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Brakes India Ltd., Madras v. Superintendent Of Central Excise, Madras And Others

Madras High Court
Apr 29, 1986
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Factual and Procedural Background

The writ appeal challenges orders of the lower authorities (Second respondent — Collector/Superintendent and Third respondent on appeal) and the judgment of the learned single Judge (Padmanabhan J.) in W.P. 3700 of 1977. The petitioners (appellants here) are manufacturers/marketers of motor-vehicle parts who purchase brake lining "blanks" from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. and other brake-lining manufacturers. The petitioners perform drilling, trimming and chamferring on these purchased blanks to suit specific vehicle requirements, repack the treated linings as "kit linings" bearing their trade name ("B.I Girling") and sell them.

The second respondent by order dated 14-2-1977 directed the petitioners to obtain a Central Excise licence (Rule 174, read with s.6 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944) and, under Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, demanded appropriate duty on past clearances of the duty-paid brake linings considering duty already paid by the original manufacturers; a penalty of Rs. 200 under Rule 173-Q was also imposed. On appeal, the third respondent (order dated 19-7-1977) required the petitioners to file price lists for assessment and confirmed that they should be treated as "manufacturers" for the purposes of licensing and differential duty collection.

The petitioners sought relief under Article 226 of the Constitution by challenging (a) the direction to take out a Central Excise licence and observe excise formalities in respect of the drilling/trimming/chamferring done at their factory, and (b) an interim stay against the respondents from raising any demand on clearance of the duty-paid brake linings after such processes.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the processes of drilling, trimming and chamferring performed by the petitioners on purchased duty-paid brake lining blanks constitute "manufacture" within the meaning of s.2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
  2. Whether the orders requiring the petitioners to obtain a Central Excise licence and to pay differential excise duty (taking into account duty already paid on blanks) and imposing penalty were competent and sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • What they purchase from other manufacturers are finished brake linings (or at least items that do not undergo any transformation amounting to manufacture) and the processes they perform (drilling, trimming, chamferring) are minor operations that do not produce a new substance with a distinct name, character or use.
  • The processes do not alter the essential identity of the brake linings; the articles continue to be brake linings after these operations and thus do not fall within the concept of "manufacture" as explained in authorities such as "Delhi Cloth Mills v. Union of India".
  • Brake lining blanks are available in the market and the operations performed by them do not involve highly technical skill or sophisticated operations; therefore the operations should not be characterized as incidental or ancillary to manufacture.
  • They contended that they merely tailor or adapt already duty-paid goods for customer convenience and so should not be required to take out a licence or be subjected to further excise levy beyond what has already been paid.

Respondents' (Revenue) Arguments

  • The items purchased by the petitioners are incomplete brake lining "blanks" (semi-finished products) which require drilling, trimming and chamferring to become brake linings that can be used by vehicle owners.
  • Drilling, trimming and chamferring are processes performed to complete the manufacture of brake linings for specific vehicles; such processes are incidental or ancillary to the completion of the manufactured product and therefore fall within s.2(f) of the Act.
  • The goods are marketed under the petitioners' part numbers and trade name ("B.I Girling"); the blanks bear part numbers supplied by the petitioners at the time of ordering, and in the market the final "kit linings" are identified with the petitioners — these facts indicate that the petitioners are the effective manufacturers of the finished product.
  • The revenue sought only differential duty, taking into account duty already collected when the blanks were cleared from the original manufacturers, and also maintained the licensing requirement and penalty under the Central Excise Rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Partington v. Attorney General, 1869 L.R. 4 HL 100 Principle that fiscal statutes must be construed by the letter; taxing statutes admit no equitable construction — adhere to statutory language. Quoted to emphasise that interpretation of excise law must depend on statutory language and be strict in favour of the taxpayer if ambiguity exists; supports textual approach in determining "manufacture".
Union of India v. Delhi Cotton and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 S.C. 791 Distinction between mere processing and "manufacture": manufacture implies bringing into existence a new substance known to the market; mere changes are not necessarily manufacture. S.2(f) clarified not to import processing=manufacture universally. Cited extensively to explain that not every change is manufacture, but the definition in S.2(f) was intended to include processes incidental to completion of a manufactured product; used to explain the legal tests and then applied to facts to find that the petitioners' processes were incidental/ancillary and thus amount to manufacture.
South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 S.C. 922 Reinforces that "manufacture" requires such transformation that a new and different article emerges, with a distinctive name, character or use; "goods" means articles that ordinarily come to market. Referred to for the principle that manufacture is transformation into a new article known in the market; supports the court's approach in examining whether the drilling/trimming resulted in a commercially distinct or completed product.
Union of India v. Hindu Undivided family business known as Ramlal Mansukhrai Ravari, (1970) 2 SCC 472 : AIR 1971 S.C. 2333 Consideration whether rolling billets into circles constituted manufacture — processes that result in a finished product that is the subject of excise leviability. Cited to show facts where a process (rolling) was held to be part of manufacture because it produced circles that were goods for excise purposes; used as an instance where intermediate processes are held to be part of manufacture.
Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia, (1973) 1 SCC 7 : AIR 1973 S.C. 425 Interpretation of "manufacturing purpose" (in Transfer of Property Act context): making or fabricating articles by labour or power that are vendible and useful; transformation into a different article/material with distinctive character/use is manufacture. Referred to for the ordinary meaning of manufacture and that the term implies transformation into something vendible with distinct character/use; used as supporting authority for the court's interpretive approach.
Extrusion Processes P. Ltd. v. N.R. Jadhav, Supdt., Central Excise, 1974 Tax L.R. 1655 : 1979 ELT (J) 380 Printing and lacquering of already-extruded tubes (where extrusion was done by others and excise already paid) do not involve any process incidental or ancillary to completion of the manufactured product for purposes of excise. Referred to as a contrasting authority showing that certain finishing operations (printing, lacquering) were held not to be incidental/ancillary manufacture; court used it to delineate limits of what operations may be excluded from "manufacture".
Metro Readywear Company v. Collector Of Customs, 1976 K.L.T 642 : 1978 ELT (J) 520 Ironing of stitched brassieres (with electric power) prior to packing was a process incidental or ancillary to completion and therefore attracted excise under the relevant tariff item. Referred to as an authority where a finishing process rendered the product marketable and was held to be incidental/ancillary to manufacture; used to support that finishing processes, if essential to marketability, can be part of manufacture.
The Deputy Commissioners, Sales Tax, Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers, AIR 1980 S.C. 1227 : 1980 ELT 343 (S.C.) In a sales-tax context (Sec.5-A Kerala General Sales Tax Act), pineapple processed to slices retained identity and thus was not "consumed in manufacture" for purchase-tax purposes; criteria for when an article is consumed in manufacture (commercial identity test). Cited and discussed to explain tests for consumption and transformation; the court also cautioned about importing sales-tax reasoning directly into excise law since taxable events differ (sale vs manufacture).
Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1985 (20) E.L.T 179 (S.C.) Emphasised difference between sales tax (taxable event = sale) and excise (taxable event = manufacture); reiterated that excise attaches when transformation into a new commercially known commodity occurs. Used to underline that excise liability depends on transformation into a new commodity and to caution against relying on sales-tax precedents for excise questions; supported the principle applied to the facts that transformation for excise may be a question of degree.
Delhi Cloth Mills v. Union of India (as cited by petitioners) Used by petitioners to submit that not every change is manufacture; cited for the proposition that manufacture involves a total transformation producing a new and different article. Mentioned by petitioners in submissions; the court noted and considered the contention but found on facts that the petitioners' processes were incidental/ancillary to manufacture and so distinguished the submission.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the decisive question as one of statutory interpretation of "manufacture" in s.2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and its application to the drilling, trimming and chamferring performed by the petitioners on purchased brake lining blanks.

