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P.R Rajagopalan v. Southern Structurals...
Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitions arise from the termination of employment of the petitioner, who had been employed by Southern Structurals Limited (the respondent company) since 1962 and was a Stores Officer at the time of termination. The petitioner alleges a sequence of adverse transfers and charge memos beginning in the mid-1970s after he reported suspected misappropriation, culminating in a transfer order dated 22-8-1980 to the Ramagundam Project, and an alleged month's notice of termination dated 1-9-1980 for disobedience of the transfer order. The termination order was later withdrawn on 8-9-1980, but a charge-sheet dated 17-9-1980 was served and an order of termination dated 3-10-1980 was ultimately issued.
The petitioner filed an appeal under S. 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act (TSE), TSE case No. 44 of 1980, which was dismissed on 27-7-1983 on the ground that the respondent company was exempted under G.O. Ms. No. 545 as an establishment under the Government of Tamil Nadu. Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1983 challenged that dismissal and related matters. To avoid technical objections about the form of challenge, the petitioner later filed Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991 directly challenging the termination order and service rules (clause 6(4)). Both petitions were heard together and disposed of by the same order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal under S. 41(1) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act was maintainable in view of G.O. Ms. No. 545 exempting establishments under the Government (the procedural/maintainability issue).
- Whether the respondent company is an instrumentality/agency of the State (a 'state' under Art. 12 of the Constitution) or otherwise an 'establishment under the Government' for purposes of exclusion from the TNE Act, having regard to overwhelming State shareholding and government nominees on the Board.
- Whether the termination of the petitioner's service was arbitrary, contrived, vitiated by malice in law and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.
- Whether delay in bringing Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991 warranted refusal of relief based on laches or undue delay.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner's service was unlawfully terminated by the respondent — the termination was preceded and accompanied by a series of transfers and charge memos which the petitioner attributes to his discovery of misappropriation by others and subsequent victimisation.
- Although the petitioner had initially filed an appeal under S. 41 of the TNE Act, he conceded that because of G.O. Ms. No. 545 the TNE Act provisions and S. 41 appeal might not be available; accordingly he did not press a challenge to the correctness of the deputy commissioner's order dismissing the appeal as not maintainable.
- The central contention pressed is that the termination order was actuated by malice in law, was arbitrary, and violated Article 14 (and Article 16(1)) of the Constitution.
- The petitioner contended that the appeal and earlier proceedings did not preclude the High Court from considering the constitutional and public-law aspects of the termination when the statutory remedy was unavailable.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent company maintained that the petitioner’s service was governed by its service rules which formed the contract of service; the company legitimately transferred the petitioner to Ramagundam and the petitioner refused to obey the transfer (letter dated 28-8-1980), resulting in termination after one month's notice dated 1-9-1980.
- The respondent contended that the termination was for reasonable cause and not for misconduct, and that the charge-sheet dated 17-9-1980 was issued only to investigate allegations; the fact the termination notice preceded the charge-sheet indicated termination was not for the alleged misconduct.
- Before the labour authority the respondent relied on G.O. Ms. No. 545 and asserted that being a Government company the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act did not apply; consequently the appeal under S. 41 was not maintainable.
- In other pleadings the respondent sought to argue that despite the State holding 92.4% of shares and nominating most directors, the State did not exercise deep and pervasive control that would make the company a 'state' under Art. 12; the respondent asserted it was not an instrumentality or agency of the Government.
