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S.P.S Jayaram & Co. v. Assistant Collector Of Central Excise (Preventive), Madurai

Madras High Court
Jun 25, 1986
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a partnership firm trading as S.P.S Jayaram & Company, manufacturing products marketed as "Gopal Tooth Powder" (including variants described as packets, tin-round and "Jet Tooth Powder"). The firm filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus (or a direction in that nature) restraining the respondent from applying provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (referred to as Act 1 of 1944) and another Act described as Act 5 of 1986.

The petition followed an earlier writ (W.P. No. 4694 of 1978) in which the petitioner had sought to restrain enforcement of a communication dated 25.11.1978. That earlier writ led to an order dated 14.10.1981 which gave the respondent time to consider applicability of Act 1 of 1944; subsequently, an Additional Collector issued an office communication (Order No. 32/81 dated 10.12.1981) stating that after considering the evidence there was "no case to be made out" and directing release of seized goods. The earlier writ was ultimately allowed on 14.12.1981.

In the present proceedings the respondent contended that the petitioner's premises amounted to a "factory" (section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948) and that excise was payable because clearances in 1976–77 had exceeded Rs. 30 lakhs. The petitioner contested maintainability and the merits, advancing arguments including (a) constructive res judicata / prior communication binds respondent, (b) the premises is not a "factory", (c) the product is not a "dentifrice" within Tariff Item 33.06, (d) requirement of conformity with Indian Standard Specifications and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, and (e) equitable estoppel against the respondent.

The respondent produced a laboratory certificate dated 3.2.1986 stating that "Gopal Tooth Powder" is of standard quality under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and rules. The petitioner had itself made a declaration of conformity to Indian Standard Specifications (dated 11.11.1983).