The court reviewed legal principles from authorities: (a) fiscal statutes require strict textual interpretation but in case of doubt are construed in favour of the taxpayer; (b) "manufacture" in excise law ordinarily denotes a transformation producing a new or commercially recognisable article (distinctive name, character or use), but the definition in s.2(f) also expressly includes "any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product"; (c) whether a process is part of manufacture depends on facts and the commercial identity and market recognition of the product.

Applying these principles to the facts admitted and revealed by documentary material and oral explanation, the court observed:

  • The petitioners themselves admitted they purchase "brake lining blanks" (semi-finished articles) made to their specifications from Messrs. Rane and others, and that these blanks cannot be used in vehicles without drilling, trimming and chamferring.
  • The petitioners supply drawings/part numbers to Rane; the blanks cleared to the petitioners bear the petitioners' part numbers (the drilled part number), and the petitioners market the finished "kit linings" under their trade name and part numbers — in the market the kit linings are identified with the petitioners rather than Rane.
  • The drilling/trimming/chamferring are performed to render the blanks fit for direct use in vehicles (functional necessity); drilling is not uniform but depends upon vehicle type, and buyers cannot purchase undrilled blanks and use them directly.
  • Given that s.2(f) includes processes incidental or ancillary to completion of a manufactured product, and because the operations in question are essential to render the blanks usable and marketable as finished kit linings, these operations fall within the statutory concept of "manufacture".

The court distinguished authorities which hold that minor finishing operations (e.g., printing/lacquering in Extrusion Processes) do not amount to manufacture, by focusing on the factual differences: where an operation is essential to completion and to the product's identity and marketability, it will be incidental/ancillary to manufacture. The court also noted that while not every change is manufacture, the emphasis must be on whether the change produces a product with a distinctive character or use known to consumers and the trade.

The court accepted the reasoning of the learned single Judge that the petitioners' operations complete the manufacture of brake linings and that the petitioners must therefore be deemed manufacturers for the purposes of the Act and Rules. The court further noted that the revenue's demand was confined to differential duty (taking into account duty already paid by the original manufacturers), which framed the financial consequence of accepting that these were manufacturing operations.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ appeal is dismissed. The court upheld the finding that the processes of drilling, trimming and chamferring applied by the petitioners to the purchased brake lining blanks are incidental or ancillary to the completion of the brake lining as a manufactured product and therefore the petitioners are to be deemed manufacturers under s.2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The respondents were held entitled to call upon the petitioners to obtain the requisite Central Excise licence and to collect differential excise duty (after accounting for duty already paid by earlier manufacturers). The court made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners must comply with central excise licensing requirements and are liable to pay differential excise duty on the kit linings prepared by them — the revenue's demand (limited to differential duty) and licensing requirement were upheld.
  • Scope of precedent: The opinion applies established tests from prior authorities (transformation/commercial identity and whether processes are incidental or ancillary to completion) to the facts; the decision applies those principles factually to conclude the operations amount to manufacture. The opinion does not purport to establish a new general rule beyond applying these established principles to the specific factual matrix.
Show all summary ...