- Subsequently an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent before this Court disavowed the contention that the respondent is not a 'state' under Art. 12, and the respondent unconditionally apologized for earlier submissions to that effect (referring to the C.V. Raman decision as affecting the view taken earlier).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| C.V. Raman v. The Management of Bank of India and another (1985 II M.L.J 439 = 98 L.W. 560) | The distinction between an “establishment under the Government” under S.4(1)(c) of the TNE Act and an “authority” under Article 12; caution against importing the tests for Art.12 mechanically into S.4(1)(c) analysis. | The respondent relied on the reasoning in C.V. Raman to justify its earlier attempt to argue that the company was not a 'state' under Art.12; the respondent later withdrew that submission and apologised. The Court treated the withdrawal and failure to produce records as justifying a presumption that the respondent is an instrumentality/agency of the State. |
| Sri Konaseema Co-op. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju (AIR 1980 A.P. 171) | Summarised propositions on when writ jurisdiction is available against societies/authorities: (i) if a society is 'state' under Art.12, writ lies to enforce bye-laws/fairness; (ii) writ may lie to enforce statutory public duties even if not 'state'; (iii) bye-laws are contractual and not of the force of law unless statutory protection exists (e.g., provision in Shops & Establishment Acts); (iv) public law remedies are not for enforcing private contractual rights but Art.14 can apply where state character is present. | The Court used this Full Bench dictum as guidance on how to approach whether a writ should issue against the respondent: to distinguish between public law and private law obligations and to assess whether the respondent falls within the ambit of Art.12 or whether statutory public duties exist that justify writ relief. |
| Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT (AIR 1992 S.C. 76) | Explains that Art.12 should not be stretched to include every autonomous body; state control, financial contribution, or nomination alone are not determinative; a combination of state aid, control and performance of important public/state functions may indicate 'state'. | The Court relied on this principle to emphasise that whether an entity is an 'authority' for Art.226 and an 'authority' for Art.12 are distinct enquiries, and to adopt a nuanced assessment of the respondent's character rather than a formalistic one. |
| E.E & C. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ramana Dayaram Shetty (Supreme Court judgments — cited together) | Principles concerning the operation of Article 14 and the limits of writ relief to enforce private contractual obligations; that private contractual obligations (not statutory) ordinarily cannot be enforced by writ, but Art.14 can operate to check arbitrary state action prior to contract enforcement. | The Court invoked these authorities to support the proposition that contractual obligations alone do not attract writ relief, but that where public law or constitutional fairness (Art.14) is engaged, writ jurisdiction may be invoked; relevant to deciding whether termination was arbitrary and violative of Art.14. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by addressing factual and legal strands that were placed before it and by applying the legal principles distilled from the cited authorities:
- Maintainability/Exemption: The petitioner accepted that because of G.O. Ms. No. 545 (10-2-1950) and the company's character as an establishment under the Government, the TNE Act did not apply and S.41 appeal was not competent. The petitioner therefore gave up attacking the deputy commissioner's order dismissing the S.41 appeal. That factual/legal position framed the need to consider constitutional relief.
- Contradictory Pleadings on 'State' Character: The respondent had taken inconsistent positions — asserting before the labour authority that it was a Government-managed factory (to avoid the TNE Act) but later in affidavits before the High Court suggesting that the State did not exercise deep and pervasive control and thus the company was not a 'state' under Art.12. The Court identified this conflict and required production of records to ascertain control and shareholding details.
- Failure to Produce Records and Subsequent Apology: The respondent did not produce the records as directed. Instead, it filed an affidavit explaining that its earlier stance arose from reliance on the C.V. Raman decision and then unconditionally apologised for the submission that the respondent was not a 'state' under Art.12. The Court treated the failure to produce records and the apology as indicative that the respondent had not discharged the heavy onus of showing independence from State control.
- Onus and Characterisation: Applying the legal tests (as discussed in Sri Konaseema and Supreme Court jurisprudence such as Chander Mohan Khanna), the Court concluded that the petitioner had discharged the onus of proving that the respondent company was a Government company and an instrumentality/agency of the State. The Court relied on the following salient factual indicators present on record: overwhelming State shareholding (92.4%), majority of directors being Government nominees, requirement of Government approval for director appointments, and Government counter-guarantees to bankers — all pointing to deep State control.
- Nature of Termination: The Court examined the sequence of events: multiple transfers, charge memos (some not pursued after explanations), the issuance and withdrawal of transfer/termination orders, and the issuance of a charge-sheet with only 48 hours' time to explain. The Court found that the termination was contrived — it was based on a ground (alleged disobedience) which had ceased to be operative due to earlier withdrawal of transfer order — and that the company used the termination to avoid proper enquiry into the charges. The order was therefore characterised as arbitrary and tainted by malice in law.
- Constitutional Violation and Remedy: Because the respondent was found to be an instrumentality of the State (bringing it within the ambit of public law obligations) and because the termination was arbitrary and contrived, the Court held that Articles 14 and 16(1) had been violated. The Court therefore concluded that writ relief was appropriate.
