JUDGMENT Abdul Hadi, J.

This appeal by the plaintiff is against the dismissal of his suit O.S No. 1710 of 1979 on the file of the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Erode, praying for specific performance of the sale agreement dated 8-11-1978, by respondents 1 to 11 (defendants 1 to 11) and for possession thereof, or, in the alternative, for specific performance of the said agreement, by respondents 1 to 9 by executing a sale deed over their 5/6th share in the suit property and for receiving proportionate consideration and for partition and separate possession of the said 5/6th share.

2. The allegations made in the plaint may be summarised as follows:— The above said property was allotted to one Aziz Khan by order dated 27-11-1969 in L.P.A No. 72 of 1965. On his death, his heirs under Muslim Law, viz., respondents 1 to 11 inherited the said property. While so, on 8-11-1978, respondents 1 to 11 entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for sale of the said property to him at the rate of Rs. 20/- per square foot of the ground area of the said property and received a sum of Rs. 2,000/- as advance. The said agreement provided that respondents should obtain certified copies of the orders of the various court proceedings, culminating in the above said Letters Patent Appeal at their cost, and furnish the same to the appellant within 3 months from 8-11-1978 and within 60 days thereafter the respondent should execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant and receive the balance sale price. Though respondents 10 and 11 were present at the time or the negotiations preceding the agreement, they were not available to sign the agreement by the time the agreement could be formally reduced to writing on stamp papers as they happened to reside at Madras and Podanur respectively and had gone away promising to sign the agreement later on. On the undertaking and assurance of respondents 1 to 9 to get respondents 10 and 11 to execute the agreement and the sale deed, respondents 1 to 9 took Rs. 1000/- from the appellants on 9.11.1978 as further advance. Though respondents 10 and 11 have not signed in the agreement, they are also bound by the terms of the agreement as they were also parties to the same. Respondents 1 to 11 did not furnish the above referred to certified copies even after a lapse of three months and in spite of repeated demands by the appellant. So, the appellant himself obtained the said copies at his expenses. The appellant has always been ready and willing to take a sale deed, paying the balance price. But, the respondents 1 to 11 have set up then father's brother, the 12th respondent to issue a notice on 14.5.1979 to the appellant and respondents 1 to 11 claiming a share in the suit property and challenging respondents 1 to 11 to enter into the abovesaid agreement. The said notice was given at the instigation of respondents 1 to 11 to thwart the appellant as the value of the property had gone up very much since the date of agreement. The appellant issued a notice on 30.11.1979 to the respondents, offering to perform his part of the obligations and demanding the performance of the agreement by respondents and further offering that in the event of respondents 10 and 11 refusing to execute the sale deed as undertaken taking advantage of the absence of their signatures in the agreement, the appellant was willing to take the sale deed in respect of the share of respondents 1 to 9 alone in the suit property and pay the proportionate price therefore. The said notice was served on respondents 1, 2, 4 and 6 to 11. The appellant understands that respondents 1 to 11 have entered info another sale agreement relating to the suit property with respondents 13 and 14, who have notice of the earlier agreement dated 8.11.1978

3. Respondents 10 to 14 remained absent and hence were set ex parte.

4. The allegations in the original written statement of the 1st defendant/1st respondent dated 11.8.1980, which is adopted by defendants 2 to 9 (respondents 2 to 9) may be summarised as follows; The averment that on 8.11.1978 respondents 1 to 11 entered into an agreement with the appellant, is not true. It is only respondents 1 to 9 who had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on that date. The terms of the agreement in so far as they relate to respondents 1 to 9 as set out in the plaint are correct. The allegation that respondents 1 to 9 assured and undertook to get respondents 10 to 11 to execute the document is not true. As per the agreement, respondents 1 to 9 had handed over all the relevant documents relating to the suit property to the appellant even in June, 1979 and at that time, the appellant assured them that he would pay the balance sale price within 60 days thereafter. The averment that the respondents 1 to 9 had not furnished the relevant documents and that the appellant was making repeated demands therefor are not true. The 1st respondent was insisting on the appellant to pay the balance amount within the stipulated time and respondents 1 to 9 were always ready and willing to execute the sale deed. But, due to his financial difficulties, the appellant was not prepared to pay the balance amount, and in view of the said default, the agreement had come to an end in September, 1979. The notice dated 14.5.1979 issued by the 12th respondent was not given at the instance of the respondents 1 to 9. The allegation that the appellant had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, is not true. The averments that respondents 1 to 9 undertook to get respondents 10 and 11 to execute the suit agreement and the sale deed and on such undertaking, respondents 1 to 9 took yet another advance of Rs. 1,000/- from the plaintiff on 9.11.1978, are not true. Respondents 1 to 9 did not give any such undertaking. Respondents 1 to 9 have given a detailed reply to the appellant's notice. Respondents 1 to 11 had not entered into any agreement, with respondents 13 and 14 except the above said agreement dated 8.11.1978

