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Bhanumathy v. M. Venkatesan & Ors:

Madras High Court
Feb 24, 1989
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Revision concerning I.A. to Reopen Suit)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 23 of 1984, Sub-Court, Salem, who brought a suit for partition and separate possession of A and B schedule properties and for an account of profits of the firm Narayana Udayar and Brothers (dissolved in 1980). While the suit was pending, the plaintiff filed I.A. 933 of 1988 seeking to reopen the case so that she could be examined and further documentary evidence could be adduced.

On 13-6-1988 she filed an affidavit asserting that, because she could not travel from Madras to Salem for hearings, her husband had been attending on her behalf, contacting her previous advocate and informing her about the suit's stage. She alleged that her husband extracted money and jewels from her, lived a wayward life, and, without her consent, had given evidence as her witness and made endorsements on the plaint. She sought leave to examine herself and to mark documents she considered important.

The 12th respondent contested the application, stating that the plaintiff's counsel had reported he was not examining the plaintiff and was satisfied with the husband's evidence (the husband was examined as P.W.1), and that the plaintiff's counsel had endorsed on the plaint that the plaintiff was not claiming rights against the 12th respondent. It was contended that the endorsements and the husband's evidence were made with authority, and that the plaintiff had not reserved a right to be examined later in terms of Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C.

The court below rejected the petitioner's application to reopen the suit. The petitioner filed the present civil revision petition challenging that rejection.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff may reopen the case to examine herself after her husband was examined as P.W.1 and her counsel had closed the plaintiff's evidence, particularly where she alleges her husband and previous counsel acted without her consent and made prejudicial endorsements on the plaint.
  2. Whether Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C. bars the plaintiff from later claiming the right to be examined when she did not reserve the right to be examined at the outset or obtain a court order permitting later examination.
  3. Whether allegations made against the plaintiff's former counsel (that he acted against her interests) can form a basis for relief in the absence of notice to that counsel or supporting affidavit from the counsel himself.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner / Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed she could not attend hearings and had deputed her husband to attend; however, he acted without her consent by testifying as her witness and by causing endorsements on the plaint that prejudiced her interests.
  • The plaintiff asserted that because the husband and her previous counsel acted against her interests (fraudulently or without authorization), she should not be held to have lost her right to be examined and should be allowed to give evidence and mark important documents now.
  • Plaintiff's counsel argued the court below should have inquired whether she had consciously and willingly given up her right to be examined before applying Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C., and that the omission to make such a inquiry vitiated the order rejecting the reopening application.

Respondents' Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The 12th respondent stated that the plaintiff's counsel reported that he would not examine the plaintiff and was satisfied with the husband's evidence; consequently defendants saw no need to lead oral evidence and the matter proceeded to argument.
  • It was pointed out that the husband had been in charge of attending the case from the beginning and that the plaintiff had given him authority to act on her behalf; there was no material showing she ever withdrew that authority or instructed counsel not to follow the husband's instructions.
  • The respondents argued that the plaintiff did not reserve her right to be examined later and, by examining her husband early, she cannot now seek to be examined in view of Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C.
  • They also contended that allegations made against counsel behind his back cannot be accepted without notice to the counsel or supporting affidavit, and that the appropriate remedy for any misconduct by counsel or agent is separate proceedings, not reopening the present suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequential analysis grounded in the factual assertions within the record and procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure:

  1. Authority and Agency: The court noted that the plaintiff had repeatedly stated her husband attended court from Madras to Salem and contacted her previous advocate to update her on the case. The court interpreted this as an authority given to the husband to look after the case, and observed that she had not produced any correspondence showing she ever withdrew that authority.
  2. Binding Effect of Acts by Agent and Counsel: Relying on the general principle that acts done by an agent bind the principal, the court held that the husband's examination as P.W.1 and the endorsements made by the plaintiff's counsel (acting under vakalat) were binding on the plaintiff unless adequately disproved.
  3. Absence of Proof and Procedural Safeguards: The court emphasized the absence of any proof that the husband or counsel acted without authority. It highlighted that serious allegations against an advocate should not be acted upon on the basis of unsupported, behind-the-back assertions; the court explained that before accepting such allegations it is the court's duty to direct the party to serve notice on the advocate or to secure an affidavit from the advocate in response.
  4. Availability of Alternate Remedies: The court observed that if the plaintiff believed she had been wronged by her agent or counsel (for negligence, fraud, etc.), she had adequate remedies in other civil or criminal proceedings and before appropriate professional regulatory bodies (e.g., the Bar Council). The court stated that the present interlocutory application was not the appropriate forum to investigate or redress such allegations.
  5. Application of Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C.: The decisive legal principle applied was Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C. The court found that the plaintiff had not exercised her right to be the first witness on her side at the outset, nor had she procured a court order reserving her right to be examined later. Consequently, under that provision she could not now seek reopening to be examined.
  6. Observations on Litigation Practice: The court expressed concern about litigants who change counsel at strategic moments to protract proceedings or to make belated allegations; it treated such practices skeptically and said they cannot form the basis for relief unless substantiated.