- Delay and Laches: The respondent argued delay in filing Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991 should bar relief. The Court examined the procedural history — the petitioner had earlier challenged the termination process by appealing under the TNE Act and had moved the High Court by W.P. No.10116 of 1983 when the appeal was dismissed — and found the delay in filing the second writ to be excusable in the circumstances.
- Relief Moulding: Taking all factors into account, the Court quashed the termination notice dated 1-9-1980 and the termination order dated 3-10-1980, allowed Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991, allowed Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1983 insofar as it impugned the same termination, and directed that the petitioner be deemed reinstated in continuous service as if no termination had occurred. The Court made no order as to costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991 is allowed. The impugned notice of termination dated 1-9-1980 and the subsequent order of termination dated 3-10-1980 are quashed. Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1983 is allowed to the extent that it impugned the same termination. The petitioner is to be deemed reinstated in continuous service as if there had been no termination. There shall be no order as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The immediate consequence is reinstatement of the petitioner with continuity of service and the nullification of the termination proceedings specified in the order.
- On characterisation of the respondent: The Court reached the conclusion that the respondent company was an instrumentality/agency of the State on the factual record before it; this determination was pivotal in invoking constitutional protections (Arts. 14 and 16) and exercising writ jurisdiction.
- Remedial principle: The decision demonstrates that where an entity performs under deep and pervasive State control such that it is an instrumentality of the State, actions of that entity affecting employment may be reviewed for arbitrariness and malice in law under constitutional provisions even if private-law or contractual machinery exists.
- Precedential note: The opinion applies existing principles from prior judgments (as cited) to the facts; the Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal doctrine beyond application of established tests and remedies. The decision is fact-specific and grounded on the record of shareholding, board composition and conduct in the termination process.
End of summary — prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion without adding or inferring information beyond the text.
1. Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1983 is directed against the order of T.S.E case No. 44 of 1980 by the second respondent therein viz., the Assistant Commissioner of Labour II Madras under which order he has held that no appeal is maintainable under S. 41(1) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act against the order of termination of service passed by the management of Southern Structurals Limited the first respondent therein W.P No. 17376 of 1991 is directed against the order of termination passed by the said respondent as well as to quash the service rules so far as Cl. 6(4) thereof is concerned.
2. Relevant facts as set out in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions are as follows:— Petitioner was employed as a Stores Officer in the service of the respondent-Southern Structurals Limited when according to him his service was unlawfully terminated by order dated 1-9-80. He had joined the service of the respondent in July 1962 as cashier-cum-accounts Assistant and risen to the status of the Stores Officer by and by in July 1974. In March 1975 he was transferred to Structural Engineers and Technicians Industrial Co-operative Society Limited. In July 1977 he was recalled to the stores at Pattabiram. In September 1979 he was transferred to the Data Collections and Statistics section of the Industrial Engineering Department, where he remained for a brief period of 13 days only after which he was recalled to the Accounts Department. According to the petitioner he discovered during 1975 that the personal assistant to the then Managing Director of the Company had in collusion with a typist at the Head Office been misappropriating the share capital of members. This led to the disciplinary action against some of the guilty persons. The Managing Director did not take this kindly and subjected the petitioner to a spate of transfers, followed by a charge memo in March 1978, alleging that the petitioner was responsible for the missing of two plates from the stores. On petitioner's explanation this charge was not followed up. In December 1979 a further memo emanated as if one forged round was missing from the stores. The said charge was also not followed up on petitioner's explanation about the round having been consumed. In May 1980 another charge memo came up that colour coding of stock had not been carried out by the petitioner. The petitioner answered this charge also. However the petitioner was transferred to Ramagundam Project in Andhra Pradesh on 22-8-1980 and asked to join duty on or before 27-8-1980. The petitioner represented to the General Manager and sought time to report for duty and also represented on 28-8-1980 requesting for a month's time as his wife had undergone a major surgery from which she was yet to recover and to meet her medical expenses he was required to dispose of certain properties with respect to which certain execution proceedings was pending in Court. The petitioner was served with another office memo to join at Ramagundam before 10-9-1980. This order the petitioner received on 4-9-1980. However, before the petitioner could proceed he received another memo dated 1-9-1980 purported to be one month's notice of termination of service on the ground that he had disobeyed the transfer order dated 22-8-1980. The petitioner represented against the said termination. This termination order was withdrawn on 8-9-1980. The petitioner was also informed that the second transfer order also stood cancelled.
