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Sun Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union Of India And Others
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (Delivered by Nainar Sundaram, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged in manufacture and sale of newsprint (white printing paper) to newspaper concerns. For the assessment years 1975–76 to 1981–82 the petitioner had been assessed to sales tax on the basis that a concession notification of 12 November 1965 (published 24 November 1965) applying a concessional tax rate (2%) to sales of white printing paper to newspaper concerns applied.
The third respondent issued notices seeking revision of those assessments on the ground that the 1965 concession notification had been withdrawn by a withdrawal notification dated 20 March 1967 (published 22 March 1967) which listed the earlier notifications to be cancelled.
The petitioner challenged the impugned notices by filing writ petitions. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the petitioner had an available remedy to object by replying to the revision notices and that, on the material on record, there was no infirmity in the notices. The petitioner appealed from those orders; two principal points were argued before the Division Bench, the second having been raised by permission as an additional ground.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the withdrawal notification of 20 March 1967 was validly issued and published (i.e., whether there was due publication and sufficient particularity so as to put the public and authorities on notice that the concession notification of 1965 was withdrawn).
- Whether the withdrawal of the concession complied with the "like manner and method" and conditions required by section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act (i.e., whether the State Government was satisfied that withdrawal was necessary in the public interest and whether that satisfaction and the requisite conditions appeared on the face of the withdrawal notification or associated material).
- As an ancillary matter (raised but not determinative for relief): whether an earlier appellate order in favour of the petitioner for 1975–76 precluded the assessing authority from initiating revision proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Petitioner) — Dr. D. Pal
- The exercise of delegated legislative power (withdrawal of a notification) is conditional upon due publication; the withdrawal notification must be published in a manner that gives proper notice to the public and authorities.
- The withdrawal notification did not set out the commodity or goods or other particulars; it merely listed Gazette numbers, page and Part/Section; without further particulars no one could know the scope/content of the withdrawal.
- The withdrawal notification therefore did not comply with the manner and method required (i.e., "in the like manner and method") and was ineffective; effectively there was no withdrawal in law.
- Reference to section 28 of the General Clauses Act (Central) was made to support that statutory instruments should cite enactments properly; the withdrawal notification failed that rule.
- Where withdrawal is claimed to be justified by public interest, there was no material to show the State Government was satisfied that withdrawal was necessary in the public interest; the withdrawal notification is silent on that point and related Board proceedings do not properly address the statutory subsection applicable to item 10.
- Once these infirmities are established, the petitioner should succeed in the writ petitions; the additional point (appellate order in petitioner's favour for 1975–76) was also relied upon as weighing against initiation of revision proceedings.
Respondents — Mr. C. Natarajan
- A concession can be withdrawn and a State may collect tax when law requires it; assurances earlier given by the State do not bind it from collecting tax later and promissory estoppel is not available to bar withdrawal.
- The respondents relied on the withdrawal notification and supporting Board proceedings (dated 31 March 1967) as reflecting reasons for withdrawal and asserted those proceedings correctly sum up the background and rationale for cancellation of the earlier notifications.
- Case law was invoked by respondents to support the proposition that notifications are legislative in character and may be withdrawn.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kailash Nath v. State of U.P. ([1957] 8 STC 358 (SC) : AIR 1957 SC 790) | Notification made in accordance with statutory power has statutory force; exemption by notification is as if contained in the Act. | Cited to support that notifications issued under statutory powers possess the force of law and to frame the general proposition that notification is legislative in character. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya (AIR 1961 SC 751) | A rule framed in absence of specific provision is deemed part of the Act; supports legislative character of delegated rules. | Relied upon as part of settled law that delegated legislative action (notifications) is legislative in nature and must be respected in form and substance. |
| Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana (AIR 1964 SC 648) | Notifications under constitutional/statutory power have force of law; discussion of functions of Government branches. | Adduced to show that notifications carry legislative effect and therefore their issuance and withdrawal must respect statutory requirements. |
| Narinder Chand Hem Raj v. Lt. Governor, Himachal Pradesh ([1971] 2 SCC 747 : AIR 1971 SC 2399) | Exercise of delegated legislative power is legislative irrespective of whether by Legislature or its delegate. | Used to reinforce the proposition that notification/withdrawal is legislative and hence must follow prescribed mode. |
| State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone ((1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711) | Affirmed prior principles about delegated legislation and adopted Babu Ram Upadhya dictum. | Cited to show judicial consistency that delegated notifications are legislative acts governed by statutory modes of exercise. |
| State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. ((1988) 4 SCC 59 : AIR 1988 SC 1737) | Power to grant exemption is quasi-legislative. | Applied to underscore that grant or withdrawal of exemptions is not merely administrative and must meet legislative formalities. |
| Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab ([1990] 77 STC 82 (SC) : (1990) 3 SCC 87 : AIR 1990 SC 820) | Notification under a State Sales Tax Act is exercise of legislative power. | Referred to support the broader proposition that notifications under sales tax statutes are legislative acts. |