After hearing the parties and reviewing affidavits and records, the Court dismissed the writ petition and assessed costs (later fixed at Rs. 500 by the same Bench).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent may reassess or otherwise proceed to apply provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 to the petitioner's products in view of an earlier communication/order (constructive res judicata/previous decision).
  2. Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the respondent from taking action against the petitioner.
  3. Whether the petitioner's premises qualify as a "factory" under section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 (a point bearing on excise liability historically relied upon by the parties).
  4. Whether the petitioner's products qualify as taxable preparations for oral or dental hygiene (i.e., fall under Tariff Item 33.06 as "dentifrices", including tooth-powder) and thereby attract excise duty.
  5. Whether the conversion of ash (vibuthi) into tooth-powder by the processes described amounts to "manufacture" within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (so as to attract excise duty).
  6. Whether conformity with Indian Standard Specifications and certification under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act precludes invocation of excise provisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The respondent is bound by the earlier communication/order of the Additional Collector dated 10.12.1981 (constructive res judicata / estoppel by prior administrative decision) and therefore cannot reopen the question whether the products are subject to excise duty.
  • The petitioner's premises do not fall within the definition of "factory" under section 2(m) of the Factories Act and accordingly its products should not be subject to excise qua factory concept (one strand of maintainability/merits).
  • The products are not "dentifrices" within the meaning of Tariff Item 33.06, and the petitioner relied on textbook material and expert affidavit (Dr. Jacob Graves Daniel) asserting that ash cannot be an ingredient of a dentifrice.
  • The respondent is estopped from taking action (equitable estoppel) because of prior communications and conduct.
  • The petitioner raised compliance and standard considerations (invoking Indian Standard Specifications and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act) to contend that excise provisions should not be invoked if such statutory standards are not satisfied.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The earlier communication of 10.12.1981 was not an order passed by an adjudicating authority and does not bind the respondent; alternatively, a change in law or circumstances allows the respondent to revisit the question (reliance on principles permitting departure from an earlier administrative stand where cogent reasons exist).
  • The petitioner's premises constitute a "factory" and clearances in 1976–77 exceeded the monetary threshold (Rs. 30 lakhs), justifying excise assessment; the petitioner may be given opportunity to prove number of persons employed by attendance registers.
  • The respondent produced a Government-approved laboratory certificate (Report No. SBG/635 dated 3.2.1986) certifying that "Gopal Tooth Powder" is of standard quality under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and rules, undermining the petitioner's contention that the product cannot be treated as a regulated dentifrice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India ((1970) 3 SCC 76 : AIR 1970 SC 1498) Authority may depart from an earlier administrative stand only for cogent reasons (fresh facts, change in process, tariff modification, later judicial pronouncement). Cited to reject petitioner's plea of constructive res judicata where a change in law/principle was shown; court accepted that change in law removes bar of earlier communication.
J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Union of India (1981 ELT 328) Reiterates the principle that an authority can depart from an earlier stand only for cogent reasons. Used to support the legal proposition that reconsideration is permissible when justifying circumstances exist.
Ramnugar Cane and Sugar Company Ltd. v. Union of India (1983 ELT 6) Explains that the definition of "manufacture" is inclusive and the clauses appended are illustrative, not exhaustive. Relied upon for the proposition that the statutory definition of "manufacture" must be interpreted broadly and illustratively.
Deputy Commissioner Sales Tax, Ernakulam v. M/s. PIO Food Packers (1980 Supp SCC 174 : AIR 1980 SC 1227) Authorities note that "manufacture implies a change; but every change is not manufacture" and that a transformation producing a new article with distinctive name/character/use is material. Quoted by the court (passage reproduced) to support that transformation into a new commercial product can amount to manufacture.
Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1985 (20) ELT 179 (SC) : (1985) 3 SCC 314) Affirms principles about "manufacture" and preferred certain earlier decisions; invokes the passage that a new and different article must emerge for manufacture. Relied upon in support of the Court's conclusion that the petitioner's process produced a new commercially distinct product (tooth-powder) and hence attracted excise.
Union of India v. R. Mansukhrai (1970) 2 SCC 472 Illustrates that processes incidental to completion of a manufactured product are within the definition of "manufacture" (e.g., conversion processes described by legislature). Quoted to show that processes leading to completion of a product fall within section 2(f) and to analogize the petitioner's process to such recognised manufacturing acts.
Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. (AIR 1963 SC 791) Earlier authority concerning the scope of "manufacture" (cited among other cases addressing similar issues). Included among the judicial authorities noticed by the Bench in assessing the manufacture question; used as contextual support for the manufacturing analysis.
W.A. No. 411 of 1980 — The Brakes India Ltd. Padi v. Superintendent of Central Excise (1980 ELT 775 (Mad.)) Holds that processes like drilling, trimming and tailoring that complete an unfinished product can attract the mischief of "manufacture" under section 2(f). The court relied on a Division Bench decision in W.A. No. 411 and treated the present facts as standing on even stronger footing than that case (therefore supporting finding of "manufacture").
South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1968 SC 922) Decision addressing issues relevant to the concept of "manufacture" (listed among authorities). Noted among authorities considered by the Bench in connection with the manufacture analysis.
Union of India v. (Hindu Undivided Family Business known as) Kamla Mansukhrai Redari ((1970) 2 SCC 472 : AIR 1971 SC 2333) Addresses the meaning of "manufacture" and processes incidental to completion of products. Listed among supporting authorities for the Court's broader proposition on manufacture.
Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia ((1973) 1 SCC 7 : AIR 1973 SC 425) Listed among cases bearing on manufacturing concept and relevant statutory interpretation. Referred to as part of the body of precedent supporting the Court's interpretation of "manufacture".
Extrusion Processors Pvt. Ltd. v. N.R. Jadhav (1974 Tax. L.R 1655) One of the cited authorities addressing questions of processing and manufacture. Included among the authorities relied on or noticed in the manufacture enquiry.
Metro Readywear Company v. Collector of Customs (1976 K.L.T 642 : 1978 ELT J 520 (Ker.)) Cited as part of judicial material on when processing results in a completed product for fiscal purposes. Noted by the Bench in reviewing the relevant authorities.
Commissioner, Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Bechu Ram Kishorilal (38 STC 236) One of several decisions listed in the survey of authorities. Mentioned among cases the Court noted; the Bench chose not to reproduce full discussion of all such citations.
Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Union of India (1980 E.L.T 268 (Bombay)) Case dealing with excise/tariff questions (listed among citations). Referred to as part of the body of case law bearing on tariff/classification and manufacture issues.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Natarajan (48 STC 315 Mad.) Listed among authorities relevant to sales/excise jurisprudence. Noted by the Court as one of multiple authorities on related questions.
Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. PIO Food Packers (46 STC 63) Listed among the cases addressing processing and completion of products. Included in the judicial survey referred to by the Court.
Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. (35 STC 493) Another authority cited in the survey of relevant case law. Mentioned among cases relied upon for principles regarding processing/manufacture.
State of Gujarat v. Sukhram Jagannath (50 STC 76) Listed among cited authorities addressing tax/incidence questions. Noted among authorities considered by the Court.
B. Dar Laboratories v. State of Gujarat (22 STC 160 (Guj.)) Case included in the compilation of authorities. Referred to in the Court's recital of prior decisions on related matters.
State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. ((1977) 1 SCC 643 : AIR 1977 SC 879) A precedent on tax law principles cited among others. Included in the list of authorities the Court referenced in framing its analysis.
S.P.S Jayaram & Company rep. by Managing Partner S.P.S. Salvaraj v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise (W.P. No. 4694 of 1978) The earlier writ by the same petitioner resulting in the Additional Collector's communication dated 10.12.1981 and the writ being allowed on 14.12.1981. Referred to as the prior proceeding relied upon by the petitioner to invoke constructive res judicata; the Court explained why that prior communication did not finally bar present reconsideration.
W.A. No. 41 of 1980 (Division Bench judgment dated 29.4.1986 referenced) Reference used for the proposition that fiscal statutes are to be interpreted according to their language and ambiguities resolved in favour of the citizen (against the Revenue). Invoked to restate the principle that taxation must be grounded in statutory language and ambiguities construed in favour of taxpayers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in a sequence matching the issues raised:

