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Director Of School Education, Madras And Others v. V. Gnanaraj And Anothers
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Nainar Sundaram, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was employed by the first respondent as a Physical Director, a post for which the prescribed qualification was a pass in Master of Physical Education (M.P.Ed). The petitioner did not initially possess the M.P.Ed qualification. Government orders had granted time for persons in the petitioner's position to acquire the qualification; that extension was, at one stage, until 31-5-1988.
On 12-5-1988 the second respondent issued instructions to replace unqualified Physical Directors. On 30-5-1988 the third respondent granted permission to the first respondent to terminate the services of the petitioner, and on 31-5-1988 the first respondent terminated the petitioner's services (the impugned order).
The petitioner challenged the termination by filing W.P. No. 6796 of 1988. While the writ petition was pending, G.O. Ms. No. 1514, Education (HS.2) Department, dated 23-9-1988 amended Rule 11 by substituting "31st May, 1990" for "31st May, 1988" (thus extending the period for acquiring the qualification). The petitioner acquired the M.P.Ed qualification in August 1989, i.e., within the new extended period.
On 27-9-1988 the second respondent issued a proceedings/clarification stating that the extension would apply to staff who were in service on 28-4-1981; the petitioner qualified as such. On 4-10-1988 the third respondent directed strict adherence to that clarification.
The learned single Judge, while finding the termination of 31-5-1988 lawful as per the rules then in force, noted the subsequent amendment by G.O. Ms. No. 1514 and the Government Pleader's statement that the extension applied to the petitioner. The single Judge issued a writ of mandamus directing the Government to absorb the petitioner in any one of the Government Aided Schools from the coming academic year (the order contained a clerical slip referring at one place to "Government schools" but the intended meaning and the petitioner’s counsel's position was absorption in a Government Aided School). The single Judge later clarified the order in W.M.P. No. 10748 of 1990 substituting "Tuticorin" for "Tirunelveli".
Respondents 2 to 4 (appellants in the writ appeal) challenged the single Judge’s direction in this writ appeal. The appeal was heard by the court whose opinion is summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned single Judge exceeded the scope of the writ petition by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Government to absorb the petitioner in a Government Aided School despite finding that the impugned termination was in accordance with the rules prevailing at the time.
- Whether the subsequent Government amendment (G.O. Ms. No. 1514 dated 23-9-1988) and the clarification/proceedings of 27-9-1988 made the petitioner entitled to relief despite the earlier lawful termination.
- Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, may take note of subsequent events and give complete and effective reliefs beyond the exact prayer in the writ petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Respondents 2 to 4) Arguments
- The learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that once the learned single Judge found the termination of the petitioner's services dated 31-5-1988 to be in accordance with the rules prevailing then, the single Judge should have left the matter there and not issued a writ of mandamus directing the Government to absorb the petitioner in any Government Aided School.
- Implicit in the challenge was the contention that the single Judge went beyond the scope of the controversy as framed in the writ petition by granting the direction to the Government.
Petitioner's Arguments / Position
- The petitioner challenged the termination order and sought relief. The petitioner's counsel (Miss Anna Mathew) stated expressly that the petitioner would be satisfied if given appointment in any one of the Government Aided Schools (not necessarily a Government school), and that her client's interest would be secured thereby.
- The petitioner had acquired the required qualification (M.P.Ed) in August 1989, which was within the period extended by G.O. Ms. No. 1514 (i.e., before 31-5-1990).
Government's Representations (as recorded)
- The learned Additional Government Pleader, representing respondents 2 to 4 before the learned single Judge, made a statement that the proceedings (extension of time) shall govern and be applicable to the case of the petitioner as well.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, grounded on the facts and the legal principles the opinion itself states:
- Jurisdictional principle: The court observed that while exercising writ powers under Article 226 it is not strictly bound to the exact prayers made in the writ petition. The power may be used to take note of subsequent events and to give complete, effective and appropriate reliefs in furtherance of justice. Hence, the court rejected the appellants' argument that the single Judge should have confined himself to the exact prayer.
- Effect of the subsequent government action: The court noted that G.O. Ms. No. 1514 dated 23-9-1988 had extended the time for acquiring the qualification up to 31-5-1990, and that the petitioner had acquired the qualification in August 1989, which fell within the extended period.
- Representation by Government counsel and administrative clarification: The court recorded that the learned Additional Government Pleader had fairly stated that the extension proceedings would apply to the petitioner, and the second respondent's 27-9-1988 clarification indicated the extension applied to staff in service on 28-4-1981 (a category including the petitioner). The third respondent directed strict adherence to that clarification.
- Assessment of the Government's conduct: The court critically examined the fact that the earlier extension lapsed on 31-5-1988 and that the further extension was made only on 23-9-1988—after lapse—creating a gap. The court characterized the Government's delay as lethargic and observed that the Government had omitted to provide for contingencies (such as persons ousted in the interregnum), resulting in prejudice to staff like the petitioner. The court held that such delay and omission could be deemed arbitrary and discriminatory.