5. On these pleadings, the following issues were framed for trial:—

“(1) Whether the alleged agreement for sale was entered into by defendants 1 to 11 or by defendants 1 to 9 only?

(2) Whether the plaintiff has been always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?

(3) Whether the agreement has come to an end?

(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement for sale?

“(5) Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable?

“(6) Whether the suit has not been properly valued and proper court fee not paid?

“(7) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?”

6. Subsequently the 1st respondent filed an additional written statement dated 3.5.1981 which was also adopted by respondents 2 to 9. The allegations therein may be summarised as follows:— It is false to state that respondents 10 and 11 were present during the negotiation preceding the suit agreement and agreed to sign the agreement later on. The understanding was that the agreement and the sale should be one and indivisible and that respondents 1 to 11 should sign and execute the document evidencing one single transaction. Respondents 10 and 11 reside elsewhere and were not available for executing the suit agreement. The appellant undertook to obtain their signatures in the agreement on his own responsibility. The specific understanding was that the appellant should persuade respondents 10 and 11 to join in the execution of the suit agreement, failing which the entire agreement should stand cancelled. There was no agreement in respect of fractional shares. The original agreement was left in the custody of the appellant, who had the responsibility to obtain the signatures of respondents 10 and 11 so as to render the agreement valid and enforceable against all. As the appellant could not obtain the signatures of the respondents 10 and 11, the agreement in its entirety has been rendered inoperative and is not enforceable. In any event, the suit alternative relief is unsustainable. Even for the alternative relief, the appellant is bound to pay the entire sale consideration of Rs. 1,30,000.

7. After the above said additional written statement, the following additional issues were framed for trial:—

“(1) Whether the suit agreement is valid and enforceable in law?

“(2) Whether the suit claim regarding alternative relief as to partial enforcement is sustainable?

8. On additional issue No. (1) and original issue Nos. (2) to (4) the trial Court came to the following conclusions:—

(a) Prior to 8.11.1978 that is, on 29.10.1978 there were only negotiations between the appellants on the one hand and respondents 1 to 11 on the other hand.

(b) The suit agreement dated 8.11.1978 is not valid since the understanding between the parties was only for execution of a single and indivisible sale deed by all the respondents jointly, but respondents 10 and 11 had not joined in the sale agreement.

(c) The appellant has not been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the agreement has come to an end due to non-performance, latches and calculated delay on the part of the appellant. So, it is inequitable to enforce the same.

On the other issues, the trial Court came to the following conclusions:—

(a) It was respondents 1 to 9 only who had executed Ex. A1 sale agreement and that the said agreement had come to an end even in September, 1979 due to the appellant's default and the agreement did not subsist after September, 1979.

(b) As per S. 12 of the Specific Relief Act also, the appellant is not entitled to claim partial performance by respondents 1 to 9 only.

(c) Though it is true that respondents 1 to 9 had received Rs. 2,000/- on 8.11.1978 and another Rs. 1,000 on 9.11.1978 as advance from the appellant, the appellant cannot claim refund in this suit, in view of S. 22(2) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. Hence the trial Court dismissed the suit.

9. Mr. K. Sarvabhauman, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant made the following submissions before us:

(a) The trial Court erred in concluding that there was no agreement between the parties including respondents 10 and 11, even prior to 8.11.1978, on a Sunday preceding the Deepavali day, that is on 29.10.1978 So, according to him, the absence of signatures of respondents 10 and 11 in Ex. A1 cannot be an impediment to grant specific performance by all the respondents including respondents 10 and 11.

