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Y.A Kader v. Muthulakshmi Ammal (Died) And 3 Others

Madras High Court
Aug 14, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from multiple connected suits concerning two sale agreements executed on 19.6.1974. The appellant, Y.A. Kader, was plaintiff in O.S. Nos. 18 and 19 of 1978 (suits for specific performance) and defendant in O.S. Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 (suits for possession and mesne profits). Ex. A1 was a sale agreement in respect of 8.71 acres for Rs. 65,325 (advance Rs. 2,000 paid and possession delivered on 19.6.1974). Ex. A2 was a sale agreement in respect of 1.81 acres for Rs. 13,575 (advance Rs. 2,000 paid and possession delivered on 19.6.1974). A subsequent sale deed dated 18.12.1974 was executed in respect of 3.971/2 acres out of the 8.71 acres (Ex. A1). Another deed (Ex. B3 dated 3.10.1974) conveyed a further 87 cents in favour of the appellant's nominee. The vendors (including Muthulakshmi ammal and others) alleged that Kader failed to pay the balance price within the six months stipulated by the agreements; notices (Ex. A3 dated 20.1.1977 and Ex. A10 dated 24.2.1977) were sent and the vendors terminated the contracts and sued for possession (O.S. 84 and 85 of 1977). Kader sued for specific performance in O.S. 18 and 19 of 1978. All suits were tried together; the trial court dismissed O.S. 18 & 19 (specific performance) and decreed O.S. 85 in full and O.S. 84 in part (3.80 1/2 acres out of the 4.73 1/2 acres claimed). The present appeals challenge those outcomes.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant (Kader) is entitled to protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act by reason of part performance (i.e., whether he performed or was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract).
  2. Whether the appellant was in fact ready and willing to perform the contracts for sale, so as to entitle him to specific performance under the Specific Relief Act (and to invoke S.53-A).
  3. Whether the plaintiffs in O.S. Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 were entitled to possession (and mesne profits) despite the presence of a default/penalty clause in the sale agreements.
  4. What reliefs should be granted to the parties (extent of possession decrees, mesne profits, costs and time for delivery of possession) in view of the facts and the application of S.53-A and related principles.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Y.A. Kader)

  • The appellant contended he was entitled to the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act because he was put into possession of the properties on 19.6.1974 and continued in possession thereafter.
  • The appellant asserted he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contracts; any delay was due to the vendors' failure to measure the lands and alleged shortfall in acreage.
  • The appellant argued that, because each sale agreement contained a default clause permitting the vendor to take an extra Rs. 2,000 and execute the sale deed, the plaintiffs' remedy should be limited to claiming that enhanced consideration (i.e., damages or the adjusted sale), not recovery of possession.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents maintained that Kader was not ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration and therefore could not claim specific performance or protection under S.53-A.
  • They asserted that they took steps (including measurement) in 1976 and served notices (Ex. A3 and Ex. A10) when Kader failed to complete the transactions within the contractual time; the vendors properly terminated the contracts and sought possession.
  • The respondents argued that the default/penalty clause did not preclude their seeking possession after a long delay and change in circumstances; they relied on authority that a penalty clause does not by itself make time of the essence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Karthikeya Mudaliar v. Singaram Pillai, 1956 II M.L.J. 515 That readiness and willingness to perform the contract must be established by evidence; Section 53-A does not expressly require a plea of readiness and willingness in the written statement in a suit for possession. The court relied on the passage to explain that evidence of readiness and willingness is necessary; absence of a formal plea in the written statement is not necessarily fatal in a suit for possession, but readiness/willingness must be established by evidence.
Anantha Pillai v. Rathnasabapathy Mudaliar Illustration that if the plaintiff fails to lead evidence of readiness and willingness, condition (vi) of S.53-A is not satisfied. The court cited this decision to show that lack of proof of readiness/willingness defeats reliance on S.53-A.
Sardar Govindarao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai, 1982 1 S.C.C. 237 Section 53-A requires the person claiming part performance to be shown to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract; absence of such readiness/willingness disqualifies the claimant from protection. The court treated this Supreme Court observation as persuasive authority to construe ‘willingness’ in S.53-A as equivalent to ‘readiness and willingness’ under S.16 of the Specific Relief Act, thereby supporting its conclusion that the appellant could not invoke S.53-A.
Hatten v. Russell, 38 Ch. D. 334 Where a contract fixes a day for completion but provides only for a penalty/interest on delay, that clause does not necessarily make time the essence so as to prevent relief where completion is delayed due to vendor's defect of conveyance (not title). The court relied on this principle to reject the argument that the presence of a default clause limited the vendors to only claiming damages; after a long delay and changed circumstances, the vendors could seek possession.
Gomathinatagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar Mere inclusion of a penalty clause in the agreement does not by itself indicate an intention to make time of the essence. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that the vendors were not confined to claiming only the penalty/extra Rs. 2,000 and could seek possession where there had been long default by the purchaser.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the contractual documents, the acts done pursuant to them, the conduct of the parties and the evidence (or lack thereof) of readiness and ability to pay the balance consideration.

