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The Executive Office... v. The President, Vadak...

Madras High Court
Mar 14, 1990
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Factual and Procedural Background

This Civil Revision Petition was filed by the Valliyur Town Panchayat challenging the order in C.M.A. No. 61 of 1989 of the District Judge, Tirunelveli, which had confirmed an interim injunction granted in I.A. No. 856 of 1989 in O.S. No. 255 of 1989 (District Munsif's Court, Valliyur). The interim injunction restrained the panchayat from collecting an enhanced water tax under bye-laws amended pursuant to a resolution dated 14-9-1988.

The underlying suit was brought by respondents 1 and 2, on their own behalf and on behalf of the residents of the panchayat, seeking a declaration that the resolution and the consequent amendment of the relevant bye-law were invalid and for a permanent injunction. The factual background in the pleadings shows:

  • By resolution dated 23-11-1987 the panchayat resolved to increase water tax for domestic and non-domestic uses with differentiated rates and a minimum charge for consumption below 8,000 litres.
  • The resolution was sent to the Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board, as contemplated by paragraph 89(2) of the Manual of Panchayat Administration (as amended by G.O. Ms. No. 1105 dated 22-7-1980).
  • The Superintending Engineer "made corrections" to the resolution: deleting the special minimum rate for the initial 8,000 litres and fixing uniform per-1,000-litre rates subject to a general minimum (Rs. 10 domestic; Rs. 20 non-domestic).
  • The panchayat adopted the engineer's suggestion by resolution dated 14-9-1988 and sought to implement it from 1-9-1989. The suit and interlocutory application for injunction followed; the trial court granted an interim injunction which was confirmed by the lower appellate court, and the panchayat (defendant) filed this revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court and lower appellate court could grant and confirm an interim injunction in a representative suit before final sanction under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C., had been formally granted.
  2. Whether the Superintending Engineer (Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board) had jurisdiction under paragraph 89(2) of the Manual of Panchayat Administration to alter or modify a resolution passed by the panchayat (as opposed to only approving or disapproving it).
  3. Whether, taking into account the nature and effect of the alteration made by the Superintending Engineer, the plaintiffs had demonstrated (a) a prima facie case, (b) that the balance of convenience favoured them, and (c) that they would suffer irreparable injury such as to justify a temporary injunction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Valliyur Town Panchayat) Arguments

