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Ashok Kumar Kedia v. Balaji Builders & Anr.

Madras High Court
Aug 29, 1989
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Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These petitions were filed to set aside the order dated 20-4-1989 in O.S.A. 87 of 1989 and to implead the petitioner as second respondent in that appeal. O.S.A. 87 of 1989 arose from an order in Application No. 1385 of 1989, which in turn related to Application No. 5578 of 1988 in C.S. 34 of 1983. In Application No. 5578 of 1988 the highest offer made by the appellant (Messrs. Sri Balaji Builders) of Rs. 23,00,000 was accepted and the appellant was directed to deposit that amount with the plaintiff Bank on or before 10-3-1989. The plaintiff bank could appropriate Rs. 15,00,000 as per an earlier order dated 26-7-1988. The auctioneer's remuneration had been fixed at Rs. 50,000.

The appellant filed Application No. 1385 of 1989 seeking an extension of time until 5-4-1989 to pay the balance, stating reasons relating to availability of funds. That application was rejected by a brief order dismissing the extension request. O.S.A. 87 of 1989 was then filed against that refusal; the appeal was allowed because amounts had since been deposited. The present petitions challenge the order in O.S.A. 87 of 1989 and seek impleadment, asserting that the petitioner (a defendant ranked fifth in the suit) and other defendants were not impleaded when extensions were sought and that a later higher offer of Rs. 23,50,000 from Priya Exports (P) Ltd. could yield a better price and reduce the liability to the plaintiff Bank.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 20-4-1989 in O.S.A. 87 of 1989 should be set aside and the petitioner impleaded as a second respondent in the appeal.
  2. Whether non-impleadment of defendants in the application for extension (Appn. No. 1385 of 1989) and in the subsequent appeal is a valid ground to set aside the order or disturb the sale/confirmation.
  3. Whether the court has jurisdiction to extend the time fixed for deposit of the sale price (including under S. 148, C.P.C.), and if so, whether the circumstances in this case warranted extension of time.
  4. Whether a subsequent higher offer (from Priya Exports (P) Ltd.) after the court has accepted a prior highest bid can be a ground to refuse confirmation of sale.
  5. Whether the auctioneer's fixed remuneration (Rs. 50,000 in this case) is reasonable and what principles should guide fixation of remuneration in court-directed auctions.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (represented by Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan)

  • The defendants, including the petitioner (ranked fifth defendant), ought to have been impleaded as parties in Application No. 1385 of 1989 (the extension application) and in the appeal; failure to do so is said to be prejudicial.
  • It was argued that there was a specific understanding that the amount had to be deposited by 10-3-1989 and, in the absence of the non-impleaded parties, the highest bidder should not be permitted to seek or obtain an extension or later deposit.
  • The petitioner claimed that a later offer from Priya Exports (P) Ltd. of Rs. 23,50,000 could yield a better price for defendants and reduce liability to the plaintiff Bank, and this should be considered.

Plaintiff's / Respondent's Position

  • The plaintiff pointed out that the highest offer of Rs. 23,00,000 had been accepted by agreement between the parties; therefore, non-impleadment of other defendants in the extension application or the appeal could not be the basis for complaint.

Appellant's Application / Explanation for Extension (as stated in Appn. No. 1385 of 1989)

