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D.C.W Ltd. v. Union Of India

Madras High Court
Feb 21, 1991
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (a single petitioner-company across all matters) manufactures caustic soda by electrolysis of sodium chloride brine using BASF-type high amperage mercury cells. In the primary cell a gaseous mixture containing hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, water vapour and a substantial percentage of chlorine is produced. This mixture is conveyed by pipeline into two branches: one to a liquid chlorine plant, and the other to a furnace where it is burnt with hydrogen to produce hydrochloric acid fumes which are absorbed to make commercial hydrochloric acid. The central dispute is whether the gaseous mixture taken from the primary cell for manufacture of hydrochloric acid (referred to as "wet chlorine") is "goods" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and whether it is classifiable under sub-heading 2801.10 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. A subsidiary question is whether that form is marketable where the petitioner captively consumes it rather than actually marketing it.

The petitions under review are:

  • W.P. No. 8647 of 1988 — against an order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise dated 25-4-1988 imposing duty of Rs. 8,00,839.80 for wet chlorine removed without payment of duty for the period 1-5-1987 to 31-10-1987.
  • W.P. No. 12177 of 1988 — against an order dated 8-7-1988 imposing duty of Rs. 8,41,204.44 for the period 1-11-1987 to 30-4-1988.
  • W.P. No. 13838 of 1988 — against a show cause notice proposing to levy Rs. 8,20,421.78 for the period 1-5-1988 to 30-9-1988.

It is not disputed that the petitioner had an alternative remedy available (an appeal under Section 35-A to the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals)), and in the case of W.P. No. 13838 of 1988 the petitioner could submit explanations and, if an adverse order were passed, appeal against it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the gaseous mixture (wet chlorine) produced in the primary cell and taken through pipelines for manufacture of hydrochloric acid is "goods" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
  2. Whether the wet chlorine is classifiable under sub-heading 2801.10 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 ("2801.10 - Chlorine (including liquefied or solidified gas)"), and therefore excisable.
  3. Whether the wet chlorine is marketable (i.e., capable of being sold in the market) even though the petitioner captively consumes it and does not in fact market it.
  4. Procedural question: whether the High Court should refrain from entertaining the writ petitions because the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy of appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-company (Applicant)

  • Contended that "wet chlorine" taken through special pipelines to the adjoining plant for manufacture of hydrochloric acid is not excisable goods under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
  • Relied on Government of India Revision No. 1842/77 dated 30-7-1977, which concluded on two grounds that wet chlorine was not dutiable: (a) it did not meet the technical meaning of "compressed gas" as envisaged under the earlier tariff entry (compression as understood in trade/ISI standards), and (b) following DCM's case (1977 (1) ELT J199), the gas was not brought to the market nor capable of being brought and sold in the wet condition because it was violently reactive and would attack steel pipes or metal containers if stored as such.
  • Pointed out that the Department's need to compute chlorine quantity arithmetically from hydrochloric acid production demonstrated the difficulty of treating wet chlorine as an excisable good.

Second Respondent / Department (Revenue)