(b) The appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and it is only the respondents, who did not furnish the above referred to documents of prior title within the three months period allowed under Ex. A1 sale agreement and though the written statement stated that these documents were given by respondents 1 to 9 to the appellant in June, 1979, so far they have not been given and only the appellant had to obtain certified copies of the same in July 1979. Thereafter, to the suit notice. Ex. A.5 dt. 29.11.1979 sent by the appellant to the respondents 1 to 11, there was reply only by respondents 1 to 9 under Ex. B.3 dt. 21.12.1979 and there was no reply by respondents 10 and 11. The finding of the trial court that there was delay on the part of the appellant and the appellant had not come to court with clean hands, is absolutely without any justification.

(c) The additional written statement was filed several months after the original written statement, setting up an entirely new and inconsistent case to the effect that the understanding between the parties was that the appellant should persuade respondents 10 and 11 to join in the execution of the suit agreement and that failing which the entire agreement which is one and indivisible should stand cancelled. There is also no proof to substantiate this contention. On the other hand, the above referred to Ex. B3 the reply to the suit notice belies the abovesaid contention. Therefore, at least the alternative relief should be granted. S. 12 of the Specific Relief Act has no application to the present case.

10. He also relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions:— Kanniah Gupta v. Subbarami Reddi AIR 1952 Madras 687 Sethu Parvathy Arnmal v. Pajji K. Srinivasan Chettiar 85 L.W 84 Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh 4 AIR 1990 S.C 854 Suryaprakasa Rayudu v. Lakshminarasimha 5 AIR 191 Madras. 462 and certain other decisions. Reference would be made to these decisions in the course of his judgment.

11. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents Mr. G. Subramaniam made the following submissions:—

(a) There was no agreement executed by respondents 1 to 11 on 8.11.1978 as set out in plaint and the discretionary relief of specific performance cannot, therefore, be granted. Even as per the plaint, respondents 1 to 9 undertook to get respondents 10 and 11 to execute the agreement. But as the said undertaking has not been proved there is no equity on the part of the appellant. He has not come to Court with clean hand.

(b) There is no readiness and willingness on the part of the appellant. Further it is not clear whether the alleged readiness and willingness was with reference to the agreement executed by respondents 1 to 9 or the alleged agreement of respondents 1 to 11.

(c) Even Ex. A1 does not show how much share each of the respondents is entitled to in the suit property. Further, the agreement between the parties is an indivisible one and unless all the sharers including respondents 10 and 11 join in the execution of the agreement, there cannot be specific performance with reference to the share of respondents 1 to 9 alone.

He also relied on the following decisions:—

Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi Sohan Lal v. Union of India and certain other decisions. Reference would be made to those decisions at the appropriate places in the course of the judgment.

12. We have bestowed our due consideration to the rival submissions of the respective counsel. Regarding the question, whether there was an agreement by respondents, including respondents 10 and 11, to sell the suit property, even ten days prior to the date of Ex. A1 (8.11.1978) that is on 29.10.1978, we have to concur with the finding of the court below for the following reasons: First of all, the plaint itself does not plead about any such agreement, as on 29.10.1978 In fact, it does not even say when actually the alleged agreement took place prior to 8.11.1978 Paragraph 4 of the plaint only states as follows:

“Though defendants 10 and 11 were present at the time of the negotiations preceding the agreement, and were parties to such negotiations, by the time the agreement, could be formally reduced to writing on stamp paper, defendants 10 and 11 were not available to sign the agreement, as they happened to reside at Madras and Podanur respectively and gone away promissing to sign the agreement later. However, defendants 1 to 9 assured and undertook to get defendants 10 and 11 to execute the agreement and the sale deed to follow. Though defendants 10 and 11 have not signed the agreement, they are also bound by the terms of the agreement as they were also parties to the same.”