  1. Maintainability / Constructive Res Judicata: The Court acknowledged the prior communication of the Additional Collector dated 10.12.1981 (dropping proceedings and releasing seized goods) and the subsequent allowance of the earlier writ. However, the Court accepted the respondent's contention that there had been a change in the law and the factors relevant to the applicability of excise (notably that the "factory" concept was no longer relevant to determine excise liability). Relying on the principle (as expounded in Orient Paper Mills and similar authorities) that an authority may depart from an earlier stand when cogent reasons (including changes in law) exist, the Court concluded that the petitioner could not claim a bar by constructive res judicata.
  2. Conformity with Standards and Drugs & Cosmetics Certification: The Court examined the petitioner's own declaration (dated 11.11.1983) that its product conformed to Indian Standard Specifications and the respondent's production of a laboratory certificate dated 3.2.1986 certifying the product as of standard quality under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Given those materials, the Court held that the petitioner was disabled from contending that the respondent could not invoke excise provisions on the ground that the product did not satisfy statutory standards.
  3. Equitable Estoppel: The Court found the essential factual ingredients of equitable estoppel to be absent. There was no adequate basis in the petitioner's pleadings or documents to show a representation by the respondent (either by words or conduct) on which the petitioner had relied to its detriment. Consequently, the equitable estoppel argument failed.
  4. Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes: The Bench reiterated the settled rule that fiscal statutes must be applied according to their language, ambiguities resolved in favour of citizens and never on an assumption of tax without statutory foundation.
  5. Whether the product is a "dentifrice" under Tariff Item 33.06: The Court observed that the taxable genus is "preparations for oral or dental hygiene" and explicitly includes dentifrices (examples: tooth-paste and tooth-powder). The Court rejected the petitioner's contention (based on textbook definitions and expert affidavit) that ash could never be a dentifrice, pointing out that the tariff itself provides examples making it unnecessary to import specialized definitions; dictionaries also equate "dentifrice" with tooth-powder.
  6. Whether conversion of ash into tooth-powder is "manufacture" under section 2(f): The Court carefully analyzed section 2(f) ("Manufacture includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product") and distilled three components it considered relevant from prior decisions: (a) there must be a transformation; (b) a new and different article must emerge; and (c) the new article must have a distinct commercial name, character or use different from its component parts.
  7. Application of facts to the statutory test: The Court summarized the petitioner's disclosed processes (manual/mechanical sieving of ash; addition and mixing with calcium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate; addition of colour and sweetener; addition of a volatile flavouring mixture; final sieving and packing) and concluded that these steps effected a transformation of ash (vibuthi) into a new commercial commodity known and marketed as "tooth-powder". The Court considered the transformed product to have a distinct commercial name, character and use from the raw ash.
  8. Reliance on precedent: The Court drew upon the authorities cited (including PIO Food Packers, Empire Industries, Union of India v. R. Mansukhrai and the Division Bench decision in W.A. No. 411 of 1980) to support its conclusion that the processes described amounted to manufacture under section 2(f). The Court regarded the factual situation as at least as strong as those precedents where processing of unfinished articles was held to amount to manufacture.
  9. Conclusion on excise liability: On the combined reasoning (product falls within the taxable genus of preparations for oral/dental hygiene and the conversion process constitutes manufacture), the Court held that the petitioner's products were subject to excise duty.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The court concluded that the petitioner's products ("Gopal Tooth Powder" variants) are subject to excise duty because (a) they fall within the taxable category of preparations for oral or dental hygiene (Tariff Item 33.06 includes tooth-powder), and (b) the processes by which ash (vibuthi) is converted into tooth-powder amount to "manufacture" within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The petition was dismissed with costs (advocate's fee later fixed at Rs. 500).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner’s challenge failed; the respondent may apply excise provisions to the petitioner’s products, and the petitioner was ordered to pay costs which were fixed at Rs. 500.
  • Broader legal effect: The opinion applied existing precedent to the facts and did not purport to establish a novel principle of law. The decision affirms application of established tests for "manufacture" and the import of tariff language (i.e., that the taxable genus includes preparations for oral/dental hygiene, with tooth-powder as an example). The Court did not state that it was creating a new precedent beyond its fact-bound application of earlier authorities.

