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Annamalai Nadar, 144... v. D. Tliangamani And 3...
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns two revision petitions before this Court. The tenants, who fall within the definition of "tenants" under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (the Act), are petitioners; the respondents are the landlords. The landlords sought eviction of the tenants under section 14(1)(b) of the Act on the ground of bona fide requirement for demolition and reconstruction. The Controller dismissed the eviction petitions. The landlords then preferred appeals to the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur (the appellate authority under the Act), which were heard and disposed of in favour of the landlords. The tenants challenged those appellate decisions by filing these two revisions. A jurisdictional question was raised concerning whether the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur had jurisdiction to act as appellate authority because the government notification conferring appellate authority on Subordinate Judges was issued in 1973 whereas the court at Srivilliputhur was constituted only in 1982. The single Judge originally seized of these revisions referred the jurisdictional question to a Bench; the Bench heard the jurisdictional question and, having resolved it, proceeded to decide the merits. The Bench ultimately dismissed the two revisions and granted the tenants six months from the date of the order to vacate and deliver possession to the landlords; no costs were awarded.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur (a court constituted after the 1973 notification) had jurisdiction to exercise appellate authority under S. 23 of the Act when the notification conferring appellate powers on "Subordinate Judges" was issued prior to constitution of that court.
- On the merits, whether the appellate authority correctly evaluated the "existing condition of the building" and other relevant materials in allowing eviction under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act (i.e., whether the appellate authority's factual conclusions supporting bona fide requirement for demolition and reconstruction were sustainable).
Arguments of the Parties
Tenants' Arguments (Appellants in the revisions)
- The notification under S. 23 of the Act (notification dated 30-8-1973, II-1 No. 3006(f) of 1973) conferred appellate jurisdiction on Subordinate Judges then in existence; because the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur, was constituted only in 1982, that court was not in existence when the notification was issued and therefore could not derive powers from that notification.
- Reliance was placed on the view expressed by V. Balasubrahmanyan, J. in R. Purushothaman v. K.S. Vijayalakshmi, where it was held that only officers/authorities actually in existence at the time of the notification can be competent to exercise conferred appellate powers.
- On the merits, the tenants submitted that the appellate authority ignored a vital and relevant factor — the existing condition of the building — and that the condition did not justify demolition and reconstruction as claimed by the landlords.
Landlords' Arguments (Respondents)
- The 1973 notification is a general conferment of powers by official title and, under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 (notably S. 9 paragraph (f), S. 14 and S. 17), powers conferred on an office by title may be exercised by the holder for the time being; thus a court constituted later (such as Srivilliputhur) is entitled to exercise the conferred appellate powers.
- Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Janardan v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1234, which was cited as guidance on construing conferment of powers with reference to General Clauses provisions.
- Pointed to a conflicting single-judge view (Dr. Uma Rani v. Meenakshisundaram) but relied on the contrary view expressed by S. Natarajan, J. (and the subsequent dismissal of the writ appeal) that the government order conferring powers on all Subordinate Judges operates to confer those powers on subsequently constituted subordinate courts within their territorial jurisdiction.
- On merits, the landlords accepted that the condition of the building is a vital factor but submitted that the appellate authority did consider the condition and, applying relevant Supreme Court ratios, correctly concluded that the condition warranted demolition and reconstruction under S. 14(1)(b).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R. Purushothaman v. K.S. Vijayalakshmi (V. Balasubrahmanyan, J.) | The principle that, under S. 23, conferment of appellate jurisdiction requires that the officers/authorities be in existence on the date of notification; authorities not in existence at that date are excluded. | The tenants relied on this decision to argue the Srivilliputhur court lacked jurisdiction. The Bench discussed this view but rejected it as a general rule in favour of a construction permitting conferment by office title under the General Clauses Act. |
| Janardan v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1234 | Guidance that, where conferment is by office or title, relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act may support exercise of powers by the holder for the time being; used to construe conferment of powers. | The Court relied on Janardan to support the proposition that a general conferment by office title can be exercised by the officer/court when constituted later, reading S. 23 of the Rent Control Act with the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act. |
| Dr. Uma Rani v. Meenakshisundaram and another (W.P. No. 2285 of 1985; order dated 19.3.1985) and W.A. No. 322 of 1985 (dismissed 15-11-1985) | A single-judge view by S. Natarajan, J. (as he then was) that S. 23 does not confine conferment to persons in existence and that a general G.O. conferring powers on all Subordinate Judges permits subsequently constituted subordinate courts to exercise such powers. | The Bench preferred the view expressed by S. Natarajan, J., and noted that the writ appeal against that view was dismissed by the First Bench, supporting the conclusion that the subsequent constitution of a court does not prevent it from exercising powers conferred generally by title. |
| Metalwareynd Co., etc. v. Bansilal Sanna and others, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1559 (= 92 L.W. 38 S.C.S.N.) | Established that the existing condition of the building is a vital factor to be considered when deciding bona fide requirement under the relevant provision (i.e., that condition is not irrelevant and must be regarded with all circumstances). | The appellate authority relied on this ratio in assessing the existing condition of the building; the Bench found that the appellate authority properly considered that condition and therefore no fault could be found with its factual conclusions. |
| M/s. P. Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Associated Publishers Madras Ltd., 19901 IMLJ 12 (= 1990-2-L.W. 547) | Held that the condition of the building is an essential consideration; it need not be so deteriorated as to be in danger of crumbling down, but it must indicate a bona fide and timely requirement for demolition and reconstruction under S. 14(1)(b). | The Bench relied on this later Supreme Court pronouncement to conclude that the appellate authority's finding was consistent with current Supreme Court ratio; no exception could be taken to the appellate authority's decision on this ground. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two analytical stages: (A) jurisdictional question; and (B) merits.
