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Virudhunagar Co-Operative Milk Supply Society Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax.
Factual and Procedural Background
These two references concern assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 and raise a common question of law. The assessee is a co-operative society engaged in supplying milk, running a canteen and operating a salvage farm, poultry, dairy farm and livestock unit (including raising grass for cattle). For the two assessment years in question the assessee claimed losses from the salvage farm which were allowed by the original Income-tax Officer (ITO).
While making the assessment for year 1970-71 the successor ITO discovered information indicating an underassessment of the assessee's total income for 1968-69 and 1969-70. The successor ITO invoked section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and brought to tax the previously allowed losses, holding that income from the salvage farm, poultry, dairy farm and livestock was exempt under section 10(27) and therefore the losses should not have been allowed.
On appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the assessee argued (a) that all relevant facts had been placed before the original ITO and the allowance of loss followed consideration by that officer so reopening was a mere change of opinion, and (b) that section 10(27) did not apply as the assessee was not running a dairy farm. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the reopening on the ground that the original ITO had been unaware that the assessee maintained stud bulls and engaged in livestock breeding and dairy farming; that information emerged during the 1970-71 assessment and showed the income to be exempt under section 10(27).
The Tribunal, relying upon Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. CIT (West Bengal-II), held that reopening the assessments was justified and remitted the question of applicability of section 10(27) to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, allowing the assessee to produce evidence on that point.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer acted properly in invoking the provisions of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act?
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The reassessment proceedings were initiated merely because the successor-officer had a change of opinion; reopening an assessment on that basis is not justified.
- All facts relating to the salvage farm operations had been placed before the original ITO and the loss had been allowed after consideration; therefore the allowance could not be reopened on the ground of mere difference of view.
- Section 10(27) would not apply because, the assessee contended, it was not running a dairy farm.
Revenue's Arguments
- The successor ITO obtained information from the assessment records, during the 1970-71 assessment, that the losses claimed earlier had been wrongly allowed because the income from the salvage farm, livestock breeding unit, poultry and dairy farms was exempt under section 10(27), and hence losses should not have been allowed.
- This was not a mere change of opinion; rather it was the possession of new information (derived from investigation of assessment records for another year) that justified reopening under section 147(b).
- Reliance was placed on precedents (including Kalyanji Mavji, Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, and United India Fire & General Insurance) to support the proposition that information discovered during the course of assessment proceedings for another year can justify reopening earlier assessments under the comparable provision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. CIT (West Bengal-II) | The Supreme Court enumerated categories under the comparable provision (section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) including: (1) information as to true state of law from judicial decisions; (2) income escaped due to oversight/inadvertence/mistake; (3) information from an external source (new matters or fresh facts not present at original assessment); and (4) information obtained from investigation of the assessment record itself. | The court placed the present case within category (4): information obtained from investigation of the assessment record (the 1970-71 assessment proceedings) justified reopening under section 147(b). |
| Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 996 | The Supreme Court qualified the reach of category (2) by indicating that oversight, inadvertence or mistake would not necessarily give power to reopen under section 34(1)(b); an error discovered does not automatically justify reopening. | The court in the present opinion treated that limitation as applicable to category (2) but noted that Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society did not disapprove the other categories in Kalyanji Mavji, especially category (4), which is relied on here. |
| United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1985] 153 ITR 81 (Mad) | Shows a case where the ITO, unaware at original assessment of a fact (here, which shares yielded dividends), obtained the information only in the course of assessment for another year; supports that information may be acquired during another year's assessment. | The court used this precedent to support the proposition that information discovered during the assessment for another year (from assessment records) may justify reopening earlier assessments. |
| Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd. v. CIT [1961] 42 ITR 547 (Mad) | Recognizes that by examining records the officer may inform himself and that assessment records can be a source of information leading to discovery of escapement or underassessment. | Cited to support the view that information need not come from an external source and that assessment records themselves can provide the basis for reopening. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by stating the statutory prerequisites for invoking section 147(b): (i) the Income-tax Officer must have information in his possession and (ii) he must have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The information relied on must have come into the officer's possession after the original assessment.
The court examined the timeline and facts of this case and found that the successor ITO obtained information while finalizing the assessment for the year 1970-71 — specifically, the 1970-71 assessment involved disallowance of a loss claimed by the assessee in respect of the salvage farm and that assessment order was accepted by the assessee. Thus the information relied upon by the successor ITO came to his notice after the original assessments for 1968-69 and 1969-70 had been completed.