| Harla v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1951 SC 467) | Before a law operates, it must be promulgated/published so that the public may know it; natural justice requires publication. | Invoked to emphasize that withdrawal must be broadcast in a recognisable way; supports the petitioner's contention that due publication is required. |
| State Of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (AIR 1965 SC 722) | If statutory mode/form of publication is mandatory, failure to comply may result in no effective order. | Used to support the view that failure to follow statutory publication/formalities may render a withdrawal notification ineffective. |
| Hansraj v. H.H. Dave (AIR 1970 SC 755) | Operation of a notification must be judged by the words employed, not the subjective intention of the authority. | Cited to support that the clarity of language in the withdrawal notification is decisive; ambiguous/omnibus wording cannot be allowed to efface statutory requirements. |
| Asia Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Union of India ([1985] 155 ITR 568 (Mad.)) | Printing the Official Gazette without making it available to the public does not amount to effective notification. | Applied by the court (and its view later confirmed by a Bench) to hold that mere departmental circulation/printing is insufficient for due notification to public. |
| Union of India v. Asia Tobacco Co. Ltd. (W.A. Nos. 1051—1053 of 1984; judgment dated 10 July 1989) | Confirmed the Asia Tobacco position regarding effective notification. | Referred to as confirmation that notification must effectively inform the public, not merely be printed internally. |
| State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Ragubir Prasad ((1979) 4 SCC 686 : AIR 1979 SC 888) | Publication means more than mere communication to officials or departments; public notice is required. | Relied upon to reject the respondents' contention that internal departmental communication sufficed as publication. |
| Mathra Parshad and Sons v. State of Punjab ([1962] 13 STC 180 (SC) : AIR 1962 SC 745) | (Cited by respondents) Authority to tax and to withdraw concessions; related to limits on promissory estoppel against State collecting tax. | Noted by the court as part of respondents' contention that concessions can be withdrawn and promissory estoppel will not bar collection; court accepted the legal proposition but found facts here different due to infirmities in withdrawal. |
| Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat ([1987] 64 STC 304 (SC) : (1987) 1 SCC 31 : AIR 1987 SC 142) | (Cited by respondents) Support for the proposition that the State may withdraw concessions and collect tax. | Recognised as part of respondents' legal support; court nevertheless found the withdrawal defective on publication and satisfaction grounds. |
| Sohanlal Shantilal and Brothers v. Union of India (1990) 46 ELT 211 | (Cited by respondents) Related to withdrawal/collection propositions. | Referred to by respondents; court treated these authorities as not dispositive given the defects identified in the withdrawal notification. |
| Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 676) | Court may examine whether an amending order complied with like conditions under which original order was made. | Cited to support that courts can inquire whether withdrawal complied with the same conditions as the original concession; court applied this to hold inquiry proper here. |
| M.A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala ((1974) 2 SCC 687 : AIR 1974 SC 2249) | Even where power is expressed in subjective terms ("when satisfied"), courts will review whether reasonable/ relevant considerations support the decision. | Invoked by petitioner and applied by the court to hold that the satisfaction of "public interest" must have a factual basis and is reviewable on minimal grounds. |
| Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India ((1980) 4 SCC 321 : AIR 1981 SC 70) | Where validity of order depends on public interest, the State must disclose material so court may be satisfied that public interest basis exists. | Applied to require that reasons/material be available to justify withdrawal on public interest grounds; absence of such material here weighed for petitioner. |
| Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. ((1983) 144 ITR 225 (SC) : (1983) 4 SCC 392 : AIR 1984 SC 1182) | Sets out parameters of judicial review of administrative action; courts may interfere where actions are perverse, based on wrong approach, irrelevant considerations, or no reasonable body could reach the decision. | Cited to frame the standard of review and to justify court scrutiny of whether the withdrawal was within permissible bounds and was not arbitrary or based on irrelevant material. |
| Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India ([1981] 1 SCR 962 : (1980) 4 SCC 544 : AIR 1981 SC 431) | Even subjective statutory discretion carries implicit obligation to apply mind to relevant matters and eschew irrelevant considerations. | Referred to support the proposition that decision-making authorities must actually apply their minds; court found non-application of mind on item 10. |
| Barium Chemicals' case ([1966] Supp SCR 311 : 1966 36 Comp Cas 639 : AIR 1967 SC 295) | Landmark decision on judicial review parameters (cited as part of the settled principles). | Mentioned among authorities establishing the scope of judicial review; used as background authority for interference where action is perverse or unreasonable. |
| Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (AIR 1954 SC 282) | Discussion including a definition of 'tax' and characteristics distinguishing tax from other impositions. | Invoked by respondents on the nature of taxation; court recorded the reliance but based its decision on defects in withdrawal rather than this tax-definition argument. |
| Bakul Cashew Company v. Sales Tax Officer ([1977] 40 STC 178) | Bench of Kerala High Court accepted that power to tax is presumed in public interest; cancellation of exemption subjects categories to tax and may satisfy public interest test. | Noted by respondents; court considered these angles but held that the specific material for "public interest" satisfaction was missing for item 10. |
| Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P. v. Rao Thakur Narayan Singh ([1965] 56 ITR 234 (SC)) | (Cited by petitioner on a related point) Issues on finality of certain orders and consequences for further proceedings by authorities. | Cited by petitioner in relation to the appellate order for 1975–76; court observed that it need not decide that aspect given its primary rulings on notification infirmities. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a focused two-part analysis corresponding to the principal points argued.