A. Jurisdictional Analysis
- The Court began by extracting S. 23(1)(a) of the Act which empowers the Government to confer appellate authority "by general or special order" on such officers and authorities as it thinks fit.
- The tenants' submission was that the 1973 notification conferred powers only on officers/courts in existence at that time and therefore the Srivilliputhur court, constituted in 1982, could not derive jurisdiction. This submission relied on the single-judge reasoning in R. Purushothaman.
- The landlords countered that the notification was a general conferment by official title and that the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 (specifically S. 17, S. 14 and paragraph (f) of S. 9) permits powers to be conferred by office or title so that the holder for the time being may exercise them.
- The Court examined the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act quoted in the opinion:
- S. 17: powers may be conferred by name or by office or on classes of officials generally by their official titles;
- S. 14: where an Act confers a power on the holder of an office, the power may be exercised by the holder for the time being;
- Paragraph (f) of S. 9: for applying a law to persons executing functions of an office, it is sufficient to mention the official title of the officer at present executing such functions.
- Relying on these provisions and on Janardan (supra) the Court concluded that S. 23 does not mandate conferment on a persona designata only, and that a general conferment by title can be worked out in the light of the General Clauses Act. The Court accepted the view expressed by S. Natarajan, J. that a general government order empowering "all Subordinate Judges" will, when a Subordinate Judge's court is duly constituted, operate to confer appellate powers on that court within its territorial jurisdiction.
- Accordingly, the Court rejected the tenants' submission that the appellate authority lacked jurisdiction, holding that the Srivilliputhur court could validly exercise the powers conferred by the 1973 notification.
B. Merits — Substance of Revisions
- Having resolved the jurisdictional question against the tenants, the Court proceeded to consider the revisions on merits (since the reference to a Bench was not limited to jurisdiction alone).
- The tenants argued that the appellate authority failed to properly consider the existing condition of the building and that that condition did not justify eviction for demolition and reconstruction.
- The landlords conceded that the existing condition is a vital factor but contended the appellate authority had considered it and reached a factual finding that demolition and reconstruction were justified.
- The Court reviewed the materials and the decisions below and noted that there was a factual difference between the Controller and the appellate authority. The appellate authority had applied the Supreme Court ratio in Metalwareynd Co. (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1559) that the existing condition of the building is a vital factor in determining bona fide requirement.
- The Court also referred to the later pronouncement in M/s. P. Orr & Sons which clarified that while the condition must be an essential factor, it need not have deteriorated to the point of imminent collapse — it must indicate a bona fide, timely and genuine requirement for demolition and reconstruction.
- The Court found that the appellate authority had adverted to and analyzed all relevant materials, applied the correct tests, and arrived at factual findings that were supportable on the record. The Court emphasized that revisional powers under S. 25 of the Act are not coextensive with those of a court of appeal, and unless the appellate authority applied wrong tests or misdirected itself on facts, its findings are not to be disturbed.
- Because the appellate authority applied correct legal tests and its factual conclusions were sustainable, the Court concluded that the findings were not amenable to interference in revision.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: REVISIONS DISMISSED.
Direct Consequences for the Parties
- The decisions of the appellate authority (Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur) in favour of the landlords are sustained.
- The tenants' challenge to the appellate court's jurisdiction is rejected; the court had jurisdiction under the 1973 notification read with the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891.