3. While so according to the petitioner he was informed by letter dated 8-9-1930 that the representation against the transfer to Ramagundam was rejected and this was followed by a letter dated 17-9-1980 containing a charge sheet for certain alleged omissions. Under this letter the petitioner was called upon to explain the charge within 48 hours. The petitioner has stated.
“While so by letter dated 17-9-1980 the respondent issued a charge sheet for alleged omission on my part and gave me 48 hours to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against me. The charges were vague and various office orders which I was unaware of were referred to. The charges also related to acts in 1977, 1978 and 1979. I sought substantiation of the same and requested for production of records. But by order dated 3-10-1980 vide the month's notice dated 1-9-80 my services were terminated.”
Petitioner filed an appeal under S. 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, TSE case No. 44 of 1980. The said case was dismissed by order dated 27-7-1983 on the sole ground that the respondent company was exempted under G.O Ms. No. 545 being an establishment under the Government of Tamil Nadu.
4. Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1983 was admitted to hearing. To avoid any technical objection that the order impugned in the said petition was one passed in appeal under S. 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Entertainments Act and thus the termination order passed by the first respondent had not been questioned in the said writ petition the petitioner as advised filed Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991. Both petitions have been heard together and are having disposed of by a common order.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner conceded that in view of the order in G.O Ms. No. 545 dated 10-2-1950 of the Government of Tamil Nadu since the respondent company is a Government company the provisions of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act are not applicable and accordingly the appeal under S. 41(1) of the said act was not competent. He has thus given up any challenge to the validity or correctness of the order in TSE case No. 44 of 1980. He has however contended that on the facts as aforementioned the order terminating the petitioner's service is afflicted by malice in law and is arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
6. In the counter affidavit filed in W.M.P No. 21051 of 1991 in W.P No. 10116 of 1983 on behalf of the first respondent it is stated that the petitioner's services with the first respondent company was governed by the service rules of the first respondent company which were/are in the nature of contract of service. It is further stated as follows:
“6. “The first respondent company transferred the petitioner vide its letter dated 22-8-1980 from its factory at Pattabiram to Ramagundam project where the first respondent company was doing certain contract work. But the petitioner by his letter dated 28-8-1980 refused to obey the said transfer order of the first respondent company and stated that he would not be in position to go to Ramagundam site immediately due to certain domestic problems and that he was willing to visit not only Ramagundam site but other sites also once in a while to organise the accounting, billing work, collections etc.”
7. Since the first respondent company wanted to reorganise and restructrue its accounts department by efficent persons and to weed out the inefficient ones and since no other suitable work was available for the petitioner the first respondent company terminated the services of the petitioner by giving one month's notice vide its letter dated 1st September, 1980.
8. Though the first respondent company directed vide its letter dated 4-9-1980 to proceed to Ramagundam Super Thermal Power Project Ramagundam Si e before 10th September, 1980 to organise and take care of the complete accounting side in view of the notice of termination issued on 1-9-1980 the first respondent company cancelled the above said order dated 4-9-1980 vide its office order dated 8-9-1980. The charge sheet dated 17-9-1980 issued by the first respondent company to the petitioner was only to find out the truth in the alleged charges against the petitioner. The fact that the termination notice preceded the said charge sheet clearly shows that the petitioner's service were not terminated for any misconduct.
9. As said above the petitioner's service were terminated by the first respondent company only for reasonable cause. Against the said termination order the petitioner preferred an appeal bearing No. 44 of 1980 before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour Madras under S. 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act. The said appeal was dismissed by the second respondent as not maintainable in view of G.O Ms. No. 545 dated 10-2-1950 which exempted all persons employed in any kind of work in factories and governed by the Factories Act, 1948 from all the provisions of the said Act. Against the impugned order the petitioner preferred the above writ petition in the year 1983”.