  1. Facts and documents: The court noted that Ex. A1 and Ex. A2 were executed on 19.6.1974, possession was handed over on that date, and an advance of Rs. 2,000 was paid in each transaction. Subsequent sale deeds had been executed only in respect of parts of Ex. A1 (3.971/2 acres) and 87 cents under Ex. B3 for the appellant's nominee; no sale deed had been executed pursuant to Ex. A2.
  2. Burden and evidence of readiness/willingness: The court emphasized that one essential requirement for invoking S.53-A is that the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his contractual obligations. The court found no evidence that the appellant had made any attempt after 3.6.1975 to pay the balance consideration; in his chief examination the appellant did not speak to readiness and willingness and no documentary evidence was produced of his ability to pay.
  3. Measurement dispute: The vendors alleged measurement in July 1976 disclosed minor deficiencies (4 1/2 cents and 5 cents) because a road was put after the agreement. The appellant replied (Ex. A5) that he was ready to have sale deeds taken after measurement in his presence. The vendors' subsequent letter (Ex. A8) stated the lands were measured in the appellant's presence — a fact not denied by the appellant in Ex. A9. The court treated this as undermining the appellant's claim that measurement issues excused his delay.
  4. Conclusion on readiness: Given the absence of evidence of attempts to pay, the appellant's silence after the relevant dates, and the evidence about measurement and offers to accept proportionate price, the court concluded the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contracts. Consequently, the appellant could not claim specific performance nor the protection of S.53-A.
  5. Default clause and remedies: The court addressed the appellant's contention that the vendors were limited to claiming the Rs. 2,000 default remedy and could not seek possession. The court held that after the long delay and a total change in price circumstances, the vendors were not restricted to that remedy. The default clause indicated time was not of the essence but did not prevent vendors from recovering possession where the purchaser had unreasonably delayed.
  6. Relief and quantification: The court determined that small deficiencies in area (4 1/2 + 5 = 9 1/2 cents) required adjusting the decree in O.S. 84. It fixed the specific extents for which possession could be decreed (1.461/2 acres in S. No. 178/4 and 2.301/2 acres in S. No. 179/1) and directed mesne profits to be determined by the lower court under Order 20, Rule 12, C.P.C.
  7. Consequential rulings: On the above basis the court modified and confirmed parts of the trial court's decree as explained below and directed timelines and costs consistent with the findings.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appellant is not entitled to specific performance or to protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act because he was not shown to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contracts; the vendors are entitled to possession in respect of the lands as quantified by the court.

Direct effects on the parties (as stated in the judgment):

  • A.S. No. 54 of 1980 (appeal against O.S. 84 of 1977) is allowed in part: the decree is modified so that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of 1.461/2 acres in Survey No. 178/4 and 2.301/2 acres in Survey No. 179/1 (i.e., adjusted to account for the 4 1/2 and 5 cents deficiency). Mesne profits for those extents are to be determined by the lower court (O.20, R.12, C.P.C.). The appellant must pay respondents' costs proportionate to the dismissal of the appeal in respect of the remaining land.
  • A.S. No. 351 of 1985 (appeal against O.S. 85 of 1977) is dismissed; the trial court's decree in O.S. 85 of 1977 is confirmed in full because there was no shortage in extent there.
  • A.S. Nos. 380 of 1985 and 408 of 1985 (connected appeals) are dismissed with costs, consequent on the above findings and decrees.
  • Time for delivery of possession in both O.S. Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 is fixed as three months from the date of this judgment.

Broader implications: The judgment applies established principles on the requirements of readiness and willingness under S.53-A and the distinction between a default/penalty clause and making time of the essence. The court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applied existing authorities to the facts before it and adjusted the parties' remedies accordingly.