  • Raised a preliminary objection that the Court should not entertain the writ petitions because of the availability of an adequate alternative remedy (appeal under Section 35-A); relied on several reported and unreported decisions for this principle.
  • Substantively, submitted that after enactment of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 the sub-heading 2801.10 includes "Chlorine (including liquefied or solidified gas)", and that the earlier emphasis on compression or purity no longer applies; therefore wet chlorine falls within the tariff entry.
  • Argued that wet chlorine need only undergo chilling, drying and liquefaction (processes preparatory to storage/transport) and that the presence of a specific tariff entry for chlorine means it cannot escape duty.
  • Asserted that marketability is satisfied: actual marketing is distinct from marketability; the fact that the assessee removes wet chlorine to the hydrochloric acid plant shows the product is marketable even if the assessee chooses not to market it.
  • The Assistant Collector adopted a methodology to compute duty by converting captive hydrochloric acid production into an equivalent quantity of chlorine and multiplying by the tariff rate (example calculation produced in the impugned order, resulting in the duty amounts noted above).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandran Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd. ((1985) 1 SCC 260 : AIR 1985 SC 330) Principle that courts should ordinarily not interfere where an adequate alternative remedy (such as appeal) is available. Relied upon by respondents to urge non-interference; court considered it in deciding whether to exercise discretion to hear the writ petitions but ultimately proceeded to examine merits because petitions were pending for a substantial period.
Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa ((1983) 2 SCC 433 : AIR 1983 SC 603) Similar principle on alternative remedy and judicial restraint. Referred to in submissions on alternative remedy; court noted the principle but determined to decide merits in the circumstances of long pendency.
S. Jagadeesan v. Ayya Nadar Janaki Animal College ((1984) 1 SCC 158 : AIR 1984 SC 1512) Another authority on availability of alternative remedy and when courts should refrain from intervention. Considered in the context of the preliminary objection; court retained discretion and chose to examine merits given delay.
Z. Raja Beedi Factory v. The Collector of Central Excise (W.A. No. 257 of 1988 dated 2-3-1988) and related unreported decisions (W.A No. 1730 of 1987 dated 25-10-1988; W.A Nos. 865 to 875 of 1989 dated 30-10-1989) Unreported/bench decisions relied upon to support remanding to alternative remedy. Noted by respondents as supporting non-interference; court acknowledged these decisions but proceeded to examine merits because of the prolonged pendency of the writ petitions.
Madura Coats Ltd. v. Asstt. Collector Of C. Ex. [1990 (48) ELT 321] Considered by this Court on the question of alternative remedy and discretion. Cited as part of the Court's prior consideration of the alternative remedy principle; Court still elected to decide the present petitions on merits.
Raj Soni v. AIR Officer Incharge Admn [(1990) 3 SCC 261] Authority relevant to exercise of judicial discretion where alternative remedies exist. Referred to in deliberations on preliminary objection; court observed the authorities but proceeded to examine merits.
Government of India, Revision No. 1842/77 (Order dated 30-7-1977) Administrative conclusion that wet chlorine did not satisfy the technical meaning of "compressed gas" under the former tariff entry and that wet chlorine was not capable of being brought to market in the wet condition (hence not "goods" under Section 3). The court treated this Government Order as a primary support for the petitioner's contention that wet chlorine is not excisable; the order's twofold reasoning (compression/technical standards and marketability/inherent reactivity) was relied upon in favour of the petitioner.
DCM's case (1977 (1) ELT J199) Authority followed by the Government in concluding that the gas was not brought to the market and not marketable in the wet condition. Cited as the precedent followed by the Government order; the court noted that the Government adopted that reasoning in concluding wet chlorine was not "goods".
Union Carbide India Ltd. v. Union of India [1986 (24) ELT 169 (S.C)] Principle that an article existing only in a crude, incomplete or unmarketable form (requiring further processing) may not be "goods" under Section 3. Cited by the court to illustrate that items not having a market identity in their crude state are not excisable; used in support of petitioner's position that wet chlorine lacks marketability as produced.
Bhor Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay [1989 (40) ELT 280 (S.C)] Principle that marketability is an essential ingredient for an item to be dutiable under the Schedule and that the item must be known in the market as a distinct identifiable commodity; actual sale is not necessary but marketability is. Applied by the court to reject the second respondent's assertion that mere removal to an adjoining plant proved marketability; the court relied on the Bhor Industries formulation of the "goods" concept under Section 3.
Collector of Central Excise v. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises [1989 (43) ELT 214 (S.C)] Observed that articles must be known in the market or capable of being sold in the market to qualify as goods; actual sale is not necessary but marketability is required. Relied upon by the court to reinforce that captive consumption does not automatically render an item excisable unless the item is marketable or known in the market as such.
Collector of Central Excise v. Kanoria Chemicals and Industries [1990 (49) ELT 593 (Tribunal)] Tribunal decision holding that wet chlorine cannot be categorised as "goods" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The court noted the Tribunal's confirmation of the Government's view and treated that decision as further support for quashing the impugned departmental orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages: first it addressed the respondents' preliminary objection based on the availability of an alternative remedy (appeal under Section 35-A), and second it examined the merits of the dispute on whether wet chlorine constitutes "goods" excisable under Section 3 and is classifiable under sub-heading 2801.10.