Order note: The Court recorded that the writ petition was dismissed by order dated 2.5.1986 and subsequently fixed the advocate's fee at Rs. 500 on remand/mention before the same Bench.

Show all summary ...

1. This writ petition coming on for hearing on Tuesday the 8th, Monday the 15th, Tuesday the 16th, Thursday the 17th, Wednesday the 23rd. Monday the 28th and Wednesday the 30th days of April, 1986 and Friday 2nd day of May, 1986 upon perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof the order of the High Court dated 19.3.1986 and made herein, and the counter and Reply affidavits filed herein and the records relating to the prayer aforesaid comprised irr the return of respondent to the Writ made by the High Court, and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. U.N.R Rao for M/s. C. David, R. Vijayandran and Miss Sathya Rao, Advocates for the petitioner, and of Mr. K. Jothi, Additional Central Government Standing Counsel on behalf of the Respondent, the Court made the following order:—

The Petitioner is a partnership firm carrying on business under the name and style of S.P.S 3ayaram & Company manufacturing Gopal Tooth Powder. It has come forward with this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other order or direction in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent not to apply any of the provisions of Act 1 of 1944 and Act 5 of 1986.

2. To sustain the relief claimed in this petition, Mr. U.N.R Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner urged 4 points, 2 of them touching on the maintainability of the proposed action by the respondent to assess the petitioner's products named ‘GOPAL TOOTH POWDER (PACKETS), GOPAL TOOTH POWDER (TIN BOUND) and JBT TOOTH POWDER’ to excise duty while the others relating to the merits. Yet another contention is that the respondent is disabled from taking any action against the petitioner by virtue of the doctrine of ‘equitable estoppel’.

3. It is convenient to advert to the arguments relating to maintainability. On an earlier occasion, the petitioner approached this Court in W.P No. 4694 of 1978 S.P.S Jayaram & Company rep. by Managing Partner S.P.S Salvaraj v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Madurai-14 seeking the relief of forbearing the respondent from enforcing the communication of the respondent dated 25.11.1978 issued to the petitioner. An order came to be passed in the said writ petition on 14.10.1981 granting two months time to the respondent to follow the procedure as known to the respondent for taking a decision as to the applicabiltiy or otherwise of the provisions of Act 1 of 1944 (Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944) to the petitioner's company and adjourning the proceeding to 14.12.1981 Pursuant thereto, the Additional Collector of Central Excise, Madurai-2 in his reference C. No. V/60/15/3/78CX 3.Order No. 32/81 dated 10.12.1981 had stated as follows:

“After having considered all the evidence on record, I am satisfied that there is no case to be made out. Under the circumstances, I hereby drop ail case proceedings and order the seized goods to be released to the party”.