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JUDGMENT

All these appeals are by one Y.A Kader, A.S No. 54 of 1980 is against the Judgment and Decree in O.S No. 84 of 1977, A.S No. 351 of 1985 is against the Judgment and Decree in O.S No. 85 of 1977, A.S No. 380 of 1985 is against the Judgment and decree in O.S No. 18 of 1978 and A.S No. 408 of 1985 is against the Judgment and Decree in O.S No. 19 of 1978; all the said suits were on the fite of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram. The Appellant Y.A Kader herein is the Plaintiff in O.S No. 18 of 1978 and 19 of 1978 and defendant in O.S No. 84 of 1977 and O.S No. 85 of 1977. 0. S. Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 are for possession and mesne profits. O.S No. 84 of 1977 was fited one Muthulakshmi, the 1st Respondent in A.S No. 54 of 1980. She having died pending A.S No. 54 of 1980, her three legal representatives were brought on record as Respondents 2 to 4 in the said A.S No. 54 of 1980. Likewise, in the view of the joint memo dated 17.7.1991, in A.S No. 380 of 1985 also the same three are hereby brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased Respondent Muthulakshmi ammal. O.S No. 85 of 1977 was fited by the above referred to Muthulakshmi and tne 3 chitdren of one Savithri ammal, who are Respondents 2 to 4 in A.S No. 54 of 1990. The said three persons are Respondents 2, 3 and 4 in A.S No. 351 of 1985 and they have also been recorded as legal representatives of the deceased 1st Respondent Muthulakshmi ammal. In O.S No. 84 of 1977 possession was claimed with reference to 4.73 1/2 acres of land. In O.S No. 85 of 1977 possession was claimed with reference. In O.S No. 85 of 1977 possession was claimed with reference to another land, whose extent is 1.81 acres. O.S Nos. 18 and 19 of 1978 were fited by the Appellant herein for specific performance of the contract of sale of the lands involved in the above referred to O.S No. 84 1977. White O.S No. 18 of 1978 was against the above said Muthulakshmi alone, O.S No. 19 of 1978 was fited against the said Muthulakshmi and 3 chitdren of Savithri Ammal (Respondents in A.S No. 54 of 1980) and was for specific performance of another contract of sale of the lands involved in the above said O.S No. 85 of 1977. All these suits were tried together as they are connected with each other and common evidence was recorded.

2. O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 for possession came to be fited in the following circumstances:— Admittedly two sale agreements were executed on 19.6.1974 One is Ex. A1. It was executed by the Plaintiff in O.S No. 84 of 1977 in favour of the above said Kader, the appellant. The other is Ex. A2, executed by the above said Savithriammal, who died subsequently, in favour of the above said same Kader. By the former agreement, 8.71 acres of wet lands were agreed to be sold for Rs. 65,325/- at the rate of Rs. 25/- per kuli. In the latter agreement 1.81 acres of wet lands were agreed to be sold for Rs. 13,575/- at the same rate. Under each of the said agreements, a sum of Rs. 2,000/- was paid as advance. Further, possession of the respective lands was also handed over to the buyer, the above said Kader on the same date. Further, in respect of the above said Ex. A1 sale agreement, subsequent to the said sale agreement, on 18.12.1974 sale deed was executed with reference to 3.97-1/2 acres. This is out of the above said 8.71 acres and the above said portion covered a consideration of Rs. 36,187/- out of the above said total consideration of Rs. 65,325/- under the sale agreement. With reference to the above facts, there is no dispute between the parties.

3. White so, according to the Plaintiffs, with reference to the balance 4.73-1/2 acres, the said Kader did not come forward to pay the balance price and get the sale deed executed, despite the fact that the sale agreement provided that within six months of the date of sale agreement, the sale should be completed and despite the fact that the Vendor reminded Kader to perform his part of the contract, by even sending Ex. A3 notice dated 20.1.1977 Further, according to the plaintiff in O.S No. 84 of 1977, a even though the Appellant Kader sent a reply Ex. A5 dated 26.1.1977, he did not come forward to pay the balance price and hence by Ex. A10 dated 24.2.1977, the said plaintiff terminated the contract on the ground that the Appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and fited the suit O.S No. 84 of 1977 claiming back possession of the above referred to 4.731/2 acres out of the total 8.71 acres. In the other suit O.S No. 85 of 1977 also according to the plaintiffs therein, the defendant Kader did not come forward to pay the balance sale price, viz., Rs. 11,575/- despite the fact that even in the sale agreement relating thereto, the same six months period was stipulated as the period within which the sale should be completed. In this case also possession of the land was admittedly handed over to Kader on 19.6.1974 itself; Here again, according to the said plaintiffs, despite the reminders sent by them, Kader did not come forward to pay the balance price and get the sale deed. The above said Ex. A10 terminates Ex. A2 contract also for the same reason. That is why O.S No. 85 of 1977 has been fited for possession of the above said 1.81 acres of land.

