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P. Swaminathan And Others v. Lakshmanan .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners (accused) were convicted by the trial Court for an offence under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-. That conviction and sentence were confirmed on appeal. The petitioners filed the present revision challenging the conviction and sentence.
The respondent had preferred a private complaint alleging that the petitioners, after a mediation held on 7-2-1982, executed and got registered (on 8-2-1982) an agreement under which the respondent and two mediators were to sell the petitioners' properties to pay creditors. On 25-4-1982 the petitioners, by notice through a counsel, repudiated the agreement alleging coercion and police assistance in obtaining signatures and registration. On 27-4-1982 a publication appeared in the Malai Murasu, alleging that the respondent and the mediators had used influence and terrorised the petitioners into executing a false document and were attempting unlawful sales of the petitioners' properties. The respondent claimed defamation and his reputation as an advocate and businessman was allegedly lowered.
During trial the respondent examined himself (P.W.1) and other witnesses (P.Ws.2–4). The petitioners offered no oral or documentary evidence. The Magistrate convicted the petitioners; that conviction was confirmed on appeal; the present revision was dismissed by the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioners are entitled to the protection of Exception 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code (i.e., whether the imputation complained of was made in "good faith" for protection of the petitioners' interests, and therefore not defamatory under Section 500).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by their counsel)
- The petitioners relied on Exception 9 to S.499 IPC, arguing that the imputation made in the publication was in "good faith" for the protection of their interests.
- Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon earlier decisions (cases referenced in the opinion) to support the contention that Exception 9 applied.
Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by his counsel)
- The publication was made in bad faith, without honesty of purpose and contained false allegations.
- No civil action had been pursued by the petitioners to set aside the agreement, which supported the contention that the publication was not in good faith and thus did not attract Exception 9 to S.499 IPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| H. Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 (1966 Cri LJ 82) | Explains that for Exception 9 to S.499 IPC the element of "good faith" requires due care and attention (per S.52 IPC) rather than honesty as defined in the General Clauses Act; simple belief is insufficient; accused must have a rational basis for the statement. | The court relied on H. Singh to hold that "good faith" requires due care and attention and a rational basis for the imputation; honesty in the General Clauses Act does not alter the standard under S.499 Exception 9. |
| Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, (1970) 1 SCC 590; AIR 1970 SC 1372 (1970 Cri LJ 1266) | Reiterates that "good faith" requires care, attention and prudence in the background of context and circumstances when applying Exception 9. | The court cited Chaman Lal to reaffirm that the assessment of "good faith" is fact- and circumstance-specific and requires prudence and due care. |
| Ayeasha v. Peerkhan Sahib, AIR 1954 Mad 741 (1954 Cri LJ 1239) | Holds that an essential ingredient of "good faith" is whether the accused had reasonable grounds for believing the imputations to be true and believed it was necessary for his safety to publicise them. | The court used this authority to emphasise that reasonable grounds for belief and necessity of publication are relevant to establishing Exception 9. |
| B. Mallangouda Patil v. M. Basappa Konnur, 1980 MLJ (Crl) 373 | Explains the burden of proof for an accused claiming an exception to S.499: if materials on record establish a preponderance of reasonable probability that the exception applies, the accused's burden is satisfactorily discharged. | The court applied this principle to note that the accused need only establish "good faith" on a preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt; nevertheless, the petitioners failed to do so on the facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded by first identifying the nature of the publication and then applying the legal standard for Exception 9 to S.499 IPC. The court noted the statutory texts relied upon in the analysis:
- Exception 9, S.499 IPC: not defamation if imputation made in "good faith" for protection of interests or public good.
- S.52 IPC: "good faith" means done or believed with due care and attention.
- General Clauses Act, S.3(22): defines "good faith" as being done honestly (distinct statutory definition).
Relying on Supreme Court and High Court authorities (summarised above), the court explained the legal test for "good faith" under Exception 9: the accused must have acted with due care and attention (a rational basis) and, on the facts and circumstances, there must be reasons to accept that he acted with such care. The accused bears the burden of proving the exception on a preponderance of probabilities.
Applying those principles to the facts, the court observed:
- The agreement was signed by all petitioners on 7-2-1982 and registered on 8-2-1982, with all petitioners appearing for registration and thus admitting execution.
- The petitioners remained silent and took no steps for months; they did not protest the execution or registration at the time and allowed the respondent and mediators to act on the agreement in selling properties and settling creditors' dues.
- Only about 2½ months after registration (when prospective purchasers were coming forward), the petitioners sent a notice repudiating the agreement and later caused the publication alleging coercion and dishonesty by the respondent and mediators.
- The publication imputed "dishonesty" (as defined in S.24 IPC) to the respondent and mediators by alleging they used influence and terrorised the petitioners into executing false documents and were attempting unlawful sales for wrongful gain.
