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Patrick Martin1 v. Mr. Patrick Martin A...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (David Annoussamy, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order dated 9-11-1988 by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. Two matters were before that Judge:
- The first matter concerned Diary No. 18070 of 1988 contained in an unnumbered Original Petition of 1988. The High Court office returned the papers on the ground that, after establishment of the Family Court, the petition should lie only before that Court; petitioners' counsel contended the High Court had not lost jurisdiction.
- The second matter was Application No. 5607 of 1988 in O.M.S. No. 26 of 1987 (the underlying O.M.S. having been filed by a Christian husband for a decree of divorce). By Application No. 5607 of 1988 the wife prayed for transfer of O.M.S. No. 26 of 1987 to the Family Court on the contention that the High Court's jurisdiction had been ended by the Family Courts Act, 1984 (the Act).
The learned Single Judge determined whether these matters could be tried only by the Family Court or whether the High Court retained jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge held that the High Court had no jurisdiction and directed both matters to be transferred to the Family Court. There is no appeal in respect of the divorce matter. The present appeal is by the petitioners in the unnumbered Original Petition carrying Diary No. 18070 of 1988; the petitioners are foreign nationals seeking appointment as guardians of an Indian minor female child.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, following the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Court (and not the High Court) has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with petitions relating to guardianship of the person, custody of, or access to a minor (i.e., whether the High Court's original jurisdiction in such matters has been ousted).
- Whether Clause 17 of the Letters Patent (special jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of persons and estates of infants, idiots and lunatics) preserves a special High Court jurisdiction that is unaffected by S.8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
- Whether Clause 17 of the Letters Patent, construed in its historical context, applies to natives (Indian subjects) or only to British subjects of European origin, and whether it remains operative after independence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The High Court possesses a civil original jurisdiction of a general nature under Clause 11 of the Letters Patent (analogous to the jurisdiction of a District Court), but in addition has a special jurisdiction relating to infants and lunatics under Clause 17.
- The special jurisdiction under Clause 17 was asserted to be not affected by S.8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, because the High Court in exercise of Clause 17 could not be equated to a District Court; accordingly S.8 would not operate to oust that special jurisdiction.
- Counsel further contended that jurisdiction once conferred could be taken away only by an express provision and that since S.8 did not expressly take away the special jurisdiction under Clause 17, Section 20 of the Act (which makes the Act overriding) would be ineffective to oust Clause 17.
Other Parties / State
The opinion records that there was no respondent and that the learned Advocate General was heard, but it does not contain a detailed account of arguments advanced by the State or other parties.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Julieta v. Lila Ceutinho, A.I.R. 1961 Bom. 275 | Interpreting Clause 17 territorially: the decision held that for the purpose of Clause 17 the jurisdiction of the High Court could extend territorially to the entire State (i.e., territorial extent of the High Court's jurisdiction). | The Court observed that this decision dealt only with territorial extent and did not assist the appellants on the central issue (which was whether Clause 17 applied to natives or survived the Act). |
| In the matter of A.T. Vasudevan | Used in a case where the manager of a Joint Hindu Family was appointed guardian and the court purported to act under Clause 17 (incidentally bearing on the competence to act for minors). | The Court recorded that the Vasudevan decision did not examine whether Clause 17 applied to natives and therefore could not be relied upon to resolve the present issue. |
| In re Lovejoy Patell | The decision suggested that the meaning of "British subject" evolved after 1858 (so that native inhabitants of British India became British subjects) and thus the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court might have been correspondingly enlarged. | The Court noted that even if that ratio were adopted it would not help the appellants in this case (because the child to be adopted is not British now) and therefore it did not support the appellants' contention. |
| State of Madras v. C.G. Menon (Supreme Court) | Principle that pre-constitutional provisions incompatible with India's status as an independent sovereign State are to be regarded as having become extinct despite Article 372; laws applicable only to colonial conditions may cease to be operative. | The Court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that Clause 17 (as a colonial remnant creating a special forum for Britishers) no longer remains operative and has become a "dead letter" after independence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded on two linked strands: statutory interpretation of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and historical/constitutional construction of Clause 17 of the Letters Patent.
Statutory analysis of the Act:
- The Court examined Explanation (g) to Section 7(1) of the Act, which confers jurisdiction on the Family Court to deal with suits or proceedings relating to guardianship of the person, custody of, or access to any minor.
- Section 8 of the Act was interpreted to mean that from the time a Family Court is established for any area, no District Court will have jurisdiction in respect of suits or proceedings of the nature described in the Explanations to Section 7(1).