On the preliminary objection, the Court acknowledged established principles (citing several Supreme Court and other decisions) that ordinarily courts should not correct every illegal order where expert authorities are better placed to deal with technical or factual matters. However, the Court also recognized the complementary principle that once a writ petition has been admitted and pending for some time it may be improper to drive the party to an alternative remedy. Taking these authorities together and noting that the writ petitions had been pending since 1988 (a significant period), the Court exercised its discretion to decide the issue on merits rather than summarily relegating the petitioner to the appellate route. The Court left open the possibility that after examining the merits it could still relegate the parties to the alternative remedy if that appeared appropriate.

On the merits, the Court reviewed:

  • The impugned order of the Assistant Collector which computed duty by estimating total hydrochloric acid captively consumed, converting that into an equivalent chlorine requirement (using a theoretical requirement per metric tonne) and multiplying by the duty rate under the tariff (an arithmetical method producing the stated duty sums).
  • The petitioner's reliance upon the Government of India Revision No. 1842/77 (30-7-1977), which gave two distinct reasons for holding wet chlorine non-excisable: (a) it did not meet the trade/ISI understanding of "compressed gas" as required under the erstwhile tariff entry, and (b) following DCM's case, wet chlorine was not brought to market nor capable of being brought/sold in the wet condition because it was violently reactive and could not be stored or transported in standard metal containers.
  • The revenue's counter-argument that the 1985 Tariff Act placed chlorine under sub-heading 2801.10 (including liquefied or solidified gas), thereby removing the earlier emphasis on "compression" or "purity", and that wet chlorine is therefore simply chlorine and subject to duty; additionally, the revenue contended that marketability existed even if the assessee did not market the product.

The Court evaluated the competing positions against authorities on the concept of "goods" and marketability. It highlighted Supreme Court pronouncements (Union Carbide; Bhor Industries; Ambalal Sarabhai) establishing that for an item to be excisable under Section 3 it must be an article known in the market as a distinct identifiable commodity or at least capable of being sold in the market. The Court emphasized that actual sales are not required but marketability (capability of being sold / known in the market) is essential.

The Court found that the Government order's second reasoning — that wet chlorine in the wet condition cannot be stored or transported safely and therefore is not capable of being brought to market — was not addressed adequately by the second respondent. The second respondent's assertion that marketability is shown by mere removal to the hydrochloric acid plant was treated as an incorrect statement of law in light of Bhor Industries and Ambalal Sarabhai. The Court also noted supporting findings in Union Carbide (regarding incomplete or unmarketable articles) and the Tribunal decision in Kanoria Chemicals, which expressly held wet chlorine was not goods under Section 3.

Given these authorities and the Government order, and having regard to the long pendency of the petitions, the Court concluded that it would be unjust to require the petitioner to pursue the alternative remedy after nearly two and a half years. The Court therefore quashed the impugned departmental orders and the show cause notice and allowed the writ petitions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's ultimate disposition was to quash the impugned orders and show cause notice and to allow the writ petitions. The Court made the rule nisi absolute and ordered no order as to costs.

Immediate consequences for parties:

  • The departmental orders under challenge (including the demand assessments and the show cause notice described in W.P. Nos. 8647, 12177 and 13838 of 1988) were quashed.
  • The writ petitions were allowed and the rule nisi made absolute.