- The tenants are granted six months from the date of the order to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the landlords.
- No costs were awarded.
Broader Implications
The opinion resolves the specific statutory-interpretation conflict in favour of construing a general governmental conferment of powers by office title as effective to empower subsequently constituted courts/officers (when they assume office) to exercise those powers, in light of the General Clauses Act and authoritative guidance (Janardan). The Court did not state that it was laying down a new binding precedent beyond applying existing authorities and the General Clauses provisions; the decision upholds the appellate authority's factual conclusions without purporting to convert the revisional jurisdiction under S. 25 into an appellate re-hearing.
Reference: Opinion authored by Nainar Sundaram, J.; two revisions referred to a Bench by a learned single Judge because of a jurisdictional question. The summary above is confined to information contained in the provided opinion.
Nainar Sundaram, J.—These two revisions stand posted before us as a Bench because a question of jurisdiction of the appellate authority was raised and the learned single Judge who was earlier seized of these two revisions, deemed fit to refer them to a Bench.
2. Before we take up the question of jurisdiction, it will be appropriate if we trace as to how these revisions have come to be preferred to this Court. The tenants within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Act No. 18 of 1960) hereinafter referred to as the Act, are the petitioners in these two revisions. The respondents are the landlords within the meaning of the Act. The landlords sought the eviction of the tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises in question for demolition and reconstruction under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. The Controller dismissed the petitions for eviction. The landlords preferred appeals and they were heard and disposed of in their favour of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur, Ramanathapuram District as the appellate authority, under the Act. These revisions are directed against the decisions of the appellate authority.
3. Mr. V. Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants raises the question of jurisdiction of the appellate authority in the following manner: According to him, the notification under S. 23 of the Act, conferring jurisdiction as appellate authority under the Act on all the Subordinate Judges, including those of Ramanathapuram district, was made in the year 1973 vide notification 11-1-No. 3006 (0 of 1973 and the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur came to be constituted only in the year 1982 and hence that notification cannot be of any avail for the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur to exercise the powers of the appellate authority under the Act and hence the appeals entertained, heard and disposed of by him, must be held to be without jurisdiction. S. 23(1) (a) of the Act, reads as follows:—
“The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, confer on such Officers and authorities as they think fit, the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purpose of this Act, in such areas and in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.”
The concerned notification confers on the officers mentioned in column(1) of the table the powers of the appellate authority for the purposes of the Act. Amongst the officers mentioned in column(1) fall all Subordinate Judges within the respective jurisdiction in the area mentioned in column(2) which takes in Ramanathapuram district. According to Mr. V. Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants, on the date of the notification in 1973, the court of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur, not having been constituted, the said notification would not cover the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur and thus, he must be held to have lacked jurisdiction to exercise the powers of the appellate authority, under the Act. In support of his submission learned counsel for the tenants places reliance on a pronouncement of V. Balasubrahmanyan, J.,) in R. Purushothaman v. K.S Vijayalakshmi.1 There the learned single judge was faced with a similar contingency and he was of the view that only those officers and authorities who were actually in existence at the time of the notification conferring the power could be competent to exercise such powers of appellate authorities. The view of the learned single Judge has been expressed in the following terms:
“Necessarily therefore this process of conferment of appellate jurisdiction in terms of S. 23, requires as a precondition that the officers and authorities in question must as on that date, exist as authorities and officers. This at once excludes officers and authorities who are not in existence or who are only in contemplation. Although a notification conferring jurisdiction by the Government under S. 23 of the Act, when once it is properly done and notified will have force thereafter, whether it is modified or altered, the very conferment of jurisdiction rests on the officers or authorities who exist as on the date of the notification and are therefore the objects of the conferment of the power. This consideration of S. 23 is also consistent with the realities of administration of justice, it is in myjudgment reasonable to understand the references to “such officers and authorities as they think fit”, occurring in S. 23 of the Act as a reference only to those officers and authorities who were actually in existence at the time of the notification conferring the power but another step in reasoning to construe the notification dated 30-8-1973 in II-1 No. 3006(e) of 1973, as having a reference only to existing Subordinate Judges and within their respective jurisdictions in Kanyakumari District and other districts named in the notification. The result is that this notification would severely exclude all Subordinate Judges in the Kanyakumari district who were unknown quantities at the time the notification was issued. On the basis of this determination of mine, I must hold that the learned Subordinate Judge, Kuzhithurai, who came into being only by virtue of the notification dated 21-3-1974 and upon whom no relative appellate jurisdiction was conferred under S. 23 of the Rent Control Act, had no jurisdiction to take on file the appeal, namely, H.R.A No. 1 of 1978, much less proceed to hear and determine it.”