7. In another return filed in Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991 it is stated that “the respondent company refute the allegations that the petitioner's service was terminated in an arbitrary and whimsical manner. “It is only for the reason of refusal by the petitioner to join duty at Ramagundam site his service was terminated after giving one month notice for the same”. In this affidavit the first respondent has taken the stand that the Government of Tamil Nadu was holding 92.4% of shareholding in the equity capital of the respondent but holding share capital by the Government of Tamil Nadu does not amount to having deep and pervasive control over the affairs of day to day management/administration of the respondent and only in the capacity as shareholder the Government of Tamil Nadu is appointing Directors to the extent of its shareholding. It is further stated:
“Further the Article of Association of the respondent company does not require any prior permission from the Government of Tamil Nadu for running affairs of the company. In fact neither the memorandum of Association nor the Articles of Association of the respondent come any provide for any power or control or right in favour of the Government of Tamil Nadu to issue any direction or to regulate or interfere with the business or affairs of the respondent company. Even the Directors nominated by the Government of Tamil Nadu are completely free from Governmental control in discharge of their functions. The respondent company is doing business/manufacturing a tivity in relation to cranes aid structural works like any ordinary person would do and as such is not enjoying any monopoly status conferred by the Government or corporations like Air India or Indian Airlines. While the Government of Tamil Nadu has control over the respondent company to the extent mentioned above it cannot constitute deep and pervasive state control which is a prerequisite for the respondent company to be construed as a state agency or instrumentality. The functions of respondent company are not of any public importance nor are they related to Government functions. Facts clearly indicate that the respondent company is not an instrumentality or agency of the Government.
After taking the above stand in this counter affidavit it is further stated:
“Even though the respondent company might fall under the definition of establishment under State Government as per S. 4(1)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act for reasons mentioned above the respondent company does not fall under the category of ‘other authority’ under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. The respondent is advised to submit that all establishments which may fall under the category of (‘Establishment under State Government’ under S. 4(1)(c) of TNSE Act do not necessarily fall under the category of ‘other authority’ under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. Either for the reason that the respondent company might fall under the category of establishment under State Government or by reason of the averments made by the respondent in the counter statement before the authority under the TNSE Act, it is not possible to state that respondent company is falling under the heading ‘other authority’ under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India.”
8. The stand thus that the first respondent is neither an instrumentality nor an agency of the Government nor an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India would appear to be in conflict with the previous statements that the respondents has been making in the sense that to oust the jurisdiction of the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, it was maintained that the respondent company was a Government company and to use the jurisdiction of this court it was suggested that even though there has been a overwhelming shareholding in the hands of the State Government, the State Government has been appointing Directors and though only its nominees were managing the affairs of the company the Government never had that deep and pervasive control upon the affairs of the company which would convert it into an agency or instrumentality of the State Government. Keeping this controversy in mind the court on 13-2-1992 ordered as follows:
“My attention has been drawn to a counter statement filed on behalf of the respondent company before the Deputy Commissioner of labour in which it is stated inter alia:
The respondent company is a factory managed by the Government of Tamil Nadu and it is covered by the Factories Act 1948, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and not by the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947.
The authorised capital of the respondent company is Rs. 350 lakhs and the paid up capital of the respondent company is Rs. 148.85 lakhs divided into 62-60 lakhs equity shares of Rs. 2.25 lakhs each amounting to Rs. 140.85 lakhs and 2 lakhs 9.33% preference shares of Rs. 4 each amounting to Rs. 8,00,000, and out of the 60.60 lakhs of equity shares the Government of Tamil Nadu owns 57.80 lakhs equity shares which amounts to 92.4% of the total equity capital of the respondent company.”
The Board of Directors of the respondent-company consists of eight directors out of which six directors are the nominees of the Government of Tamil Nadu.
The appointment of any director on the Board of Directors of the respondent company has to be approved by the Government of Tamil Nadu.
The Government of Tamil Nadu has given counter guarantee to the extent of Rs. 535 lakhs in favour of the bankers of the respondent company in respect of the guarantees and various other credit facilities provided by the banker to the respondent company.
All the facts stated above will go to prove that the entire control and management of the respondent company is with the Government of Tamil Nadu and hence even assuming without admitting that the respondent company is an establishment as defined under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 it is an establishment under the Government of Tamil Nadu and so the respondent company is exempted from the provisions of the said act according to S. 4(1)(c) of the said act.
In an affidavit filed before this Court however in W.P No. 17376 of 1991 an attempt is made to suggest that the entire control of the company is not that of the State Government and for the reasons of its shares and other factors as seated it cannot be said that it is under the control of the State Government and it is a State under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India.