  • The appellant explained that amounts had been utilised as advance tax, and as a result the full balance was not immediately available within the short notice; it stated that Rs. 4,00,000 had been remitted on 10-3-1989, another Rs. 2,00,000 would be remitted on 13-3-1989, and the balance would be remitted by 15-4-1989.
  • The appellant undertook to pay interest at 12% on the balance until the date of payment.
  • It is recorded that these reasons were found acceptable and reasonable and that amounts had subsequently been deposited with the plaintiff bank.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manilal Mohanlal Shaw v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahamad (1955-1 S.C.R. 108 = A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 349) Held that non-payment of price by a defaulting purchaser renders sale proceedings a nullity; inherent powers of the court cannot circumvent mandatory provisions of Order XXI, Rules 84 and 85, CPC, to relieve purchaser of obligation to make deposit. The court acknowledged this authority (relied on by petitioner’s counsel) but explained that it did not mean the court lacked jurisdiction to grant extensions; the court must consider whether circumstances justify extension and must give reasons when refusing or granting relief.
Navalkha and Sons v. Ramanujadas (1970-2 A.W.R. S.C. -46 = 1970-2 Com. L.J. 8) Emphasises the duty of the court to satisfy itself that, with regard to market value, the price offered is reasonable and adequate; once the court is satisfied as to adequacy, a subsequent higher offer is not ordinarily a valid ground to refuse confirmation. The court relied on this principle to conclude that, having accepted the price and the parties having agreed, a later higher offer (from Priya Exports) did not justify setting aside the order or refusing confirmation where the court had earlier found the price adequate.
Smt. Jahan Kanwar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. (1971 1 SC Comp. case, 230 = 1970-2 MLJ 46) Concerning S.457(1)(c) of the Companies Act (as construed): if directions to be given by court will affect any person prejudicially, that person must be served with notice under natural justice; no order affecting rights should be made without affording opportunity to represent the case. The court invoked this principle to underline the importance of notice and opportunity where orders affect parties prejudicially; this informed its observation that parties should ordinarily be impleaded in interlocutory applications, although in the present case the court found no prejudice from non-impleadment.
Periyakkal v. Dakshyani / Periakkal v. Dokshyani white (cited regarding S. 148, C.P.C.) Holds that even where parties enter into a compromise and ask the court to make an order in terms of that compromise (including fixed times), the court retains jurisdiction to extend time in appropriate cases; the court may relieve against forfeiture where circumstances justify and the parties' contract has merged in a court order. The court applied this authority to support the proposition that it had jurisdiction under S.148, C.P.C., to grant extension of time if valid grounds were shown; it relied on this to justify allowing the appeal where acceptable reasons for delay were presented and amounts were subsequently deposited.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded on the following analytic path, strictly as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Nature of the consent: The court examined the order dated 3-3-1989 which recorded that the sale "may be confirmed in favour of the highest bidder" and that earnest money of unsuccessful bidders had been refunded. The court interpreted the parties' consent as being confined to the price for which the property could be sold, not to the timetable for payment fixed by the court.
  2. Jurisdiction to extend time: The court held that the fact of a consent to price did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to extend the time fixed for deposit. Citing authorities (including Periyakkal), the court emphasised that it retains jurisdiction (under S.148, C.P.C.) to extend time in appropriate cases and to relieve against forfeiture where circumstances justify intervention after a contract has merged in a court order.
  3. Necessity of reasons when refusing/allowing extension: The court stressed that whether extension is granted or refused, it must state reasons so parties understand the basis of the decision. This principle was used to support the need for reasoned orders in such interlocutory matters.
  4. Evaluation of the appellant's grounds for extension: The appellant's application had stated that available funds had been used for advance tax, and gave specific dates and amounts of remittances (Rs. 4,00,000 on 10-3-1989; Rs. 2,00,000 on 13-3-1989; balance by 15-4-1989) and offered to pay 12% interest on the balance until payment. The court found these reasons "acceptable and reasonable" and noted that the amounts had, in fact, been deposited with the bank.
  5. Effect of subsequent offers: Applying the Navalkha principle, the court observed that once the court is satisfied that the price is adequate, a later higher offer ordinarily is not a valid ground for refusing confirmation. The court noted there was no affidavit from Priya Exports and no circumstance of a dramatically higher offer deposited in court to justify disturbing the sale.
  6. Non-impleadment: While acknowledging that it is desirable and fair to implead all parties in interlocutory applications, the court found that because the defendants had indicated agreement to the accepted price and were not prejudiced by non-impleadment, failure to implead them in the extension application and the appeal could not constitute a ground to set aside the order.
  7. Auctioneer remuneration: The court undertook a separate, expanded discussion on the fixation of auctioneer remuneration. It criticised the fixation of Rs. 50,000 as disproportionate given the limited nature of services in the circumstances. The court set out principles to guide future fixation: remuneration must reflect the nature and extent of work, the risk involved (if any), and whether independent decision-making is required; remuneration should not be determined by a rigid percentage rule that may yield extortionate amounts; reasons should be recorded explaining how quantum was arrived at; and fixed modest remunerations with provision for additions if unforeseen work arises may be appropriate.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: These petitions are dismissed. No costs.