Broader implications: The opinion rests on existing authorities and administrative orders (Government of India Revision No. 1842/77, Supreme Court decisions and a Tribunal decision) to conclude that wet chlorine, in the wet condition in which it is produced, is not "goods" within the meaning of Section 3 and therefore not subject to the excise demand asserted. The opinion does not state that it is creating a novel precedent beyond applying and relying on those authorities; no separate, broader legislative interpretation beyond the cited authorities is articulated in the text.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner in all the cases is the same. The petitioner-company manufactures caustic soda by electrolysis of sodium chloride brine by BASF type high amperage mercury cells. During this process in the primary cell a mixture of gases consisting of Hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen water vapour and a substantial percentage of chlorine content are produced. This mixture of gases is fed through pipe line and diverted into two branches. One branch goes to the liquid chlorine plant, with which we are not concerned. The other branch is taken to a furnace where it is burnt with Hydrogen resulting in Hydro chloric acid fumes which are absorbed in water to make commercial grade Hydro chloric acid. The bone of contention between the parties is whether the mixture of gases liberated in the primary and taken through pipe lines for manufacture of Hydro chloric acid, otherwise called wet chlorine, is goods within the meaning of Section 3 of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and whether it is classifiable under sub-heading 2801.10 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The subsidiary question is whether in that form, it is marketable even though the petitioner does not actually market it and captive-ly consumes the same for the manufacture of Hydro chloric acid. W.P 8647 of 1988 concerns the order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise dated 25-4-1988 imposing a duty of Rs. 8,00,839.80 for the total quantity of wet chlorine manufactured and removed without payment of duty for the period from 1-5-1987 to 31-10-1987. W.P No. 12177 of 1988 is against a similar order dated 8-7-1988 for the period from 1-11-1987 to 30-4-1988 imposing a duty of Rs. 8,41,204.44. W.P No. 13838 of 1988 is against a show cause notice proposing to levy Rs. 8,20,421.78 for the period from 1-5-1988 till 30-9-1988. It is not-disputed that the petitioner-company has an alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Section 35-A to the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals). Similarly in W.P No. 13838 of 1988, the petitioner-company can submit its explanation and if an order is passed against it, an appeal can be filed.

2. Let me at the outset deal with the preliminary objection of Mr. A.S Venkatachala Moorthy, counsel for the respondents. The submission is that this Court should not interfere with the impugned orders on the short ground of availability of adequate alternative remedy. In support of the contention, the following judgments are relied upon: (1) Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandran Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd., ((1985) 1 SCC 260 : AIR 1985 SC 330), (2) Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa ((1983) 2 SCC 433 : AIR 1983 SC 603) and S. Jagadeesan v. Ayya Nadar Janaki Animal College ((1984) 1 SCC 158 : AIR 1984 SC 1512). Reliance is also placed upon the unreported judgments in Z. Raja Beedi Factory v. The Collector of Central Excise, Madras-34 (W.A No. 257 of 1988 dated 2-3-1988), W.A No. 1730 of 1987 dated 25-10-1988 and Southern Engineering Industries, Coimbatore v. The Superintendent of Central Excise, Coimbatore I Division, Coimbatore - 1991 (52) ELT 373 (Mad.) (W.A Nos. 865 to 875 of 1989 dated 30-10-1989). The principles are too well known. For more than one reason Courts should not take upon the duty of correcting every illegal order especially when it involves assessment of factual material or technical questions with which the prescribed authorities are more conversant and have expert knowledge. Equally, there is one other well accepted principle that when a writ petition has been admitted and is pending for some time, it will be improper to drive the party to an alternative remedy. Having all these principles in mind, it is for the Court to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner with the interest of both parties in mind. No doubt, the Division Bench in W.A Nos. 865 to 875 of 1989 (cited supra) has considered this very aspect and still directed the party to invoke the alternative remedy. I have myself considered this aspect in Madura Coats Ltd. v. Asstt. Collector Of C. Ex. [1990 (48) ELT 321]. There is also the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Soni v. AIR Officer Incharge Admn. [(1990) 3 SCC 261]. I, therefore, feel, it would be more appropriate to decide the issue after examining the merits of the case especially because the writ petitions are pending from 1988. If, while examining the merits of the case, it is felt that it would be more appropriate to relegate the petitioners to the remedy of appeal, it can always be done. The impugned order proceeds as follows:—