Nainar Sundaram, J.:— This writ, appeal is directed against the order of Padhmanabhah J. in W.P 3700 of 1977. The petitioners in that writ petition are the appellants; and the respondents therein are the respondents herein, It will be convenient for us if we choose to refer to the parties as per their array in the writ petition. The petitioners are the manufacturers of brake equipments, apart from other motor vehicle parts. We are more concerned with the brake linings over which a controversy has arisen as to whether it will attract the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (Act 1 of 1944), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The point involved is certainly argumentative but at the same time it requires a decision only with reference to the interpretation to be put on the expression manufacture as defined in S. 2(f) of the Act. Certain facts need delineation. The petitioners purchase brake lining blanks from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras and other brake lining manufacturers. An exception was taken, in the course of the arguments, on behalf of the petitioners, to the learned single Judge calling the items purchased by the petitioners as ‘brake lining blanks’ and it was contended before us that what the petitioners purchase is only brake lining as such, after the process of its manufacture is completed. In our view, this contention appears to be a puerile and a feighed one to get over the implications, factual and legal, of what the petitioners themselves expressed before the Authorities with regard to the nature of the articles purchased by them from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., and other brake lining manufacturers and subsequently marketed by them after putting the articles to specified processes. According to the petitioner, the brake linings which they purchase from the aforesaid concerns have to go through the processes of drilling, trimming and chamferring for the purpose of making them to suit the requirements of the users of the various vehicles and they are put in a carton and sold under the caption ‘B.I Girling Kit Linings’ and nothing more happens and hence such processes can never come within the ambit of ‘manufacture’ as defined by S. 2(f) of the Act. The view of the respondents on this question is different. According to them, the articles purchased from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras, and other brake lining manufacturers by the petitioners though after payment of excise duty at 20 per cent are subjected to the further processes of drilling, trimming and chamferring to suit the needs of the concerned customers depending upon the vehicles, for which brake linings are required and then only marketed by the petitioners and the said process will certainly fall within the ambit of S. 2(f) of the Act, and what is demanded is only the difference in duty between what is leviable on the products as they are marketed by the petitioners and the duty already collected at the time of clearance of the articles from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras and other brake lining manufacturers.

2. The second respondent by his order dated 14-2-1977 directed that the petitioners should immediately take out a licence under Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, read with S. 6 of the Act, and the second respondent further ordered under Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, that the petitioners should pay the appropriate duty on the past clearance of brake linings effected from their factory taking into account duty, if any, that was paid on the goods previously by M/s. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras. The second respondent also imposed a penalty of Rs. 200 under Rule 173-Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The petitioner, aggrieved by this order of the second respondent, preferred an appeal to the third respondent. The third respondent, by order dated 19-7-1977, did not opine differently, with regard to the petitioner's obligations to possess a licence for manufacture of brake linings. With regard to the demand, the third respondent passed orders in the following terms;-

“In so far as the demand issued by the lower authority is concerned, it is obvious that the assessments earlier made on the values declared by M/s. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., for the blanks will not be valid in the new circumstances. Since the appellant firm is considered as ‘manufacturers’ they should file a separate price list for approval, on the basis of which, the assessments should be completed. In so far as the past clearances are concerned, the assessment should be finalised on the basis of the price lists to be filed by the appellant firm. On approval of the price list by the proper officer, differential duty, if any, should be collected.”

3. As a result, he disposed of the appeal in the above terms. The petitioners chose to approach this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, with the prayers projected as follows:—

“(a) A writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, or order or direction in the nature of writ or otherwise and restrain the respondents from the execution of the orders referred to in Ex. P. 3 and P. 5, enclosed with the affidavit i.e, restrain the respondents from directing the petitioner to take out a Central Excise Licence and observe all Central Excise formalities when the duty paid Brake Linings drilled, trimmed, chamferred in the petitioner's factory at Padi, Madras-600050.

(b) To issue an order staying the operations of Ex. P. 3 and P. 5 i.e, restrain the respondents from raising any demand on their part clearance of duty paid Brake linings, and allow the clearance of duty paid Brake linings, after drilling, trimming, chamferring from the petitioner's factory, without subjecting them for further Central Excise levy, pending the disposal of the writ petition.”

4. The latter prayer was only interim. Padmanabhan J. who heard the matter rightly concentrated on the aspect as to whether the process of drilling, trimming, charferring admittedly done by the petitioners to the articles obtained by them would amount to ‘manufacture’ within the meaning of S. 2(f), so as to attract the mischief of the Act. At this juncture, it must be pointed out that Item 34-A of the Tariff Entry of the First Schedule to the Act levies 20 per cent ad valorem duty on parts and accessories of Motor vehicles and tractors, including trailers, and sets out the items, including brake linings. However, it is stated that by a subsequent Notification issued by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Motor Vehicle parts and accessories, falling under item 34-A of the First Schedule to the Act, other than those specified in the schedule annexed to the notification, were totally exempted from the duty of excise leviable thereon, and brake linings is one of the items so scheduled. Hence, brake linings would certainly be subject to the levy of excise duty. After adverting to the ponouncements throwing light on the question.. Padmanabhan, 3. found no reason to interfere with the decisions of respondents 2 and 3 and as a result he was obliged to dismiss the writ petition, but without costs.

