Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Marius Louis Peria v. Santo Rane Charles

Madras High Court
Apr 30, 1987
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal (A.S. 51 of 1982)

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant in O.S. 677 of 1976 (Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry) filed this second appeal challenging the judgment of the Second Additional District Judge, Pondicherry, in A.S. 51 of 1982.

The respondent (as plaintiff) had filed O.S. 677 of 1976 seeking cancellation of settlement deed Ex. A-1 on account of non-performance of a condition contained in that settlement deed and for recovery of possession. Initially the suit was dismissed as barred by res judicata because of an earlier dismissal of O.S. 284 of 1972. On appeal (A.S. 4 of 1978) the First Additional District Judge remanded the matter to the lower Court for disposal on other issues. C.M.A. 495 of 1978 to the High Court was dismissed, confirming the remand order. The Principal District Munsif thereafter considered the matter on merits and decreed the suit. The appellant (defendant) challenged that decree in A.S. 51 of 1982, which appeal was dismissed. The present (second) appeal challenges the legality and correctness of that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the settlement deed Ex. A-1 is liable to be cancelled on account of non-performance of the condition incorporated in the settlement deed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (through Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan) contended that the provision in the settlement deed requiring the appellant to maintain the respondent is merely a "pious wish" of the settlor and does not create a right in the settlor to cancel the settlement deed for failure to perform.
  • The appellant relied upon precedent(s) holding that where no condition for suspension or revocation is stipulated in the gift deed, the gift cannot be revoked under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act (for example, Jayalakshmi v. Kaliaperumal and similar authorities).
  • Authorities were cited that, according to the appellant, support the view that a gift subject to maintenance obligation cannot be revoked under Section 126 where there is no agreement that the gift shall be suspended or revoked on a specified event or where the alleged contingency does not defeat the gift (e.g., Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa; Venkatasubbiah v. Subbamma).

Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The respondent's pleaded case is that Ex. A-1 contains an express recital providing that if the appellant fails to maintain the respondent, then the respondent has a right to cancel the document; and the respondent prayed for cancellation and recovery of possession on that basis.
  • Both Courts below found as a matter of fact that the appellant failed to maintain the respondent; that factual finding is not challenged in the present second appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jayalakshmi v. Kaliaperumal (1985) 1 M.L.J. 202 : 98 L.W. 167 Held that where no condition is stipulated in the gift deed for suspension or revocation, the gift cannot be cancelled under Section 126 (revocation by mere will of donor is void). The court distinguished this case because in Jayalakshmi there was no condition in the deed; by contrast Ex. A-1 contains a specific recital permitting cancellation on failure to maintain.
Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa (Orissa High Court) Held that a gift subject to an obligation to maintain the donor cannot be revoked under Section 126 where there is no agreement that the gift may be suspended or revoked and the contingency does not defeat the gift. The court distinguished this authority on the ground that in the present case Ex. A-1 contains an express contingency making cancellation permissible on failure to maintain.
Venkatasubbiah v. Subbamma A.I.R. 1956 A.P. 195 : 1956 An.W.R. 632 Held that failure of the donee to maintain the donor amounts to want of consideration and that a donor cannot revoke a completed settlement at will where no contingency is mentioned; donor must seek to set aside the deed in court. The court distinguished this case because in the present case Ex. A-1 does contain a contingency (express recital) which, on its happening, entitles the donor to seek revocation/cancellation.
Smt. Gaurja v. Tarachand Illustrates a situation where the court found the gift to be unconditional and there was no express provision for cancellation or suspension. Distinguished by the court: unlike that case, Ex. A-1 contains an express recital permitting cancellation on breach of the maintenance obligation.
Gangadhara Iyer v. K.S. Iyer A.I.R. 1952 Trav. Cochin 47 Held that once a gift becomes complete it cannot be revoked unless there is an express reservation in the deed permitting revocation. Distinguished: the cited decision concerned a deed without an express reservation; Ex. A-1 contains an express contingency/reservation enabling cancellation.
Ankamma v. Narasayya (1946) 2 M.L.J. 551 : 59 L.W. 663 : A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 127 Held that a donor with power of revocation who validly revokes becomes absolute owner of the property; supports revocation where power exists. Used by the court as an authority consistent with the proposition that where a revocable contingent arrangement exists, revocation can operate to restore ownership to the donor.
Sarba Mohan v. Manmohan A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 488 Held that acceptance of an onerous condition is necessary in addition to the gift; the condition must be accepted to be operative. The court relied on this principle to support the view that the specific condition in Ex. A-1 (maintenance obligation) and its acceptance make the condition operative and integral to the gift.
Jagatsingh v. Dungar Singh Found that a gift and a contemporaneous agreement (that the donee would maintain the donor) read together fall within Sections 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, permitting revocation on failure of the donee. Applied as supporting authority: similar transactional structure (gift + an agreed maintenance condition) leads to revocation rights on breach.
Subramania v. Kanniammal A.I.R. 1953 T.C. 115 Laid down conditions to attract Section 126: (1) agreement that gift shall be suspended or revoked on a specified event; (2) event not depending on donor's will; (3) agreement at time of acceptance of gift; (4) condition not illegal/immoral/repugnant. The court applied these four criteria and found that Ex. A-1 satisfies them, supporting cancellation on breach of the maintenance condition.
Mt. Purnia v. Manindranath A.I.R. 1968 Assam & Nagaland 50 Held that when a gift deed and an acceptance deed executed on same day superadd a condition, the condition is integral and cannot be separated from the gift. Relied upon to conclude that the maintenance condition in Ex. A-1 is an integral part of the transaction and therefore operative for purposes of revocation on breach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began its analysis by considering Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, which permits suspension or revocation of a gift by agreement between donor and donee on the happening of a specified event that does not depend on the will of the donor, and bars revocation by the mere will of the donor. The court noted that a gift may also be revoked in the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded.