4. As against the submissions made by Mr. V. Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants, we heard Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel, appearing for the landlords submitting that the notification is general in nature and the conferment of powers is also general by official titles and this is permissible by virtue of S. 17 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 and when such conferment of powers has been done, the powers could be exercised by the holder for the time being in office and it is not necessary that the holder of the office must be functioning at the time when the conferment of powers takes place and this is the result of a combined reading of S. 9 paragraph (0, S. 14 and S. 17 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891. The learned counsel for the landlords, draws our attention to a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Janardan v. The State of Maharashtra A.I.R 1978 S.C 1234 where there was a lack of definition of ‘Commissioner of Police’ under S. 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act 4 of 1887 and yet, by virtue of Bombay Police Act 22 of 1951 an Assistant Commissioner of Police was enabled to discharge the functions of the Commissioner of Police andthe exercise of the powers by the Assistant Commissioner of Police under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act 4 of 1887 was upheld by adverting to S. 17 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1 of 1904 whose implications are similar to S. 9 paragraph (f), S. 14 and S. 17 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891. Learned counsel for the landlords also brings to our notice the pronouncement of S. Natarajan, J. as he then was, in Dr. Uma. Rani v. Meenakshisundaram and another W.P No. 2285 of 1985 and W.M.P No. 3885 of 1985 order dated 19.3.1985 wherein the learned single Judge took a view at variance with the one taken by V. Balasubrahmanyan, J. in R. Purushothaman v. K.B Vijayalakshmt
5. We must record that Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel for the landlords, initially submitted that this court should not show the indulgence of permitting the tenants to take up the question of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate authority; assuming it is a tenable contention; after the tenants contested the appeal before the appellate authority without any demur over jurisdiction, and after the decision at the hands of the appellate authority has gone against them; and if only the tenants had taken this objection and if it had any substance and tenability, the landlords in their wisdom would have certainly chosen the proper forum having jurisdiction. Though it is possible to accept this submission put forth by the learned counsel for the landlords, on the principle that a party who, on account of his own negligence and omission failed to assert the contention regarding Jurisdiction at the earliest point of time should not be allowed to raise it,- assuming it has got substance and tenability behind it,- at a later stage and that too after participating in the proceedings before the authority concerned because on account of the lapse of time and other circumstances, it will cause prejudice to the opponent party, we deemed fit to permit the tenants to raise this question of jurisdiction so as to give a quietus to it without standing on technicalities and we have allowed the applications taken in this behalf and we are proceeding to decide this question on merits.
6. S. 23(1)(a) of the Act, as could be seen from the extract made supra, speaks about the conferment of the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of the Act on such officers and authorities as the Government may think fit. A plain reading of the language of S. 23(1)(a) of the Act does not convey to our mind that the conferment of the powers of appellate authorities under the Act should be on the oasis of persona desigiiata. It could be generally done on the officers and authorities named by their titles. It is also not possible to hold that the officers and authorities named by their titles generally conferred with the powers of the appellate authorities under the Act, should be actually functioning on the date of the conferment of the powers. Such officers and authorities could assume office and function subsequently and the conferment of the powers generally done by title will certainly enable them to exercise the powers. It is in this connection, as, rightly pointed out by Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel for the landlords, the provisions of Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 do throw light as to how the conferment of general powers should be worked out. S. 17 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 reads as follows: —
“Whenever by an Act authority is given to confer powers or impose duties, such powers may be conferred or duties imposed by name or by office or on classes of officials generally by their official titles.”
S. 14 of the said Act runs as follows: —
“Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty on the holder of an office, as such, then the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed by the holder for the time being of the office.”
Paragraph(f) of S. 9 of the said Act is in the following terms:—
“for the purpose of indicating the application of a law to every person or number of persons for the time being executing the functions of an office, it shall be sufficient to mention the official title of the officer at present executing such functions, or that of the officer by whom the functions are commonly executed.”