Direct implications for the parties (as expressly stated or implied in the opinion):

  • The order dated 20-4-1989 in O.S.A. 87 of 1989 is not set aside and the petitioner is not impleaded as second respondent by these petitions.
  • The court treated the prior acceptance of the highest bid (Rs. 23,00,000) and the appellant's subsequent deposit of monies as validating the appellate relief previously granted; the petitioners' contention that a later offer from Priya Exports should displace the accepted sale was not accepted (no affidavit from Priya Exports, and no higher deposit in court).
  • Non-impleadment in the interlocutory extension application and appeal was not held to be prejudicial in this case and accordingly was not a ground to set aside the order.
  • The court provided guidance of practical import on fixation of auctioneer (and similar) remuneration: it must be reasonable, proportionate to services actually rendered, justified in terms of nature/extent/risk, and the court should record reasons for how the remuneration is arrived at. This guidance is given for future application in similar proceedings.

The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities; its principal outcomes were the dismissal of these petitions and the articulation of practical guidance on remuneration for court-appointed auctioneers.

(End of summary)

Show all summary ...

1. These petitions are filed to set aside the order dt. 20-4-1989 in O.S.A 87 of 1989 and to implead the petitioner herein as second respondent in the appeal. O.S.A 87 of 1989 came to be filed against the order in Appn. No. 1385 of 1989 in Appn. No. 5578 of 1988 in C.S 34- of 1983. It was in Appn. No. 5578 of 1988, the highest offer made by the appellant at Rs. 23,00,000 was accepted and it was directed to deposit the amount with the plaintiff Bank on or before 10 3-1989, and that the plaintiff could appropriate Rs. 15,00,000 as per order dt. 26-7-1988. The remuneration of the auctioneer was fixed at, Rs. 50,000. Thereafter, the appellant filed Appn. No. 1385 of 1989 asking for extension. of time till 5-4-1989 for paying the balance amount stating therein the reasons which had necessitated the request for extension of time. This was rejected by a cryptic order “No grounds to extend time are made out. Dismissed”. It is against this order dt. 14 3-1989, O.S.A 87 of 1989 was filed and it was allowed for reasons stated therein by taking note of the fact that amounts had since been deposited. It is thereafter these petitions are filed Stating that though the petitioner herein is ranked as fifth defendant in the suit, without impleading the defendants, the applications for extension of time has been filed, and in the appeal also, they were not impleaded, and that presently there is an offer for Rs. 23,50,000, from one Priya Exports (P) Ltd. and if the order in the O.S.A is set aside, it could enable the defendants to get a better price and reduce the liability to the plaintiff Bank.

2. Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in Appn. No. 1385 of 1989 and in the appeal, defendants ought to have been impleaded as parties; but plaintiff would point out that the highest offer made by the appellant was accepted by agreement arrived at between the parties and therefore, non-impleadment cannot be complained of. In the order of the learned Judge dated 3-3-1989 it is stated as follows—

“…The earnest money deposited by the unsuccessful bidder was refunded by the auctioners and all the parties agreed that the sale of machineries, raw materials, plot and buildings may be confirmed in favour of the highest bidder, viz, Messrs. Sri Balaji Builders…”

Yet, what Mr. Vedantam Srinivasan, learned counsel, would submit is that, it was on the specific understanding that the amount be deposited by 10-3-1989, a consent having been given, thereafter the highest bidder cannot ask either for extension in their absence or rely upon the said order to deposit the amount later on. It is seen from the order that it was the Court which fixed the date for depositing the amount, and the consent of parties was confined only to the price for which the property could be sold. Therefore, if acceptable reasons exist, the court has the jurisdiction to extend the time and need not look to the consent of parties. As would be pointed out later on, even in a case where any compromise is arrived at between the parties, till the court has the jurisdiction to extend the time. Hence, it cannot be contended that the court has no jurisdiction to extend the time; but as to whether the circumstances of the case warrant extension of time or not, is left to the eourt to decide; and if it is to reject it or grant it, it must state the reasons, so that the parties may know as to why in spite of certain materials placed before it their pleas are rejected, and equally, the other party could know as to why the petition is ordered. Learned counsel Mr. Vedantam, Srinivasan refers to Manilal Mohanlal Shaw v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahamad 1955-1-S.C.R 108-A.I.R 1954 S.C 349. wherer in it was held that non-payment of the price on the part of the defaulting purchaser renders the sale proceedings as a complete nullity, and that the inherent ppwers of the court cannot be allowed to circumvent the mandatory provisions of O. 21, Rr. 84 and 85, CPC, and relieve the purchaser of their obligation to make the deposit. Navalkha and Sons v. Ramanujadas 1970-2-A.W.R.S.C -46 = t970-2-Com. L J. 8. is relied upon to emphasise that it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property, the price offered is reasonable and adequate. In the said decision itself, it was held that, one other principle equally well settled is that, once the Court comes to the conclusion that the price offered is adequate, no subsequent higher offer can constitute a valid ground for refusing confirmation of sale, and that this discretion in confirming a sale is not to be interfered with, unless the Court had gone wrong on principle. Yet another decision relied upon is Smt. Jahan Kanwar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd. 1971 1-SC Comp case, 230=I970-2-MLJ46., wherein in construing S 457(1)(c) of the Compani's Act it was held that it is implicit in that rule that, if the directions which have to be given by the court would affect any person, prejudicially, he must be served with a notice of summons under the general rule of natural justice, and that no order should be made affecting the rights of parties without affording a proper opportunity to it to represent the case.

