for any inference being drawn to hold that the abovesaid leave had been already given by implication.

11. In this connection, no doubt the learned Counsel for the appellant draws my attention to the abovereferred to my own decision and points out that in the abovesaid decision also, it has been held as stated above that despite the fact that the I.A seeking permission under Order I, Rule 8, C.P.Ct Had been only posted for enquiry on several days and was only pending at the relevant time without order having been passed finally in the said I.A In this connection, he drew my attention to the following passage in para 4 of the said judgment.

“I.A No. 257 of 1989 was filed along with the suit seeking permission under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C, the said I.A is dated 24-5-1989. Notice was ordered in the said petition on the same day. Publication in one issue pf Dinathandhi was also ordered. On 26-6-1989 it was recorded that papar publication was made. Thereafter the said I.A was posted for enquiry subsequently on several days and so far no order has been passed finally in the said I.A”

12. Despite the above fact that the I.A was only posted for enquiry on several occasions, I have held in the said decision that it should be presumed that a conditional permission under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C had been given by implication, even though no express order granting such permission had been passed in the said I.A under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C

13. For coming to the said conclusion I relied on AIR 1977 All 421 and 1980 TNLJ 86 (DB) of this Court. The passage relied on in AIR 1977 All 421 (Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Paramananda) is as follows (at page 424):

“Unlike Order 33, Rule 8, C.P.C which provides that where the application for permission to sue as a pauper has been granted it shall be numbered and registered and shall be deemed the plaint in the suit. Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C contemplates a suit from the very inception. It is true that a representative character is imparted to the suit only after the requisite procedure has been complied with; but it would be erroneous to hold that no suit has been instituted until permission has been granted by the Court.”

……… “I think that when a Court issues notice on an application for leave under Order 1., Rule 8 made after the presentation of the suit, it should be inferred that the Court has by implication granted a conditional permission.”

14. Similarly the relevant passage in 1980 TLNJ 86 (DB), (Sankiah v. Vadakasi) is as follows:

“From the circumstances of the case and from the fact that the Court had ordered publication of the notice it can be presumed that the Court had granted the necessary permission under Order 1, Rule 8 ………… on the other hand, when the plaintiffs have filed the necessary application and the Court has ordered the necessary notice to be published in dailies, it is for the other residents of Chellam North and South Streets, if they were so inclined to have come and opposed the plaintiffs.”

15. But, neither the above referred to my own decision nor the other two decisions (AIR 1977 All 421 and 1980 TLNJ 86 (DB) all under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C can be applied to the present suit under Section 92, C.P.C This is so particularly because of what is contained in Clause (2) of Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C which runs as follows:

“The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under sub-rule (1), at the plaintiffs expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested………..”

16. The permission referred to in the said clause 2 is the permission of the Court under clause 1 of the said Rule which may be sought for by a plaintiff. So, only after permission spoken to under clause 1 is given the Court gives notice of the institution of the suit to all persons interested. So, when the Court gives such notice we can infer that the abovesaid permission has been granted by implication. That is why, I have held in the abovesaid my decision that it should be presumed that conditional permission has been given by implication. (The said permission is a conditional one because as pointed out in 1980 TLNJ 86, the defendants after they get the notice, could appear and oppose the application under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C and could get the said conditional permission revoked, if they are able to convince the Court to that effect.

17. On the other hand, there is no such provision in Sec. 92, C.P.C Further, even without ordering notice, the Court could grant the leave under Sec. 92, C.P.C though giving such notice may be a desirable one as pointed out by the Supreme Court in (1991) 1 SCC 48 : AIR 1991 SC 221. Therefore, the above referred to decision under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C cannot be applied to the present case under Section 92, C.P.C and it cannot be inferred in the present case that the leave under Section 92 has been granted by the court below by implication.

18. The next question is whether, consequent upon the abovesaid conclusion reached, should both the above referred to impugned orders in the abovesaid two I.As be set aside. In this regard, I am of the view that simply because of the abovesaid conclusion reached by me, the order in I.A 1513 of 1990 appointing a Receiver as stated above, cannot be set aside, though the other order in I.A 1511 of 1990 granting temporary injunction as stated above has to be set aside. This is because of the difference in the language used in O. 39, R. 1, C.P.C on the one hand and O. 40, Rule 1, C.P.C which I shall presently point out. No doubt in AIR 1980 Ori 100 I find the following passage (at page 104):

“Where a suit has been registered or interim orders have been passed prior to the granting of leave (under Sec. 92) the same shall be held to be incompetent, invalid and non est.”

19. But in view of the reasons I give below I think that the abovesaid ruling in AIR 1988 Ori 100 cannot be applied to an interim order appointing a Receiver pending the suit, under Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C I draw support for this proposition from the following three decisions. In 1982 Ker LT 790 (Sulaiman v. S.M Jama Ath) the Kerala High Court has held that unlike an application for the issue of a commission, which contemplates the existence of a suit for passing an order under Order 26, Rule 1, an application for the appointment of a Receiver does not in terms of Order 40, Rule 1, C.P.C contemplate an already registered suit for the exercise of the power thereunder and even while proceedings for leave under Sec. 92 are pending and the question of leave remains undecided, it will be open to the court to entertain an application for the appointment of a Receiver and deal with and dispose of the same in accordance with the law.

