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M. Palani v. The Executive Engineer, Tneb., Salem
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Bench: Nainar Sundaram, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was an employee of the respondents. On 16.8.1990 the petitioner was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Salem (S.C. No. 219 of 1985) and sentenced to life imprisonment. The respondents had earlier, invoking Standing Order 19 (XXII), issued a show cause notice dated 24.9.1988 proposing dismissal under Standing Order 20(c). The petitioner appealed the criminal conviction to this Court in C.A. No. 447 of 1988; that appeal was pending and the petitioner was enlarged on bail on 28.9.1988.
The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus or other appropriate relief restraining the respondents from proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings (stemming from the communication dated 24.9.1988) pending final decision of the criminal proceedings (Crime No.198 of 1985 / Sessions Case No. 219 of 1985).
The matter was referred by the learned single judge to a Bench by an order of Reference because the single judge, having adverted to the Supreme Court decision in Kushalkumar v. M/s. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. (AIR 1988 S.C. 2118), expressed an opinion that that decision did not delineate guidelines for cases of this nature and therefore the matter should be considered by a Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Standing Order 20(c) read with Standing Order 19(XXII), disciplinary proceedings against an employee can be lawfully proceeded with immediately after conviction by a trial court when an appeal against that conviction is pending.
- Whether the phrase "on the conclusion of the criminal proceedings" and the notion that the employee "has been found guilty of the charges framed against him" in Standing Order 20(c) requires a final conviction (i.e., conviction finally upheld after all appellate/revisional proceedings) before disciplinary punishment is imposed.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kushalkumar v. M/s. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. (AIR 1988 S.C. 2118) | Referenced by the learned single judge concerning the interplay between disciplinary action and concurrent criminal proceedings; noted as lacking clear, delineated guidelines applicable to the present type of case. | The Bench observed there was no need in the present case to elaborate norms or guidelines as to prosecution of disciplinary action while criminal proceedings are pending and did not rely upon this decision to set new standards; it was the reason the single judge had referred the matter to a Bench. |
| R.S. Das v. Divisional Superintendent, Allahabad (AIR 1960 All. 538) | Interpretation of Article 311(2) Proviso Clause (a): held that words such as "led to his conviction" imply a conviction finally upheld (i.e., finality), not merely a conviction at the trial court stage while appellate remedies remain. | The Bench quoted and relied upon this interpretation to construe Standing Order 20(c) as requiring the conclusion of criminal proceedings with a finding of guilt that has finality before disciplinary punishment is imposed. |
| Union of India v. R. Akbar Sherief (AIR 1961 Mad. 486) | Bench decision of this Court that respectfully agreed with the principle in R.S. Das regarding finality of conviction for disciplinary consequences. | The Bench noted that a previous Bench of this Court had agreed with the R.S. Das principle; the present Bench accepted that principle in construing Standing Order 20(c). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court focused on the explicit language of Standing Order 20(c), which provides for imposition of punishment "if on the conclusion of the enquiry or, as the case may be, of the criminal proceedings, the workman has been found guilty of the charges framed against him". The Court emphasized that Standing Order 20(c) unambiguously ties the imposition of disciplinary punishment to the conclusion of the criminal proceedings in which the employee is found guilty.
The central interpretive question the Court addressed was whether a conviction at the trial court stage (followed by an appeal) qualifies as the "conclusion of the criminal proceedings" contemplated by Standing Order 20(c). The Court examined earlier judicial pronouncements construing similar language in Article 311(2) Proviso Clause (a), especially R.S. Das, which held that the expression "led to his conviction" denotes a conviction that has finality and is not merely a trial-court conviction against which an appeal is pending.
Relying on and adopting the principle in R.S. Das (as affirmed in Union of India v. R. Akbar Sherief), the Court concluded that Standing Order 20(c) was intended to be applied after the criminal proceedings have reached a conclusion in the sense of finality — i.e., when there is no further appellate/revisional remedy that could upset the conviction. The Court reasoned that if the Standing Order had intended immediate disciplinary action upon trial-court conviction, it would have been worded differently.
The Court also observed that Standing Order 20(c) must be construed in a way that is reasonable and balanced, beneficial to both employee and employer: it permits the employer to act where criminal proceedings conclude in conviction on appeal (for example, where the trial court acquitted but an appellate court convicts), and it also counsels waiting for finality when an initial conviction is under challenge by appeal. The Court noted that concerns of delay do not justify construing the Standing Order so as to circumvent its intended finality; if criminal proceedings are unduly delayed, expedient steps may be taken to secure their expeditious disposal.