On the combined basis of agency principles, absence of acceptable proof, the availability of alternate remedies, and the statutory bar under Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C., the court concluded that reopening should not be permitted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The direct practical effect is that the plaintiff is not permitted to reopen the case to examine herself or to mark the documents she claimed were important, because she had not reserved the right to be examined and the endorsements and earlier actions by her husband and counsel were treated as binding in the absence of proof to the contrary.
  • The court indicated that allegations against an agent or counsel must be pursued by appropriate proceedings (civil, criminal or before regulatory bodies) rather than by an interlocutory application to reopen the present suit; it therefore confined relief to the established procedural framework rather than making any determination on separate claims of fraud or misconduct.
  • No broader precedential or novel legal principle was declared beyond the application of established agency principles and Order 18, Rule 3-A, C.P.C., and the opinion contains no citation of reported precedents.

(The summary above is strictly based on the statements and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information not present in the text.)

Show all summary ...

1. Plaintiff in O.S No. 23 of 1984, Sub-Court, Salem is the petitioner herein. She Pled the suit for partition and separate possession of A and B schedule properties, and for a direction to take accounting of the profits of the firm of Narayana Udayar and Brothers, which was dissolved in 1980 and pay the amounts which had become due to her.

2. Pending disposal of the suit, she filed I.A 933 of 1988 to reopen the case, so that she may be examined for adducing further oral and documentary evidence. The suit was posted on 13-6-1988 for further arguments. It was on that day; she filed an affidavit in the abovesaid I.A claiming that she could not go from Madras to Salem every time for the hearing of the suit, and therefore, she had deputed her husband who used to contact her previous advocate and intimate her about the stage of the suit. Her husband was extracting money and jewels from her and leading wayward life, and enmity developed when she refused to oblige him with money; and without her consent and knowledge, he had given evidence as her witness and made some endorsement on the plaint. She wanted to examine herself as a witness and mark some important documents, but without getting instructions from her husband and her previous advocate had made endorsements on the bundle against her interests. Hence she filed an application under S. 151, C.P.C for reopening the case.

3. The 12th respondent had filed counter claiming that plaintiff's counsel reported to court that he was not examining the plaintiff, and he was satisfied with the evidence of her husband, who was examined as P.W.1, and closed the plaintiff's evidence. Defendants felt that there was no necessity to lead any oral evidence on their side. Therefore, they stated that they are not adducing oral evidence and therefore, the case was posted for arguments of plaintiff's counsel on 8-3-1988 and it was adjourned to 10-3-1988 for further arguments. On that day, the plaintiff's counsel made an endorsement that he is not claiming any right or share against 12th respondent and his properties mentioned in A schedule to the plaint. Her husband was in charge of the case right from the beginning and gave evidence on her behalf and consented for making an endorsement on the plaint—which resulted in her counsel endorsing on the plaint to that effect on 10-3-1988 and 11-3-1988. The claim that the endorsements were made without her knowledge is not true. Even now she had not disclosed as to what are the important documents she wants to mark as exhibits. As she had not reserved her right to examine herself later on, but examined her husband as P.W! in the beginning, she cannot now ask for herself to be examined in view of O. 18, R. 3-A C.P.C In fact, after arguments were heard, and matter was posted for judgment several times and as Presiding Officer could not make ready the judgment before vacation, he reopened it and posted it to 13-6-1988 for further arguments. In the interval, perhaps, they have decided to change their counsel, and it had resulted in filing the present application.

4. On court below rejecting the plea for reopening of the suic, this revision petition is filed.

5. Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff, strenuously pleads that it is only in such of these instances wherein a plaintiff or a defendant foregoes his right to be examined in the beginning as a witness on his side, O. 18, R. 3-A, C.P.C, could be applied, but in a case like the present one wherein by certain fraudulent acts committed by the plaintiff's husband and her counsel having acted against her interest, her right to be examined as a witness cannot be lost. Having never given any authority in writing to make any endorsement and at no point of time, the counsel having ever informed her about the endorsement he had made, they cannot stand in the way of her right to he examined as a witness in the suit and mark the necessary documents as exhibits. He admits that the Court below should have first endeavoured to find out whether she had consciously and willingly given up her right to be examined as a witness and this omission on the part of the court below vitiates the order under revision.