The petitioner company manufactures hydro chloric acid. For this purpose, it uses hydrogen and chlorine indigenously prepared. Hydrogen is exempted from duty if captively consumed. Chlorine is exempted under Notification 40/85-C.E., dated 17-3-1985 if the end product hydro chloric acid suffers duty in full or in part. In this case, the hydro chloric acid used in the ‘ilmenite’ has not suffered duty. Therefore, the 2nd respondent seeks to impose a duty on the chlorine content used in the manufacture of hydro chloric acid. Since there is no manner or method of finding out the actual quantity of chlorine utilised, the 2nd respondent has adopted the following method:—

“Quantity of Hydrochloric Acid captively consumed during the period from 1-5-1987 to 31-10-1987. .. 22248.050 Requirement of Chlorine for 1 M.T of Hydrochloric Acid (30-33%) (Theoretical Requirement 321 kg. for 33%-Hydreehloric Acid) .. 400 kg. Total Chlorine consumed during the period from 1-5-1987 to 31-10-1987 in the manufacture of Hydrochloric Acid. .. 22248.05 × 400 1000 MT = .. 8899.22 MT The total duty payable on the said quantity of Chlorine removed without payment of duty is given below: Duty at the rate of Rs. 90/- per M.T - 8899.22 × 90 = Rs. 8,00,339.80.”

3. In reply to the show cause notice, the petitioner-company contended that the wet chlorine which is taken through special pipe lines to the adjacent plant for manufacturing hydro chloric acid is not excisable goods. The petitioner-company relied on the order in Revision No. 1842/77 dated 30-7-1977 passed by the Government of India. That order of the Government was based on two grounds. (1) Wet chlorine did not satisfy the Technical meaning of compressed gas which alone could be brought under erstwhile Tariff Item 14 H. Compression as contemplated under 14 H should be compression as understood in the trade. Therefore, going by ISI standards wet chlorine did not satisfy the entry 14 H which related to compressed chlorine. (2) Following DCM's case (1977 (1) ELT J199), the Government also held that the gas under consideration is not brought to the market, nor is it capable of being brought in the wet condition in which it is produced to be brought and sold. The Government proceeded to say that being violently reactive the wet chlorine in question will attack steel pipes or metal containers if stored as such. They went on to say that the ‘wet chlorine’ in question does not fulfil the requirements of being “goods” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. It was also pointed out that the very fact the Department had to work out the quantity of chlorine on the basis of Hydro chloric acid produced and converting the wet chlorine into dry chlorine on the basis of arithmetic formula goes to prove the inherent difficulty in holding the goods as excisable.

4. The second respondent says that after the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 sub-heading 2801.10 is as follows:—

“2801.10 - Chlorine (including liquefied or solidified gas)”

5. The aspect of compression being no longer insisted upon in the entry and purity being no longer the deciding factor, the decision of the Government of India cannot be relied upon. Therefore, he came to the conclusion that wet chlorine is nothing but chlorine except that it undergoes the process of chilling, drying and liquefaction.

6. The second respondent conveniently ignored the second reasoning of the Government of India and proceeded to say that inasmuch as chlorine as a specified item is brought under sub-heading 2801.10, it cannot escape duty. The second respondent says,

“In this particular case, it cannot be said that the product is not marketable but it can at best be said it is not marketed. Actual marketing and marketability are two distinct words having entirely different meaning. The product is not marketed for the reasons best known to the assessee. That does not mean that the product is not marketable. The fact that he is removing the wet chlorine to the Hydrochloric Acid Plant itself establishes the marketability of the goods. Even for the sake of argument if we accept the contention of the assessee, it cannot be said that marketability is the sole criterion and that too when chlorine has got a specific entry in the Tariff.”