When there could be a conferment of powers generally and that has been done by referring to the authorities and officers by their title, those powers could be competently exercised by the holder for the time being of the office. As and when the officers and authorities conferred with the powers get constituted for the area mentioned in the notification under the Act, they will be seized of the powers and they can exercise the powers competently. That is the result of a combined reading of the above provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891. We find that dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Janardan v. The State of Maharashtra A.I.R 1978 S.C 1234 has set down the guidelines as to how to construe the conferment of powers and work them out looking into the provisions of the General Clauses Act. When we have not found the conferment of the powers on the basis of persona designata, the conferment of powers generally on officers and authorities by their title has got to be worked out only in the context of implications of the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act. S. Natarajan, J., as he then was, has expressed his view in the following terms in the pronouncement referred to above:
“With very great respect of the learned Judge, I am wholly at variance with the view taken by him. S. 23 confers exclusive powers on Government to confer the powers of appellate authorities on such officers and authorities as it thinks fit. The section does not stipulate that the Government is empowered to confer powers of appellate authorities only on name persons or existing courts. The conferment of power is not on the basis of persona designata. The Government has, therefore, passed a general order viz., G.O, No. 3006(f)/1973, empowering all the Subordinate Judges in the districts of Tamil Nadu except Dharmapuri district to exercise the powers of appellate authorities. The words, “by general or special order” occurring in S. 23, should not be lost sight of. The G.O.in question is a general order, and by reason of it, every Subordinate Judge exercising judicial powers within his respective jurisdiction, will stand automatically conferred with the powers of an appellate authority under the Act. Merely because a Court has been constituted subsequently, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be contended that the subsequently constituted Court will not derive the powers conferred on all Subordinate Judges by the Government order in question. Once a Court has been duly constituted, it automatically follows that it will have power to hear all the cases falling within its territorial jurisdiction.”
The view expressed by the learned Judge is in tune with the view expressed by us. We note that the writ appeal in Dr. Uma Rani v. Meenakshisundaram and another W.A No. 322 of 1985 preferred against the pronouncement of S. Natarajan, J., as he then was, has been dismissed by the First Bench of this Court on 15-11-1985. In the light of our above discussion, we are not able to sustain the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the tenants that the appellate authority in the instant case, lacked jurisdiction to decide the matters.
Eschewing the contention regarding jurisdiction, we are obliged to take up the two revisions and deal with them on merits, since these two revisions are of the year 1982 and the reference to a Bench is not to consider merely the question of jurisdiction.
Mr. V. Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants made his submissions on merits. According to the learned counsel for the tenants, the appellate authority ignored to take note of and adjudicate a vital and a relevant factor namely, the existing condition of the building. Learned counsel for the tenants was at pains to impress upon us that the existing condition of the building does not warrant the upholding of the case of the landlords for demolition and re-construction. Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel for the landlords, on the other hand would submit that there is no gain saying that the condition of the building is a vital and a relevant factor, but the appellate authority did advert to this aspect and has come to the conclusion on facts that the existing condition of the building did warrant the countenancing of the plea of the landlords to get at the same for demolition and reconstruction. We have been taken through the decisions of the two forums below. It is true that there is difference of opinion on this question between the Controller and the Appellate Authority. But the Appellate Authority has in fact, referred to the ratio of the Supreme Court in Metalwareynd Co., etc. v. bansilal Sanna and others etc A.I.R 1979 SC 1559 = 92 L.W 38 S.CS.N, “ where it has been countenanced:
Wc arc clearly of the view that the existing condition of the building far from being totally irrelevant is a vital factor which will have to be considered while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under that provision which has to be done by having regard to all the circumstances
Only after adverting to and analysing all the materials placed in the case, the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that even the existing condition of the building did warrant the countenancing of the pleas of the landlords under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel for the landlords brings to our notice that in a subsequent pronouncement in M/s. P. Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Associated Publishers Madras Ltd. 19901 IMLJ 12 = 1990-2-L.W. 547, the Supreme Court while holding that the condition of the building is not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into account by the Controller, but it is an essential condition, however, has laid down that in order to satisfy the test under S. 14(1)(b) the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down: but the condition of the building must be such as to indicate the bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purposes of demolition and re-construction. When we take note of the latest ratio of the Supreme Court, we find that no exception could be taken to the decision of the appellate authority.
9. Be it so a case of reversing judgment, the powers of this Court under S. 25 of the Act are not wide enough to make them those of a second court of first appeal. It would be a different matter if the appellate authority has applied wrong tests and has proceeded to decide the factual issues. Such is not the case here. We are convinced that there has been advertence to the correct tests and there has been an appropriate consideration of the relevant factual materials over the questions, and the findings rendered by the appellate authority are not liable to be questioned in revisional jurisdiction. The result is, these two revisions fail and they are dismissed. No costs.
10. At this juncture Mr. V. Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants puts forth the plea for grant of time for his clients to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlords. We find that the tenants had a very long time on account of the pendency of these two revisions. However, finding sincerity in the pleas for grant of time putforth by the learned counsel for the tenants, we grant the tenants, six months time from today to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlords.
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