From these facts the court concluded that the petitioners were "actuated by mala fides" and had a desire to resile from the agreement to defeat creditors' claims and retain properties. The presence of mala fides, the court held, negated "good faith." Because the petitioners failed to establish that the imputation was made with due care and attention (they had not acted promptly, had admitted execution by registering, and had not pursued civil remedies), Exception 9 did not apply.
The court therefore rejected the petitioners' contention that they were protected by Exception 9 and affirmed the findings of mala fides and defamatory publication.
Holding and Implications
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE CONFIRMED; REVISION DISMISSED
Direct effect: The Magistrate's conviction of the petitioners under Section 500 IPC and sentence (fine of Rs. 100/-) was upheld on appeal and the revision challenging that conviction was dismissed. The petitioners were not entitled to the protection of Exception 9 to Section 499 IPC because the court found lack of "good faith" (presence of mala fides and absence of due care and attention).
Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles regarding Exception 9 and "good faith" as developed in prior case law; the court did not purport to create a new legal precedent. The decision confines itself to applying settled tests (due care, preponderance of probabilities burden on accused, and contextual assessment of good faith) to the facts of this case.
End of summary. This synthesis is limited to information expressly contained in the provided opinion.
1. The accused, who have been convicted by the trial Court for an offence under S. 500 of the Penal Code and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- which conviction and sentence have been confirmed in appeal, have filed the present revision challenging the conviction and sentence. The respondent preferred a private complaint against the petitioners for the above offence on the following allegations made in the complaint. The respondent, after practising as an Advocate for two years, took up business in sale of silk yarn and was holding several posts as Secretary of the Handloom Weavers' Association, Salem, Member of All India Silk Yarn Producers' Association and so on. He was enjoying a high reputation. Respondents 2 to 4 are the sons of the first respondent and they are living together as a joint family. The third respondent was a broker in Salem in yarn. In that business, he had purchased silk yarn from several merchants and had failed to return the price amount and had utilised them for the benefit of the joint family. The third petitioner approached the respondent and one Mohanraj and Venkateswaran stating that he was being hard presssed by the Silk merchants to whom he owed heavy amounts and that the respondent and others should act as mediators and pacify them and settle the different claims of the creditors. Thereupon, on 7-2-1982, a mediation was held in which I the petitioners agreed that the respondent and the other two mediators, should sell the properties of the petitioners on behalf of the petitioner and pay the creditors and in token of the settlement, an agreement was written up signed by all the petitioners. Next day, on 8-2-1982, the petitioners went to the office of the Sub-Registrar and had the above agreement registered. They also handed over in terms of the above agreement, all the documents relating to the properties, to the respondent and the other two mediators. However, on 25-4-1982, the respondent received a notice through a counsel, on instructions from the petitioners stating that with the help of the police and others, the petitioners were taken to the police station and were intimidated and forced to enter into an agreement and they signed the agreement and under compulsion and police help they were taken to the office of the Sub-Registrar to get the agreement registered. On 27-4-1982 in the issue of Malai Murasu, a publication was made by an Advocate, on instructions from the petitioners, containing the same allegations and the public who saw the above notice started thinking ill of the respondent. The reputation enjoyed by the respondent in the public, was lowered. The respondent had been defamed by the petitioners through the above publication.
2. During trial, the respondent examined himself as P.W 1 and examined P.Ws 2 and 3 to speak to his reputation being defamed and P.W 4, the Advocate who made the publication in the ‘Malai Murasu’. The petitioners pleaded innocence and had no oral or documentary evidence to offer. On the learned Magistrate accepting the complainant's case and convicting the petitioners and sentencing them as shown above and the same having been confirmed in appeal, the present revision has been filed.
3. Thiru C. Selvaraj, learned Counsel for the petitioners would strongly urge that the petitioners would be entitled to Exception 9 to S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code, that the imputation was made in good faith for the protection of the petitioners' interest and that, therefore, the publication being covered by the above exception, would not attract the penal provision. Learned Counsel relied upon certain decisions which I shall refer to during the discussion.
4. Per contra, Thiru V. Jeevahan, learned Counsel for the respondent would urge that the publication had been made in bad faith, without any honesty of purpose, containing false allegations and had not been followed up by any civil action to have the agreement set aside and as such, the publication would not be covered by Exception 9 to S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioners are entitled to the protection of Exception 9 to S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code.
6. Reference may first be made to the nature of the publication. The agreement was entered into on 7-2-1982. It has been signed by all the four petitioners. It has been registered in the Sub-Registrar's Office on 8-2-1989, with all the petitioners appearing for the registration. On 25-4-1982, Ex. P. 2 notice has been sent through a counsel on instructions from all the petitioners, repudiating the agreement and pleading coercion, threat and intimidation by the respondent and the other mediators, who are alleged to have obtained the signature of the petitioners in the agreement and got the registration done with the help of the police. On 27-4-1982, the publication, Ex. P. 3 has been made in ‘Malai Murasu’ a Tamil daily of wide circulation, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Offending passages in Ex. P. 3 so far as they relate to the petitioners are that the respondent and the other two mediators used their influence and in an unlawful manner compelled and terrorised the petitioners got a false document on 7-2-1982 and using that false document, were trying to sell the house and lands mentioned in the publication, that the respondent and the two mediators have no right to sell the above properties and that the petitioners did not give them any right or authority to sell the properties and if anyone bought the properties or entered into any agreement of sale in respect of the properties, the said transactions would be illegal in the eye of the law and would not bind the petitioners.