Applying this interpretation to the present facts (where the petitioner had been convicted by the trial court but had an appeal pending), the Court found that disciplinary action should not be proceeded with pending the final conclusion of the criminal proceedings and that the petitioner's position deserved protection.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Bench found "a warrant to allow the writ petition" and accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The Court also ordered that there be no costs.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed, thereby granting the relief sought to restrain the respondents from proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings pending the final decision of the criminal proceedings (as was the prayer in the petition).
- The Court interpreted Standing Order 20(c) to require the "conclusion" of criminal proceedings in the sense of a conviction that attains finality (i.e., not merely a trial-court conviction when an appeal is pending) before disciplinary punishment contemplated by that Standing Order is imposed.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down wide procedural norms beyond this interpretive application; its practical consequence applies to the parties before the Court. The Court observed that issues of undue delay in criminal proceedings are a separate concern and may be addressed by appropriate measures to expedite those proceedings, rather than by construing the Standing Order to bypass finality requirements.
No costs were awarded in the cause, as explicitly stated by the Court.
Nainar Sundaram, J: This writ petition stands listed before us as a Bench because of an order of Reference made by the learned single judge, who heard the writ petition earlier. As to what prompted the learned single Judge to make a Reference of this writ petition to a Bench can be gathered when we recapitulate the necessary facts of the case. The petitioner is under the employ of the respondents. On 16.8.1990 the petitioner has been convicted for an offence under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code by the First Additional Sessions Judge of the Court of Sessions of Salem Division of Salem District, in S.C.No.219 of 1985. He has been sentenced to life imprisonment. The respondents invoking the Standing Order, 19 (XXII), issued the show cause on 24.9.1988 as to why the petitioner should not be visited with an order of dismissal. For this, reliance was placed on Standing Order, 20(c). Standing Order, 19 (XXII) reads as follows:
“19. Acts and omissions constituting misconduct (xxii) Act/Acts resulting in conviction in any Court of Law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude.”
Standing Order, 20(c) reads as follows:
“20. Punishment for misconduct:
(c) If on the conclusion of the enquiry or, as the case may be, of the criminal proceedings, the workman has been found guilty of the charges framed against him and it is considered after giving the workman concerned a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed that an order imposing any of the punishments mentioned in clause (1) above would meet the ends of justice. The competent authority shall pass an order accordingly.”
The Petitioner, as against his conviction in S.C.No.219 of 1985, has preferred an appeal to this Court in C.A.No.447 of 1988 and the same is pending and suspending the sentence passed onPage: HC161him, he has been enlarged on bail on 28.9.1988 The petitioner has filed the writ petition projecting the following prayer:
“For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus or such other writ, order or direction directing the respondents 1 and 2 herein from proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in terms of the communication dated 24th September, 1988 in Ku.R.No Ma. Pa.Po/Ss.Ni/VI/Vs/Sa/N1, P1 3 /U1.Ko.C./No. 2326.AD/3352/88 on the file of the Superintending Engineer, Salem Electricity Distribution Circles, Salem - the 2nd Respondent herein or otherwise, against the petitioner pending the final decision in respect of the criminal proceedings forming the subject-matter of Crime No.198 of 1985, Kichipalayam Police Station, Salem and Sessions Case No.219 of 1985 on the file of the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Salem, except in accordance with law and pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”
The learned single judge, who initially heard the writ petition, adverted to the ratio of the Supreme Court in Kushalkumar v. M/s. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. (AIR 1988 S.C 2118) and expressing an opinion that there has been no delineation in the above decision with regard to the facts and circumstances to be considered in for cases of the present nature and there are no guidelines set down as to the matters to be taken into account by the Court while considering the question, deemed fit to refer the matter to a Bench.