- Section 2(e) of the Act imports definitions from the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 2(4) of the C.P.C. defines "district" to include the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. On this basis the Court concluded that Section 8 operates to exclude the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court in matters falling within the Act.
- Section 20 of the Act makes its provisions override anything inconsistent in any other law. The learned Single Judge relied on this provision to hold that the Act would prevail over any inconsistent pre-existing jurisdictional provisions.
- The Court also emphasized that the High Court's original jurisdiction is not a constitutional "normal" jurisdiction but a precarious one that can be terminated by law of the appropriate legislature (the High Court's original jurisdiction having been allowed to continue as an interim measure pending alternative arrangements under the constitutional scheme).
Historical and interpretive analysis of Clause 17:
- The Court traced Clause 17 of the Letters Patent back through the 1865 Letters Patent to the 1862 Charter and further to the Supreme Court Charter of 26.12.1800 (Clause 32). Clause 32 authorized the Supreme Court to appoint guardians "according to the Order and Course observed in that Part of Great Britain called England," which the Court construed as showing the jurisdiction was directed to Europeans (British subjects of European origin) rather than natives.
- The Court explained that the Charters historically distinguished between British subjects (in the Charter sense) and natives and that the original design of British-era courts was to serve British subjects. The Court cited historical commentary (A.N. Sinha) and described the dual system of judicial administration prevalent in those times.
- Applying established canons of interpretation, the Court stated that words in instruments such as the Charters must be construed in light of the intention of the lawmaker and the meaning at the time of enactment. The Court relied on illustrations from Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes to support that approach.
- For historical reasons and the legislative practice noted (including references to special treatment of Europeans in various statutes), the Court concluded Clause 17's jurisdiction extended only to British subjects of European origin and did not apply to natives.
- The Court further held that even that limited colonial-era jurisdiction has ceased to be operative after independence, invoking the principle applied in State of Madras v. C.G. Menon that colonial provisions incompatible with India's independence must be treated as having become extinct.
Practical consequence of the reasoning:
- The Court stated that even if Clause 17 were treated as a general jurisdiction applicable to all, Section 15 of the C.P.C. would require approaching the lowest grade court competent to try the dispute (here, the Family Court or, until its establishment, the District Court), with the right of appeal to the High Court preserved.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct Implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The High Court's original jurisdiction in respect of matters falling within the scope of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (which includes guardianship of the person and custody/access to minors) has come to an end for the area where the Family Courts Act is in effect; such matters fall to be tried by the Family Court (or, until its establishment, by the competent District Court), subject to the right of appeal to the High Court.
- Clause 17 of the Letters Patent, as a colonial remnant, was construed to have been limited to British subjects of European origin and, in any event, has become inoperative after independence and therefore cannot sustain a separate special jurisdiction of the High Court in the present context.
- The Family Courts Act, 1984, and specifically its Sections examined by the Court (including the override provision, Section 20), operate to exclude inconsistent original civil jurisdiction of the High Court in matters covered by the Act.
The opinion does not state that it is laying down a broader novel precedent beyond the conclusions reached in the facts of the case, but it does record conclusions of general application about the effect of the Family Courts Act, 1984 on High Court original jurisdiction and about the historical (and now defunct) scope of Clause 17 of the Letters Patent.
RR/VCS.
David Annoussamy, J.
1. This is an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent against an order passed on 9-11-1988 by a learned single Judge of this Court.
2. Two matters came before him. The first one is having Diary No. 18070 of 1988 in an unnumbered Original Petition of 1988. Since the papers were returned by the office of this Court on the ground that after the establishment of the Family Court, the petition would lie only before that Court, the matter was placed before the learned single Judge, upon the contention of the petitioners' counsel that the High Court has not lost jurisdiction on the matter.
3. The second matter is Application No. 5607 of 1988 in O.M.S No. 26 of 1987. (O.M.S No. 26 of 1987 was filed by a Christion husband for a decree for divorce from his Christian wife, the first defendant therein. By way of Application No. 5607 of 1988, the wife prayed for thetransfer of O.M.S, No. 26 of 1987 to the Family Court on the contention that the High Court's jurisdiction in the matter has been put an end to by the Family Courts Act, 1984, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
4. Learned single Judge took up for determination the point whether the above said two matters could be tried only by the Family Court or whether this Court has still jurisdiction to try them. After elaborately going through the matter, learned single Judge in a well considered Judgment held that this Couit had no jurisdiction to enter tain them and that both the matters were necessarily to be transferred to the Family Court for disposal in accordance with law. There is no appeal in respect of the second matter, viz., the matter relating to divorce. The present appeal is by the petitioners in the unnumbered O.P carrying Diary No. 18070 of 1988 which was filed for appoint ment of the petitioners therein (foreign nationals) as guardians of an Indian minor female child.