Thus, it only says that there were negotiations, but, it does not specifically say that there was actually an agreement between all the parties including respondents 10 and 11 prior to Ex. A1 date. Further it only states that “defendants 10 and 11 were present at the time of the negotiations.” But, it does not say specifically that they also agreed to sell the suit property. Further, in Ex. A5 suit notice also, we find almost the same allegations. Further, even P.W 1, the plaintiff only deposed that in the negotiations that took place one day prior to Deepavali, defendants 10 and 11 told that the advance amount could be given to defendants 1 to 9 and that defendants 1 to 11 would sign the agreement after they return to their town. Nowhere there also P.W 1 specifically deposed that on any particular day prior to Ex. A1 date, defendants 10 and 11 expressly agreed to sell the suit property. Further, if really on 29.10.1978 itself all the respondents have agreed to sell the suit house, there would have been payment of some advance towards the sale consideration on that date. But P.W 1 admitted no advance was paid on that day. Further, P.W 1 deposed that one Sultan Mohideen, former councillor of Erode Municipality was present at the time of the above referred to negotiations, but that he was not going to be examined, despite the fact that there was no enmity between P.W 1 and the said Sultan Mohideen. Therefore, we conclude that there was no agreement on the said date, viz., 29.10.1978 or any day prior to 8.11.1978 by all the respondents, including respondents 10 and 11.

13. Then, coming to Ex. A1 sale agreement, admittedly it is not signed by respondents 10 and 11, though it purports to be by all the parties including respondents 10 and 11. In all the pages of Ex. A1, the places where respondents 10 and 11 should have signed remain blank. So, there is no proof that respondents 10 and 11 also agreed to sell their respective, shares in the suit property. No doubt it was also contended by the learned Counsel for respondents that Ex. B1, which is the duplicate copy of Ex. A1 and retained by respondents does not contain the signature of the appellant even and contains the signature of only respondents 1 to 9. Therefore, his contention is that the appellant, who retained Ex. A1, put his signature in Ex. A1 just prior to the filing of the suit to show that there was a concluded contract between the plaintiff and respondents. But, there is no evidence to prove that the appellant put his signature in Ex. A1 just prior to the filing of the suit. That apart, S. 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act says that the court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. I have also held so in R. Ramaswamy v. Seethammal relying on Lalji v. Ramji.

14. So, we have to see whether respondents 1 to 9 at least agreed to sell their share in the suit property to the appellant and whether in view of the fact that respondents 10 and 11 have not joined in Ex. A1 sale agreement, there was no agreement even by respondents 1 to 9 in respect of their share and whether in other words, the contemplated agreement was one and indivisible. The original written statement of the 1st defendant, which was adopted by defendants 2 to 9 no doubt states that the allegation that on 8-11-1978, defendants 1 to 11 entered into an agreement with the plaintiff is not true. But, in next sentence the clear admission is as follows:—

“It is only defendants 1 to 9 entered into an agreement with the plaintiff.”

The further plea is as follows:

“As per the agreement defendants handed over all the relevant documents relating to the property to the plaintiff even in the month of June and at the time of receipt of all the relevant documents, plaintiff assured the defendants that he will pay the balance amount as per the agreement witin 60 days, i.e: before the end of August 1979.

Contrary to that, only this defendant insisted the plaintiff to pay the balance amount within the stipulated time. The defendants were always ready and willing to execute the document Due to the plaintiff's default the agreement has come to an end in the month of September 1979.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The above said pleas clearly show that there was an agreement to sell to the appellant at least by respondents 1 to 9 on 8.11.1978 All that the abovesaid respondents contend is that the abovesaid agreement has come to an end in the month of September, 1979. So, according to them, it was in force till September, 1979. Further, as per the above said pleas it is also clear that the above said agreement of respondents 1 to 9 was not contingent upon respondents 10 and 11 joining in the said sale transaction for selling their share in the suit property also. In view of the above said pleas, it is further clear that according to respondents 1 to 9 at least up to September, 1989, they were willing to sell their share in the suit property despite the fact that they knew till that date that respondents 10 and 11 had not signed in Ex. A1 nor otherwise came forward to join in the sale transaction along with respondents 1 to 9.

15. While this is the plea in the above original written statement dated 11.8.1990, in the additional written statement, which was filed by the said defendants 1 to 9 about 9 months later, for the first time a completely new case was sought to be set up as follows.