The court then turned to precedent, principally Kalyanji Mavji's case, which categorised situations in which the comparable provision would apply. The court identified that the present facts fall within category (4) of that classification — i.e., information obtained from an investigation of the materials on the record of a later assessment or from other enquiry or research into facts or law. The court expressly distinguished category (2) (oversight/inadvertence/mistake) in light of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, which had limited the scope of category (2) and indicated that an error discovered later does not necessarily justify reopening. However, the court emphasized that Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society did not disapprove the other categories, notably category (4).
The court also relied on United India Fire & General Insurance and Salem Provident Fund Society to show that relevant information can legitimately be found by examining assessment records and that the source of information need not be external to the records.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the successor ITO had come into possession of information while finalizing the 1970-71 assessment which indicated the earlier allowance of losses was erroneous because the related activities attracted exemption under section 10(27). The reopening was therefore not a mere change of opinion by the successor-officer but was prompted by information acquired after the original assessments.
The limited question of whether section 10(27) in fact applied was not decided on the merits by the court; that issue was remitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for further enquiry, with liberty to the assessee to produce evidence.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court answered the reference in the affirmative and held that section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act was properly invoked and that the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer acted properly in reopening the assessments for the years 1968-69 and 1969-70.
Implications and direct effects:
- The reopening of the assessments for 1968-69 and 1969-70 is sustained as justified on the ground that the successor ITO, while making the assessment for 1970-71, obtained information from the assessment records indicating that the earlier allowance of losses was erroneous.
- The question whether section 10(27) applies to the assessee's activities was not decided; that issue was remitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for investigation and the assessee was permitted to produce evidence in support of its contention.
- The Revenue was awarded the costs of the reference; counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 500.
- No novel principle was laid down by the court beyond application of existing authorities (the opinion applies and distinguishes earlier precedent rather than announcing a new rule).
The summary above is restricted to the content and holdings expressly contained in the provided opinion.
1. These two references relating to the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 raise a common question of law. The assessee is a co-operative society. Besides carrying on business in the supply of milk it runs a canteen and also raises grass for the use of cattle as part of salvage farm, poultry dairy farm and livestock unit. In respect of the assessment years in question, a claim was made by the assessee for the loss incurred by it in the salvage farm and this was allowed by the Income-tax Officer. Subsequently, while making the assessment for the assessment year 1970-71, the Income-tax Officer came into possession of information that there was an underassessment of the total income of the assessee for the two years in question. Thereupon, the Income-tax Officer initiated action under section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ), and brought to tax the loss allowed under salvage farm, after holding that under section 10(27) of the Act, the income derived by the assessee from the salvage farm, poultry dairy farm and livestock until carried on by the assessee was exempt from tax and that consequently the losses incurred in the salvage farm operation should not have been allowed. On appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the assessee, it was contended that all facts relating to the salvage farm operations carried on by the assessee had been placed before the Income-tax Officer, who made the original assessment and only after consideration thereof, the loss was allowed in the original assessment and, therefore, it was not open to the successor-officer, on a mere change of opinion, to initiate proceedings for reassessment. It was also contended that section 10(27) of the Act would not apply, as the assessee was not running a dairy farm. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the reopening of the assessment on the ground that the Income-tax Officer, who made the original assessment, was unaware of the fact that the assessee was maintaining stud bulls and such expenditure had been debited to the profit and loss account and that only in the course of the assessment proceedings for the subsequent year, the successor-officer found that the assessee's activity included livestock breeding and dairy farming and maintenance of bulls and the income therefrom was exempt under section 10(27) of the Act and under these circumstances, the loss under this business should not have been allowed. On further appeal by the assessee before the Tribunal, reiterating its objection that there was only a mere change of opinion and that section 10(27) of the Act would not apply, the Tribunal, relying upon Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. Cit, West Bengal-Ii . , held that the reopening of the assessment for the assessment years in question was justified and that on the other question of applicability or otherwise of section 10(27) of the Act, the matter had to be remitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for going into that question, giving liberty to the assessee to produce whatever evidence it wanted in support of that contention.
2. At the instance of the assessee, under section 256(2) of the Act, the following common question of law for the two assessment years in question, has been referred to this court for its opinion:
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer acted properly in invoking the provisions of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act?"
3. Learned counsel for the assessee strenuously contended that the reassessment proceedings had been initiated merely on the basis of the change of opinion on the part of the successor-officer and that that would not in any manner justify the reopening of the assessment. Reference in this connection was also made to several decisions holding that a mere change of opinion on the part of the officer concerned would not justify the reopening of the assessment already completed. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Revenue, inviting attention to Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. Cit, West Bengal-Ii . , Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT and United India Fire and General Insurance CO. Ltd v. CIT Ltd. v. CIT [1985] 153 ITR 81 (Mad), submitted that in this case, from the assessment records the officer obtained information on an investigation of the materials that the claim for the loss made by the assessee had been wrongly allowed, as the income from the salvage farm, livestock breeding unit, poultry and dairy farms carried on by the assessee was exempt from tax and consequently losses should not have been allowed and it was, therefore, not a mere change of opinion on the part of the successor-officer which made him to resort to the reopening of the assessment.