- Relief proportionality and protection of third-party interests: The court reasoned that it would be inappropriate to blame the first respondent school technically for the termination, and equally improper to oust the fifth respondent who had been appointed in the petitioner's place and who was qualified. Therefore, the court found the learned single Judge’s remedy—to direct the Government to absorb the petitioner in any one of the Government Aided Schools—was an appropriate, workable remedy that rectified the inequity without displacing the current appointee nor penalizing the school.
- Practical considerations: The single Judge had been put on notice of vacancies in certain schools and had permitted the Government to consider absorption in any one of the schools; there was no plea that the directions were unworkable. The court accepted that remedy as administratively feasible and just.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Appeal dismissed.
Implications and direct effects:
- The writ appeal challenging the learned single Judge’s order is dismissed; the single Judge’s direction that the petitioner be absorbed in any one of the Government Aided Schools from the coming academic year stands upheld.
- No costs were awarded (the opinion records "No Costs").
- The court's decision remedies the petitioner’s loss caused by the administrative delay in extending the qualification period and does so without displacing the qualified incumbent in the post or penalizing the appointing school.
- The opinion does not elaborate on or claim to establish any new binding precedent beyond applying the principle that Article 226 jurisdiction may be used to grant complete and effective reliefs in light of subsequent events; the decision's consequences are stated primarily as the direct effect on the parties in this case.
Nainar Sundaram, J.:— This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge, dated 20-4-1990 in W.P No. 6796 of 1988 and the order of clarification, dated 25th June, 1990 passed in W.M.P No. 10748 of 1990 in that writ petition. We will presently refer to the import and impact of the orders of the learned single Judge. Before that, we must refer to the array of parties so that we could deal with the controversy in this writ appeal conveniently and appropriately. The first respondent in the writ appeal is the petitioner in the writ petition. Respondents 2 and 3 in the writ appeal are respondents 1 and 5 in the writ petition. Respondents 2 to 4 in the writ petition are the appellants in the writ appeal. We are referring to the parties as per their array in the writ petition. The petitioner was in the services of the first respondent as a Physical Director. The qualification prescribed for the said post was a pass in Master of Physical Education, the abbreviation being M.P Ed. The petitioner lacked it. But there were Government Order granting time to personnel like the petitioner to acquire that qualification. On 2-5-1988 the Government extended the time for acquiring the qualification up to 31-5-1988. On 12-5-1988 the second respondent issued instructions to replace unqualified physical Directors. On 30-5-1988 the third respondent granted permission to the first respondent to terminate the services of the petitioner, who had not been qualified himself. On 31-5-1988 the first respondent, by the order impugned in the writ petition, terminated the services of the petitioner. The petitioner came to this Court impugning the order of termination passed by the first respondent. While the writ petition was pending, G.O Ms. No. 1514, Education (HS. 2) Department, dated 23-9-1988 with regard to the period within which the qualification has to be acquired, the concerned rule was amended in the following manner:
“In the said special Rules, in Rule 11, for the expressions “31st May, 1988” the expressions “31st May, 1990 shall be substituted.”
1. In August, 1989, the petitioner had acquired the qualification of M.P Ed. On 27-9-1988 the second respondent issued proceedings of clarification and the relevant portion as found in paragraph 2 thereof is as follows:
“The Government order should be communicated immediately to the management of all Aided Higher Secondary Schools and extent authorities of all local body Higher Secondary Schools as the extension of time given to the Government Higher Secondary School teachers in service on 28-4-19981 will apply to the staff handling higher secondary classes on 28-4-1981 in non-government Higher Secondary Schools also.”
2. A perusal of the above extract shows that the benefit of extension was available to teaching staff who were in service on 28-4-1981. The petitioner was one such staff. On 4-10-1988 the third respondent while communicating the proceedings of the second respondent dated 27-9-1988, directed strict adherence to the said proceedings.