The central legal question was whether the recital in Ex. A-1 constituted such an agreement/contingency (i.e., an agreement that the gift shall be suspended or revoked on the happening of a specified event) so as to attract Section 126, and whether that contingency had in fact happened.

The court observed the following factual and legal points (as reflected in the opinion):

  • Both Courts below had found as a question of fact that the appellant failed to maintain the respondent; that factual finding was not challenged in the second appeal and therefore stands.
  • Several authorities were considered and distinguished where the gift deed did not contain an express condition permitting revocation; those cases were inapplicable because they lacked an express contingency in the deed.
  • The court identified and relied on authorities that support revocation where there is an express contingency/agreement that the gift shall be suspended or revoked on a specified event (including Ankamma v. Narasayya; Sarba Mohan v. Manmohan; Jagatsingh v. Dungar Singh; Subramania v. Kanniammal; Mt. Purnia v. Manindranath).
  • In particular, the court applied the fourfold test from Subramania v. Kanniammal: (1) an agreement between donor and donee that the gift shall be suspended or revoked on the happening of a specified event; (2) the event must not depend on the donor's will; (3) the agreement must be made at the time of acceptance of the gift; and (4) the condition must not be illegal, immoral or repugnant to the estate created.
  • The court concluded that Ex. A-1 contains a specific recital that the appellant was bound to maintain the respondent and that, upon failure to comply with that condition, the settlement deed is liable to be cancelled. It treated that recital as a contingency provided in the agreement and as agreed to between the parties at the time of the acceptance of the gift deed; the condition could not be separated from the other terms of the gift.

On the basis of these determinations—applying Section 126 and the authorities cited—the court held that the cancellation claim was rightly allowed by the Courts below and that the second appeal had no merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is dismissed. The court upheld the conclusion of the Courts below that Ex. A-1 is liable to be cancelled for non-performance of the maintenance condition. The opinion concludes: "the conclusion of both the Courts below is correct and there are no merits in the second appeal and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree and judgment in favour of the respondent (cancellation of Ex. A-1 on account of non-performance of the specified condition and related reliefs) are affirmed; the appellant's challenge in the second appeal fails. The opinion explicitly states there will be no order as to costs.
  • Scope with respect to precedent: The court relied on, distinguished and applied existing authorities on gifts subject to conditions and on Section 126. The decision treats Ex. A-1's express recital as a valid contingency permitting cancellation. The opinion does not state that it is creating a new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities; its reasoning is framed as an application of established tests and precedents to the facts of this case.

This summary is restricted to the facts, arguments, authorities and conclusions that appear expressly in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. The defendant in the suit O.S. 677 of 1976 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Pondicherry has filed this appeal challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment of the Second Additional District Judge, Pondicherry in A.S. 51 of 1982.