4. On 14.12.1981, the writ petition was allowed by this Court. It is therefore contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent is bound by the communication dated 10.12.1981 issued by the Additional Collector; in other words, even a quasi-judicial authority is bound by the principles of ‘Constructive res judicata’. To put it differently, in the teeth of the communication dated 10.12.1981 issued by the Additional Collector, the respondent is not entitled to take up the issue once over and decide whether the products manufactured by the petitioner are subject to excise duty while on the other he is bound by the order made by him on 10.12.1981 In this connection, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union Of India - (1970) 3 SCC 76 : AIR 1970 SC 1498 : 1978 ELT (J 382). However, he conceded that if there is a change in the circumstances or in the law, then, the principle of ‘constructive res judicata’ will not stand in the way of the respondent taking any action. Indeed, such is the principle settled by the above decision. The same principle was reiterated by the Delhi High Court in J.K Synthetics Ltd. v. Union of India (1981 ELT 328) and it is worthwhile to refer to the principle, namely, an authority can depart from his earlier stand only for cogent reasons, such as fresh facts are brought on record or the process of manufacture has changed or the relevant Tariff entry has undergone modification or subsequent to the earlier decision, there has been a pronouncement of a High Court or the Supreme Court which necessitates the reconsideration of the issue. In this case, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Jothi, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, there is a change in the principle of law. In the supplemental affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner in W.P No. 4894 of 1978˜S.P.S Gayaram and Company rep. by Managing Pertner S.P.S Saivaraj v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Madurai-14, the petitioner has referred to the definition of section 2(m) of the Factories Act and submitted that the petitioner's premises where the manufacturing process is carried on will not fall under the said definition. The case of the respondent herein is that proceeding as could be seen from his counter is that the petitioner's premises is a factory manufacturing goods and is not exempted from the levy of excise duty because its clearance in the year 1976-77 had exceeded Rs. 30 lakhs. It is further stated in the said counter that the petitioner will have opportunity to prove its contentions about the number of persons employed through the attendance register. Thus, one of the points urged by the petitioner is that its premises is not a factory within the meaning. of section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 and therefore the products manufactured by it are not subject to excise duty. It may not be out of place to refer to the petitioner's letter, dated 20.11.1980 addressed to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Madurai-2 wherein it is stated:

“Ours is not a ‘Factory’ conforming to the definition of factory under section 2(m) of the Factories Act”.

5. It is common ground that the factory concept has no relevance now in determining whether the petitioner's products ae subject to excise duty or not. Thus, it is factually established that there is a change in the application of law and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to call to its aid the principle of ‘constructive res-judicata’.

6. In the view I am of taking, it is unnecessary for me to advert to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that the order dated 10.12.1981 passed by the Additional Collector is not an order passed by the adjudicating authority and therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to plead the principle of ‘constructive res judicata’. In any event, I find that such a contention is hardly tenable because, ultimately this Court allowed W.P No. 4694 of 4978. So too, it is unnecessary to examine whether the order dated 10.12.1981 can be treated as an order passed by quasi-judicial authority because, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, what was communicated to the petitioner is that the action was dropped.

7. The other point advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that unless the petitioner's products satisfy the Indian Standard Specifications and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Rules made thereunder, the provisions of the Excise Act cannot be invoked. On the materials available in this case, the petitioner is disabled from raising such a contention. First of all, the petitioner itself has declared that its tooth powder conforms to the Indian Standard Specifications as laid down by the Indian Standard Institution as early as on 11.11.1983 Secondly, the respondent has produced a certificate dated 3.2.1986 bearing Report, No. SBG/635 issued by Sunderson Pharmaceuticals (Analytical Division), Government Approved Laboratory, Korpogam House, Madural-14 to the effect that ‘Gopal Tooth Powder’ is of Standard Quality as defined in the Act and the rules made thereunder. The certificate was issued under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Rules made thereunder. These two documents will fairly establish that the products manufactured by the petitioner not only conform to Indian Standard Specifications but also the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and the Rules made thereunder. Consequently, the contention that the respondent cannot invoke to his aid the provisions of the Excise Act to levy excise duty on the products of the petitioner has to be rejected.

8. Let me now turn to the argument relating to ‘equitable estoppel’, I hasten to add that the basic ingredient necessary to sustain the principle of equitable estoppel is wholly absent in this case. It is too difficult to find from the averments in the affidavit of the petitioner or from the documents produced by it that there was any representation either in words or by conduct of the respondent which was acted upon by the petitioner. Unless this basic ingredient is established there is no scope for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Hence, this point also fails.

