Tractors And Farm Equipment, Ltd. v. R. Venkatraman

1. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 5313 of 1979. That writ petition, in its turn, was directed against the award of the second respondent in I.D No. 224 of 1978. In that industrial dispute, there was an adjudication by the second respondent, on the question of the propriety of the non-employment of the first respondent by the appellant. The first respondent's services with the appellant were terminated in disciplinary action. The second respondent upheld the propriety of the disciplinary action on merits. However, on the question of punishment, the second respondent chose to interfere and directed reinstatement of the first respondent by the appellant, denying the first respondent back-wages from 17 August 1976, when he was suspended pending disciplinary action till the date of reinstatement. This award of the second respondent has been examined by the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge found no warrant to interfere with the discretion exercised by the second respondent on the question of punishment and dismissed the writ petition. That is how the writ appeal has come to be preferred by the appellant.

2. Sri M.R Narayanaswamy, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that when the nature of the charge is considered, the punishment of dismissal from service could not be said to be harsh and keeping in mind the need to maintain discipline in the establishment, that punishment ought to have been sustained both by the second respondent and by the learned Single Judge. The charge, that was levelled against the first respondent was that he slapped the chargehand, while on duty, on 13 August 1976. The finding of the second respondent, as confirmed by the learned Single Judge, is that, this did happen and the domestic enquiry was not in any manner vitiated and it must be held. On 11 August 19/6, the first respondent, during night shift, was found sleeping by the chargehand. The appellant issued a memorandum to the first respondent on 13 August 1976, calling for explanation. On 16 August 1976, the first respondent wrote a letter to the appellant that on 11 August 1976, while he was working in the night shift he had taken ill on account of dysentery. The chargehand complained to the appellant that on 13 August 1976, the first respondent slapped him stating that the chargehand was responsible for the issuance of the memorandum by the appellant. On 17 August 1976, the charge memorandum with regard to the misconduct of slapping of the chargehand by the first respondent was issued by the appellant. On the same day, the first respondent replied and he denied the incident and the first respondent was also speaking about the strained relationship between him and the chargehand. We have traced the above facts only to show as to how the incident of slapping, as found against the first respondent, happened.

3. The well-accepted principle on the question of exercise of powers under S. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, to evaluate the gravity of misconduct for the purpose of the punishment to be imposed on a workman is, that once that power has been exercised, this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of any important legal principle, should not undertake to re-examine the question of adequacy or inadequacy of the materials for interference by the Labour Courts. The second respondent adverted to the case of the appellant that the first respondent was in the habit of flouting the instructions of his superiors. In Para. 9 of the award, the second respondent points out that there is dearth of material as to the actual order passed on such allegation. Rightly the second respondent eschewed the suggestion on the part of the appellant to maintain the extreme penalty of dismissal from services on the ground that the past conduct of the first respondent was not complimentary to him. In Para. 10 of the award, the first respondent (second respondent?) has discussed the question as to whether the punishment imposed by the appellant on the first respondent was commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct or as to whether it was disproportionate. The second respondent, after such discussion, came to the conclusion that the punishment was disproportionate. That was why the second respondent, while ordering reinstatement of the first respondent, deemed fit to deny him wages for the period from 17 August 1976, till the date of reinstatement. This was within the purview of the powers of the second respondent. The learned Single Judge, in our view, rightly declined to interfere with this discretion, on the part of the second respondent. It cannot be stated that the second respondent did not exercise the discretion judicially. The view taken by the second respondent was that the punishment imposed by the appellant was disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the first respondent. The second respondent has given reasons for his decision. Such being the position, we are not persuaded to interfere in writ appeal and accordingly this writ appeal is dismissed. Bat, we make no order as to costs.