2. The facts of the case are as follows: The respondent herein as plaintiff filed the suit O.S. 677 of 1976 on the file of the District Munsif, Pondicherry, for cancellation of the settlement deed Ex. A-1 in view of the non-performance of the condition imposed in the said settlement deed and for recovery of possession. Originally, the suit was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by Res Judicata in view of the dismissal of the earlier suit O.S. 284 of 1972. Thereupon an appeal was preferred in the District Court in A.S. 4 of 1978 and the First Additional District Judge, Pondicherry, remanded the matter to the lower Court for disposal on other issues. C.M.A. 495 of 1978 was preferred to the High Court and the same was dismissed confirming the order of the first Additional District Judge, Pondicherry. The Principal District Munsif considered the matter on merits and decreed the suit. As against the said decree and judgment, the appellant defendant filed A.S. 51 of 1982 and the said appeal was dismissed. This second appeal is filed challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment of the second Additional District Judge, in A.S. 51 of 1982.

3. The point for determination in the second appeal is whether the settlement deed Ex. A-1 is liable to be cancelled on account of the non-performance of the condition incorporated in the settlement deed.

4. The respondent herein executed the settlement deed Ex. A-1 dated 27.7.1971 with the following recitals.

The respondent herein filed the suit for cancellation of the settlement deed on the ground that the appellant failed to maintain him as per the conditions in the settlement deed and as such he is entitled to pray for cancellation of the settlement deed in view of the provisions contained in Ex. A-1. Both the Courts below on the question of fact found that the appellant failed to maintain the respondent and the said finding cannot be challenged in the second appeal.

5. The only contention of Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned advocate for the appellant, is that the term of the settlement deed imposing a condition that the appellant should maintain the respondent will amount to only a pious wish on the part of the settlor, the respondent herein, and that the failure to comply with the same will not entitle the respondent to have the settlement deed cancelled. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the suspension or revocation of a gift and the same is as follows:

The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part; at the mere will of the door, is void wholly or in part, as the case may be;

A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded;

Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.

Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for consideration without notice.

According to the above section, a gift can be revoked by agreement between the donor and the donee on the happening of any specified event; but the same cannot be revoked by the mere will of the donor. Bearing in mind the above section we have to consider whether the recital in Ex. A-1 will empower the respondent to have the settlement deed cancelled in view of the fact that the appellant failed to maintain the respondent. Learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, contends that what is contained in the settlement deed Ex. A-1 is only a pious wish of the donor and the same will not clothe the donor with any right to cancel the settlement deed fur the failure to maintain the respondent. He relied upon the case reported in Jayalakshmi v. Kaliaperumal (1985)1 M.L.J. 202 : 98 L.W. 167, wherein a single Judge of this Court held that a deed of gift cannot be cancelled in view of the provisions contained in Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. The exact recitals in the gift deed are not extracted in the said judgment. But it is specifically mentioned in the said case that in the gift deed no condition is stipulated. When no condition regarding cancellation is found in the gift deed, then the same cannot be cancelled since it will not amount to a cancellation on the happening of any specified event, but cancellation by the will of the donor. In the present case, in Ex. A-1, there is a specific recital that if the appellant fails to maintain the respondent, then the respondent has a right to cancel the document. Hence the facts of the present case are different from that of the case in Jayalakshmi v. Kalaiperumal (1985)1 M.L.J. 202; 98 L.W. 167, and the principle laid down therein cannot be applied to the facts of this case. The next case relied on by Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan is the one in Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa , where a single Judge of the Orissa High Court held that a gift subject to the condition that the donee should maintain the donor cannot be revoked under Section 126 for failure of the donee to maintain the donor, firstly, for the reason that there is no agreement between the parties that the gift could be either suspended or revoked, and secondly, this should not depend on the will of the donor; again, the failure of the donee to maintain the donor as undertaken by her in the document is not a contingency which should defect the gift. On a perusal of the facts of that case, it is seen that in the gift deed there was no contingency which should defeat the gift. But in this case, the gift deed contains an express contingency that in case of failure to maintain, the gift is liable to be cancelled. Hence, the facts in the case in Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa, are different and the principle laid down therein is not applicable to the facts of this case. The case reported in Venkatasubbiah v. Subbamma A.I.R. 1956 A.P. 195 : 1956 An.W.R. 632, is also relied on by the appellant. In that case, ft has been held that a gift subject to the condition that the donee should maintain the donor cannot be revoked under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, for failure of the donee to maintain the donor firstly for the reason that there is no agreement between the parties that the gift should be either suspended or revoked; and secondly this should not depend on the will of the donor. It has been held that the failure of the donee to maintain the donor as undertaken by him in the document is not a contingency which could defeat the gift. All that could be said is that the default of the donee in that behalf amounts to want of consideration. The Andhra High Court held that it is not open to a settlor to revoke a settlement at his will and pleasure and he has to get it set aside in a Court of law by putting forward such pleas relating to the invalidity of gift deed. From the facts of the case, it is seen that there is no contingency mentioned in the document which could defeat the gift itself. Under this circumstance, the Court held that the donor cannot cancel the document, in view of the absence of such a contingency, but it is open to the donor to file a suit to set aside the gift deed. But, in the present case, in view of the fact that there is a contingency mentioned in Ex. A-1, the donor is entitled to file a suit for setting aside the deed of gift on the happening of the contingency. In Smt. Gaurja v. Tarachand , the donor alleging that she had gifted the suit land on the condition that the donee would maintain her during her lifetime sought the cancellation of the gift on the ground that the donee had ceased to maintain her. The Court held that the donee had ceased to maintain her. The Court held that the gift was an unconditional gift. On a perusal of the facts of that case, it is seen that there was no express provision for cancellation or suspension of the gift. But in the present case, we have such a recital in Ex. A-1, and hence, the facts of that case will not apply to the present case. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported in Gangadhara Iyer v. K.S. Iyer A.I.R. 1952 Trav. Cochin 47, where it has been held that when once the gift becomes complete it cannot be revoked unless there is an express reservation in that behalf in the deed of gift itself. This case will again not apply to the present case since there is no provision for the revocation in the gift deed.

