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P.S.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. And Ors.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal was listed for final hearing on 21.4.1988. The counsel then on record reported no instructions, the party did not appear and the appeal was dismissed on that date. Subsequently, C.M.P. No. 9919 of 1990 was filed seeking to set aside the order of dismissal dated 21.4.1988. The affidavit in support explained that different vakalaths (powers of attorney for advocates) had been filed at different times: originally M/s. M.N. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan; later M/s. M. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss filed a vakalath but no formal petition to revoke the earlier vakalath was filed. The Registry accepted and kept the later vakalath without making the requisite entries or requiring a stamped petition for change of practitioners. At the hearing the Court chose to hear the appeal on merits (despite the delay in seeking recall) and also took up the petition for setting aside the dismissal. The appeal challenged an order dismissing an application to set aside a Court auction sale; that application had been brought under Order 21, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Registry may accept and retain a fresh vakalath without a stamped petition for change of practitioners or without a formal application to revoke the earlier vakalath (i.e., whether the Registry's practice complied with Order 2, Rule 4(3) of the Appellate Side Rules).
- Whether the order of dismissal dated 21.4.1988 should be set aside after a delay of more than two years (the propriety of entertaining C.M.P. No. 9919 of 1990).
- Whether an application under Order 21, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure may entertain objections to the proclamation of sale that could have been raised before the proclamation of sale was settled.
- Whether the appellant, who had filed a separate partition suit claiming a half share, can challenge the execution sale either as a third party or as a person interested in the property within proceedings under Order 21, Rule 90.
- Whether the evidence produced by the appellant was sufficient to show that the auction sale caused substantial injury to the judgment-debtor because the property was worth materially more than the sale price (the substantive question under Order 21, Rule 90).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The sale proclamation described the property vaguely and inaccurately.
- The property sold was a running business and should have been sold only last, after sale of other items, if necessary.
- The D. No. (door/description number) was wrongly given as 16/2, but no such property exists.
- The property sold had not been attached earlier in the execution proceedings, rendering the sale invalid.
- The appellant claimed entitlement to a half share in the property as joint family property (he had filed a partition suit C.S. No. 188 of 1972 claiming one half share).
Court Below / Registry / Respondent Position (as reported in the opinion)
- The Court below rejected the appellant's objections and dismissed the application to set aside the sale.
- It was stated that objections to the proclamation of sale (items 1 to 4 above) should have been raised before the proclamation was settled and cannot be raised later under Order 21, Rule 90 (citing Sub-rule (3) of Rule 90, Order 21).
- The Registry had been accepting vakalaths endorsed with consent for change of practitioners without requiring stamped petitions for orders; the Registry's practice was wrong and contrary to the rules.
- The materials on record did not prove that the appellant was entitled to one half share; that issue was to be determined in the appellant's separate partition suit (C.S. No. 188 of 1972).
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two related strands: (A) procedural/practice matters concerning vakalaths and (B) the merits of the appeal under Order 21, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure.
(A) Vakalath / Registry Practice
- The Court observed that under Order 2, Rule 4(3) of the Appellate Side Rules the Registrar is empowered to order change of practitioners on an application made on a stamped petition. In the present matter, although a vakalath was filed by M/s. M. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss, no formal petition to revoke the earlier vakalath of M/s. M.N. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan was filed.
- The Registry's practice of accepting vakalaths with endorsements of consent for change of practitioners without requiring a stamped petition for an order was noted as contrary to the rules and impermissible. Unless a petition for revocation or change of practitioners is filed, the vakalath already on record remains valid and only that counsel's name should appear in records and cause lists.
- The Registry was directed that no change of vakalath shall be accepted henceforth unless accompanied by an application for an order for change of practitioners; this directive was given as a mandatory instruction to be strictly followed.
- The Court also recorded that at the time of the dismissal on 21.4.1988 M/s. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss did not appear to inform the Court they represented the appellant, nor had the appellant informed the earlier counsel about engaging new counsel.
(B) Merits under Order 21, Rule 90
- The appeal challenged the dismissal of an application to set aside a Court auction sale brought under Order 21, Rule 90, with objections largely directed at the description and valuation of the property and at the appellant's claimed half share.
- The Court emphasized that objections which could have been taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was settled cannot subsequently form the basis for an application under Order 21, Rule 90, citing Sub-rule (3) of Rule 90 of Order 21. Therefore objections 1 to 4 (description, business character, wrong D. No., non-attachment earlier) were barred from being raised in the present application.
- Regarding the appellant's dual stance—claiming rights as a third party and also seeking to set aside the sale as a person interested—the Court noted that if he were a third party he could not challenge the sale in these proceedings; if he asserted an interest in the property, then the bar under Order 21, Rule 90 still prevented raising objections that could have been raised earlier. The appellant had separately filed a partition suit (C.S. No. 188 of 1972) in which his claim to a half share would properly be adjudicated.