  • The courts below should not have passed the interim injunction because the plaintiffs had not obtained permission under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C., to sue in a representative capacity; I.A. No. 257 of 1989 (application for permission) remained undetermined and no final order granting permission had been passed.
  • Implicitly, the petitioners contended that any relief granted to "the entire residents" could only be given if the representative suit had been properly sanctioned; otherwise any injunction could only bind the two named plaintiffs individually.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs (respondents) contended that the Superintending Engineer had no jurisdiction to alter or modify the resolution passed by the panchayat and that his role was limited to approving or disapproving the panchayat's resolution (i.e., he could not "alter" it).
  • Respondents pointed to the fact that notice was issued on the O.1 R.8 application and publication in a newspaper had been ordered and effected, implying that the procedural safeguards for a representative suit had been followed and that a conditional permission could be inferred.
  • By implication, respondents relied on authorities and practice to argue that the omission to pass a formal order did not necessarily vitiate the representative character of the suit when notice/publication had been ordered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Paramanand, A.I.R. 1977 Allahabad 421 Held that a suit is instituted at presentation and that representative character is imparted only after requisite procedure; also observed that issuing notice on the O.1 R.8 application may be taken as a conditional permission. The court relied on the authority for the proposition that the issuance of notice/publication can be treated as implying conditional permission under O.1 R.8 and so the absence of a final formal order did not preclude the suit's representative character.
Sankiah v. Vadakasi, 1980 T L.N.J. 86 Held that where the court ordered publication of notice, it can be presumed that necessary permission under O.1 R.8 was granted by implication; no formal order is always necessary. The court used Sankiah to support the inference that publication and notice amounted to conditional permission, and thus rejected the petitioners' O.1 R.8 objection.
Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar, 1933 38 L.W. 16 = A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 183 Cited among prior decisions relating to the procedure and effect of permission under O.1 R.8 (historical authority considered). Referenced as part of the body of precedent considered when deciding whether omission of a formal order vitiates representative proceedings; court noted it had been considered in Sankiah.
Kamalakshi & Others v. Bahulayan & Others, A.I.R. 1972 Kerala 269 One of the decisions considered on O.1 R.8 and representative suit procedure. Referred to as part of the jurisprudence examined in the decisions (e.g., Sankiah) supporting the view that publication/notice can constitute implied permission.
Mukaremdas v. Chhagan Kisan, A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 491 Held that a formal order granting permission under O.1 R.8 is not always necessary; permission can be granted even at the appellate stage (as per view of Justice Gokhale). Used to support the proposition that omission of a formal order does not necessarily invalidate representative proceedings and that permission may be implied from court action such as ordering publication.
Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Salem etc. v. Natramai K.S. Ellappa etc., 100 L.W. 240 Held that procedure under O.1 R.8 must be followed and without doing so no relief could be granted to the individual concerned. The court acknowledged this authority but distinguished the present case on the basis that the O.1 R.8 procedure (notice/publication) had been followed, though a final order had not been formally recorded.
Punjab Co. op. Bank v. Hari Singh, A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 749 Expressed the view that mere omission to pass a formal order granting sanction would not vitiate a decree where the court had effectively acted to give permission. Referred to in support of the proposition that direction to publish notice can be treated as constituting implicit permission under O.1 R.8.
Muthukurappa v. Appavoo, 1942 55 L.W. 837 = A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 161 Authority cited for the statement that a court must be deemed to have given permission when it ordered publication of notice. Used as part of the chain of authority to infer implied permission from the ordering of publication.
Kunhalavi Musaliar v. Abdullah, 1965 Ker. L.T. 907 Referenced for the proposition cited from Muthukurappa about deemed permission when publication was ordered. Referred to illustrate judicial acceptance of the view that publication orders imply permission for representative suits.
Narayani Kamalakshi v. Kunchiyan Behulayan (as cited in the opinion) Passage emphasising that failure of a court to pass a formal order on an O.1 R.8 petition should not be treated as fatal where the court has directed publication. Invoked to support the conclusion that the summary procedural steps taken (notice and publication) permitted a presumption of conditional permission under O.1 R.8.
Barkat Ali v. Zulfiquar (citation not given in text) Established the settled law that grant of temporary injunction requires (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience in favour of the applicant, and (iii) that the applicant would suffer irreparable injury if injunction is not granted; these three are conjunctive requirements. The court applied this test and found that although a prima facie case existed, the alteration effected by the engineer was not significant; the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable injury and the balance of convenience lay with the panchayat, so injunction was inappropriate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (A) the procedural question under Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C., concerning the representative suit; and (B) the substantive/interlocutory question concerning the engineer's alterations and the appropriateness of an interim injunction.

A. Order 1, Rule 8 (Representative Suit) — Procedural Analysis

  • The petitioners argued that no interim relief could be granted on behalf of all residents until the O.1 R.8 application (I.A. No. 257 of 1989) had been finally allowed. The court examined the record of the O.1 R.8 application: it showed that notice had been ordered on the day the application was filed, publication in the newspaper had been directed and effected, and the matter had been repeatedly posted for enquiry though a final formal order had not been recorded.
  • The court reviewed relevant authorities and reasoned that where a court issues notice and directs publication on an O.1 R.8 application after presentation of the suit, a conditional permission may be inferred. The court relied on Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Paramanand and the Division Bench decision in Sankiah v. Vadakasi, along with other decisions, to hold that ordering notice/publication amounts to implied/conditional permission so as to permit representative relief to be sought and provisional relief to be considered.
  • As a result, the court concluded that the petitioners' objection based on absence of a formal recorded order under O.1 R.8 could not be sustained on the facts of the present case.