5. Learned single Judge who has revie wed all the decisions cited by the parties came to his conclusion on the following lines: As per Explanation (g) to S. 7(1) of the Act, the Family Court has jurisdiction to deal with a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the cus tody of or access to any minor. As per S. 8 of the Act, from the time of the establish ment of a Family Court for any area, no District Court will have jurisdiction in res pect of any suit of proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanations to sub-S.(1) of S. 7 of the Act. As per S. 2(e) of the Act, all words and expressions used, but not defined in the Act and defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Code. S. 2(4) of the C.P.C defines ‘district’ as meaning the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a “District Court”) and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil juris diction of a High Court. Therefore, the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court has been excluded by virtue of S. 8 of the Act. Learned single Judge further added that as per S. 20 of the Act, the provisions thereof shall effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act. He referred also to the Constitution. The original jurisdiction of the High Court is not a normal jurisdiction of a High Court in the scheme of the Constitution; such original jurisdiction is a precarious one susceptible of being terminated at any time by a law of the appropriate legislature; such jurisdiction was allowed to continue as an interim measure till alternative arrangements were made as per Art. 225 of the Constitution. He therefore concluded that the original jurisdiction which vested in the High Court in respect of minors had come to an end after the Family Courts Act, 1984, has come into effect in the city of Madras.
6. Since this is a matter related to question of jurisdiction and since there was no respondent in the case, learned Advocate General also was heard.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants would point out that as per Cl. 11 of the Letters Patent dated 28-12-1865 this High Court has got civil original jurisdiction of general nature with local limits which is analogous to the jurisdiction of a District Court and that the reasoning of the learned single Judge would apply to such jurisdiction. In fact, he accepted that this Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction under Clause 11 of the Letters Patent dated 28.12.1865 in respect of matters covertd by the Act from the time of the commencement of the Act. But his main contention was that this Court under the abovesaid Letters Patent possessed in addition to territorial general jurisdiction under Cl. 11, a special jurisdiction relating to infants and lunatics under Cl. 17, that such jurisdiction was not affected since the High Court in exercise of that jurisdiction could not be equated to a District Court and that S. 8 of the Act would not operate. He further added that jurisdiction once conferred could be taken away only by an express provision, that since S. 8 did not take away the special jurisdiction under Cl. 17, S. 20 of the Act would be also effectless. This is therefore the point which we have to determine.
8. Cl. 17 of the Letters Patent dated 28.12.1865 reads as follows: —
“And we do further ordain that the said High Court of judicature at Madras, shall have the like power and authority with respect to the persons and estates of infants, idiots, and lunatics within the Presidency of Madras, as that which was vested in the said High Court immediately before the publication of these presents,”
Since the jurisdiction is one which vested in the High Court immediately before the publication of the abovesaid Letters Patent, we have to refer to the previous Letters Patent. The relevant provision, viz. Cl. 16 of the Charter dated 26.6 1862 reads as follows:“
“And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Madras, shall have the like power and authority with respect to the persons and estates of infants, idiots, and lunatics, whether within or without the Presidency of Madras, as that which is now vested in the said Supreme Court of Madras.”
Since here again there is reference to the power which was at that time vested in the pre existing Supreme Court, we have to refer to the relevant provisions in the Charter creating the Supreme Court. In that Charter dated 26.12.1800 the corresponding clause, viz, Cl. 32, reads as follows: —
“And we do hereby authorize the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras to appoint Guardians and Keepers for Infants, and their Estates, according to the Order and Course observed in that Part of Great Britain called England; and also Guardians and Keepers of the Persons and Estates of natural Fools, and of such as are or shall be deprived of their Understanding or Reason, by the Act of God, so as to be unable to govern themselves and their Estates, which we hereby authorize and empower the Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras to enquire, hear, and determine, by inspection of the Person, or by such other Ways and Means, by which the Truth may be best discovered and known.”