- On the central factual question whether the sale caused substantial injury (the statutory touchstone under Order 21, Rule 90), the Court examined the evidence produced by the appellant and found it insufficient. The engineer who acted as an expert witness (P.W.3) conceded that particulars were given to him by a manager whose identity he could not state, that his valuation was based on notes not produced, that he had not perused documents relating to the property, had not ascertained yearly income, and that he was not qualified to value machinery (he relied on experience). Consequently the Court rejected that valuation report as unreliable.
- Oral testimony by the appellant was regarded as self-interested and unsupported by documentary proof. P.W.1 (an accountant) admitted he did not know the price for which the property had been sold. P.W.4 claimed a higher value but was related to the judgment-debtor and not shown to be competent to value the property; his testimony was not accepted to prove the asserted value.
- On the whole, the Court concluded that the evidence did not establish that the property was worth materially more than the auction price or that substantial injury was caused by the sale; therefore there was no justification to set aside the sale or to interfere with the order of the Court below.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's dispositive rulings are summarized as follows:
- The appeal is dismissed with costs.
- C.M.P. No. 9919 of 1990 stands allowed. (As stated in the opinion.)
Implications:
- The Court refused to set aside the Court auction sale on the merits because the appellant failed to prove that the sale caused substantial injury or that the property was worth materially more than the sale price.
- The Court directed the Registry to cease the practice of accepting changes of vakalath without an application (stamped petition) for an order for change of practitioners; henceforth no change of vakalath shall be accepted unless accompanied by such an application. This is an operational directive addressed to the Registry and practicing counsel.
- The appellant's allegation of entitlement to one half share is to be determined in his pending partition suit (C.S. No. 188 of 1972) and was not decreed or resolved in these proceedings; the Court declined to decide that substantive claim in the execution/Rule 90 context.
- No case law precedents were cited in this opinion; the decision rests on statutory rules (including Order 21, Rule 90 and Order 2, Rule 4(3) of the Appellate Side Rules) and the factual evaluation of evidence produced by the appellant.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and language of the provided opinion; no information beyond the opinion has been added or inferred.
1. The appeal was in the list for final hearing on 21.4.1988 and learned Counsel who was on record at that time reported no instructions; the party's name was called and the appellant did not appear. Hence, the appeal was dismissed on that date.
2. C.M.P. No. 9919 of 1990 has been filed for set. ting aside the order of dismissal dated 21.4.1988. It is stated in the affidavit that at the time when the appeal was filed M/s. M.N. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan had filed vakalath for the appellant and on 12.1.1987 they had given consent for change of vakalath. It is further stated that on 19.1.1987 a vakalath was filed by M/s. M. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss, Advocates, Madras. But, admittedly no application was filed for revocation of vakalath given already to M/s. M.N. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan. Under Order 2, Rule 4(3) of the Appellate Side Rules, the Registrar is empowered to order change of practitioners on application made on stamped petition. Though no petition was filed by the appellant or his new counsel M/s. M. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss the Registry simply accepted the vakalath filed by M/s. M. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss and kept it along with records without making any entry of the fresh vakalath. Accordingly, the vakalath of M/s. M.N. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan continued to be valid and the Registry was right in not recognising the vakalath of M/s. M. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss and making entries in the registers. The Registry is also right in showing the names of M/s. M.N. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan as counsel for the appellants in the cause list when the case was posted in the list for disposal.
3. At the time when the appeal was dismissed as stated above, M/s. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss did not appear before Court and inform the Court that they were representing the client; nor did the appellant inform M/s. M.N. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan that he had engaged M/s. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss after M/s. Padmanabhan and R. Singaravelan had given consent for change of Vakalath.
4. Hence, there is no necessity for this Court to entertain this application, which has been filed alter a period of more than two years. When the application came up for hearing, I felt it better to hear the appeal on merits and dispose of the same. Consequently, the petition for setting aside the order of dismissal dated 21.4.1988 was also posted along with the appeal to-day and the appeal was heard on merits. It should also be mentioned that counsel who' are appearing for the appellant to-day are not M/s. Shamdoss and Thulasidoss. These counsels filed their vakalath on 2.1.1989 and they too have not filed an application for change of practitioners.
5. It is seen that the Registry has been simply accepting vakalaths with endorsements of consent for change of practitioners without stamped petitions for orders. This practice is clearly against the rules and it is not permitted in law. The Registry has been adopting this practice and counsel have also been ignoring the rules. A petition for revocation of vakalath or for change of practitioners is absolutely necessary and unless such a petition is filed, the vakalath already on record would continue to be valid. Only such counsel's name would appear in the record. I have issued directions to the Registry that hereafter no change of vakalath shall be accepted unless there is an application for an order for change of practitioners. This should be strictly followed by the Registry hereafter.