-
Validity of Publication / Particularity of Withdrawal Notification:
- The court reiterated settled law that notifications issued under statutory authority are legislative in character and carry the force of law, but stressed that their exercise must follow the statutory mode and that natural justice requires effective promulgation so that the public and authorities are informed.
- The concession notification of 1965 was clear and specific in its terms (captioned referring to rate of tax on white printing paper and explicitly detailing the scope—sales of white printing paper to newspaper concerns under s.8(2)(b) at 2%).
- By contrast, the 1967 withdrawal notification was omnibus: it listed ten items and referred only to Gazette numbers, pages and dates without reproducing or describing the commodities, rates or statutory subsections affected. Item 10 in the withdrawal schedule references "III No. 601 of 1965" but the body of the withdrawal notification did not replicate or make clear the specific subject-matter (i.e., sales of white printing paper under s.8(2)(b)).
- The court held that such a withdrawal notification lacked the clarity and particularity required to put the public or authorities on notice; a mere reference to Gazette particulars was considered insufficient to satisfy the "in the like manner and method" requirement when the original concession had been granted by a clear and specific notification.
- Departmental communications (such as the Board communication of 31 March 1967 to Deputy Commissioners) and internal circulation were held inadequate to constitute due publication — publication must be more than mere inter-departmental communication.
- The court relied on earlier decisions (including Asia Tobacco and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Ragubir Prasad) to conclude that effective notification requires public availability and clarity; therefore the withdrawal notification could not be treated as having lawfully withdrawn the concession for item 10.
-
Whether Withdrawal Complied with "Like Manner and Method" and Public Interest Satisfaction (s.8(5) and General Clauses Act):
- The court noted that section 8(5) empowers the State Government to grant exemptions by notification in the Official Gazette if the Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest; by the General Clauses Act, any power to withdraw must be exercised in the like manner and subject to like sanctions and conditions.
- The withdrawal notification itself did not state that the State Government was satisfied that withdrawal was necessary in the public interest; it contained no reference to public interest or to satisfaction of the statutory precondition for withdrawal.
- The court examined the Board proceedings of 31 March 1967 relied upon by respondents and extracted paragraph 2. Those proceedings, the court found, dealt with changes in local and central tax rates and reasoning applicable to certain items but referred to s.8(1) and the effect of local rate changes; they did not address s.8(2)(b) or the specific concession (item 10) relating to white printing paper.
- Because the Board proceedings did not apply to the statutory subsection relevant to item 10, the court concluded they were alien to the matter and reflected non-application of mind with respect to item 10; item 10 appeared to have been included in a "hotch-potch" manner without proper reasoning or reference to statutory conditions.
- Citing authorities on judicial review, the court explained that when power is conferred in subjective terms ("if satisfied"), courts can inquire whether there was relevant material and whether a reasonable body could have been satisfied; the State must disclose material when public interest is invoked to support an order. Applying these principles, the court found the withdrawal lacked the necessary material and articulation of public interest support.
- Given the dual defects (defective publication/particularity and absence of material showing satisfaction of public interest requirement for withdrawal of item 10), the court held the withdrawal notification was ineffective in law in respect of the concession enjoyed by the petitioner.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Division Bench allowed the writ appeals. The court set aside the orders of the learned single Judge and allowed the writ petitions out of which these appeals arose. The court declared that, on the facts, the withdrawal notification did not validly or effectively withdraw the concession in respect of the petitioner's sales of white printing paper to newspaper concerns.
Implications / Consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner succeeds — the notices seeking revision of assessments (based on the asserted withdrawal) are undermined by the court's findings; the writ petitions are allowed as prayed for and the revision notices founded on the defective withdrawal cannot stand insofar as they rely on that withdrawal.
- The orders of the learned single Judge are set aside; the writ appeals are allowed and the writ petitions are allowed. No costs were awarded.
- The court declined oral leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, stating that it applied established Supreme Court principles and had not departed from them.