4. Before proceedings under section 147(b) of the Act can be taken, the Income-tax Officer must have information in his possession and he must also have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. No doubt such information must have come into the possession of the officer after the assessment. In this case, it is seen that the Income-tax Officer became aware of the disallowability of the losses claimed by the assessee for the assessment years in question while making the assessment for the assessment year 1970-71, when the loss claimed by the assessee in respect of the salvage farm was disallowed and that assessment order had also been accepted by the assessee. It is thus seen that information had been obtained in this case from the assessment year 1970-71. We are therefore, unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the assessee that purely prompted by a change of opinion, reassessment proceedings had been resorted to. Though a number of decisions were referred to by learned counsel for the assessee, we are of the view that there is no need for making any detailed reference to all of them, excepting Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT , as it was also relied on by learned counsel for the Revenue, though for a different purpose. In this connection, we may first refer to Kalyanji Mavji's case [1976] 102 ITR 287, where the Supreme Court, with reference to section 34(1) (b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, comparable to section 147(b) of the Act, dealt with the applicability of that provision to certain categories of cases. The Supreme Court enumerated the following categories of cases as covered by section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (headnote):
"(1) Where the information is as to the true and correct state of the law derived from relevant judicial decisions;
(2) where in the original assessment the income liable to tax has escaped assessment due to oversight, inadvertence or a mistake committed by the Income-tax Officer;
(3) where the information is derived from an external source of any kind; such external source would include discovery of new and important matters or knowledge of fresh facts which were not present at the time of original assessment; and (4) where the information may be obtained even from the record of the original assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record or the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law."
5. The case of the assessee would fall within category (4) enumerated above, in that, the information had been obtained by the officer from the record of the assessment proceedings in connection with the assessment year 1970-71. We may now notice Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 996, where the Supreme Court has pointed out at page 1004, referring to Kalyanji Mavji's case [1976] 102 ITR 287, that the categorisation in that decision under category (2) thereof, i.e., that income liable to tax has escaped assessment due to oversight, inadvertence or mistake would also fall within section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, has been stated rather too widely and broadly and goes even further beyond what is warranted by the statute and that an error discovered, would not give the officer the power to resort to a reopening under section 147(b) or the act. Though Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society's case has taken the view that oversight, inadvertence or mistake, would not fall within section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, nothing has been said by way of disapproval of the other categories enumerated in Kalyanji Mavji's case , particularly with category (4), within which the present case would fall. We are, therefore, of the view that the case of the assessee would fall within category (4) as per the decision in Kalyanji Mavji's case [1976] 102 ITR 278 (SC), and that that would justify the reopening of the assessment. We may also in this connection refer to United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1985] 153 ITR 81 (Mad), where the court considered the propriety of the reopening of an assessment in a case where the Income-tax Officer, at the time of the completion of the assessment, was unaware of the fact that the shares held by the assessee were such that some of them yielded dividends, while others did not yield dividends and that fact came to his knowledge only in the course of the assessment for another assessment year. Referring to Salem Provident Fund Society Ltd. v. CIT [1961] 42 ITR 547 (Mad), to the effect that by looking into the records, the officer informs himself and that record would be a source of information, if that information lead to the discovery of an escapement of assessment or underassessment, it was pointed out that is is not necessary that such information should be from an outside source, but that it may be found in the assessment records themselves. In this case, the assessment records, in the process of finalisation of the assessment for the assessment year 1970-71 gave information to the officer that losses claimed by the assessee in respect of the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70, which should have been disallowed, had been countenanced, and it was on the basis of this information, that the officer proceeded to reopen the assessment by resorting to section 147(b) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the reopening of the assessment was not the outcome of a mere change of opinion on the part of the successor-officer, but owing to his having come into possession of information with reference to the erroneous allowance of the losses claimed by the assessee during the assessment years in question while finalising the assessment for the year 1970-71. The question whether section 10(27) of the Act would apply or not, has been remitted for on investigation and the assessee has also been given an opportunity of placing such evidence as it may have in support of its stand. We, therefore, hold that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, section 147(b) of the Act was properly invoked and the Tribunal was which in the view in took on that question. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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