5. In this writ appeal, the very same approach has been made by Mr. S. Govind Swaminathan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners-appellants herein, to persuade us to accept the contentions of the petitioners that the processes, referred to above, will not fall within the ambit of S. 2(f) of the Act and hence the proceedings of respondents 2 and 3 are incompetent. We are conscious of the fact that we are dealing with a fiscal legislation. In the words of Lord Cairns in Partington v. Attorney General, 1869-L.R. 4 HL 100—

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: If the persons sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible, in any statute, what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute.”

6. The interpretation of fiscal statute imports nothing of reason and justice, but depends entirely upon the language of the Legislature. It is true that in case of doubt, they are construed most strongly against the Revenue and in favour of the citizen., With regard to statutes imposing burdens, the following passage in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. is worth noting:

“Statutes which impose pecuniary burdens are subject to the rule of strict construction. It is a well-settled rule of law that all charges upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, because in some degree they operate as penalties; the subject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the obligation, and language must not be strained in order to tax a transaction which, had the legislature thought of it, would have been covered by appropriate words. ‘In a taxing Act’, one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.”

7. Excise duty is leviable on the manufacture of goods and not on the sale. Sec. 3 of the Act contemplates levy and collection of duties of excise on all excisable goods, which are produced or manufactured in India. Sec. 2(d) defines ‘excisable goods’ as follows:

“‘Excisable goods’ means goods specified in the First Schedule as being subject to a duty of excise and includes salt.”

8. Sec. 2(f) of the Act defines ‘manufacture’. The main part of the section is relevant and the clauses which follow merely dilineate that in relation to certain products what would include ‘manufacture’. So far as brake linings are concerned, we do not get any such amplification. The relevant part of S. 2(f) reads as follows:

‘manufacture’ includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product.”

9. The alertness and the anxiety of the revenue naturally have always been to find out whether any process, which would fall within the definition of ‘manufacture’, has escaped the levy of duty.

10. Before we advert to what has actually happened in the present case, it will be useful if we refer to the pronouncement of Courts, most of them being of the highest Court in the land, when they dealt with the implications of ‘manufacture’ occurring in the Act and elsewhere. In Union of India v. Delhi Cotton and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 S.C 791 : 1977 ELT (J 199), from raw oil, like groundnut oil and til oil, with all impurities, purchased; by the application of certain processes of refinement with the aid of the power in some of the processes, refined oil resulted and after further processes this refined oil became vegetable product known as ‘Vanaspathi’. This vegetable product by itself became liable for excise duty as vegetable product, under the concerned column. On behalf of the revenue it was contended that there was manufacture of refined oil as is known to the market and that substance squarely came within the other concerned column and therfore liable to duty under that clause and the fact the manufacturers did not put this refined oil on the market, but used it to produce a finished product, known as Vanaspathi, cannot affect the liability to duty, under the Act. The Supreme Court found on the factual materials disclosed that the substance produced by the manufacturers at any intermediate stage before Vanaspathi came into existence was not shown to be refined oil, as known to the market. On a consideration of the factual materials, the Supreme Court held that it had no doubt about the correctness of manufactuer's case that the raw oil purchased by them for the purpose of manufacture of Vanaspathi did not become at any stage ‘refined oil as is known to the consumers and commercial community.’ There was a discussion in the pronouncement of the implication to be annexed to the concept of ‘manufacture’ under the Act. The following passages throw light as to how the Supreme Court dealt with this aspect:—

“To say this is to equate ‘processing’ to ‘manufacture’ and for this we can find no warrant in law. The word manufacture, used as a verb is generally understood to mean as ‘bringing into existence a new substance’ and does not mean merely ‘to produce some change in a substance’, however minor in consequence the change may be. This distinction is well brought about in a passage thus quoted in Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, volume 26 from the American judgment. The passage runs thus—

‘Manufacture’ implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use.

It is helpful to consider also in this connection the ordinary meaning of the word ‘goods’. For, by the very words of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, excise duty is leviable on ‘goods’. The Act itself does not define ‘goods’ but defines ‘excisable goods’ as meaning ‘goods specified in the First Schedule as being subject to a duty of excise and includes salt.’ On the meaning of the word ‘goods’ an interesting passage is quoted in the words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 18, from a judgment of a New York Court thus:

‘The first exposition I have found of the word ‘good’ is in Bailey's Large Dictionary of 1732, which defines it simply ‘merchandise’, and by Johnson, who followed as the next lexicographer, it is defined to be movables in a house; personal or immovable estates; wares, freight; merchandise.’

Webster defines the word ‘goods’ thus—

‘Goods: Noun: Plural (1) (movables), household furniture, (2) personal or movable estate, as horses, cattle, utensils, etc., (3) wares, merchandise, commodities bought and sold; by merchants and traders.’

These definitions made it clear that to become ‘goods’ an article must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold.