4. The court below has dismissed O.S Nos. 18 and 19 of 1978 and decreed O.S No. 85 of 1977 as prayed for and gave a partial decree in O.S No. 84 of 1977 in favour of the plaintiff therein with reference to only 3.80 1/2 acres of land out of the above said 4.73 1/2 acres of land claimed by the plaintiff therein. The above said partial decree was so given because the court held that apart from the above referred to 3.971/2 acres of land, sale deed was executed for another 87 cents also under Ex. B3 dated 3.10.1974 in favour of the defendant Kader's nominee.

5. For decreeing O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 and dismissing O.S Nos. 18 and 19 of 1978 as staled above, the court below found that the above said Kader was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. His defence in the suit was that he was entitled to pari performance contemplated under S. 53. A of the Transfer of Property Act and so, O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 would not lie at all. Further, his defence was that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and there was delay because the respective vendors did not measure the respective lands agreed to be sold and there was actually deficiency in the extent agreed to be sold.

6. The court below has held that there is no scope for application of S. 53. A of the Transfer of Property Act since one of the essential requirements therein, viz., the transferee performing or being willing to perform his part of the contract, has not been satisfied in the present case by the transferee Kader. Further, the court below has also held that the respective plaintiffs in O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 were not at fault with reference to the measuring of the respective lands as alleged by the defendant Kader.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant initially submitted that the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and only the Respondents were at fault. As against this initial submission, the learned counsel for the respondents argued the other way about. So, first of all, it may be seen who was at fault. Pursuant to Ex. A1 sale agreement for 8.71 acres, admittedly sale deeds were executed excepting for 3.861/2 acres out of the total 8.71 acres and that is why O.S No. 84 of 1977 was laid by the plaintiff Muthulakshmi ammal, therein for recovery of possession of the said extent, on the footing that there was breach of contract on the part of the above said appellant Kader. Of the said sale deeds admittedly the last one was on 3.6.1975 Then so far as Ex. A2 sale agreement is concerned, for 1.81 acres admittedly, no sale deed was executed pursuant to the agreement. That is why the other suit O.S No. 85 of 1977 has been filed by the Plaintiffs therein on the same ground of breach of contract. Both the transactions put together the balance of sale consideration, after taking into account the advance of Rs. 2,000/- paid in each of the two transactions, would come to about Rs. 30,000/- roughly and the main thing that has to be considered is whether the abovesaid appellant Kader was ready and willing to pay the abovesaid balance sale price and whether due to any fault on the part of the respective respondents, he rightly withheld the said payment. First of all, after the abovesaid last sale deed of 3.6.1975, there is no document showing that the appellant Kader made any attempt to pay the abovesaid balance sale price. The Appellant as D.W 1 in his chief examination, did not at all speak about his readiness and witlingness to pay the said sale price and perform his part of the contract. Further, no documentary evidence has been fited to show that the appellant had resources to pay the said balance sale price. That apart, so far as Ex. A2 sale agreement is concerned, as already stated there was no sale deed executed even for a part of the property agreed to be sold thereunder. Just as Ex. A1, Ex. A2 is also dated 19.6.1974, as already stated, and the terms of both the agreements are almost same and even under Ex. A2 within six months from 19.6.1974 the sale has to be completed. But the appellant did not pay the balance sale consideration under Ex. A2 within the said six months period or even thereafter and there is nothing to show that he was ready and willing to pay the same and thereby perform his part of the contract. So, so far as Ex. A2 is concerned, the appellant was keeping quiet even after the expiry of the above said six months period, that is, right from the end of 1974 itself and so far as Ex. A1 sale agreement, he was keeping quiet at least from the above said dated of 3.6.1975 So far as Ex. A1 sale agreement, it is only the plaintiff Muthulakshmi ammal who sends notice under Ex. A3 dated 20.1.1977 to the appellant slating, intcralia, as follows:—

“Even though a period of over two years had passed, you have not completed the transaction by paying all the amounts due and taking sale deeds of all the properties… You have not cared to take sale deeds for the rest of the lands and you ore deliberately cvadin and gaining time obviously on account of the advantageous position you are having in being in possession and enjoyment of the properties and realising the income therefrom. When my client sent her brother to Mayuram in July, 1976 for taking action, you said that if the lands arc measured, you will fulfill the terms of the contract immediately. After considerable difficulty and also at personal cost my client had the lands measured by a surveyor, but apart from a very small extent the rest are found to be correct and at any rate so far as the nanja lands are concerned, only an extent of 4 1/2 cents in R.S 178/4 and 5 cents in U.S 179 were found to be deficient. The deficiency is only due to the fact that after the agreement a road seems to have been put up by the panchayat, and the place is occupied by road. My client's brother informed you even to reduce proportionately for the extent found to be less. Even after such an offer you have not fulfilled your obligation.” (Underlining is mine).