6. It is not her case that her husband was never authorised to appear and he had attended court proceedings without her know ledge and consent. In paragraph 2 of the affidavit she states that as she was having ill-health and could not move to Salem from Madras regularly, for every time to look after her case, her husband used to go to Salem and contact her previous advocate and inform her about the stage of the case. Hence, she has given him the authority to look after the case on her behalf. She had never with drawn this authority given to him. No correspondence had been placed in this application to show that she had ever informed her counsel that he should not act on the instructions of her husband in future. Her counsel had never complained to her that her husband is interfering with the court proceedings without authority and compelling him to do certain things which would be against her interests. Hence, any act done by an agent would be binding upon the principal. The vakalat given' to her counsel authorises him to make endorsement. Hence, her husband being examined on her behalf as P.W.1 and her counsel making endorsements on the plaint on certain aspects along with P.W.1 cannot be got over by simply making sweeping allegations without any proof whatsoever.

7. It is not uncommon for litigants to change their counsel at their whims and fancies. Whenever they find that they are faced with an unfavourable order or placed in an inconvenient position, for the purpose of protracting proceedings, a practice has come, to change counsel and speak in a different voice. More often they are done deliberately, so that the proceedings can be protracted for a long period. Plaintiffs are no exception to ask for protraction with ulterior motives. By instituting proceedings maliciously for the purpose of harassing the defendants, plaintiffs do not want an early disposal of the case. Hence, by asking counsel to report no instructions or by changing counsel at the crucial moment in a case, I.A's of different hues are filed in large numbers in civil Courts By changing counsel, affidavits are filed maligning them behind their back by making outrageous claim which is for the ulterior motive to subserve their personal interests or at the sacrifice of the reputation of the concerned lawyers. No allegation made against a lawyer behind his back, could ever be a cause for granting any relief to any litigant under any circumstances. It is the cardinal duty of a court before accepting the allegations made against the counsel, to direct the parties to serve a notice on the counsel of the nature of allegations made against him or secure an affidavit, which would support the claims made by the petitioner in the petition filed against him. In their absence, it would be unsafe to grant relief by a presumption being drawn that advocates indulge in practices which are alleged as against them in such affidavits. A serious allegation had been made that her husband had made certain endorsements prejudicial to her interests, and the counsel and her husband had brought about the unpleasant situation upon her. This is the only reason for relief claimed in the application. Hence, on her self-serving Claim, no adverse inference can be drawn against her husband and the counsel. As claimed by respondents, even now the husband and wife are living together, and by change of counsel at the time of arguments, they are resorting to this unfair practice.

8. Unless in matters of this nature, the affidavit of the concerned counsel is filed admitting the allegation or after notice is taken to him, if he comes forward to admit all tbe averments made by the concerned party, no court would ever accept allegations made against the counsel behind his back to form the basis for granting relief in a proceeding.

9. If a litigant is let down either by his authorised agent or by his counsel, he has to resort to the remedies available in law. Any one who acts without the authority of a party, be it a counsel or any one else, is liable to be proceeded against both in civil and criminal courts, if circumstances warrant. The alleged negligence, fraud, etc., if had happened, enables her to secure adequate relief in courts against any counsel, apart from approaching the Bar Council. Instead of proving her claims in appropriate proceedings, she cannot call upon the court below in this I.A to investigate whether the endorsements had been made without her consent.

10. Learned counsel would then rely on the letter dated 15-2-1988 written by her for mer counsel stating that the case is posted to 18-2-1988, and that he should be contacted on that day, and that “Mrs. Bhanumathi need not come on that date”. It is claimed that having been so advised, and she having been deprived of examining herself as a witness, her interests should not suffer on what had happened behind her back. If she had any grievance in this regard as stated above, she can prove it by instituting appropriate proceedings and get remedies in courts as well. It is an internal matter between herself and her; advocate. They are scheming litigants, who-stage-manage for future situations, if circumstances warrant for utilising them. This by itself would not mean that the allegations-made by her against her husband and the counsel could be accepted and acted upon. Having given tbe authority to both; of them, to represent her interests in the proceedings, the consequences which flow out of it, will-have to be faced by her.

11. Hence in view of O. 18, R. 3-A,. C.P.C, she having not exercised her right to be examined as a first witness in the beginning of the trial, and having not reserved her right by an order of court to examine herself later on, she cannot ask for reopening of the case.

12. Hence, this civil revision petition is dismissed.

RR/VCS.