1. Petitioners are legal representatives of one S. Gunasekaran, who joined Government Service as a Junior Engineer and was working under the first respondent. He filed the writ petition to quash the order of the first respondent, dated 5 March 1981, directing the period of his suspension from 5 July 1974 to 3 January 1978, to be treated as leave to which petitioner would be eligible. He died during the pendency of the writ petition and his legal representatives have been brought on record.

2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, he had seated as follows: In 1974 he was in charge of supervising the work providing laterite soling of the 60 feet road east of the Pallavan Transport Depot at Vyasarpadi. On a suspicion that he had committed certain irregularities he was placed under suspension by order, dated 10 June 1974, with effect from 5 June 1974. An enquiry was conducted on a charge of illegal gratification alleged to have been received by him from a contractor by name L. Kishtappa Chetty, and ultimately, the Chief Engineer had stated that the conclusion arrived at by the Divisional Engineer was not a sound one based on his report. By Resolution No. 83, dated 11 April 197 8, the Board resolved that the charges be dropped and the period of suspension to be treated as one of duty. Without giving any opportunity to petitioner, it resiled from the said resolution and passed Resolution No. 320 to treat the period of suspension as on leave. The said penalty having been imposed under Fundamental Rule 54, he preferred an appeal to the second respondent, and on it being rejected, he preferred the writ petition claiming that, once a charge is dropped, it tantamounts to a total exoneration, and hence Fundamental Rule 54(2) cannot to invoked. Once first respondent took a quasi-judicial decision as per Resolution No. 83, thereafter it had no jurisdiction to review the said decision and pass Resolution No. 320. Chief Engineer on both the occasions having cleared him, it was at the behest of the Government alone, this adverse order had been passed and it had no jurisdiction to issue such directives to the first respondent, particularly, when the disciplinary proceedings are dropped.

3. On behalf of first respondent, in the elaborate counter-affidavit filed, it is stated as follows: Gunasekaran was the Assistant Engineer put in charge of the work for providing laterite soling to the balance width of 29 feet on 60 feet road east of Pallavan Transport Depot at Vyasarpadi. On 7 June 1974, a report was received from vigilance stating that he had been arrested on 5 June 1974, for his alleged recording of false cash receipt and preparing a bill for Rs 8,948 in favour of contractor L. Kishtappa Chetty and for acceptance of Rs. 3,000 from the contractor after the bill was encashed. Base J on this report, he was placed under suspension with effect from 5 June 1974. The vigilance report was sent by Government in August 1975, and he was prosecuted. As Kishtappa Chetty, who had turned as an approver died on 21 September 1975, the vigilance informed the Board that the said witness having died, this is a fit case for conducting departmental enquiry. Hence, a charge memo, dated 19 April 1976, was issued to him stating that he had recorded false measures and prepared a bill for Rs. 8,948 in July 1973, in favour of Kishtappa Chetty and accepted a bribe of Rs. 3,000 from him. He submitted his explanation and the enquiry officer submitted his report. The Divisional Engineer certified that the work carried out was of sub-standard quality. The Chief Eagineer, who was apprised with the enquiry report, came to the conclusion that the Divisional Engineer's opinion was not conclusive and that he had not established that the work was sub-standard. He also held that the bills paid at intervals did not lend credence to the allegations that payment was made without making supply. The records of enquiry along with Chief Engineer's (Technical) opinion were placed before the Board, and it called for more comprehensive note to be submitted and thereafter, a comprehensive note was put up by him stating that the measurement book does not give room for the impression that there was any fraudulent practice. As for approver's statement, he found that it had not been corroborated independently. Regarding evidence of Divisional Engineer, it was held to be not conclusive, and it is not established that the compaction consolidation was only 10 per cent, and the bills paid at intervals do not lend credence to the allegation that the payment was made without receiving full supply. Hence, Board pissed a resolution in Resolution No. 83 on 27 January 1978, resolving to drop the charge and to treat the period of suspension as one of duty. Pending issue of orders, Government was apprised of the position, and as desired by the Government, de novo the Board again looked into the matter and then it dropped the charges, but yet it came to the conclusion in Resolution No. 320 dated 22 April 1978, that the suspension period be treated as leave to which the petitioner is eligible as he had not been fully exonerated of the charges framed against him. As against the decision being communicated to the petitioner on 24 June 1978, he preferred an appeal to the Government on 25 July 1978. Government felt that a show-cause notice should have been issued to the petitioner as to why such a punishment should not be awarded. Thereafter, petitioner on being informed to submit his explanation, and as the suspension was not wholly unjustified, as he had faced a departmental enquiry, the impugned order was passed.