9. The law is well settled that so far as fiscal statutes are concerned, their application depends entirely upon the language found in the enactment and should there be any ambiguity in the language employed, it has to be interpreted in favour of a citizen and against the Revenue. So too, there can be no presumption as to a tax. In other words, the right to tax has to be found in the enactment itself and not elsewhere. If any authority is needed, reference may be made to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W.A No. 41 of 1980 dated 29.4.1986 This requires reference to the particulars as to how and from what ingredient, the petitioner's products, namely, ‘Gopal Tooth Powder (Packets), Gopal Tooth Powder (Tin Round) and Jet Tooth Powder’ are manufactured. According to the petitioner, the products are composed of (i) Sacred ash (Vibuthi) 07.5%; (ii) Calcium Carbonate 1.00% and (iii) Sodium bicarbonate 1.00% plus sweetening agent, colouring agent and flavours. It is submitted by the petitioner that this ash or vibuthi is cleaned, coloured and medicated. It is seen from the supporting affidavit of Dr. Jacob Groves Denial filed by the petitioner that ash (vibuthi) undergoes the following different mechanical processes. According to him, the following are the processes in respect of a bag of 50 kgs. of vibuthi-ash.

(i) The ash is sieved manually. There is machinery for mechanical sieving as well. Mud, sand and bigger particles of ash are separated from the finer grains of ash.

(ii) The above is mixed with a mixture of Calcium Carbonate and sodium bicarbonate weighing ½ Kg. (1%).

(iii) The above mixture is further mixed with pink food colour plus saccharin weighing 100 gms. Ratio is 1:500. Mixing is done by hand.

(iv) To the above is added 358 ml. of a flavouring mixture consisting of camphor (Karpooram), Thymol (Sms Uppu), Manthol (Puthia Uppu). This is highly volatile. The mixing is done manually and the product is hand seived once again, Resultant product is packed in callaphane/Kraft paper packets of 20 gms. each”.

10. Immediately it is necessary to notice that the excise duty is leviable on the manufacture of goods but not on the sale. The immediate question, therefore, is” whether the transformation of ash into tooth powder is a manufacture within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Section 2(f) reads:

“Manufacture includes any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product”.

11. I am excluding the other sub-sections as they are not relevant for my present purpose. As rightly pointed out by the Rajasthan High Court in Ramnugar Cane and Sugar Company Ltd. Jaipur v. Union of India (1983 ELT 6) the definition of ‘manufacture’ is inclusive and the eight clauses appended to the definition are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. In my interpretation the ingredients of a manufacture as visualised by Section 2(f) are: (a) There must be a transformation; (b) From such transformation, a new and different article must emerge, and (c) Such new article must have a distinct name as a commercial commodity of its character or use should be different from its component part or parts.

12. Before 1 proceed further, it is convenient at this stage to advert to the argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that unless tooth powder is ‘dentifrice’ it will not come under Tariff 33.06 According to Tariff 33.06, any preparation for oral or dental hygiene, including dentifrices (for example tooth paste and tooth-powder) and denture fixative pastes and powders is subject to excise duty at 15%. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, ‘dentifrice’ is not described in the Act and he had taken much pains, in this connection to refer to a book called ‘A textbook of Preventive Dentistry’ by Richard E. Stallord, D.D.S, Ph.D, Adjuct Professor, School of Public Health, University of Minnesots, Minnespolis, Minnasota and the affidavit of Dr. Jacob Graves Daniel, he had referred to 10 text books of different authors and had stated that as a result of his study of the said books on the subject of Dentifrice, he is persuaded to conclude that ash of any kind cannot be used as an ingredient of a dentifrice. It is, therefore, contended by the learned Senior Counsel-for the petitioner that ash will never be a dentifrice and therefore tooth powder made out of ash will never be dentifrice and hence will fall outside the purview of Tariff Item No. 33.06 There are several fallacies in this argument. Taxable item is not dentifrice; on the other hand, any preparation for oral or dental hygiene including dentifrices (for examples, tooth-paste and tooth powder) and denture fixative pastes and powders is made taxable. The genus, therefore, is a preparation of oral or dental hygiene while the species are dentifrices. In turn, dentifrices include toothpaste, tooth-powder etc. When the taxable item itself should indicate what is meant by dentifrices, it is wholly unnecessary to look for its meaning especially when the meaning can be understood from the examples indicated in the said item. According to the said item, toothpaste and tooth-powder are examples for dentifrices In other words, tooth-paste and tooth-powder fall under the category of ‘dentifrices’. Indeed, according to Webster's Dictionary ‘dentifrices1 means - Tooth-powder’. Even according to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary of 1983 Edition, the meaning of dentifrice is given as a substance: used in rubbing or cleaning the teeth - tooth-paste or tooth-powder. Therefore, the argument that the petitioner's products are not dentifrices and therefore they will not fall under Tariff Item 33.06 carries ho merit.