2. The counter affidavit in the writ petition has a definite slant of facts to accept writ jurisdiction of this Court for the reason that fundamental rights of any person may not be enforced by a writ unless it is against a state under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. Before I make any order as to whether there is an attempt to mislead the court by a statement in the counter affidavit before this Court and thus any action is warranted it is necessary that all the records pertaining to the establishment and the control upon the affairs of the company by the State Government/any other person are called for and examined by the court. It is also necessary to known who besides the State Government held the shares of this company and whether those besides the Government holding the shares of the company are themselves a State under Art. 12 of the Constitution or not. There are many informations of this kind which are not disclosed in the counter affidavit filed before this court. Thus it is hereby ordered that the respondents shall produce before this court all the relevant records showing how the company was created who control it and how it cannot be stated to be a Government Company who besides the State Government are members of the company (share holders) and who besides the Government of the State exercise any control with respect to the affairs of the company. All the relevant records pertaining to the above must be produced before this court at the next hearing. Put up next week.”
No records however as directed under the above order have been produced. A further affidavit has been filed on behalf of the first respondent stating inter alia that the aforementioned stand was taken due to the fact that in C.V Raman v. The Management of Bank of India and another . 1985 II M.L.J 439 = 98 L.W 560.) it was observed that there was a distinction between “an establishment under the Government” under S. 4(1)(c) of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act and an ‘authority” under Art. 12 of Constitution of India and “it was also observed that it cannot be gainsaid that the principle applicable to the determination of an ‘authority’ under Art. 12 of Constitution of India can bodily be imported in deciding the meaning of ‘establishment’ under the Government’ under S. 4(1)(c) of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act”.
It is thereafter said:
“Because of this I presumed that inspite of the averments made by the respondent before the authority 41 (1) of the TNSE Act about the extent of the control by the Government of Tamil Nadu over the respondent I may be able to convince this Hon'ble court that the respondent does not fall within the definition of ‘state’ under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India by reason of the abovesaid distinction.”
After saying so it is said:
“I hereby unconditionally apologise without any reservation whatsoever for having made out the above submission that the respondent is not “state” under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India”.
It is understandable why if there were/are materials that could justify the stand of the respondent company that it was not a state under Art 12 of the Constitution of India it should abstain from producing relevant records and materials and instead decide to file the affidavit aforementioned. The court at this stage can proceed with the presumption that the first respondent is an instrumentality/agency of the State of Tamil Nadu.
9. In a Full Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Konaseema Co-op. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju . AIR 1980 A.P 171. a detailed study had been made with reference to various pronouncements of the Supreme Court as to how a court should approach to determine whether a writ should issue to a certain authority or not. The Full Bench summarised the rule as follows:
“From the above discussion the following propositions emerge:—
(i) If a particular co-operative society can be characterised as a ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution (applying the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in that behalf) it would also be an ‘authority’ within the meaning and for the purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution. In such a situation an order passed by a Society against its employee in violation of the bye laws can be corrected by way of a writ petition. This is not because the bye laws have the force of law but on the ground that having framed the bye laws prescribing the service conditions of its employees the society must follow them in the interest of fairness. If it is left to the sweet will and pleasure of the society either to follower not to follow the bye laws it would be inherently arbitrary and may very limely give arise to discriminatory treatment. A society which is ‘state’ has to act in conformity with Art. 14 and for that reason it will be made to follow the bye laws.
(ii) Even if a society cannot be characterised as a ‘state’ within a meaning of Art. 12 even so a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty which an employee is entitled to enforce against the society. In such a case it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a ‘person’ ‘or an, ‘authority’ within the meaning of Art. 226 of the Constitution. What is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it and the court will enforce such statutory public duty.
(iii) The bye laws made by a co-operative society registered under the A.P Co-operative Societies Act do not have the force of law. They are in the nature of contract terms of contract between the society and its employees or between the society and its members as the case may be. Hence where a society cannot be characterised as a ‘state’ the service conditions of its employees governed by bye laws cannot be enforced through a writ petition. However in the matter of termination of service of the employees of a cooperative society S. 47 of the A.P Shops and Establishment Act provides a certain protection and since the said protection is based upon public policy it will be enforced in an appropriate case by this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Ordinarlily of course an employee has to follow the remedies provided by the A.P Shops and Establishments Act but in appropriate case, this court will interfere under Art. 226 if the violation of a statutory public duty is established. It is immaterial which act or rule casts such a statutory public duty.