“The plaintiff undertook to obtain their signatures in the agreement on his own responsibility. As a matter of fact, the specific understanding was that the plaintiff should persuade defendants 10 and 11 to join in the execution of the suit agreement, and that, failing which, the entire agreement shall stand cancelled.”

Certainly this is a new and different case, inconsistent with the plea already raised in the original written statement. It is not difficult to hold that the said new case was only an after thought and set up only to somehow wriggle out from the obligation flowing from Ex. A1 sale agreement executed by respondents 1 to 9. This new case is also quite contrary to what is contained in Ex. B3, the reply dated 21.12.1979 by the respondents other than the respondents 10 and 11 to the suit notice Ex. A5 dated 29.11.1979 Ex. P3 contains the same pleas as quoted above from the written statement. It is to be noted that in the said reply it is further stated as follows:—

“My Clients (defendants 1 to 9) were always ready and willing to execute the document up to the stipulated time.”

This also shows that according to them they were ready to execute the sale deed with reference to their share in the property at least up to the abovesaid stipulated time, even though defendants 10 and 11 have not joined in the sale transaction. In the light of Ex. B3 and the original written statement, it is clear that what is deposed by D.Ws 1 and 2 that unless defendants 10 and 11 join in the sale agreement, there was no contemplation of sale at all, cannot be believed at all.

16. No doubt Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi cited by the learned counsel for the respondents had laid down that the jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract is based on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract and where a valid and enforceable contract has not been made, the Court will not make a contract for them. Undoubtedly this is the law. But, in the present case, from what is stated above, it is clear that there is a valid and enforceable contract between respondents 1 to 9 on the one hand and the appellant on the other hand. Sohan Lal v. Union of India cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, also has no application to the facts of the present case. There, only on the footing that admittedly no contract whatsoever has been entered into between the parties therein it was held that specific performance relief cannot be given. Similarly Shanmugam, A. v. T.R Kannappa Mudaliar and Krishna Reddy, H. G. v. M.M Thimmiah (961 L.W 88) cited by the learned counsel for the respondent also has no application to the facts of the present case.

17. In Kanniah Gupta v. Subbarami Reddi cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, an agreement for sale of certain piece of land belonging to the joint family of A and B, though intended to be executed by both in favour of C, was in fact signed by A only. In that context it was held that as A did not make, B signing the document a condition for the validity and enforceability of the document, the agreement could be enforced as regards the share of A in the joint family property. Further, in Sethi Parvathy Ammal v. Bajji K. Srinivasa Chettiar also it has been held that when a document is proposed to be executed by several parties and only some of them execute and others do not, whether the document is binding on those appellants, who have executed it, depends upon the intention of the parties. It has been further observed therein that the intention that the documents would be incomplete and would not be enforceable against the executing parties, has to be established by the executing parties by showing that they would not have executed the agreement, if the other party had not joined in the agreement or that they did not intend to be bound by the agreement until and unless the others who were proposed to be the parties to the agreement joined in the execution.

18. The same question was also considered by a Bench of this Court in K. Venkatasubramaniam v. S. Arthanariswami Chettiar 1980 T.L.N.J 417 and the same principle was laid down in the said decision also and on the facts of the said case, the Bench came to the conclusion that the agreement before them could not be considered to be contingent agreement in the sense that its validity was contingent on the 3rd defendant therein joining in the execution of the sale deed and that the defendants 1 and 2 therein were the only persons who entered into the agreement and they would be bound by it. The learned counsel for the respondents no doubt cited in this context Abdul Aziz v. Abdul Sammad A.I.R 1937 Madras 596 No doubt, on the facts of that case, this court held therein that the contract in question was not divisible into two parts, one relating to a third and the other relating to the remaining two-thirds and that the Court could not substitute a new bargain and force a contract on the parties by decreeing the balance claim with respect to 1/3rd share of the defendant therein. But, the said decision turned on the facts of that case. On the other hand, as already stated, the facts in the present case are different.