This consideration of the meaning of the word ‘goods’ provides strong support for the view that ‘manufacture’ which is liable to excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, must be the ‘bringing into existence of a new substance known to the market’. But, says the learned counsel, look at the definition of ‘manufacture’ in the definition clause of the Act and you will find that ‘manufacture’ is defined thus: Manufacture includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. [S. 2(f)]. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel that by inserting this definition of the word ‘manufacture’ in S. 2(f) the legislation intended to equate ‘processing’ to ‘manufacture’ and intended to make mere ‘processing’ as distinct from ‘manufacture’ in the sense of bringing into existence of a new substance known to the market, liable to duty. The sole purpose of inserting this definition is to make it clear that at certain places in the Act the word ‘manufacture’ has been used to mean a process incidental to the manufacture of the article. Thus, in the very item under which excise duty is claimed in these cases, we find the words ‘in or in relation to the manufacture of which any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power’. The definition of ‘manufacture’ as in S. 2(f) puts it beyond any possibility of controversy that if power is used for any of the numerous processes that are required to turn the raw material into a finished article, known to the market the clause will be applicable; and an argument that power is not used in the whole process of manufacture using the word in its ordinary sense, will not be available. It is only with this limited purpose that the legislature in our opinion, inserted this definition of the word ‘manufacture’ in the definition section and not with a view to make the mere ‘processing’ of goods as liable to excise duty.”

11. In South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 S.C 922 : 1978 ELT (J 336), (S.C), there was a manufacture of sugar by carbonisation and further manufacture of soda ash by solvay ammonia soda process. For producing these products certain dioxide was required. The manufacturer set up a lime kiln, which also generated kiln gas. The question arose as to whether the kiln gas produced by lime kiln could be subject to excise duty under item 14. H. The answer given by the Supreme Court was in the negative. The following passage in the pronouncement requires advertence to:

The Act charges duty on manufacture of goods. The word ‘manufacture’ there must be such a transformation that a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. The duty is levied on goods. As the Act does not define goods, the Legislature must be taken to have used that word in its ordinary dictionary meaning. The dictionary meaning is that to become goods, it must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and is known to the market.”

12. In Union of India v. Hindu Undivided family business known as Ramlal Mansukhrai Ravari, (1970) 2 SCC 472 : AIR 1971 S.C 2333 : 1978 ELT (J 389) (S.C), the court was concerned with rolling of billets of copper alloys into circles in some form or the other and in different sizes, to find out whether item 26-A (2) would be attracted for levy of duty thereunder. It was found that the uncut articles cannot be directly used for preparing the utensils and they had to be converted into circles implying that the uncut circles have to undergo the further change before they can be described as circles. The earlier pronouncements in Union of India v. Delhi Cotton and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 S.C 791 and South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 S.C 922 were referred to and it was found that on facts the said, principles cannot be imported and applied. The Supreme Court, after adverting to the definition of ‘manufacture’ under S. 2(f) of the Act, held that the rolling of a billet into a circle is certainly a process in the course of completion of the manufactured product, namely, circles and hence the end result of this process of manufacture is the production of circles in some form which is envisaged as the goods to be subjected to excise duty and therefore excise duty was correctly levied by the revenue.

13. In Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia, (1973) 1 SCC 7 : AIR 1973 S.C 425, the court was more concerned as to what could be the manufacturing purpose within the meaning of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. However, pronouncements under the Act and in particular Union of India v. Delhi Cotton and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 S.C 791 : 1977 ELT (J 199) (S.C), and South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 S.C 922 : 1978 ELT (J 336) (S.C) were adverted to and it was observed as follows:

“In all these cases the statute or the notification concerned did not furnish any artificial meaning to the expression ‘manufacture’ and the court applied, therefore, the ordinary meaning as commonly understood to that expression. The expression ‘manufacturing purposes’ in S. 106, thus, means purposes for making or fabricating articles or materials by physical labour, or skill, or by mechanical power, vendible, and useful as such. Such making or fabricating does not mean merely a change in an already existing article or material, but transforming it into a different article or material having a distinctive name, character or use or fabricating a previously known article by a novel process.”

14. In Extrusion Processes P. Ltd. v. N.R Jadhav, Supdt., Central Excise, 1974 Tax L.R 1655 : 1979 ELT (J 380), a Bench of the Gujarath High Court consisting of J.B Mehta and S.R Sheth JJ. dealt with a case where there was a purchase of plain extruded tubes manufactured by others, already subject to excise duty. The only process undertaken by the petitioners was that of printing and lacquering. On facts, the Bench held that Item 27(e) of the First Schedule to the Act would apply because the process of extrusion was already over. The pronouncements of the Supreme Court, were adverted to and it was opined that the printing and lacquering of the extruded tubes do not involve any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of the manufactured product.

15. In Metro Readywear Company v. Collector Of Customs, 1976 K.L.T 642 1978 ELT (J 520), a Bench of the Kerala High Court dealt with a case, where there was a manufacture of brassieres and upto the stage of ironing the aid of electric power was not availed of. However, after the process of stitching was over, the stitched brassieres were ironed using electric irons, before they were packed in boxes. It was held as follows:

“Since the definition contained in S. 2(f) of the Act includes all processes that are incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product the only question to be considered by us in the present case is whether the process of ironing applied to the stitched brassieres can be regarded as incidental or ancillary to their completion. In our opinion, the process of ironing that was applied to the stitched brassieres prior to their packing was a process incidental to the completion of the brassieres as a manufactured product since the said process was obviously intended to give a finishing touch in order to render them marketable as ready-to-wear undergarments. In asmuch as the said process was admittedly being carried out with the aid of power, liability for payment of duty under Item 22-D gets attracted. The contention to the contrary put forward by the petitioner cannot therefore be accepted.”