- No broad new legal doctrine was laid down; the court applied established principles on validity of notifications, publication, requirement of particularity and the limited scope of judicial review of executive satisfaction on "public interest." The decision turns on the factual application of those principles to the impugned withdrawal notification and associated material (or lack thereof).
Final operative line in the opinion: "Writ appeals allowed."
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Nainar Sundaram, J.:— These writ appeals are directed against the orders of the learned single Judge in a batch of writ petitions, where the appellant herein, who was the petitioner in the writ petitions, questioned the notices issued by the third respondent for revision of the assessments for the years 1975–76 to 1981–82. The respondents herein were the respondents in the writ petitions. It is better, we refer to the parties as per their nomenclature in the writ petitions. The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and is carrying on business of manufacture and sale of newsprint paper to various newspaper concerns throughout India for the past about three decades. Suffice it to state at this juncture that the petitioner for all these assessment years was assessed to sales tax in respect of sales of white printing paper to the newspaper concerns on the basis that the concession notification dated 12th November, 1965, published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated 24th November, 1965, hereinafter referred to as “the concession notification” (the details of which we will have occasion to refer to later because there is a controversy built over the said details) applied. By the notices, impugned in the writ petitions, there is a move to reopen the assessments on the ground that the concession notification had been withdrawn by the withdrawal notification dated 20th March, 1967, published in the Fort St. George Gazette, dated 22nd March, 1967. The said notification hereinafter referred to as “the withdrawal notification”. The learned single Judge, who dealt with the writ petitions, dismissed them, opining that the petitioner can take objections by filing comprehensive replies to the impugned notices and even otherwise on examining the materials on record there is no infirmity in the impugned notices. The learned single Judge dealt with the matter very briefly in the following manner:
“The point that arises for determination in these petitions is whether the relief prayed for in these writ petitions can be granted.
Even at the outset, it has to be stated that when there is proper remedy available for the petitioner to put forth its objections by way of reply to the notices of revisions issued by the third respondent, the petitioner has come forward with these writ petitions. Whatever it wants to say by way of objections, it can be done by filing comprehensive replies to the notices. On the other hand, and far from doing so, to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution, is not called for. Anyhow, these petitions have been admitted. And this Court, at this stage, on examining the material on record, does not find any infirmity in the notices issued by the third respondent, since they have been issued only under the relevant provisions of the Act. For this reason, all these writ petitions are dismissed.”
2. As noted earlier, these writ appeals are directed against the orders of die learned single Judge. Dr. D. Pal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, canvassed before us two points, coveting interference in appeals at our hands. It must be stated that the second of the points was not taken in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions and the same has been taken only before us in these writ appeals by taking out the appropriate applications for permission to raise additional grounds.
3. The first point gets projected as follows in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions: The exercise of delegated legislation is conditional upon the publication thereof. There must be due publication of the withdrawal notification in exercise of the delegated legislative power, which alone will be in the letter and spirit of the statutory provision enabling the exercise of such power. Neither the public, nor even the authorities were aware of the issuance of the withdrawal notification in the year 1967, whereby the concession notification of the year 1965 was withdrawn. It must be stated that the power of delegated legislation has not been properly exercised and cannot be given effect to. There was no publication of the withdrawal notification to the best of the information received by the petitioner. The withdrawal notification merely sets out the number, the page, Part and Section of the Fort St. George Gazette in which the concession notification was published. The withdrawal notification did not set out the commodity or goods with respect to which the concession notification was issued and the withdrawal notification does not set out any further particulars. Without such particulars, it would be impossible for anyone to know as to what the scope and content of the withdrawal notification are. This is made clear from the very fact that the authorities themselves did not know about the withdrawal notification. The respondents in their counter-affidavit, with regard to this grievance of the petitioner, would only say that no more particulars need be published, as contended by the petitioner. To assess the grievance of the petitioner to find out as to whether it is a tenable one or not, it becomes necessary to extract both the notifications. The concession notification runs as follows:
“REVENUE DEPARTMENT
Rate of tax on white printing paper under Central Sales Tax Act.
(G.O.P No. 3117, Revenue, 12th November, 1965)
III No. 601 of 1965.—In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (5) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956), the Governor of Madras hereby directs that the tax payable by any dealer in the State of Madras under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 8 of the said Act in respect of sales by him of white printing paper to the newspaper concerns in the course of inter-State trade or commerce shall be calculated at the rate of 2 per cent
C.P Kelu Erady,
Joint Secretary to Government.”
4. The withdrawal notification is in the following terms:
“REVENUE DEPARTMENT
Cancellation of certain notifications relating to reduction in rate of tax under section 8(5) of Central Sales Tax Act.
(G.O.P No. 642, Revenue, 20th March, 1967).