To this Ex. A3, the appellants no doubt sent a reply under Ex. A5 dated 26.1.1977 In the said reply no doubt he stated that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He further stated therein that it was not correct to state that the above said Muthulakshmi Ammal had the lands measured by a surveyor and the deficiency was 41/2 + 5 cents only. He then staled that without notice to him he understands that surveyor was brought and that he measured some items only.” Therefore, he stated that he was ready and willing to have the sale deeds taken after due measurement of all the lands in his presence. It is to be noted that the sale agreement as such does not contain any term for measuring the lands agreed to be sold. Further, it is not shown by any evidence that prior to July, 1976, this question of measurement was raised at all by the appellant. Further, Ex. A3 specifically states that the deficiency of 4 1/2 cents +5 cents was only due to the fact that after the sale agreement, a road was put up by the Panchayat on the suit land reducing its area to the above extent. The fact that the road came in after the sale agreement, has not been denied in Ex. A5. Further, in reply to Ex. A5, Ex. A8 letter dated 8.2.1977 was sent by Muthulakshmi ammal to the appellant. In the said letter, apart from stating that the application for measuring the lands was made in Chalan No. 72-73-74 dated 29.6.1976 and on 14.7.1976 it is also sated that in the presence of the appellant, the lands were measured. To this categorical statement of the presence of the appellant at the time of measurement of lands by the surveyor, there is no denial in the subsequent reply Ex. A9 dated 15.2.1977 sent by the appellant to the plaintiff Muthulakshmi ammal. Any way, when the plaintiff Muthulakshmi ammal has expressed her witlingness to accept the balance price in proportion to the extent sold, the appellant can have no grievance. If necessary, the appellant could have himself measured the land at the cost of the plaintiff and demanded the execution of the sale deed according to the extent on payment of the proportionate price thereof. Taking all these into consideration, I think there was no justification on the part of the appellant to have delayed considerably in paying the balance sale price with reference to both the sale agreements and performing his part of the contract. So, he witl not be entitled to specific performance, which is claimed by him in his two suits O.S Nos. 18 and 19 of 1978.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the suits O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 are not maintainable in view of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. His contention is that the appellant, in part performance of the respective sale agreements, was put in possession of the respective suit properties on 19.6.1974 and continued to be in possession thereof and his possession could not be disturbed. But, I am unable to accept this contention in view of the fact that one of the several requirements under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act has not been satisfied by the appellant for claiming protection thereunder. The said requirement under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Properly Act is the transferee should have performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. So, unless the appellant transferee has proved that he has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, he cannot invoke S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. I have already held that he was not ready and willing to pay the balance sale price and perform his part of the respective contracts and that he was not entitled to specific performance claimed by him in his two suits. But, the learned counsel for the appellant, however contends that the term used in S. 53-A is mere witlingness to perform the transferee's part of the contract and not readiness and witlingness to perform his part as mentioned under S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act. But, the said counsel was unable to cite any authority to make any such distinction between the abovesaid terminology used in S. 53-A and the corresponding one used in S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice three decisions from which it can be safely inferred that the term ‘willingness’ used in S. 53-A of the Transfer of Properly Act is, nothing different from the term willingness and readiness used in S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act. The first of these decisions is Karthikeya Mudaliar v. Singaram Pillai 1956 II M.L.J 515, where I find the following passage:—

“S. 53-A however docs not provide that there must he a plea in a suit for possession, where the defendant seeks the aid of S. 53-A, that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract must no doubt he established by evidence and that readiness and willingness must be shown to have existed ever since the time of the agreement and not necessarily when the suit is filed. It maybe that such a pleading may be absolutely necessary in a suit for specific performance on the part of the plaintiff. But the absence of an averment in the written statement in a suit for possession, where the defendant raises plea under S. 53-A, does not appear to me to be fatal, as S. 53-A does not in terms provide for any such requirement.”