16. In The Deputy Commissioners, Sales Tax, Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers, 1980 Supp SCC 174 : AIR 1980 S.C 1227 : 1980 ELT 343 (S.C), the question arose as to whether the pine-apple fruit consumed in the ‘manufacture’ of pine-apple slices will fall within S. 5-A(1)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. That section reads as follows:

“5. A. Levy of purchase tax.. (1) Every dealer, who, in the course of his business, purchases from a registered dealer or from any other person any goods the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act, in circumstances in which no tax is payable under Sec. 5, and either — (a) consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise, or shall, whatever be the quantum of the turnover relating to such purchase for a year, pay tax on the taxable turnover relating to such purchase for the year at the rates mentioned in Sec. 5”.

17. What actually happened in that case was the pine-apple purchased by the assessee was washed and then the inedible portion, the end, x crown, skin and inner core were removed; thereafter, the fruit was sliced and the slices were filled in cans, sugar was, added as a preservative, the cans were sealed under temperature and then put in boiling water for sterilisation. The Supreme Court answers the question in the negative by stating that when the pine-apple fruit is processed into pine-apple slices for the purpose of being sold in sealed cans, there is no consumption of the original pineapple fruit for the purpose of ‘manufacture’. The relevant discussion, which preceded the answer is found in the following terms:

“There are several criteria for determining whether a commodity is consumed in the manufacture of another. The generally prevalent test is whether the article produced, is regarded in the trade, by those who deal in it, as distinct in identity from the commodity involved in its manufacture. Commonly manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one case to another, and indeed there may be several stages of processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change. But it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Where there is no essential difference in identity between the original commodity and the processed article it is not possible to say that one commodity has been consumed in the manufacture of another. Although it has undergone a degree of processing, it must be regarded as still retaining its original identity.”

18. There was also a reference to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. In our view, it will not be strictly in order to draw inspiration or guidance from pronouncements, which have dealt with the statutes, the ambit and scope of which, are different. The rule seems to be that one fiscal Act should not ordinarily be construed by another fiscal Act. This has also been stressed by the Supreme Court in a subsequent pronouncement. In Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1985 (20) E.L.T 179 (S.C), the decision in The Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers, 1980 Supp SCC 174 : AIR 1980 S.C 1227 : 1980 ELT 343 (S.C) was referred to and it was observed as follows:

“It may be noted that the taxable event in the context of Sales Tax Law, is ‘sale’. The taxable event under the Excise Law is ‘manufacture’. The moment there is transformation into a new commodity commercially known as a distinct and separate commodity having its own character, use and name, whether be it the result of one process or several processes ‘manufacture’ takes place and liability to pay duty is attracted. Though in the facts of that case perhaps it was not necessary and as such the attention of the Court was not drawn to the definition of the term ‘manufacture’ under Sec. 2(f) of the Central Excise Act nor was the Tariff Item 1 B placed before the Court.”

19. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the question as to whether a process is a process of ‘manufacture’ or not has to be determined naturally having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and having regard to the well known tests laid down by it. The following observations also indicates the principle to be kept in mind while deciding this question:

“It is well-settled that one cannot absolutely make a thing by hand in the sense that nobody can create matter by hand, it is the transformation of a matter into something else and that something else is a question of degree. Whether that something else is a different commercial commodity having its distinct character, use and name and commercially known as such from that point of view is a question depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case”.

20. We think we have made sufficient advertence to the relevant case law on the subject and it is better now that we dwell on the facts of the present case. The show cause was issued on 30-10-1976 and the allegations therein rule as follows:

“Investigations conducted reveal that the duty paid blank linings so received by M/s. Brakes India Ltd., Padi are in the form of blocks to their drawing, that these further drilled with holes and both ends of the block with holes and both ends of the block are chamferred to prevent the edge of the linings contributing to the grab of the brake drum and the ultimate finished products are given the trade name ‘kit linings’ and sold by them. Messrs. Brakes India Ltd., Padi, have admitted these facts in their letter AD. EFG. 76 dated 23-7-1976 addressed to the Superintendent, Central Excise, Group IX, Madras-6.”

21. The petitioners replied to the show cause on 22-11-1976, and this is what they stated:

“We are only drilling holes on the brake linings in additional to making it properly usable by trimming in or by tailolring adjustments and as such this cannot come with the concept of ‘manufacture’ as clarified by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth Mills v. Union of India. A ‘manufacture’ involves a change but all changes are not ‘manufacture’. A total transformation resulting in a new product is the essential feature for any product to fall within the ambit of the definition of ‘manufacture’. Our operations do not alter the brake linings and it continues to be brake linings after the drilling and tailoring operations.”

22. There was a hearing before the second respondent and the petitioners were represented by their advocate Thiru G. Venkateswaran and the submissions made by the learned counsel and the explanations offered by Thiru Vedanta-chari, the Chief Cost Accountant of the petitioners, have been summarised in the order of the second respondent in the following terms:

“It was stated brake linings even without drilling/trimming/tailoring operations are carried out to suit the convenience of customers, drilling is not identical for all types of vehicles but has to be done separately depending upon the vehicle for which the brake linings is to be used and that buyers cannot purchase the brake linings without drilling from the market. It was contended that in the above circumstances, drilling, tailoring cannot be considered as incidental or ancillary to the completion of manufacture of brake linings that Messrs. Brakes India Ltd. cannot be considered of being manufactured brake linings out of semi finished products purchased from M/s. Rane Brake Tinings Ltd;, and, therefore, M/s. Brakes India Ltd. are not required to comply with licensing formalities. As regards kit linings it was submitted that M/s. Brakes India Ltd., buy undrilled and duty paid brake linings from M/s. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., that depending upon the requirements of the vehicle holes are drilled in these duty paid goods, the brake linings so drilled with holes are packod in cartons of four sets or two sets each depending upon the type of vehicles in which they are going to be used, that such packings are called kit linings, and these cartons indicate that part number as per the service part catalogue of M/s. Brakes India Ltd., Shri Vedanthachari, Chief Cost Accountant of M/s. Brakes India Ltd., who was also present during the personal hearing explained that M/s. Brakes India Ltd., give to M/s. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., drawings for various types of brake linings, the latter at the time of clearance of the blank brake linings to the former will indicate on the said blanks the drilled part number as given by the former, that the kit linings packed by M/s. Brakes India Ltd. are given the trade name ‘girling’ and that the majority of the buyers are brake assembly buyers.”