7. The above publication would show that the petitioners-complainants are accused of having used their influence to compel and terrorise the petitioners into executing false documents and on the basis of those documents, were attempting to sell the properties. The publication imputes that through the unlawful sale of the petitioners' properties, the respondent and the other mediators, were trying to get a wrongful gain for themselves or bring about a wrongful loss to the petitioners, which would bring their act within definition is the term ‘dishonestly’ as defined in Sec. 24 of the Indian Penal Code. In short, the publication imputed dishoestly to the respondent and the other mediators. The publication is defamatory.
8. Exception 9 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code is as follows:
“It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.”
9. The term “Good Faith” occurring in the above exception has been defined in S. 52 of the Indian Penal Code as hereunder:
“Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith”, which is done or believed without due care and attention.”
“Good faith” has also been defined in the General Clauses Act 10 of 1897 in S. 3, subsec. (22) as follows:
“A thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.”
10. Reading all these provisions together, the Supreme Court in H. Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 : (1966 Cri LJ 82) held that the element of honesty, which is introduced by the definition in the General Clauses Act, is not introduced by the definition in the Indian Penal Code and, hence, in considering the elements necessary to establish “good faith” for Exception 9 of S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code, it was clear that the element of honesty was not necessary and it had only to be established that the accused acted with due care and attention. Simple belief or actual belief by itself, would not establish “good faith”. The accused must show that he had a rational basis to make the statement, though logical infallibility was not required. The Court further observed at page 88 of Cri LJ 1966:
“Thus, it would be clear that in deciding whether an accused person acted in good faith under the Ninth Exception, it is not possible to lay down any rigid rule or test. It would be a question to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case—what is the nature of the imputation made; under that circumstances did it come to be made; what is the status of the person who makes the imputation; was there any malice in his mind when he made the said imputation; did he make any enquiry before he made it; are there reasons to accept his story that he acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that the imputation was true? These and other considerations would be relevant in deciding the plea of good faith made by an accused person who claims the benefit of the Ninth Exception.”
11. The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in a later decision in Chaman Lal v. State Of Punjab† , (1970) 1 SCC 590 : AIR 1970 SC 1372 : (1970 Cri LJ 1266), wherein also it was laid down that “Good Faith” required, care and attention and prudence in the background of the context and circumstannces. Earlier a learned Judge of this Court in Ayeasha v. Peerkhan Sahib, AIR 1954 Mad 741 : (1954 Cri LJ 1239) had laid down that an essential ingredient of “good faith” was whether, the accused had reasonable grounds for believing the imputations to be true and for believing that it was necessary for his safety to give publicity to them. On the nature of the burden of proof on the accused, a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in B. Mallangouda Patil v. M. Basappa Konnur, 1980 MLJ (Crl) 373 held that if the materials on record establish preponderance of reasonable probability of a particular exception to S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code being applicable, then the burden is to be held satisfactorily discharged by the accused.
12. It follows, therefore, from the above decisions that the accused in order to bring his case under Exception 9 to S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code, must first establish that in making imputation he acted with due care and attention. The imputation need not be true. Whether he acted with due care and attention, would depend upon the facts of each case. Being an exception, the burden of proof on the accused, is not the same as that on the prosecution. The accused need not prove the exception beyond reasonable doubt as a prosecution is required to prove the guilt of the accused during trial. It would be sufficient if on a preponderance of probabilities, due care and attention could be made out, in which case, the accused would be entitled to succeed.
13. Reverting to the facts of the instant case, we find that on 7-2-982, the agreement had been signed by all the petitioners. On 8-2-1982, it had been registered at the Sub Registrar's Office, where all the petitioners had appeared and admitted execution of the agreement. The petitioners had not raised even a little voice of protest thereafter. For months they had kept quiet and had obviously allowed the respondent and the other mediators, to act on the agreement in selling the properties and settling the dues to the creditors. 2½ months after the registration of the agreement, possibly when parties were coming forward to purchase the property, actuated by mala fides and with a desire to resile from the agreement and to defeat the claims of the creditors and to retain their properties, this publication had been made, attributing dishonest as defined in S. 24 of the Indian Penal Code, to the respondent and the other mediators. It is clear that the petitioners have acted in a mala fide manner. When mala fide is present, “good faith” is ruled out. The publication, therefore, not having been made in “good faith” without any care or attention cannot be brought under the umbrella of the 9th Exception to S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the contrary. The conviction and sentence are, therefore, confirmed and this revision is dismissed.
14. Revision dismissed.
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