7. He then concludes that wet chlorine is an excisable product under sub-heading 2801.10 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. That the observations of the second respondent quoted above regarding marketability is not a correct statement of law in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhor Industries Limited., Bombay v. Collector Of Central Excise, Bombay [1989 (40) ELT 280 (S.C)] cannot be disputed. But on this ground, the counsel for respondents presses for a remand, even if the plea of alternative remedy is not accepted. This plea of the respondents ignores the categorical finding of the Government of India on the second aspect of the case where it is held that wet chlorine is not goods excisable under Section 3 of the Act. In fact, even according to the second respondent, wet chlorine has to undergo the process of chilling, drying and liquefaction before it can be stored or conveniently transported. A few more decisions which take the issue conclusively in favour of the petitioner may now be noticed. In Union Carbide India Ltd. v. Union of India [1986 (24) ELT 169 (S.C)] aluminium cans at the point at which excise duty was levied existed in a crude and elementary form. To be a marketable commodity, it needed trimming, threading and redrawing. Therefore, they should be reeded, beaded, anodized and painted. The Supreme Court observed as follows:—

“Not a single instance has been provided by the respondents demonstrating that such aluminium cans have a market. The record discloses that whatever aluminium cans are produced by the appellant are subsequently developed by it into a completed and perfected component for being employed as flashlight cases.”

8. It was held that such aluminium cans did not fall within Section 3 of the Act. In Bhor Industries Limited., Bombay v. Collector Of Central Excise, Bombay [1989 (40) ELT 280 (S.C)], it is observed by the Supreme Court as follows:—

“Therefore, the essential ingredient is that there should be manufacture of goods. The goods being articles which are known to those who are dealing in the market having their identity as such. Section 3 of the Act enjoins that there shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods other than salt which are produced or ‘manufactured’ in India. “Excisable goods” under Section 2(d) of the Act means goods specified in the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 as being subject to a duty of excise and includes salt. Therefore, it is necessary, in a case like this, to find out whether there are goods, that is to say, articles as known in the market as separate distinct identifiable commodities and whether the tariff duty levied would be as specified in the Schedule. Simply because a certain article falls within the Schedule it would not be dutiable under excise law if the said article is not “goods” known to the market. Marketability, therefore, is an essential ingredient in order to be dutiable under the Schedule to Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.”

9. In Collector of Central Excise v. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises [1989 (43) ELT 214 (S.C)], the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

“For articles to be goods, these must be known in the market as such or these must be capable of being sold in the market as goods. Actual sale is not necessary. User in the captive consumption is not determinative but the artilces must be capable of being sold in the market or known in the market as goods. It is, therefore, necessary to find out whether these are goods, that is to say, articles as known in the market as separate distinct identifiable commodities and whether the tariff duty levied would be as specified in the Schedule. Marketability, therefore, is an essential ingredient in order to be dutiable under the Schedule to Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.”

10. Finally on the identical goods in Collector of Central Excise v. Kanoria Chemicals and Industries [1990 (49) ELT 593 (Tribunal)], the Tribunal has held as follows:—

“We follow the judgment of the Govt. of India and are of the view on the basis of the evidence available on record that wet chlorine cannot be categorised as goods and does not fall under the purview of Section 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. Accordingly, we confirm the findings of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), New Delhi.”

11. In such circumstances, if the Court is to drive the party to an alternative remedy after nearly 21/2 years after the admission of the writ petitions, it will, in my opinion, amount to shirking our responsibility to do justice. One cannot be blind to hard facts. There is no need to repeat, that each case has to be weighed on its own merits. There can be no hard and fast rule to the application of the principle of alternative remedy.

12. I have, therefore, no hesitation in quashing the impugned orders of the second respondent and first respondent in W.P Nos. 8647 and 12177 of 1988 respectively and show cause notice of the respondent in W.P Nos. 13838 of 1988. The writ petitions are allowed. Rule nisi is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.