20. For coming to this conclusion, Kerala High Court relies on two decisions AIR 1945 All 261 : (1945 ALJ 492) (FB), Mohammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan and AIR 1948 Bom 139 (DB), Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani. In AIR 1945 All 261 : (1945 ALJ 492) (FB), the question was whether while setting aside the order of the District Judge removing the existing Mutwalli of the suit wakf, and appointing another Mutwalli thereof, on the ground that the said order of the District Judge was without jurisdiction, the High Court could appoint a Receiver to safeguard the wakf property of which the person appointed had taken possession pursuant to the District Judge's order. In the said decision, the following observation of Braund, J., was approved by the other learned Judge Wali Ullah, J. though the third Judge Allsop, J disagreed in that respect.

“With defence, I do not share the view that this Court, in this or any other matter involving the administration and care of assets, has no sufficient seisin of the subject-matter of a dispute which is once before it, to enable it to make such provision as is proper for the protection of the estate.”

“Jurisdiction to protect property pending the ascertainment of rights is inherent in any Court which once has cognizannce in any form of a dispute involving the execution of a trust or the administration of assets; and I think the Court has not merely jurisdiction but a duty to safeguard them. Thus the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent has asked us to do by the appointment of a Receiver pending the disposal of the matter in issue.”

21. Supporting this observation, Wali Ullah, J. also observed as follows:—

“It is clear from Order 40, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code that a Receiver can be appointed in proceedings other than suits. Thus, it has been held that a Receiver may be appointed during the course of the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act, vide AIR 1925 Lahore 489 and AIR 1929 Nag 119.”

22. In AIR 1948 Bom 139, Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani, the question was whether in proceedings in forma pauperis, the Court was competent to appoint a Receiver, and the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a Receiver could be appointed in such a case pending the decision in the application for leave to sue as pauper.

23. There, it has been pointed out that the present form of Order 40, Rule 1 differs from the older Section 503 (of the preceding Code of Civil Procedure), in that the words “where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient” have been substituted for the words “Where it appears to the Court to be necessary for the realisation, preservation or better custody, or management of property, moveable or immoveable, the subject of a suit or attachment” (Emphasis supplied). The said Division Bench points out further thus:—

“The omission of the words “the subject of a suit or attachment” leaves the rule in extremely general terms, and so far as sub-rule(1) is concerned, there is nothing whatever in the rule to suggest that a Receiver could not be appointed in any proceeding that was before the Court. It is of course necessary that there should be some proceeding before the Court and a person who has no other business in the Court at all cannot come to the Court and ask the Court to appoint a receiver and then go away. But so far as sub-rule (1) is concerned, there is nothing to suggest that an application to sue as a pauper is not the sort of proceeding in which a receiver could be appointed. It is true that sub-rule (2) refers to parties to the suit, but we do not think that these words in sub-rule (2) can be allowed to control the general terms of sub-rule (1) in view of the fact that there has been a deliberate amendment of the old rule and the principal part of the amendment was to omit the only words which would limit the proceedings before the Court to suits or attachments”.

24. No doubt the learned counsel for the respondents draws my attention to the following passage in (1991) 1 SCC 48 : AIR 1991 SC 221 at 225, R.M Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, to contend that even the Supreme Court does not contemplate that an interim order could be passed pending disposal of the petition under S. 92, C.P.C for instituting the suit thereunder.

“The desirability of such notice (of the petition for leave under S. 92, C.P.C) being given to the defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under S. 92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust. Such a construction of the provisions of S. 92 of the Code would render it difficult for the beneficiaries of a public trust to obtain urgent interim orders from the Court even though the circumstances might warrant such relief being granted”.

25. According to the learned counsel, if interim orders could be passed to safeguard the interest of the trust pending disposal of the application for leave under S. 92, C.P.C, the Supreme Court would not have made such an observation. But, in my view from this observation alone, without any further discussion in the matter, it cannot be concluded that the Supreme Court is of the view that no interim order at all could be passed pending disposal of the abovesaid application for leave under S. 92, C.P.C In view of my reasoning based on the above referred to the decisions of Kerala, Allahabad and Bombay High Courts, I hold that an order for appointment of Receiver to protect and preserve the suit trust properties could be made by a Court even ending disposal of the application for leave under S. 92, C.P.C

26. No doubt, in contract, if may also be noted that the language of O. 39, R. 1, C.P.C indicates that the temporary injunction thereof can be granted only in a ‘suit’, since the said rule begins by saying “Where in any suit, it is proved…”

27. Therefore, since no other argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant to point out any error in the above referred to receiver order in I.A No. 1513 of 1990 on its merits, I, while setting aside the impugned order in the other I.A No. 1511 of 1990 on the abovesaid legal ground that the prescribed condition precedent has not been fulfilled, I confirm the impugned order in I.A No. 1513 of 1990. Accordingly, C.M.A No. 496 of 1993 is allowed and C.M.A No. 497 of 1993 is dismissed. No costs.

28. I also want to add that it is very much regrettable that none of the learned Judges who presided over the Court below during the period from 1989 to 1993 when the above said LA. no. 604 of 1989 was pending, appears to have taken enough care to see that the said I.A was disposed of at a very early date, very soon, after the said LA. is posted before it each of them should have realised that where the plaintiffs deserve leave to institute the suit under Section 92, C.P.C but the said leave is not granted without any delay, the suit trust might suffer very much if there was mismanagement by the persons in management of the trust, but suitable interim orders could not be had from the Court. After all, if only judicial officers apply their mind, there could be no difficulty at all in disposing of an application under Section 92, C.P.C seeking the leave. The Court has only to satisfy itself whether the persons asking for leave have interest in the trust, whether the trust is a public trust and whether there are prima facie grounds for thinking that there has been a breach of trust.

29. Order accordingly.