3. In Periakkal v. Dokshyani white dealing with the extent and power of court under S. 148, CPC, it was held that even if parties enter into a compromise and invite the court to make an order in terms of the compromise and stipulate the time for deposit which they have agreed to, still, the court has the jurisdiction to extend the time in appro priate cases because even though the court could not rewrite a contract between the par lies, but it will relieve against a forfeiture clause if circumstances justify where the con tract of the parties has merged in the order of the court, and thereafter, the court's free dom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtailed.

4. Therefore, having given consent for the offer made by the appellant, it is not now open to the petitioner to claim that there is an offer from Priya-Exports private Limited, which would enable defendants to get ano ther Rs. 50,000. Regarding the time within which the amount has to be deposited, it was the learned Judge who fixed the date, and it was not one arrived at by consent of parties. Even so, as held in Periyakkal v. Dakshyani, the court has the jurisdiction under S. 148 C.P.C, to grant extention of time, provided valid grounds are made out. The petition filed by appellant had referred to the amounts set apart by it having been utilised as advance tax, and that on the order passed, it had remitted Rs. 4,00,000 on 10-3-1989 and will be remitting another sum of Rs. 2,00,000 on 13-3-1989 and because of the financial year ending, the entire amount could not be made ready within the short notice, and the balance will be remitted by 15-4-1989, and it undertakes to pay interest at 12 percent on the balance of the amount till date of payment. These reasons were found to be acceptable and reasonable and it resulted in the appeal being allowed. When by then the appellant had deposited the amount with the plaintiff bank. Having agreed for the price for which the property could be sold, it is not now open to the petitioner to claim that still higher amount could be realised. There is no affidavit filed by Priya Exports (P) Ltd. This is not even a case wherein the entire amount offered is deposited into court and asking for setting aside the sale. This is not a case wherein, as sometimes happened, double the amount is offered, and that the Court had been completely misguided in assessing the market value by auc tion. In any event, there is no need to look at the present offer made from any of these prospectives, because the defendants had agreed to accept the offer made by the appellant.

5. Regarding the non-impleadment, it is always just and fair to implead all the parties to a proceeding in every interlocutory applications, but it is unfortunate that a practice is existing to implead only some of the parties in applications, claiming that the others impleaded in the main matter are not necessary parties in the concerned application. Petitioners in such applications are at the risk of what they do, by non-impleadiug. Since they had expressed their agreement the appellant had not impleaded the defendants, and they being not prejudiced this cannot be a ground to set aside the order.

6. One other aspect requires to be touched upon so that it could be of future guidance, while fixing remuneration of auctioneers. In the initial stages of the proceedings, tear ders were called for and thereafter the auctioneers were directed to conduct a public auction. In the instant case, the auctioneer's remuneration was fixed at Rs. 50,000. The cost of publication of the notices in newspapers, issue of notices etc., and the entire cost incurred by the auctioneers, are all to be borne only by defendants, who are now com ing forward with an offer, and if accepted, according to them, would get another Rs. 50,000. It is a very valuable amount as far as a party in distress is concerned. For the holding of an auction, with all the expenses being borne by the judgment debtor, it is highly unreasonable to fix the remuneration at Rs. 50,000 on any percentage basis. Remuneration necessarily mean, converted in money value, for the services rendered, at reasonable and just compensation. It could never be disproprotionate, exorbitant, unreasonable, unjust and unbearable upon the debtors, who are called upon to pay for those services. When a necessity arises, to follow a particular procedure, any order of a court, which results in parties to the proceedings, incurring expenses, then the basic duty of the court is not to mulct parties to proceedings with expenses, which are disproportionate and highly unreasonable. Only because they happen to be litigants and look to court for relief, it cannot penalise parties by compelling them to part with amounts, for the nature of services rendered by auctioners appointed by courts to carry out certain functions. There are instances in which When an Advocate Commissioner is appointed by Court, he claims huge amounts by way of expenses and insists upon luxurious arrangement to be made, and the total amount involved turns out to be more than double the fees received by the counsel for both the parties in the conduct of the proceedings. Litigants have a just grievance against courts, when they deal with their properties or when orders of this nature are being passed wherein huge amounts are sliced off, for enlisting the services of certain persons, to get rid off the problems faced by them.