(iv) Mandamus certiorari and prohibition are public law remedies. They are not available to enforce private law rights. Every act of a society which may be a ‘state’ within the meaning of Art. 12 does not necessarily belong to public law field. A society which is a ‘state’ may have its private law rights just like a Government. A contractual obligation which is not statutory cannot be enforced by way of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Prior to entering into correct however Art. 14 operates as explained by the Supreme Court in E.E & C. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, and Ramana Dayaram Shetty case.
10. In a series of judgments the Supreme Court has pointed out how the word ‘authority’ in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not restricted to the same meaning as the words ‘other authorities’ should receive in the definition of the ‘state’ in Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. The former must receive a liberal meaning. The latter is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of various circumstances. This analysis is found in one of the latest judgments of the Supreme Court in Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT . AIR 1992 S.C 76.. The Supreme Court has said:
“Art. 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression “State”. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of welfare state, independent institution corporation and agency are generally subject to state control. The state control does not render such bodies as “State” under Art. 12. The State control, however vast and pervasive is not determinative. The financial contribution by the state is also not conclusive. The combination of state aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the state may largely point out that the body is “state”. If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution”.
11. In view of the above statement of law to which no exception can be taken it is clear that an ‘authority’ for the purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India need not be an authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and ‘any other authority’ for the purpose of Art 12 of the Contsitution of India may, in a given case be an instrumentality or agency of the Government of the State. It is not the look of the body concerned. It is its character that will decide whether it is an authority for the purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India or an authority for the purpose of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and whether its name or look is different on account of the veil or cloth. The court in such cases shall pierce the veil and notice the true character of the person concerned to determine whether it is an ‘authority’ for the purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India or/and authority for the purpose of Art. 12 of the Constitution. An authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India shall always be an authority for the purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
12. On the facts that are available on the record it can safely be said that the petitioner has discharged the onus to prove that the respondent company is a Government company which is just an agency or instrumentality of the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu and the State is in complete control of all its affairs. If the respondent company wanted to show otherwise it had to discharge a heavy onus and show by cogent material that notwithstanding the overwhelming share control and almost every Director of the company being a nominee of the state it retained its independence as a company and has not been under the deep and pervasive control of the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu.
13. Coming to the facts there is almost no controversy or little controversy that there has been a enquiry of any kind conducted into the allegations levelled against the petitioner. While on the one hand certain charges were levelled against the petitioner on the other hand the respondent company decided to terminate his services on a ground which had ceased to be a ground for the reason of the order having been recalled and a further time granted to the petitioner to join his duties at Ramagundam.
14. There are sufficient elements in the order of termination simplicitor to show that it had been contrived to avoid enquiry into the charges that had been levelled against the petitioner. The impugned order terminating the petitioner's service for the reason that it used the alleged disobedience of the transfer order as the ground's stricken by arbitrariness and for the reason that instead of proceeding with the charges levelled against the petitioner the respondent company decided to terminate the petitioner's service on a ground non est it is hit by malice in law. For these reasons there can be no hesitation in holding that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner issued by the first respondent is violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India.
15. It is however stated that this court should decline to interfere with the order of termination of the services of the petitioner because that order has been challenged only in the second writ petition that has been filed in the year 1991 after a long and inordinate delay. Taking this technical view of the matter will mean ignoring the fact that the petitioner did question the validity of the order of terimination of services under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act and when his appeal was rejected as not maintainable, moved this court in Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1983. This court's power to interfere with the arbitrary and ‘without jurisdiction’ order of the kind impugned by the petitioner herein in W.P No. 10116 of 1983 cannot be questioned. The court must always see as to how any unconstitutional act can be avoided and how far the facts of the case require moulding the relief. In the instant case I am satisfied that the delay in filing Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991 is excusable.
16. For the reason aforesaid Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991 is allowed. The impugned notice of termination dated 1-9-1980 culminating in the order of termination dated 3-10-1980 of the respondent is quashed. Writ Petition No. 10116 of 1983 is allowed to the extent that it impugned the order of the first respondent covered by Writ Petition No. 17376 of 1991. As a consequence the petitioner shall be deemed to be reinstated and in continuous service as if there has been no termination of service at all. On the facts of this case there shall however be no order as to costs.
RR/VCS.
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