III No. 169 of 1967.—In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (5) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956), the Governor of Madras hereby cancels, with effect on and from the 1st April, 1967, the Revenue Department Notifications, published in the Fort St. George Gazette, as detailed below:
Number of the notification. Page, Part and Section of the Fort St. George Gazette, in which the notification was published. Date of the Fort St. George Gazette in which the notification was published. (1) (2) (3) 1. S.R.O No. A. 3147 of 1959 Page 756 of Part I 27th May, 1959 2. S.R.O No. A. 5929 of 1959 Page 1423 of Part I 30th September, 1959 3. II-1 No. 1606 of 1960 Page 541 of Part II, Section I 12th October, 1960 4. II-1 No. 2665 of 1960 Page 902 of Part II, Section I 7th December, 1960 5. II-1 No. 5376 of 1961 Page 1852 of Part II, Section I 29th November 1961 6. II-1 No. 4156 of 1962 Page 1690 of Part II, Section I 5th September, 1962 7. II-1 No. 5420 of 1962 Page 2291 of Part II, Section I 21st November, 1962 8. III No. 118 of 1963 Page 349 of Part III 13th February, 1963 9. III No. 122 of 1963 Page 373 of Part III 13th February, 1963 10. III No. 601 of 1965 Page 2442 of Part III 24th November, 1965.
K.S Sivasubrahmanyan,
Secretary to Government.”
5. The question as to whether the legislation, in the shape of notification, is law, within the meaning of article 304 of the Constitution of India is no longer res Integra. In Kailash Nath v. State of U.P, [1957] 8 STC 358 (SC) : AIR 1957 SC 790, it was held that the notification having been made in accordance with the power conferred by the statute, has statutory force and validity, and, therefore, exemption is as if contained in the Act itself. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751, the court relied on a passage from “Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes” and held that the rule framed in the absence of any specific provision in the Act, shall be deemed to be a part of the Act itself. In Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. F.N Rana, AIR 1964 SC 648, the notification by the President under article 258(1) of the Constitution was held to have the force of law and there is profuse discussion with regard to the functions of Government, executive, legislative and judiciary. In Narinder Chand Hem Raj v. Lt. Governor, Administrator, Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh, [1972] 29 STC 169 (SC) : (1971) 2 SCC 747 : AIR 1971 SC 2399, it was held that the exercise of the power is legislative whether it is by the Legislature or by its delegate. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711, the Supreme Court relied on and adopted the dictum in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751. In State of UP. v. Renusagar Power Co., (1988) 4 SCC 59 : AIR 1988 SC 1737, it was held that the power to grant exemption is quasi-legislative. In Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, [1990] 77 STC 82 (SC) : (1990) 3 SCC 87 : AIR 1990 SC 820, the case law on the subject was adverted to and it was held that the notification issued under the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948, is in exercise of the legislative power.
6. With regard to the power of withdrawal of the notification, the provisions of the General Clauses Act—section 21 of the Central Act and section 15 of the Tamil Nadu Act—lay down that the exercise of that power should be done in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, governing the very exercise of the power to issue the notification. The power to exempt is expressed in section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act and it empowers the State Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest, by notification in the Official Gazette to direct the exemption. Notification in the Official Gazette is the manner and method in which the power of exemption could be exercised. We have to take it that the power of withdrawal also should be exercised in the like manner and method. Even otherwise, natural justice requires that before a law can become operative, it must be promulgated and published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way, so that all men may know what it is. It would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subjects of the State to be punished or penalised or be subject to obligations and deprivation of rights, by laws of which they could not have acquired knowledge. In Harla v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1951 SC 467, the above principle has been countenanced. In State Of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George ., [1965] Comp Cas 557 : AIR 1965 SC 722, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., who spoke for the majority, observed as follows:
“Where there is a statutory requirement as to the mode or form of publication and they are such that, in the circumstances, the court holds to be mandatory, a failure to comply with those requirements might result in there being no effective order, the contravention of which could be the subject of prosecution…….”
7. In Hansraj v. H.H Dave, AIR 1970 SC 755, it has been countenanced that the operation of the notification has to be judged not by the object, which the rule-making authority had in mind but by the words which it has employed to effectuate the legislative intent. One of us (Nainar Sundaram, J.) in Asia Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Union of India, [1985] 155 ITR 568 (Mad.), had occasion to consider the question as to whether the bare printing of the Official Gazette containing the withdrawal notification and without the Official Gazette being made available to the public would amount to an effective notification. The case law on the subject was adverted to and the answer was given in the negative. It was observed as follows:
“The intendment of the notification in the Official Gazette is that in the case of either grant or withdrawal of exemption, the public must come to know of the same. ‘Notify’, even according to the ordinary dictionary meaning would be ‘to take note of, observe; to make known, publish, proclaim; to announce; to give notice to; to inform’.”
8. The pronouncement in Asia Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Union of India, [1985] 155 ITR 568 has been confirmed by a Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Asia Tobacco Co. Ltd. (W.A Nos. 1051—1053 of 1984, judgment dated 10th July, 1989).