3. The learned single Judge, who dealt with the writ petition, found that after the petitioner's service was terminated, the 5th respondent, he being qualified, has been given the post, which the petitioner occupied. The learned single Judge could not find fault with the impugned order of termination, dated 31-5-1988 passed by the first respondent because that was done in tune with the rules, which prevailed then. But the learned single Judge took note of the fact that on 23-9-1988 by G.O Ms. No. 1514, there has been an amendment to the rule, substituting the expression “31-5-1990” for the expression “31-5-1988” occurring in the concerned rule and also taking note of the statement made by the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for respondents 2 to 4 that the proceedings relating to the extension of the period for acquiring the qualification are applicable to the petitioner also, deemed fit to give the appropriate direction for absorption of the petitioner in any one of the Government Aided Schools from the coming academic year. It must be pointed out that though in the earlier portion of paragraph 9 of the order, the learned single Judge clearly indicated that the petitioner should be absorped by the Government in any one of the Government Aided Schools, yet towards the end of that paragraph, it has been stated that the petitioner should be absorped in any of the Government schools. That is obviously a mistake that has crept into the order and it should only mean absorption into any one of the Government Aided Schools. Even otherwise, Miss Anna Mathew, learned counsel for the petitioner, made it clear that her client's interest will be secured and he will be satisfied if he is given the appointment in any one of the Government Aided Schools, and not necessarily in a Government School. The learned single Judge issued a writ of Mandamus, without setting aside the impugned order of termination of the services of the petitioner passed by the first respondent by directing the absorption of the petitioner in any one of the Government Aided Schools from the coming academic year. For the purpose of implementation, the learned single Judge was put on notice about two vacancies in two schools in Tirunelveli area and this has obliged the learned single Judge to direct that it is open to the Government to consider the absorption of the petitioner in any one of the schools. W.M.P No. 10748 of 1990 was taken out by the petitioner to clarify the order by substituting for the word ‘Tirunelveli’, the word ‘Tuticorin’. That has been done by the learned single Judge by the order of clarification in W.M.P No. 10748 of 1990.
4. In this writ appeal, Mr. K. Raviraja Pandian, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for respondents 2 to 4, would submit that the learned single Judge has gone beyond the scope of the controversy in the writ petition and when he found that the impugned order of termination of the services of the petitioner passed by the first respondent, was in accordance with the rules prevailing then, the learned single Judge ought to have left the matter at that, and should not have further ventured to give the direction by way of a writ of mandamus to the Government to absorb the petitioner in any one of the Government Aided Schools.
5. This Court, while exercising writ powers, is not scuttled down to the exact prayer projected in the writ petition. This Court can always take note of subsequent events for the purpose of giving complete, effective and appropriate reliefs to the parties. The facts exposed and the points involved and resolved, can certainly guide the Court to give the appropriate reliefs to the parties. The jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 is invoked only in furtherance of justice. Hence, we are not in a position to appreciate and accept the above line of thinking put forth by the Additional Government Pleader appearing for respondents 2 to 4.
6. Then the question is as to whether there is a warrant for the learned single Judge issuing the direction as he did the petitioner was in service on 28-4-1981. G.O Ms. No. 1514, dated 23-9-1988 had extended the time up to 31-5-1990 for personnel like the petiotioner to qualify themselves for the post of a Physical Director. The learned Additional Government Pleader who represented the cause of the respondents 2 to 4 before the learned single Judge, did not mince matters and he had made a fair statement that these proceedings shall govern and will be applicable to the case of the petitioner also. The earlier extension for qualifying lapsed with the end of 31-5-1988. If only the Government, when it chose to further extend the time, had acted before the lapse of the earlier period of extension, no one could have had any grievance. Obviously time had been consumed for deliberations, and about four months later, G.O Ms. No. 1514 dated 23-9-1988 came up extending the time limit up to 31-5-1990. Visibly the Government has omitted to provide for contingencies like the one the petitioner faced on account of delay in extending the time limit. The petitioner has qualified himself for the post by acquiring M.P Ed., in August, 1989 and that is within the extension, lapsing only by 31-5-1990. No explanation, much less, acceptable explanation, is forthcoming as to why provisions for teaching staff like the petitioner was omitted to be made. If by fortuitous circumstances, the petitioner had stuck on to the post on the date of G.O Ms. No. 1514, namely 23-9-1988, no problem, would have cropped up. The Government obviously had acted in a lethargic manner in granting extension, much to the prejudice of the teaching staff like the petitioner. If they had an intention to extend the time, they should have acted with alacrity before the lapse of the earlier extension. Or else they should have made provision for the teaching staff like the petitioner, who were to be ousted and were in fact ousted in the interregnum. Otherwise their action has got to be frowned upon as tainted with arbitrariness and caprice. That would bring in and in fact has brought in unhealthy and harmful discrimination. Viewed in the above light, this Court can certainly act and pass orders remedying and rectifying the inequity and unfair treatment meted out to the petitioner. Under these circumstances there is nothing wrong in the learned single Judge giving the directions as he did.
7. The first respondent school could not be technically held to be responsible for this state of affairs. Equally so, it will not be proper to oust the fifth respondent, who is a qualified hand and who has come into the post in the place of the petitioner. The best way to work out the remedies for the petitioner, without offending respondents 1 and 5 is only by giving directions to the Government as the learned single Judge did. It is not pleaded and it could not be pleaded that the directions given by the learned single Judge are unworkable. On the other hand, we find there is no challenge with reference to the statement put forth on behalf of the petitioner before the learned single Judge that there are vacancies in other schools. Under these circumstances, this writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No Costs.
8. Appeal dismissed.
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