The phrase ‘according to the Oder and Course observed in that Part of Great Britain called England’ shows that the jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the abovesaid Clause does not relate to natives, but only to Europeans. Obviously, Appointment of guardians in respect of Hindus or Muslims could not be according to the ‘Order and Course observed in England’. Further, when we take a look at the Clause relating to the general jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, viz., Cl. 21, we find the following sentence in the beginning: —
“And we do further direct, ordain, and appoint, That the Jursidiction, Powers, and Authorities of the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras, shall extend to all such Persons as have been heretofore described and distinguished in Our Charters of Justice for Madras by the Appellation of British Subjects, who shall reside within any of the Factories subject to, or dependent upon, the Government of Madras,”
The whole clause 21 is to the effect that the Supreme Court has a general jurisdiction in respect of British subjects and a limited jurisdiction in respect of suits and actions against those subjects and also against the inhabitants of Madras. When we peruse the different clauses of the Charter of the Supreme Court and also the Charters which created British Courts prior to the Supreme Court, we find always a clear distinction, viz., on one side the British subjects, and on Madras.
9. The reason for such distinction is historical. It is very well summarised in the Law of Citizenship and Aliens in India, by A.N Sinha, issued under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs in 1962 at pages 71 and 72 as follows:
“British India came into existence partly through concessions granted by or wrested from the rulers of the country and partly by conquest. Between 1765 aud 1858 the country was administered by what has been called double government, viz., the East India Company and the British Crown. Complete sovereignty was assumed by the Crown under the Government of India Act, 1858. People of India who came under the rule of the Company apart from any question of race or subjugation, stood on a different footing from that of natural-born British subjects then living in India. Courts had to be different and so were the laws. The Company, in the exercise of the sovereign power which is derived from the Moghul Emperor had no power over those who owed no allegiance to the Moghul. It had no sovereign authority over Englishmen and Europeans.”
In fact, the pattern of judicial dispensation at that time was as follows: (a) An heirarchy of Indian Courts spread all over the Presidency having as apex Courts, Suddar Awdalut and Foudjary Awdalut, having general jurisdiction except the matters and persons subject to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, (b) The Supreme Court having jurisdiction only on the British subjects in respect of the litigations in re: or as between them or in suits directed against them or the inhabitants of the Presidency Town,
10. N. Arunachalam in his erudite Arti cle ‘Judicial Institutions of the State of Madras Since the Commencement of the British Rule’ would slate as follows : —
“Until the British Parliament passed the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, it was never the intention of the British Administration of India to bring native Indians within the jurisdiction of the British Courts functioning in the three Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.”
Therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Cl. 17 in the last Charter, dated 28.12.1865 which is the same as the one which the Supreme Court possessed, is limited to British subjects and does not extend to others.
11. In his attempt that the benefit of Cl. 17 of the Letters Patent, dated 28.12.1865 extends to Indians as well, learned coun sel for the appellants placed before us three decisions. The first decision is one of Bom bay High Court in Juliet a v. Lila Ceutinho A.I.R 1961 Bom. 275 in which it was held that for the purpose of Cl. 17, the jurisdiction of the High Court would mean not merely the ordinary origi nal civil jurisdiction but would extend to the entire State of Maharashtra. If the person concerned came within the jurisdic tion of the High Court, that jurisdiction, as per the abovesaid clause of the Letters Patent, would extend to the entire State. Therefore, this decision which deals only with the territorial extent of the jurisdiction does not in any manner help the case of the appellants, since that is not the point at issue.
12. The second decision is one reported in In the matter of A.T Vasudevan where the main question was whether the Manager of the Joint Hindu Family would be com petent to alienate joint family property by getting appointed as guardian for the pur pose of sale of the minor's share. In that case, it was held that the Manager had such a power and the Court purported to act under Cl. 17 of the Letters Patent to appoint him as guardian. So the question was approached in an oblique way and the Court did not in fact examine the question whether Cl. 17 applied or not to natives, since it appears that the matter was not in controversy in that case. Therefore, reli ance cannot, be placed on that decision to determine our issue.
13. Heavy reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on the third decision reported in In re: Lovejoy Patell. In that decision, the Court ob served that in the early statutes relating to India including Regulating Act, 1773, the expression ‘British subject’ meant subject of the King of British birth, but it does not follow that in 1862 the expression ‘British subject’ continued to be confined to such a subject, because after the assumption of direct control by the Crown by Act dated 2.8.1858 every native of British India be came ipso facto a British subject. The mean ing of the expression ‘British subject’ be ing thus enlarged, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court also got consequently en larged so as to bring within its ambit all native Indian infants, is the conclusion in the decision third cited. The ratio of this decision is that the words ‘British subjects’ found in the Charter of the Supreme Court should be given the meaning they had at the time of the decision. If this ratio is adopted, it will not promote the case of the appellants, because the child to be adopted is not British now and Cl. 17 of the Charter will have no application.