6. On the other hand, in the following cases it has been held that where there is a contingency agreed upon at the time of the acceptance of the gift, then for breach of the same, the donor is at liberty to cancel the gift deed. In the case reported in Ankamma v. Narasayya (1946)2 M.L.J. 551 : 59 L.W. 663 : A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 127, it has been held that in the case of a gift, where a donor has the power of revocation and validly revokes the gift, he becomes the absolute owner of the property intended to be gifted away. In the case reported in Sarba Mohan v. Manmohan A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 488, it has been held that the gift itself is not sufficient, but the acceptance of the onerous condition is also necessary. In the present case, there is a specific condition which forms part and parcel of Ex. A-1, which had not been complied with. In the case in Jagatsingh v. Dungar Singh , there was a gift and a subsequent agreement on the same day agreeing that the donee would maintain the donor. It was held that the deed of gift and the agreement formed part of the same transaction and that the transaction read as a whole fell within the purview of Sections 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. The donor was therefore entitled to revoke the deed of gift on the donee's failure to maintain him. In the case reported in Subramania v. Kanniammal A.I.R. 1953 T.C. 115, it has been held that in order to attract Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, the conditions to be satisfied are: (1) that the donor and the donee must have agreed that the gift shall be suspended or revoked on the happening of a specified event, (2) such event must be one which does not depend on the will of the donor, (3) that the donor and the donee must have agreed to the condition at the time of accepting the gift and (4) that the condition should not be illegal or immoral and should not be repugnant to the estate created under the gift. In the present case, the incorporation of such recital in Ex. A-1 amounts to an agreement between the donor and the donee that in case of failure of the donee to maintain the donor the gift deed is liable to revoked. In the case reported in Mt. Purnia v. Manindranath A.I.R. 1968 Assam and Nagaland 50, there was a gift deed and on the same day the donee executed a deed and accepted the gift deed lying down the condition that he will maintain the donor. It was held that both the deeds taken together superadded a condition to gift and the condition formed an integral part of transaction and could not be divorced from gift. Following the principle laid down in the said decisions, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the condition mentioned in Ex. A-1, that the appellant is bound to maintain the respondent and in the event of failure to comply with such condition by the appellant to maintain the respondent, the settlement deed is liable to be cancelled is a contingency provided in the agreement and agreed to between both the parties even at the time of the acceptance of the gift deed. The said condition cannot be divorced from the other terms of the gift. Accordingly the conclusion of both the Courts below is correct and there are no merits in the second appeal and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.