9. Now let us examine whether by a perusal of the withdrawal notification, the citizen could be stated to have been put on notice of the withdrawal of the concession notification. The intendment of the notification is to take note; to give notice to; and to inform. This act of notification should not be shrouded in ambiguity. On the other hand, clarity must be inherent in it. The Revenue already declared that a concern like the petitioner would have to bear the burden of the tax liability only at a particular rate and that was a concessional rate. If that concession had got to be withdrawn, it should have been withdrawn in clear terms by making clear and specific references to all the relevant details. The concession notification bears the caption “rate of tax on white printing paper under Central Sales Tax Act”. It further refers to G.O.P No. 3117, Revenue, 12th November, 1965. We are told by Mr. C. Natarajan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, that the expansion of the words “G.O.P” is “Government Order Press”. The concession notification further quotes “III No. 601 of 1965”. In the body of the concession notification, the specific statement is that in respect of sales by the dealer in the State of Madras under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956) of white printing paper to the newspaper concerns in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax payable by him shall be calculated at the rate of 2 per cent. There was no ambiguity in granting the concession. The same characteristic or quality must inhere the withdrawal notification. Coming to the withdrawal notification, it is an omnibus one. It has taken in as many as ten items. Item 10 in the withdrawal notification is stated to refer to sales of white printing paper to the newspaper concerns in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. But, there is no such specific reference to the above relevant detail in the body of the withdrawal notification. It does not bear a caption referring to the rate of tax on white printing paper under Central Sales Tax Act, as done in the concession notification. It bears a general caption “cancellation of certain notifications relating to reduction in rate of tax under section 8(5) of Central Sales Tax Act”. In column (1) opposite item 10, there is a reference to “III No. 601 of 1965”. In column (2), page 2442 of Part III of Fort St. George Gazette is given. In column (3), the date of the said Gazette is given as 24th November, 1965. It is one among the ten items. By the withdrawal notification, the concession granted is taken away. If we are to countenance the withdrawal notification, as having been done in the like manner and method as the concession notification, certainly we will be permitting a watering down of the statutory and legal obligations with regard to exercise of the power of the withdrawal of a notification, which is legislative in character. The draftsman of the withdrawal notification could not do a cursory or a glossarist or a casual work of it; and the act of the authority approving the draft, for sending it to the publishing authority, cannot also be complemented and commended. It must be remembered that the rights of the citizen are being dealt with. By withdrawal of the concession notification, a benefit, enjoyed by the citizen is being deprived to him. While that could be done, it must be done in the like manner and method as law enjoins the conferment of it to be done. There cannot be a mutilation of the concept of “in the like manner and method”. If the authority indulges in that, that act must be ignored as ineffectual and inoperative. Dr. D. Pal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in this connection also drew our attention to section 28 of the Central General Clauses Act, 1897, to say that in any instrument made under any Central Act, any enactment may be cited by reference to the title or short title conferred thereon, and he would say that this rule stands violated in the case of the withdrawal notification. We see force and reason in this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
10. It is true there is a communication relating to the withdrawal notification by the Board on 31st March, 1967, to the Deputy Commissioners. But, this inter-communication would not suffice the concept of due notification. A similar contention was repelled by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Ragubir Prasad, (1979) 4 SCC 686 : AIR 1979 SC 888 by pointing out “contextually speaking, we are satisfied that publication means more than mere communication to concerned officials or departments”. But, in the instant case, even the departmental officials could not and did not comprehend that an event like the withdrawal notification did happen. They were oblivious to the withdrawal notification; and year after year; assessment of the petitioner was made on the basis that the concession notification applied to it. There is no dispute over the same. Dr. D. Pal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, also places before us authors and publishers of repute of books on sales tax law, Central and State, to show that they also made known to the public that the concession notification alone governed and there was no withdrawal of it. This endeavour was only to impress upon us that nobody was made wiser of the withdrawal notification and every one proceeded on the ground that the concession notification governed.
11. Mr. C. Natarajan, the learned counsel for the respondents, would submit that when the law requires that certain tax to be collected, it cannot be given up and any assurance by the State that it would not be collected also would not bind it whenever it chose to collect it, and a concession can always be withdrawn without violating the rule of promissory estoppel and in the instant case, no promissory estoppel could be pleaded. In this connection, the learned counsel for the respondents, placed reliance on the following pronouncements:
(1) Mathra Parshad and Sons v. State of Punjab, [1962] 13 STC 180 (SC) : AIR 1962 SC 745,
(2) Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, [1987] 64 STC 304 (SC) : (1987) 1 SCC 31 : AIR 1987 SC 142, and
(3) Sohanlal Shantilal and Brothers v. Union, of India, (1990) 46 ELT 211.