6. It must be remembered that, when tender system is adopted, it is the court which settles the terms of the notice, fixes the time within which it should be done and decides as to which offer to be accepted etc. and parties to the proceedings bear the expenses relating to publication etc. The limited service rendered by an auctioneer or an advocate, under such circumstances, is to act as a conduit pipe and not to take any risk whatever on any factor. Yet, on a so called percentage basis, they collect huge amounts, which parties in distress cannot bear. It may be, that the litigation involves huge amounts on the value of property involved, in the sale may be a very valuable one, but it is the mature of the services rendered which alone could be taken into account and remuneration-must be fixed reasonably and fairly. That isr the elementary duty of a court which had taken charge of the affairs of the party in distress. Equally, when auction is resorted to-taking into account the services involved in holding the auction on a particular day, the just amount could always be arrived at. The time taken in holding the auction could not have been more than an hour, and the number of bidders being handful and the like, the court which is in charge of the properties,, must be extremely frugal in managing them.

7. It may be that a percentage is evolved, but even then it is in the discretion of the court to fix remuneration. If it finds that in applying a particular yardstick it leads to a remuneration which is disproportionate, unreasonable, unjust and extortionate, certainly a court has the jurisdiction to fix reasonable and just amount alone. It may be that the defendants owned valuable properties. It is only when they have fallen into bad days, they get involved in litigation, and to get out of the difficult situation faced by them, they look to the judiciary for relief and salvation. Even if actions of the court are to border on miserliness in managing their estate, it will not be against the interest of justice, whereas if the properties of a person in distress is managed in a lavish manner, unmindful of the fate of the parties in distress, by applying yardsticks which would have no relevance to the quantum of work involved, particularly; there being no risk taken by the auctioneers in carrying out the task, any remuneration fixed which is extortionate would be doing injustice. There are millions of people working in this country in several occupations, who do not get this much of amount for the entire year, out of their hard and sustained work. Seldom, a lawyer gets this much of fees even for a complicated case. A surgeon who does the heart operation and saves a life, would not get this much of remuneration for the delicate and risky job-done by him. For the entire year of a Judge-ship in a High Court, this much of amount is not saved by a Judge.

8. Therefore, while fixing remvmertion, it is the nature and the extent of work involved, and the risk factor, if any, and whether there is any need to take any independent decision involving application of mind, etc., will have to be taken into account, and not on some percentage basis, it could be worked out as an universal rule. Remuneration means “to pay for services rendered”. The services so rendered will have to be assessed, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the order should contain reasons as to how and in what manner, the quantum has been arrived at, particularly when monumental amounts are directed to be paid,

9. It is rather surprising that, when Mr. M.G.R Prasad, learned counsel for the first respondent, was asked to deal with this point on the expectation that he would denounce when such a huge amount is paid out; he had not chosen to make any submissions, in spite of being asked about it. All these have come to be stated in this order, not on submissions made by any counsel; but on the conscience of the Court being taken aback when half a lakh of rupees is parted with, for a meagre service rendered; and for which amount, these applications have come to be filed to lessen the liability of the debtors to that extent, because it has become more dearer and valuable for them than its monetary value. With the experience gained a court could certainly fore-see what is the likely work involved in issuing a Commission or in directing sale of property to be carried out either by tender or by auction, and it could easily decide on a fixed remuneration, and give it only to those who are willing to do that at that rate. If later on, due to certain developments which could not be foreseen, it had resulted in increased service to be rendered that could always be assessed at a just and reasonable amount. For holding an auction, a fixed remuneration of Rs. 2000 could have been awarded, because what was expected to be done was to invite the tenders and no other. It was later on directed to be sold in public action, when every expenditure is borne by the party in distress, if an unanticipated work had come to be done by the auctioneer, then an added remuneration could have been ordered, so that the ultimate amount arrived at, is within reasonable limits. What is of paramount consideration is the interests of the parties to the proceedings, and not that of the Advocate Commissioner or the Auctioneer or Receiver.

10. Therefore, these petitions are dismissed. No costs.

RR/VCS