B. Substantive/Interlocutory Analysis — Engineer's Power and Appropriateness of Injunction

  • The court considered whether the Superintending Engineer had the power under paragraph 89(2) of the Manual of Panchayat Administration (as amended) to "alter" a panchayat resolution. The paragraph states: “No by-law or cancellation or alteration made by a panchayat shall have effect, until the same has been approved and confirmed by the Divisional Development Officer concerned…and by the Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board or any other technical officer…”
  • Both courts below had held that the engineer had no power of alteration; the judge in the present opinion agreed “prima facie” with that conclusion, noting that while the preamble to the government order might suggest otherwise, the actual words of the rule must control and the amendment mainly substituted the designation of the technical officer.
  • Notwithstanding the prima facie view on the engineer's power, the court examined the actual alteration made: the engineer deleted the special minimum rate for the initial 8,000 litres and instead fixed uniform per-1,000-litre rates subject to a general minimum (Rs. 10 and Rs. 20). The court characterized this alteration as not "very material" and illustrated with numerical examples to show limited practical effect:
    • Example: For domestic consumption of 8,000 litres, under the original resolution the charge was Rs. 10; under the engineer's alteration it would be Rs. 12.
    • Example: For domestic consumption of 6,000 litres, both the original resolution and the engineer's suggestion resulted in a Rs. 10 charge.
  • The court then applied the settled three-fold test for temporary injunction (prima facie case; balance of convenience; irreparable injury) as reiterated in Barkat Ali v. Zulfiquar. The judge found:
    • A prima facie case existed (recognizing plaintiffs' challenge to the resolution and bye-law).
    • However, the alteration was insignificant in practical effect and therefore the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction was refused.
    • The balance of convenience favoured the panchayat: the panchayat had asserted (in an unrepudiated counter-affidavit) substantial financial difficulty and large expenditures and liabilities connected with maintaining the protected water supply (figures for 1988–89 and amounts payable to the government were stated). No reply affidavit disputed these claims.
  • Because the plaintiffs had not satisfied the conjunctive requirements for a temporary injunction (in particular irreparable injury and balance of convenience), the court concluded that injunction was not appropriate.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the Civil Revision Petition, set aside the orders of the courts below, and dismissed I.A. No. 856 of 1989 in O.S. No. 255 of 1989 (the interlocutory application that had resulted in an interim injunction). No costs were awarded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The interim injunction that had restrained the Valliyur Town Panchayat from collecting the enhanced water tax (under the bye-law amended after the resolution dated 14-9-1988) is vacated. The panchayat may proceed to implement and collect the water tax as per the amended bye-law (subject to any further litigation or final adjudication in the main suit).
  • On precedent and broader law: The opinion relied on existing authorities regarding implied or conditional permission under Order 1, Rule 8 where the court has ordered notice/publication; it did not purport to establish a new principle beyond the authorities it followed. The decision focused on the interlocutory balance of convenience and the insignificance of the engineer's alteration rather than on creating a novel rule on the scope of the Superintending Engineer's powers.
RR/VCS
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1. This Civil Revision Petition by the Valliyur Town Panchayat is against the order in C.M.A No. 61 of 1989 on the file of the District Judge, Tirunelveli, confirming the interim injunction granted in I.A No. 856 of 1989 in O.S No. 255 of 1989 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Valliyur, restraining the said panchayat from collecting the water tax on the basis of the bye-laws, which were amended pursuant to the resolution of the panchayat dated 14-9-1988.

2. The main suit has been filed by the respondents 1 and 2, for themselves and on behalf of the residents of the said panchayat, for a declaration that the said resolution and the consequent amendment of the relevant bye-law are invalid and for a consequential permanent injunction. By the resolution dated 23-11-1987, the said panchayat resolved to increase the water tax (1) for domestic purpose from 75 paise per every 1000 litres or part thereof to Rs. 1.50 per 1000 litres beyond 8000 litres of consumption, while below the said 8000 litres limit a minimum charge of Rs. 10 was to be collected and (2) for non-domestic purpose from Rs. 1.50 per 1000 litres or part thereof to Rs. 3 per 1000 litres beyond 8000 litres of consumption, while below the said 8000 litres limit a minimum charge of Rs. 20 was to be collected. The said resolution dated 23-11-1987 was placed before the concerned Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board as contemplated by paragraph 89 (2) of the Manual of Panchayat Administration as amended by G O.Ms No. 1105 dated 22-7-1980 Rural Development and Local Administration Department. The said engineer made corrections to the said resolution, whereby the minimum rate for the supply of 8000 litres was deleted and uniformly fixed the rate at Rs. 1.50 for 1000 litres irrespective of the quantum of supply subject to a general minimum of Rs. 10 for domestic purpose and likewise for non-domestic purpose also the minimum rate for the supply of 8000 litres was fixed at Rs. 3 per 1000 litres irrespective of quantum of consumption, subject to a general minimum of Rs. 20. The resolution dated 14-9-1988 resolved to increase the water tax as suggested by the said engineer and it was sought to be implemented from 1-9-1989. It is against this resolution dated 14-9-1988 and the consequent amendment of relevant bye-law, the suit was filed and the interim injunction was sought for. Interim injunction was granted by the trial court and it was also confirmed by the lower appellate court. The defendants have filed this revision.