23. In the appeal, before the third respondent, the petitioners would aver as follows:

“We also obtain Brake Linings blanks according to our specification from M/s. Rane Brake-Linings and other Brake Lining manufacturers, after payment of Central Exciswe Duty, with a view to be of service for our buyers. We drill and trim such duty paid Brake linings blanks to suit the requirements of the users of the various vehicles.

The drilling and trimming operations carried out by us on the duty paid Brake lining blanks do not constitute manufacture in view of the fact that no new substance with a distinct name, character or use is produced so as to fall within the ambit of the definition of the term ‘manufacture’. As clarified in Delhi Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1963 S.C 791, ‘manufacture’ implies a change, but every change is not a ‘manufacture’ but something more is necessary and there must be a total transformation, from new material, resulting in a new and different articles or use.

The Brake lining blanks without drilling are also available in the market and the learned Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Madras II Divn. has not appreciated our submissions in this aspect. In such circumstances, the drilling and trimming operations done by us in neither incidental or ancillary to the completion of the manufacture. The blanks can be drilled by any body in an ordinary manner and does not require highly technical skill or sophisticated operation in making such drills on these blanks so as to qualify the process as either a process of ‘manufacture’ or as a process ‘incidental or ancillary’ to the completion of manufacture.”

24. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the relevant averments are as follows:

“M/s. Rane Brake Linings, manufacture brake linings against the order from the petitioner's company, Brake linings meant for the petitioner's company bear the brand name of Rane, the real manufacturer and also the part numbers, furnished by the petitioner's company which are directly connectable to the catalogue of the petitioner's company. These duty paid brake linings are received by the petitioner's factory at Padi, where these Brake Linings are ‘drilled, chamferred/trimmed’ before supplying to their customers, along with other accessories, or parts of motor vehicles, in one container — a carton known as ‘kit linings’ and this container bear the brand name of the petitioner's company ‘B.I Girling’ and carry the part number which figures in the petitioner's catalogue. Drilling/tri-mmering/chemferring are made by the petitioners for the convenience of customers.”

25. The factual materials disclosed as above leave no room for any doubt in our mind that what the petitioners purchase from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras, and other manufacturers of brake linings are incomplete brake linings, which the petitioners themselves called as semi finished products and brake linings blanks. The petitioner drill holes on the brake linings blanks in addition to making it properly usable by trimming it or by tailoring adjustments. The drilling, trimming and tailoring are carried out on the brake linings blanks to suit the requirements and conveniences of the customers. Drilling is no identical for all types of vehicles for which the brake lining is to be used, direct consumers of this type cannot purchase the brake linings-without drilling from the market. The petitioners buy undrilied and duty paid brake linings from M/s. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras, and depending upon the requirements of the vehicles, holes are drilled in these duty paid goods and the brake linings so drilled with holes are repacked in cartons of four sets and two sets each, depending upon the type of vehicle in which they are going to be used and such linings are called kit linings. The petitioners give to Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., drawings for various types of brake linings; and the latter at the time of clearance of the blank brake linings to the former will indicate on the said blanks the drilled part number as given by the former. The kit linings packed by the petitioners are given the trade name ‘girling’. These factual features amply demonstrate that before the petitioners pack the products in the kit linings and mark them under their trade name ‘girling’, what they indulge in is nothing short of a process of ‘manufacture’, as defined in the Act. As per the admission of the petitioners, the direct consumers of this type cannot purchase the brake linings without drilling from the market. By saying ad nauseam that such processes of drilling, trimming and chamferring cannot be considered as incidental or ancillary to the completion of manufacture of brake linings, the petitioners cannot escape the implications of the Statute. The product which they purchase is from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras and other brake lining manufacturers, are obviously unfinished products and they cannot be put to the utility for which they are meant, unless the processes which the petitioners adopt, are resorted to and completed. Certainly the mischief of ‘manufacture’ as defined in S. 2(f) of the Act is attracted. The reasons expressed by the second respondent, for rejecting the case of the petitioners, are expressed as follows:

“But the issue at hand is to whom does the product belong and with whom the product is identified in the market. This is necessitated for the reason that the product at the time of clearance from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings carry certain distinct part numbers which are not the part numbers of Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. These part numbers are not used by Messrs. Rane Brake Lining. So it has to be concluded that the product at the time of leaving the premises of M/s. Rane Brake Linings are the belongings of M/s. Brakes India Ltd. This number is exclusively the part number given by M/s. Brakes India Ltd. for indicating on the blanks by Messrs. Rane Brake Linings. This part number as per the submissions of M/s. Brakes India Ltd., is the drilled part of number of M/s Brakes India Ltd. only. This part number is actually the part number referring the blanks after the drilling and the other operations carried out by Messrs. Brakes India Ltd. Even before these operations are carried out, as per the directions of M/s. Brakes India this part number is indicated. on the blanks by Messrs. Rane Brake Linings. This part number is associated with the Brake Assembly service Catalogue of Messrs. Brakes India Ltd., and the kit linings are referred to by this part number only. In the market these kit linings are sold with the part number only by Messrs. Brake India Ltd. and not by M/s. Rane Brake Linings. Hence it is evident that Messrs. Brakes India are the real manufacturers of these kit linings.”