(Underlining is mine)

Then in Anantha Pillai v. Rathnasabapathy Mudaliar after citing the above passage the learned Judge observes as follows:—

“Admittedly, in this case the plaintiff has not let in evidence to show that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Therefore, condition No. (VI) enumerated already is not satisfied in this case and for this reason the plaintiff cannot have any reliance on S. 53-A.”

(Underlining is mine)

Further in Sardar Govindarao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai 1982 1 S.C.C 237 I also find a similar observation as follows:

“S. 53-A. requires that the person claiming the benefit of part performance must always be shown to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. And if it is shown that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract he will not qualify for the protection of the doctrine of part performance.”

(Underlining is mine).

No doubt, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Supreme Court in the above said decision was only concerned with another requirement under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, viz., that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract”. But, I do not think so, it was considering both the requirements on the facts that were before it. Even assuming that the above quoted observation of the Supreme Court was obiter, it has to be given due weight.

9. So, it is clear from the abovesaid passages quoted in the above referred to three decisions, the term willingness used in S. 53.A would mean only ‘readiness and willingness’ used in S. 16 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, I find that the appellant cannot invoke S. 53. A of the Transfer of Property Act.

10. Nextly, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respective respondents could not seek for the relief of possession and that all that they could claim if it all was only damages for breach of contract. Further, he pointed out that in each of the abovesaid sale agreements Exs. A1 and A2 there is an identical default clause stating that if the purchaser makes any default, the vendor can have Rs. 2000/- more as sale consideration and execute the sale deed accordingly. So, according to the learned counsel the appellant cannot claim back possession of the respective suit properties and if at all each of them could claim Rs. 2,000/- more as sale consideration. I do not think that this contention could be accepted after such a long time and when there is a total change in the price situation. That apart, the above referred to default clause only indicates that the time was not of the essence of the contract. So, if at least immediately after the expiry of the six months period fixed, Kader had approached the respective plaintiffs in O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 with the balance sale consideration, then they could not have refused to execute the sale deed. But, in the present case, the said defendant has kept quiet for a long time. After the last sale deed that was executed on 3.6.1975, he had not approached the respective plaintiffs therein with the balance sale consideration and asked them to execute the sale deeds. It is only the vendor who has sent notices Ex. A3 dated 20.1.1977 and Ex. A10 dated 24.2.1977 complaining about the default on the part of the said purchaser defendant. Thus, unreasonably a long period has elapsed. So, the said defendant cannot rely on the above said default clause and ask the respective plaintiffs in the above referred to two suits to execute the sale deed despite the long delay and default on his part. That apart, oven in the written statement in those two suits or in his plaints in the other two suits, he has not pleaded that as per the above said default clause, he is entitled to have the respective sale deeds though at a price higher, i.e Rs. 2,000/-. In this behalf, the learned counsel for the Respondents also relied on Hatten v. Russell 38 Chancery Division 334 where it has been held that where a contract for sale between a vendor and purchaser fixes a day for completion, and provides that if the purchase is not completed on that day the purchaser shall pay interest from that day until completion, time is not of the essence of the contract so as to entitle the purchaser if, in consequence of a defect of conveyance merely and not of title, the vendor is unable on his part to complete the contract on the day fixed. He also drew my attention to Gomathinatagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar where it has been held that mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence. Therefore, despite the above said default clause, the respective plaintiffs in O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 can seek the relief of possession prayed for and it cannot be said that they can claim only damages from the abovesaid Kader.

11. So, the possession relief sought for can be given. However, it is admitted that the land that is avaitable is 41/2 cents less in S. No. 178/4 and is less by 5 cents in S. No. 179/1. So, the plaintiff in O.S No. 84 of 1977 is entitled to a decree for possession of an extent of 1.461/2 acres in S. No. 178/4 and 2.301/2 acres in S. No. 179/1 and mesne profits therefor, which is to be decided under separate proceedings under O. 20, R. 12, C.P.C by the lower court. Thus A.S No. 54 of 1980 is allowed in part and the judgment and decree of the court below are modified as indicated above. The appeal in respect of the extent of land other than the above said 41/2 + 5 = 9 1/2 cents is dismissed. Accordingly the appellant has to pay the respondents costs proportionate to the above dismissal. However, in O.S No. 85 of 1977, since three is no shortage in the extent, the judgment and decree of the Court below are confirmed and A.S No. 351/1985 is dismissed with costs. Time for delivery of possession in both O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977 is three months from this date. Consequent on the above said findings and the decrees given in O.S Nos. 84 and 85 of 1977, A.S Nos. 380 of 1985 and 408 of 1985 are dismissed with costs.

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