3. The main objection by the plaintiffs-respondents to the said resolution dated 14-9-1989 and the amended bye-law is that the said engineer has no jurisdiction to alter or modify the resolution passed by the panchayat and that he can only approve or disapprove what the panchayat has done.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners initially argued that the courts below should not have passed the impugned order of injunction since no permission was granted under O. 1 R. 8 C.P.C, for the respondents-plaintiffs to sue in a representative capacity. I.A No. 257 of 1989 was filed along with the suit seeking permission under O. 1 R. 8 C.P.C, the said I.A is dated 24-5-1989. Notice was ordered in the said petition on the same day. Publication in one issue of Dinathandhi was also ordered. On 26 6-1989 it was recorded that paper publication was made. Thereafter the said I.A was posted for enquiry subsequently on several days and so far no order has been passed finally in the said I.A This is borne out from the certified copy of the said I.A and the orders passed thereon till 15-11 1989. In view of the above said facts, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that no interim order, giving relief to the entire residents of the said panchayat on the footing that the suit was on behalf of all of them, could have been passed in such a suit when the permission under O. 1, R. 8 C.P C, had not been obtained. According to him, if at all, the court could have granted injunction only in favour of the two plaintiffs in their respective individual capacities and not as representine the entire residents of the said panchayat. In support of his contention he cited the following passage in Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Paramanand A.I.R 1977 Allahabad 421..

“Unlike O. 33, R. 8 C.P.C which provides that where the application for permission to sue as a pauper has been granted it shall be numbered and registered and shall be deemed the plaint in the suit, O. 1 R. 8 C.P.C contemplates a suit from the very inception. It is true that a representative character is imparted to the suit only after the requisite procedure has been complied with; but it would be erroneous to hold that no suit has been instituted until permission has been granted by the Court.”

However, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, in the said decision, the Allahabad High Court also observed as follows:

“I think that when a court issues notice on an application for leave under O. 1, R. 8 made after the presentation of the suit, it should be inferred that the Court has by implication granted a conditional permission.”

It has also been held by a Divisional Bench of this Court in a case reported in Sankiah v. Vadakasi as follows:

“However it is not necessary that a formal order should be passed by the Court. From the circumstances of the case and from the fact that the Court had ordered publication of the notice it can be presumed that the Court had granted the necessary permission under O. 1, R.?…The provisions of O. 1, R. 8 do not enjoin that the plaintiffs should obtain before hand the authority of those whom they seek to represent, the reason being that it will be open to all persons having the same interest to get themselves impleaded and either support the plaintiff or oppose him in the suit…on the other hand, when the plaintiffs have tiled the necessary application and the court has ordered the necessary notice to be published in the dailies, it is for the other residents of Chellam North and South Streets, if they were so inclined to have come and opposed the plaintiffs In the absence of any such opposition from any of the residents of Chellam North and South Streets it is not for the defendants 1 and 2 to say that the plaintiffs are not entitled to file the suit in a representative capacity. We therefore set aside the finding of the trial court on issue No. 1 that the plaintiffs 1 to 3 cannot represent the entire people in the locality.”

The said decision considered many of the decisions cited by both the counsels before me like Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar 1933 38 L.W 16=A.I.R 1933 P.C 183., Kamalakshi & Others v. Bahulayan & Others A.I.R 1972 Kerala 269., Mukaremdas v. Chhagan Kisan A.I.R 1959 Bombay 491., and the above referred to Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Paramanand A.I.R 1977 Allababad 421.. In the present case, notice was issued in the application under O. 1, R. 8, C.P.C As stated above, even publication has been done. Further, it should be noted that the above said objection by the petitioner counsel was not taken up in the petition in the courts below. No doubt in Assistant Commissioner, H.R & C.E Salem etc. v. Natramai K S. Ellappa etc. 100 L.W 240., it was held by a learned single Judge of this Court as follows:

“…the procedure under O. 1, R. 8, Code of civil procedure has to be followed and without doing so, no relief could be granted to the individual concerned.”

But, in the present case, the procedure no doubt has been followed. The only thing is that final order granting, permission has not been expressly passed. But, in view of the above said observations in Sankiah v. Vadakasi 1980 T L.N.J 86. and Sri Ram Krishna Mission v. Param anand referred to above, I think it should be presumed that a conditional permission has been given by implication. The following passage in Narayani Kamalakshi v. Kunchiyan Behulayan, is significant.

“Notwithstanding the failure of a Court to pass an order on a petition under O 1, R 8 the Court shall assume such permission being granted to the parties where the Court has directed publication…The view that mere omission to pass a formal order granting sanction would not vitiate the decree was expressed by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Punjab Co. op. Bank v. Hari Singh A.I.R 1933 Lah. 749.. That such a formal order giving permission under O. 1, R. 8 is not necessary is the view expressed by Justice Gokhale of the Bombay High Court in Mukaremdas v. Chhagan Kisan A.I.R 1959 Bom. 491. In fact, the learned Judge look the view that the permission under O. 1, R. 8 can be granted even at the appellate stage. Referring to the decision of the Madras High Court in Muthukurappa v. Appavoo 1942 55 L.W 837=A.I.R 1943 Mad. 161., Mathew, J. said in Kunhalavi Musaliar v. Abdullah 1965 Ker. L.T 907., thus:—

…that the Court must be deemed to have given its permission when it ordered the publication of the notice in the paper.”