26. Similar reasons weighed with the third respondent, when he rejected the appeal of the petitioners, and they run as follows:

“It is also seen that at the time when M/s. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. sell the blanks to the appellant firm, the blanks do bear the brand name of M/s. Rane Brake. Linings Ltd. such as ‘DON-242’ and ‘DON-HF-7’ in addition, they also bear another number, which, according to manufacturers as well as the appellants, relates to the drawing number of the appellant firm furnished by them at the time of placing orders with Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. In other words, identical products are available in the market, bearing no branch name of both Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. and the appellant firm, for identical vehicles, but with different part numbers in view of the different firms marketing the same.”

27. The reasonings do not appear to us to be untenable viewed in the factual background.

28. The question as to when the manufacture of an excisable goods can be stated to be complete is certainly a mixed question of law and fact. With a purpose, obvious and portent, and to dispel any ambiguity which may be attempted to be raised as to the precise stage when the manufacture of an excisable goods could be stated to have been completed, the definition in clause in Sec. 2(f) stands enacted, first generally setting out that it will include any process, incidental or ancillary, to the completion of a manufactured product, and further expariating the relevant processes with regard to specified goods. The stage of completion of a manufacture of an excisable goods cannot be stated to have been reached until the processes incidental or ancillary have also, been completed. Ultimately, it will to a very great extent depend upon as to what is known to the consumer and the commercial community, as the product which they want to utilise and consume for the specified purpose. Commonly, manufacture is the end result of one or more processes, through which the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one product to another; and there could be several stages of processing and different kinds of processing, depending upon the utility for which the end product is meant. Any process, if it is incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product, it will certainly fall within the compass of ‘manufacture’ within the meaning of S. 2(f) of the Act. Manufacture implies a change, though every change is hot manufacture. If by a process, a change is effected in a product, which was not there previously, and which change facilitates the utility of the product for which it is meant, then the process is not a simple process, but a process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. It will not always be safe solely to go by a test as to whether the commodity after the change takes in a new name, though in stated circumstances, it may be useful to resort to it. This may prove deceptive sometimes, for it will suit the manufacturer to retain and stamp the same name to the end product also. The ‘character or use’ test has been given due importance by pronouncements of Supreme Court. When adopting a particular process, if a transformation takes place, which makes the product have a character and use of its own, which it did not bear earlier, then the process would amount to manufacture within the meaning of S. 2(f) irrespective of the fact whether there has been a single process or have been several processes. As clarified by the Supreme Court in Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1985 (20) E.L.T 179, it is the transformation of a matter into something else and that something else is a question of degree. The amplitude and magnitude of the operation is not of much significance. It is the effect of the operation on the commodity that is material for the purpose of determining whether the operation constitutes such a process which will be part of manufacture. A process or processes making the commodity to have a distinctive character or use would amount to manufacture. The principles and the facts of the case, being what they are, we fully endorse the view of the learned single Judge which he expressed in the following terms:

“It is admitted that what is purchased by the petitioners from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings, Madras, and other manufacturers of brake linings is brake linings blanks. It is also admitted that such brake lining blanks cannot be used by owners of motor vehicles without drilling holes and trimming and chamferring them. It is therefore clear that what is manufactured and supplied by M/s. Rane Brake Linings, Madras and othr manufacturers of brake linings to the specific order of the petitioners are incomplete brake linings or what are called brake lining blanks. The process of the completion, of manufacture of brake linings which could be readily used by owners of vehicles takes place only at the hands of the petitioners by the process of drilling and trimming or chamferring the same.”

As already found, the petitioners purchase brake linings blanks manufactured to their specification from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. and other manufacturers. Such brake linings blanks cannot be used by the customers in their vehicles without drilling and trimming or chamferring them. The process of drilling and trimming or chamferring is a process which has to be essentially applied in order to render the brake lining blanks fit to be straightaway used in vehicles. Consequently, the process of drilling, and trimming or chamferring of brake lining blanks is a process essential, incidental or ancillary to the completion of the brake linings as a manufactured product as without drilling and trimming or chamferring the product could not be used in vehicles. I, therefore, hold that the process of drilling, trimming or chamferring which is applied to the brakes lining blanks purchased by the petitioners to their specification from Messrs. Rane Brake Linings Ltd. and other manufacturers of brake linings is incidental or ancillary to manufacture and that therefore the petitioners must be deemed to be manufacturing brake linings. In this view, the respondents are right in calling upon the petitioners to take out a licence as required by the provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act and the Rules thereof and to pay excise duty thereon, under the provisions of the Act.”

29. It has been already noted that the definite stand of the revenue is that the petitioner is being called upon to pay only the differential duty, after taking into account the duty already levied on the brake linings blanks as and when they are removed from the factories of the respective-manufacturers. Under these circumstances, we dismiss the writ appeal, but we make no order as to costs.