2. In our view there is no need in the present case to dwell upon norms or guidelines with regard to the prosecution of the disciplinary action when criminal proceedings are simultaneously pending. In the present case, we are concerned with a specific Standing Order, which enables the employer to penalize the employee at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings wherein the employee had been found guilty of the charges framed against him. What we have said above is nothing but a re-production in Substance of Standing Order 20(c) in our own language. Standing Order 20(c) has without any ambiguity used the expression “on the conclusion of the criminal proceedings the employee ought to have been found guilty of the charge framed against him. The question is as to whether even though there is conviction and a sentence passed on the employee by the first Court, but when there is an appeal preferred against such conviction and sentence, could it be stated that there was a confusion of the criminal proceedings in which the employee has been found guilty of the charges framed against him. It is only in this connection, Mr. B.T Seshadri, learned counsel for the petitioner, draws our attention to two pronouncements, one of a learned single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad in R.S Das, S/O Kamta Prasad…Applicant; v. Divisional Superintendent, Allahabad…Opposite Party. (AIR 1960 All. 538) and another of Bench of this Court in Union of India v. R. Akbar Sheriff (AIR 1961 Mad. 486). The learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad in R.S Das, S/O Kamta Prasad…Applicant; v. Divisional Superintendent, Allahabad…Opposite Party. (AIR 1960 All. 538)had occasion to construe what Article 311 (2), Proviso, Clause (a) of the Constitution of India, when it spoke about “led to conviction on the Criminal Charge” could mean. This is what the learned Judge observed:
“But apart from the above consideration, the main thing to be considered is the true meaning of the words in the Proviso ‘which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge’. Do these words merely indicate as the respondent has contended, that there was at one stage of the proceedings a conviction against the public servant, or do they further imply a conviction finaly upheld. The word ‘led to his conviction’ mean, in the context they have been used, not merely, to bring a criminal charge against the delinquent servant but further imply that as a result of consequence it has ended in conviction also.
A proceeding will not be said to have led to his conviction if it has not a consequence of appeal, has filed in an acquittal, appeal is a continuation of the proceedings commenced on the criminal charges and it does not conclude in a conviction where an appeal is preferred against the order of the trial Court or of any subsequence Court until these subsequent proceedings have finally ordered. At the same time it is clear that the order of dismissal passed by the Divisional Superintendent cannot be supported on the ground stated in Sub-Clause (a) of the Proviso under Clause 2 of Art. 311. This is so because of the finding arrived at earlier that the Sub-Clause implies a final conviction. If that is so, the very foundation on which the dismissal order was based and watch is its turn gave occasion for a reinstatement order to be passed has fallen and if the foundation should disappear, the edifice must also necessarily go”.
3. A Bench of this Court in Union of India v. R. Akbar Sherief (AIR 1961 Mad. 486) has respectfully agreed with the principle laid down by the learned single Judge of the High Court ofPage: HC162Allahabad in R.S Das, S/O Kamta Prasad…Applicant; v. Divisional Superintendent, Allahabad…Opposite Party. (AIR 1960 All. 538).
4. We have already adverted to the verbalism of Standing Order 20(c). It speaks about the conclusion of a criminal proceedings wherein the employee has been found guilty of the charges framed against him. If the intention was to take steps to impose the penalty proposed immediately on the conviction by the first Court, the Standing Order would not have been worded in the manner as it stands. There is one test that could be safely taken note of and applied to find out how the standing order has got to be worked out. There could be cases where the employee was acquitted by the first Court and at the appellate level or revisional level, there could have been a finding of guilt as against an employee of the charges framed against him. Then the question is as to whether the employer could not take advantage of such conviction. When we asked this question, Mr. K.P.H Thulasiraman, learned counsel for the respondents, was alert enough to give the answer in the affirmative. In our view the Standing order being concluded in an appropriate and generous manner, which would be beneficial both to the employee and the employer, it must give its due meaning and further the said meaning must be given effect to. If so done, it will be appropriate to await the conclusion of the criminal proceedings wherein it is found that they have not concluded in the sense as against the decision of the first Court, there is a further agitation before the High Court and such agitation has not reached any finality. The aspect of delay need not necessarily be taken note of to put up a difference construction on the Standing Order, which has got a solemnity and sanctity, the same having stemmed forth, pursuant to statutory requirements. If there is a question of ameliorating delay, appropriate steps could be taken for expeditious disposal of the Criminal proceedings if they continued to be unduly pending. Our construction of the Standing Order 20(c) while alone is being invoked, in the present case, being what it is, as expressed by us above, we find a warrant to allow the writ petition and accordingly this writ petition is allowed. No Costs.
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