12. Nobody need take exception to the proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents. But, here the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that when the State exercises the power of withdrawal of a concession, the conferment of which was done by due notification, the same could be done only in the like manner and method and there cannot be abrasion of the same, which, if done, must be frowned upon by the court and must stand ignored, as totally ineffective. What has happened in the instant case is nothing short of the abrasion of “in the like manner and method” of exercising the power of withdrawal. There was lack of clarity and hence the withdrawal notification could not be stated to have been done by due notification. It should be held that there was no withdrawal notification at all on facts and in the eye of law. Our finding on the first point enables the petitioner to succeed in the writ petitions. Yet, for completion we shall proceed to deal with the second point.
13. The second point has been raised, as already noted, only in the additional grounds now taken before us. The same stands projected as follows: section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act confers upon the State Government the power to grant exemption or concession if the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest. Such exemption could be accorded only by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions as may be specified therein. Even though the said provision does not expressly confer a power to withdraw or cancel the exemption or concession; assuming that such a power is implied, by reason of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, the said power can be exercised only in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions. The withdrawal notification does not even prima facie disclose that the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest to withdraw the concession granted earlier. As such the conditions for the exercise of the power of withdrawal have not been satisfied and hence the withdrawal notification is illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction, power and authority or in excess of them. There is no material on which the State Government was and/or could be stated to have been satisfied that it was necessary in the public interest to withdraw the concession. There is a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents answering the second point raised in the additional grounds.
14. Here again, we must advert to the provisions of the General Clauses Act, Central and State, and they contemplate that the power of withdrawal could be exercised only subject to the like sanction and conditions. Section 8(5) of the Act lays down the conditions for granting the exemption or concession. The State Government can grant exemption or concession if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest. There should be public interest and the State Government must be satisfied about it. It has been countenanced in Kamla Prasad Khetan v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 676 that it is open to the court to find out as to whether the amending order complied with the like conditions under which the original order was made. In substance, the power to cancel, modify or vary must be exercised within the limits prescribed by the provision conferring the said power. The concession notification in the instant case specifically refers to public interest. The withdrawal notification does not refer to public interest at all. There were citations by both the sides as to how far this Court could go into this question. The learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the following pronouncements: In M.A Rasheed v. State of Kerala, (1974) 2 SCC 687 : AIR 1974 SC 2249, the principles countenanced run as follows:
“Where powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same when ‘they are satisfied’ or when ‘it appears to them’, or when ‘in their opinion’ a certain state of affairs exists; or when powers enable public authorities to take ‘such action as they think fit’ in relation to a subject-matter, the courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of an executive authority's opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated.
Where reasonable conduct is expected the criterion of reasonableness is not subjective, but objective. The onus of establishing unreasonableness however, rests upon the person challenging the validity of the Acts.
Administrative decisions in exercise of powers even if conferred in subjective terms are to be made in good faith on relevant consideration. The courts inquire whether a reasonable man could have come to the decision in question without misdirecting himself on the law or the facts in a material respect. The standard of reasonableness to which the administrative body is required to conform may range from the courts' own opinion of what is reasonable to the criterion of what a reasonable body might have decided. The courts will find out whether conditions precedent to the formation of the opinion have a factual basis.”
15. In Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 321 : AIR 1981 SC 70, it has been recognised as follows:
“When an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest the State must disclose the material so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which, to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of ‘public interest’ justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. The Court is confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest. The appropriate authority, not the court, makes the decision, but, even so, a caveat is necessary to avoid misuse.”
16. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., [1983] 144 ITR 225 (SC) : (1983) 4 SCC 392 : AIR 1984 SC 1182, our attention to the following passage has been drawn:
“By now, the parameters of the court's power of judicial review of administrative or executive action or decision and the grounds on which the court can interfere with the same are well-settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court commencing from Barium Chemicals' case, [1966] Supp SCR 311 : [1966] 36 Comp Cas 639 : AIR 1967 SC 295 on the point. Indisputably, it is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the court would be justified in interfering with the same. This Court in one of its later decisions in Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCR 962 : (1980) 4 SCC 544 : AIR 1981 SC 431, has observed thus: ‘It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote.’ Suffice it to say that the following passage appearing at pages 285-86 in Prof. de Smith's treatise: Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edition) succinctly summarises the several principles formulated by the court in that behalf thus:
‘The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories; failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidity contained within each category.’”
17. The learned counsel for the petitioner also drew our attention to a number of notifications under section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, in and by which the earlier notifications were cancelled and in them there is specific reference to the State Government having been satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest.
18. On behalf of the respondents, their learned counsel would like us to be guided by the ratio in the following pronouncements: Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282:
“A neat definition of what ‘tax’ means has been given by Latham, C.J of the High Court of Australia in—Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board, 60 CLR 263 at page 276.
‘A tax’, according to the learned Chief Justice, ‘is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not a payment “for services rendered”’
This definition brings out, in our opinion, the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within it. It is said that the essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without the tax-payer's consent and the payment is enforced by law vide—Lower Mainland Diary v. Crystal Dairy Ltd., [1933] AC 168.