Therefore, the above said objection filed by the petitioners' counsel based on O. 1, R. 8, C.P.C cannot be sustained.

5. Coming to the next question whether it can be concluded that the above saidresolution passed on 14-9-1988 and the corresponding amendment of the relevant bye-law incorporating the corrections made bythe Superintending Engineer are valid. Thelearned counsel for respondents contendedthat as per paragraph 89(2) of the Manual on Panchayat Administration as amended by theabove said Government Order, the Superintending Engineer has no power to “alter”the resolution passed by the panchayat on23-11-1987 and that if at all he can only approve and confirm it or decline to do so. The said paragraph 89 (2) runs as follows:

“No by-law or cancellation or alteration made by a panchayat shall have effect, until the same has been approved and confirmed by the Divisional Development Officer concerned…and by the Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board or any other technical officer…”

Both the courts below have held that the Superintending Engineer has no such power of alteration. I also think so, Prima Facie at least. No doubt, the preamble to the above said Government Order Ms. No. 1105 dated 22-7-1980 which amended the above said paragraph seems to proceed on the footing that the said Superintending Engineer has power to alter the resolution passed by the panchayat. Anyway, normally the preamble to the rule cannot control the actual rule that was passed when the words of the rule are clear. That apart, the only amendment that was made to the above said paragraph 89(2) seems to be that instead of Sanitary Engineer who was earlier given power to approve and confirm, the Superintending Engineer of Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage is given the said power, consequent on the formation of the said Board from 14-4-1972.

6. At any rate, I find the alterationactually made by the Superintending Engineer is nothing very material. As statedabove, he has only deleted the minimum rate of Rs. 10 for domestic purpose and Rs. 20 for non-domestic purpose for the initial 8000 litres of consumption. At the same time he stipulated a general minimum rate of a sum of Rs. 10 and Rs. 20 respectively. The result of the change actually effected by the Superintending Engineer is not anything significant. For example if 8000 litres are consumed by a domestic consumer according to the original resolution dated 23-11-1987 he has to pay simply Rs 10. According to the Superintending Engineer's alteration, which is incorporated in the subsequent resolution dated 14-9-1988 he should pay Rs. 12. Supposing 6000 litres are consumed by a domestic consumer he has to pay Rs. 10 according to the Original resolution and according to the Superintending Engineer's suggestion also he has to pay only Rs. 10. So, it cannot be said that the residents of Valliyur panchayat would suffer any irreparable injury if the temporary injunction is not granted. Further, the balance of convenience also lies in favour of the petitioners-panchayat. They have alleged in the counter affidavit before tha Court below as follows:—

“It is absolutely impossible to maintain the protected water supply without the enhancement. In the year 1988-89 the respondent nearly spent six lakhs of Rupees towards maintenance and other expenses. Till 30-3-1989 the respondents have to pay to the Government nearly 9 lakhs and odd towards protected water supply. Because of the injunction the financial position of the Panchayat is shaky.”

No reply affidavit was filed repudiating these allegations in the counter. So, the grant of injunction will inconvenience the panchayat more than the inconvenience that would be caused to the residence of Valliyur panchayat if injunction is not granted.

7. In granting temporary injunction, it is settled law that not only Prima Facie case has to be seen, but also the other two factors, viz., (1) in whose favour the balance of convenience lies and (2) whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if injunction is not granted. Just to illustrate, the decision in Barkat Ali v, Zulfiquar, held that with the first condition, viz., whether the petitioner have made out a prima facie case as sine qua non, two other conditions relating to the above said balance of convenience and irreparable injury should be satisfied by the petitioners conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle them to obtain a temporary injunction in their favour. As stated above, since the alteration made by the Superintending Engineer is very insignificant, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury if injunction is not granted. Therefore, I conclude that this is not a case for grant of temporary injunction prayed for in favour of the plaintiffs.

8. I, therefore, set aside the orders of Courts below, allow this Civil Revision Petition and dismiss I.A No. 856 of 1989 in O.S No. 255 of 1989 on the file of the District Munsif's Courts Valliyur. No costs.

RR/VCS