4. The first contention of Sri D. Murugesan, learned counsel for the petitioner is that, when a decision to drop the charge had been taken under both the resolutions, it had resulted in exoneration as contemplated under Fundamental Rule 54(2) and, therefore, as held in Natarajan (S) v. Superintendent of Police, Tirunelveli (1975—I L.L.N 162], petitioner would be entitled to relief under Fundamental Rule 54(2) and the impugned order is illegal. In Resolution No. 83, it was also decided that the period of suspension should be treated as one on duty because the charge had been dropped. This was not communicated to him. In Resolution No. 320, the decision earlier taken to drop the charge was never varied, but it was confined only to treating the period of suspenion as leave to which he is eligible. Before the two resolutions were passed, on each occasion, the Chief Engineer had submitted elaborate reports. Though learned counsel for the first respondent-Board, would claim that the Divisional Engineer had entertained misgiving about what Gunasekaran had done, it is unexplained as to how in spite of firm opinion expressed by Chief Engineer who is a superior officer to that of the Divisional Engineer, and who had been asked by the Board more than once to go through the entirety of the records and submit his opinion based on facts and figures, still the view expressed by a subordinate officer is relied upon by Board at this stage. In submitting a note to the Board before Resolution No. 83 was passed, the Chief Engineer has expressed his anguish that Gunasekaran had fallen into the hands of police, who made an attempt to spread out a wider net in a case taken by them, which was an offshoot of another enquiry held in the same area. As Chief Engineer, having the expertise to understand the contents of the records, he had stated that a scrutiny of the measurement book docs not give room for the impression that there was any fraudulent practice. After looking into the statement made by the contractor, he found that it was not corroborated by any other material on record. There was evidence of another person by name Mohamed Ibrahim and that was not found to be conclusive and that it has not been established that the compaction consolidation was only 15 per cent. He opined that the Divisional Engineer had made this co-efficient in an arbitrary manner. Even regarding payment for bills produced, he found that they did not lend any credence to the allegation that they were made without his making full supply. Once again, when the Board asked him to submit a more detailed report, he was more categoric than what he had stated earlier. Though Divisional Engineer gave opinion that the compaction factor was only 15 per cent, in Court while giving evidence, he had stated that the compaction of laterite could range between 35 per cent and 40 per cent. This would mean that there was no sub-standard execution of work, and this was the reason why an erroneous view expressed by the Divisional Engineer in the departmental enquiry was not acceptable to the Chief Engineer. As pointed out, when a superior officer had considered the prevaricating statements and the unreliable opinion of subordinate officer and apprised the Board on two occasions with facts and figures as to how far such a view was erroneous, it is quite strange that for the purpose of the writ petition, the first respondent-Board is relying upon the opinion of the subordinate officer and not that of the Chief Engineer, whose opinion found acceptance to the Board, while it pissed the two resolutions. Therefore, there is very little substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent-Board that late Gunasekaran was not fully exonerated. In the counter-affidavit, in six places, it is stated that as the petitioner had not been fully exonerated from the charge framed against him, the impugned order as passed is correct. Equally, it is admitted that the charges framed against him had been dropped. As held by the Division Bench, once the charge is dropped, it could only mean that delinquent had been fully exonerated; Dropping of charges and at the same time to claim that the delinquent had not been fully exonerated, cannot co exist. It is only because of this erroneous view that he had not been fully exonerated, the impugned order came to be passed. Once in law it is held that on charges being dropped, it leads only to exoneration, then Fundamental Rule 54(2) cannot apply. Hence, the first respondent was in error in holding that in spite of charge being dropped, still he had not been fully exonerated, and in turn the suspension was justified. Counter-affidavit is confined only to the aspect of exoneration and does not seek to claim that an opinion was arrived at by the Board that suspension was justified, and, therefore, he had passed an order holding that the period of suspension is treated as leave to which he was entitled.

5. But another contention taken, is that dropping of charge in Resolution No. 83 having been taken pertaining to disciplinary proceedings, at the best it is a quasi-judicial decision, the Board has no jurisdiction later on to review its own decision. On behalf of the respondent, it is contended that the said order was never communicated to him. But, while disposing of the appeal, the Government had become aware on it. It is not disputed that such a resolution had been passed. Along side, a decision had been taken that the period of suspension would be treated as on duty. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on State of Haryana v. Roshan Lal [1970 S.L.R 759], which took the view that an order of the quasi-judicial officer cannot be reviewed by him it had been communicated, not for compliance, even though not communicated to the concerned party. As petitioners succeed on the point already dealt with, it is needless to investigate as to what had actually transpired in this matter on this aspect.

6. Hence, the writ petition is allowed with costs, and the petitioners as legal heirs of late Gunasekaran are entitled to seek amounts which have become payable, after deducting subsistence allowance paid during the relevant period. Counsel fee Rs. 500 to be paid by Board.