The second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which, when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is, as it is said, no element of ‘quid pro quo’ between the tax-payer and the public authority…………….”
19. In Bakul Cashew Company v. Sales Tax Officer, [1977] 40 STC 178, a Bench of the High Court of Kerala accepted the statement that the power to tax has to be presumed to be in public interest, and as the cancellation of the exemption would result in subjecting the exempted categories to taxation, the test of public interest would stand satisfied.
20. Whatever be the angle from which we can test the withdrawal notification, the basic element which should not be lost sight of, is the satisfaction of the “like conditions” and in the instant case “public interest”. The withdrawal notification by itself is not portent on this subject. As noted earlier, it does not refer to any public interest and the State Government having been satisfied with it It is as bald as baldness could be on the relevant aspects. What is sought to be pressed forth before us that reasons which are nothing short of public interest alone weighed with the State in making the withdrawal notification is, the proceedings of the Board dated 31st March, 1967. Paragraph 2 of the said proceedings alone is relevant and it needs extraction, as follows:
“Items 2 to 5 and 8 to 10 in para 1 above.
The general multi-point rate of tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 has been increased from 2 per cent to 2½ per cent with effect from 1st December, 1965. The rate of Central sales tax payable under subsection (1) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, against production of ‘C’ or ‘D’ forms has also been increased from 2 per cent to 3 per cent with effect from 1st July, 1966. Under sub-section (2-A) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, if under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the sale or purchase of any goods by a dealer is exempt from tax generally or subject to tax generally at a rate which is lower than 3 per cent the tax payable under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, on the sale of such goods being nil, or as the case may be, is to be calculated at a lower rate. The rate of tax payable under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, in respect of the goods mentioned in para 1 above is less than 3 per cent. Therefore, by virtue of the provisions in sub-section (2-A) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, tax payable on the inter-State sales of these goods [but for the notifications issued under section 8(5) of the Act] will also be less than 3 per cent. In view of the changes in the rates of tax payable under the local Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the Government consider that there is no need to continue the lower rates of tax admissible under the notifications issued under sub-section (5) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and that the notifications should be cancelled.”
21. It deals with items 2 to 5 and 8 to 10 of the withdrawal notification. This proceedings set down and refers to the reasons for withdrawal. Mr. C. Natarajan, the learned counsel for the respondents, declared before and assured us that these proceedings of the Board correctly sum up and reflect the proceedings preceding the withdrawal notification and nothing need be supplemented to it from such preceding proceedings. If this is the position, we must straightway say that the reasons set out in the proceedings dated 31st March, 1967, are alien and foreign to the question. They do not and they cannot refer to item 10 of the withdrawal notification, namely, withdrawal of the concessional rate given to sales of white printing paper to the newspaper concerns in the course of inter-State trade or commerce to a dealer in the State of Madras under clause (b) of sub-section (2) to section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Apparently, item 10 has been put in the hotch-potch without any application of mind. There is no reference to section 8(2)(b) of the Act at all in the proceedings dated 31st March, 1967. It refers only to section 8(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. As rightly contended by Dr. D. Pal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, obviously there has been non-application of mind. Having given reasons, which are not tenable, the respondents cannot ask the Court to go into the field of assumptions and presumptions. Under these circumstances, we are obliged to answer the second point also in favour of the petitioner.
22. There was one aspect which Dr. D. Pal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, urged, which, in fairness to him, we must advert to, and that is that in the instant case, there was an order made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (C.T), Tirunelveli, on 28th October, 1977, for the assessment year 1975–76 settling the question in favour of the petitioner and in fact, that was implemented by the assessing officer and in the said circumstance, assuming that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner committed a mistake; yet, the assessing officer could not initiate revision proceedings. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P v. Rao Thakur Narayan Singh., [1965] 56 ITR 234 (SC). There is no need for us to strain on this aspect, since our sustaining the two points, raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, enables the petitioner to succeed. The learned single Judge, who dealt with the matter, was more guided by the fact that the petitioner could answer the impugned notices and proceed further. But, here we find a case where the impugned notices suffer infirmities, which go to the root of the matter, and to which infirmities, this Court, when its attention has been drawn, cannot shut its eyes and decline to exercise the powers intended to remedy such situations.
23. In the said circumstances, we are obliged to interfere in writ appeal. Accordingly, these writ appeals are allowed; the orders of the learned single Judge are set aside; and the writ petitions, out of which these writ appeals arise, will stand allowed, as prayed for. No costs. The oral leave asked for to appeal to the Supreme Court of India is declined by us, since we have only applied the well laid down principles of the Supreme Court of India on the two questions argued before us and in our view, we have not departed from the principles countenanced by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India.
24. Writ appeals allowed.
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