19. The learned counsel for the appellant also rightly argued that the court below erred in invoking S. 12 of the Specific Relief Act, to the facts of the present case. In this context; he relied on Kartar Singh v. Harinder Singh A.I.R 1990 Supreme Court 85. The respondent therein and his sister owned some properties. He entered into a written agreement with the appellant therein for himself and on behalf of his sister for sale of all the said properties. It was specifically mentioned in the agreement that he had agreed to sell not only his entire share in the property, but also that of his sister and that he would be responsible for getting the sale deed executed from his sister. The sister refused to sell the property coming to her share. In the above context when the appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the said agreement, the Supreme Court held that the said case was not one covered by S. 12 of the Specific Relief Act. The relevant observation of the Supreme Court runs as follows:

“It is clear from S. 12 that it relates to the specific performance of a part of a contract. The present is not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but of the whole of the contract so far as contracting party, namely, the respondent is concerned. Under the agreement, he had contracted to sell whole of his property. The two contracts, viz., for the sale of his share and of his sister's share were separate and were severable from each other although they were incorporated in one agreement. In fact, there was no contract between the appellant and the respondent's sister and the only valid contract was with respondent in respect of his share in the property. As regards the difficulty pointed out by the High Court, namely, that the decree of specific performance cannot be granted since the property will have to be partitioned, we are of the view that this is not a legal difficulty. Whenever a share in the property is sold the vendee has a right to apply for the partition of the property and get the share demarcated”.

Hence the Supreme Court granted specific performance regarding the said respondents share alone in the property. This decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Further, even in the above referred to 1980 T.L.N.J 417, the scope of S. 12 was considered and particularly it was pointed out therein that S. 12(3)(which has been wrongly relied on by the Court below) applies only to a case where a party, who is unable to perform the whole or part of the contract sues for specific performance. It was held on the facts therein that the party who sued for specific performance therein could not be said to be one so unable to perform. The said reasoning squarely applies to the facts of the present case also. In fact, though initially the learned counsel for the respondents attempted to contend that the above said S. 12 was applicable, he subsequently fairly submitted that S. 12 would not be applicable.

20. The learned counsel for the appellant also rightly argued that the Court below erred in holding that there were laches on the part the appellant which would disentitle the appellants to the relief of specific performance. In the present case there were no laches on the part of the appellant. According to P.W 1, the plaintiff, he got the copies of the prior records in July, 1979. Then he has issued a suit notice under Ex. A5. on 29.11.1979 The few months delay-in between cannot be said to be laches on his part. That apart, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel tor the appellant, many decisions right from Suryaprakasa Rayudu v. Lakshminarasimha have uniformly held that mere delay cannot be a ground for refusal of specific performance. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that there was falsity in one of the allegations made in the plaint and that hence the discretionary relief of specific performance should not be granted, to the appellant. The said allegation is that defendants 1 to 9 assured and undertook to get defendants 10 and 11 to sign the agreement and the sale deed. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this allegation has not been proved and so it is false and so he submitted that in view of the decision in Ranaswamy Goundar v. V. Venkatachalam and Rathinasababadhi Pillaiv. V. Sriramulu Chettiar the discretionary relief of specific performance should not be granted. But, this contention has no merits. The above said allegation, even assuming that it has not been proved, is not a very material allegation which is found to be false. The said decisions have no application to the facts of the present case. It cannot also be said that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Further the claim that for the alternative relief of partial enforcement, the plaintiff is bound to pay the entire sale consideration Rs. 1,30,000/- even for the 5/6th share of defendants 1 to 9 is also of no merit. The plaintiff is bound to pay only the said 5/6th share in the entire sale consideration.

21. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside and the suit is decreed in respect of the alternative reliefs prayed for with costs throughout. Time for the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration in the trial Court is one month. Time for execution and registration of the sale deed is one month from the date of such deposit.

This Appeal having been set down this day for being mentioned, the court delivered the following Judgment:

The Order of the Court was made by Venkataswami, J.)

This matter comes up before us at the instance of the learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant states that the Court below expressed certain doubt regarding the exact amount of deposit to be made by the appellant. Hence, we make it clear by the following clarification.

In paragraph 20 of the judgment, dated 25.7.1991, the last sentence is substituted as follows:

“The plaintiff is bound to pay only the said 5/6th share in the entire sale consideration, viz., Rs. 78,000/-

(Rupees Seventy Eight Thousand)”.

(Decree will follow)

RR/VCS.