14. Let us now turn to examine how the words ‘British subjects’ in the Supreme Court Charter should be construed. As per the well known canon of interpretation, the word has to be given, the meaning at the time the statute was passed. This can be gathered from the following cases reported by Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn.:
“For instance, a private Act which provided that ‘no action in any of his Majesty's Courts of Law’ should be brought against certain shipowners without a month's notice, has been held not to apply to proceedings in the Admiralty Division of the High Court, for, when the Act was passed the Admiralty Court was not one of his Majesty's courts, nor were proceedings there called actions.( (p. 85)
“2. The words ‘public religious worship’ in S. 7(2) of the Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955 were first found in the Poor Kate Exemption Act 1833. “These words were repeated by the Act of 1955, and unless the context requires, or unless in the intervening years there have been legal decisions or other matters affecting their meaning, they bear the same meaning in 1955 as they bore in 1833…”
(pp. 85, 86)
“Similarly, in two other cases, it was held that a private Act conferring exemption from ‘all taxes whatsoever’ applied only to such taxes as were in force at the time of the passing of the Act, and not to those subsequently introduced”3, (p. 262)
Another important canon of interpretation is that the words are to be construed in accordance with the intention of law maker. It has been already made clear that at the time of the Supreme Court, there was a dual system of judicial administration; one for the British Subjects and some other limited cases and another for the natives; and the purpose of Cl. 32 of Charter dated 26.12.1800 was to vest jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in respect of British subjects alone.
15. Though after the assumption of the governance of the country directly by the Crown by Act dated 2.8.1858, all inhabitants of British India became British subjects in the eye of International Law, the distinction between Indian British subjects and European British subjects continued in several fields. The Government of India Act, 1915, in S. 84(1)(c) referred clearly to European British subjects and other British subjects. Till the enactment of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, the general exemption of the Europeans from the criminal jurisdiction of the provincial courts remained. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872 and that of 1882, the Indian Legislature referred to (European British subject) to retain some of the privileges. Chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, is dealing with Criminal Proceedings against European British subjects. The same provisions were continued in the Code, 1898 and also in the Criminal Amendment Act, 1923. Therefore, for historical and other reasons, the British law maker has been throughout keen or reserving in respect of certain matters in favour of persons of European origin, special forums separate from those available to persons of Indian origin. At any rate, it is obvious that such an intention was paramount at the time of the Charter of the Supreme Court in the year 1800 and the intention manifested in the Charters of 26.6.1862 and 28 12.1865 is to maintain the same distinction. Therefore, as per the well accepted norm of interpretation, the jurisdiction of Cl. 17 of the Charter dated 28.12.1865 extended only to British subjects as was understood at the time of the Charter of the Supreme Court dated 26.12.1800, viz. to British subjects of European origin, and was not open to natives. In fact, Cl. 17 is a remnant of the dual system of judicial administration created in the interest of the colonial power. We are therefore con-strained to differ from the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in 1944.
16. Pursuing the matter still further, we have to observe that even that jurisdiction of the High Court under Cl. 17 limited as it was to Britishers is no longer available even for them. No doubt, as per Art. 372 of the Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was to continue to be in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or competent authority. But the Supreme Court has held in State of Madras v. C.G Menon that any provisions of law which were incompatible with the status of India as as independent State had to be considered as having become extinct. In that case Their Lordships dealing with the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, observed that the situation has completely changed when India became a Sovereign Democratic Republic, that the provisions of the Act could only be made applicable to India by incorporating them with appropriate changes into an Act of the Indian Parliament and by enacting an Indian Fugitive Offenders Act, that by the very nature of the Act it cannot be said to remain in force by reason of the provisions of Art. 372 of the Constitution and that India having ceased to be a British possession the whole basis of the applicability of the Fugitive Offenders Act has gone. Similarly, in this case, India having become independent, there cannot be a special forum for the Britishers in the matter of adoption. They have to subject themselves to the law of the land and therefore Cl. 17 of the Letters Patent dated 28-12-1865 has no application whatsoever and has become a dead letter.
17. Even assuming that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Cl. 17 still existed, it would be as per the appellants a jurisdiction of general nature applicable to all, then S. 15 of the C.P.C will come into play, and the appellants should approach the lowest grade Court competent, viz., the Family Court. The proper forum for the parties in the matter is the Family Court wherever and whenever it is established and till then the respective District Courts, with of course the right of appeal before this Court.
18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
RR/VCS.
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