6. Coming to the merits of the appeal, it is against an order dismissing the application for setting aside the Court auction sale. The appellant, who is the son of the judgment debtor, filed the application under Order 21, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure. He raised various grounds challenging the validity of the sale. All of them related to the description of the property in the proclamation of the sale and the value of the property fixed by the Amin as accepted by the Court. The Court below has rejected all the objections raised by the appellant and dismissed the application.
7. In the appeal it is contended by learned Counsel for the appellant that the Court auction sale was vitiated by the following circumstances:
1. The property sold was not accurately described in the sale proclamation and the description is absolutely vague.
2. The property is really a running business and it should have been sold only at the end as last item, if the sale of the other items has not realised the amount due to the decree-holder.
3. The D. No. of the property is given wrongly as 16/2 whereas there is no property bearing D. No. 16/2.
4. The property that was sold was not attached in the execution proceedings earlier and the sale is, therefore, not valid.
5. The appellant is entitled to 1/2 share in the property, as it is joint family property belonging to himself and the judgment-debtor, his father.
8. As regards the objections 1 to 4, they should have been raised before the proclamation of sale was settled by Court. It is not open to the applicant under Order 21, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure, to raise these objections against the validity of the sale. Under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 90 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is provided that no application to set aside the sale shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant can take on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was settled. Hence, none of these objections is available to the appellant.
9. Learned counsel contends that the appellant was not a party to the suit or the execution proceedings, and it is, therefore, open to him to raise these objections in the application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While on the one hand, the appellant wants to claim rights as a third party, on the other, he wants to have the sale set aside as a person interested in the property. If the appellant is a third party, he is not entitled to question the sale in these proceedings. If it is otherwise, the plea is not available to him because of Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Admittedly, he has filed a suit for partition in C.S. No. 188 of 1972 claiming one half share in the property. It is not open to the appellant now to say that he being a third party, is entitled to raise objections which could have been put forth before the Court on or before the date of settlement of proclamation.
10. The main objections raised about the half share is found against by the Court below on the ground that the materials on record do not prove that the appellant is entitled to one half share in the property. However, the question does not strictly arise in the applications under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and he ought not to have taken that objection here. Even assuming, the appellant is entitled to one half share, he having filed the suit for partition in C.S. No. 188 of 1972, should work out his rights therein. If the appellant succeeds in C.S. No. 188 of 1972 in proving that the suit property is joint family property and that he was entitled to one half share therein, certainly the other question viz., whether the debt in question is binding on the appellant will also be decided in that suit. Hence, it is not necessary to hold that the appellant is not entitled to half share in the suit property when the matter will have to be decided in the suit O.S. No. 188 of 1972, which is already pending.
11. I have gone through the evidence as well as the order of the Court below. I find, the Court below has considered the entire evidence on record and came to the clear conclusion that the sale is not vitiated by errors. The more important point is that under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a sale cannot be set aside unless upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that substantial injury is caused to the judgment-debtor by the sale. In this case, the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove that the property is worth much more than the value for which it was sold in Court auction. The appellant has examined besides himself, four witnesses, one of them being an Engineer, who claimed to have valued the property and submitted a report of valuation. He has given evidence as P.W. 3. He admitted in the evidence that the particulars regarding the property are given to him by the Manager, but he admits that he does not know who the manager was. So, neither his report nor his evidence is acceptable as sufficient to prove the value of the property. He admits that he has given the report on the basis of notes of the particulars, which he obtained from the manager, but the notes have not been filed before the Court. He admits that he did not peruse any document relating to the property for fixing the value of the property. He did not ascertain the yearly income that can be obtained from the property. He admits that he is not qualified to value the machinery and he filed the same only by experience. In view of evidence of P.W. 3, his report cannot be accepted and the claim made by the appellant that the property is worth much more than the amount for which it is sold is not true.
12. Then, reliance has been placed on the oral evidence of the appellant. The appellant is interested in exaggerating the value of the property. He has not produced any document with regard to the value of the property and so, his evidence is not acceptable. P.W. 1, an accountant in the estate, claiming to be personally acquainted with the properties deposes that the property is worth Rs. 30,000 per cent. But he admits in the cross-examination that he does not know the value for which it has been sold. P.W. 4 claims that the property is worth Rs. 50,00,000, but he is not a person competent to value the property and he admits that he is related to the judgment-debtor as his uncle's son. He speaks about a transfer which took place in 1972. His evidence does not prove the value of the property.
13. Thus, the entire evidence let in by the appellant is not sufficient to prove that the property is more valuable than the price it fetched in the court auction sale.
14. In these circumstances, there is no justification for interfering with the order of the Court below. Consequently, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. C.M.P. No. 9919 of 1990 stands allowed.
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