13. Let me now revert to the point whether there is a manufacture when the ash is transformed into tooth-powder as contemplated by Section 2(f) of the Act. In this case, there is a transformation when ash is converted into tooth-powder. In other words, a new and different article emerges and such new article has a distinct name as a commercial commodity, i.e, what was ash originally is turned into tooth-powder. It is needless to state that these are two different commercial commodities commonly or popularly known. After ash, vibuthi is transformed into tooth-powder, its use as well as its character become different. In other words, there is such a transformation as to produce a different article which bears by itself a commercial name quite different from its component part and is put to use different from its component part. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would point out that even now ash is being used for cleaning teeth. I must immediately state that such use is only out of necessity. To put it differently, when the user has no means to buy tooth-powder or when the tooth-powder is not readily available, resort is made to the use of ash. It may not be out of place to point out that even the charcoal powder or brick powder is being used by the people at lower rungs and this is also out of necessity. Such users never call neither ash nor charcoal powder nor brick-powder as tooth-powder. Therefore, such use by itself will not be a decisive factor in determining whether a transformed product has a distinct use quite different from its component part. As a matter of fact, the petitioner does not market its product as medicated or scented ash. On the other hand, it takes care in naming the transformed product as ‘toothpowder’. Therefore, it is too late in the day to doubt that ash-vibuthi and tooth-powder are two different and distinct commercial commodities. If, after transformation, vibuthi is turned into tooth-powder and is sold as such, it is no more open to the petitioner to contend that there is no change either in the use of ash-vibuthi or in the transformed product ‘tooth-powder’, by the process employed by the petitioner, ash is transformed into tooth-powder. By such process, there is\a completion of a manufactured product. In other words, at the completion of such process, we have a new end product namely, ‘tooth-powder’. To put it differently, but for the above process, there would not be a new end-product, namely, ‘tooth-powder’. Thus, the process is not only incidental or ancillary but is essential to the completion of a manufactured product, namely, ‘tooth-powder’.

14. Indeed in the decision in the Divisional Commissioner, Sales Tax, Ernakulam M/s. PIO Food Packers (1980 Supp SCC 174 : AIR 1980 SC 1227 at 1229 : 1980 ELT 343 (SC)] and in Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India - 1985 (20) ELT 179 (SC) : [(1985) 3 S.C.C 314] a passage from American decision is quoted with approval and it is worthwhile to reproduce the same and it is as follows:

“Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge, having a distinctive name, character or use [(1907) 52 L.Ed, 336 at 338]”.

15. Even the decision is Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India - 1985 (20) ELT 179 (SC) which preferred to the decision in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. (AIR 1963 SC 791) : 1977 ELT (J 199) quoted with approval the, following passage in Union of India v. R. Mansukhrai, EBWARI - [(1970) 2 SCC 472 at 477).

“The word ‘manufacture’ is defined in Section 2(f) of the Act as including any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. The rolling of a billet into a circle is certainly a process in the course of completion of the manufactured product, viz., circles. In the present case, as we have already indicated earlier, the product, that is sought to be subjected to duty, is a circle within the meaning of that word used in Item 26-A(2). In the other two cases which came before this Court, the articles mentioned in the relevant items of the First Schedule were never hold to have come into existence, so that the completed product, which was liable to excise duty uder the First Schedule, was never produced by any process. In the case before us, circles in any form are envisaged as the completed product produced by - manufacture which are subjected to excise duty. The process of conversion of billets into circles was described by the Legislature itself as manufacture of circles”.

16. As a matter of fact, I had the benefit of a recent ruling of a Division Bench of this Court to which I was also a party in W.A No. 411 of 1980. The processes involved in that case are: drilling, trimming and tailoring to suit the requirements and conveniences of the customers. Except drilling, trimming and tailoring, the brake linings suffered no change. Yet, the Division Bench held that the product which the petitioners before it purchased from M/s. Rane Brake Linings Ltd., Madras and other manufacturers of brake linings are obviously unfinished products and they cannot be put to the utility for, which they are meant unless the processes which the petitioners adopted or resorted to are completed and therefore, certainly the mischief of ‘manufacture’ as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act is attracted. Till the unfinished brake lining is trimmed, drilled and tailored, it cannot be used by the customer for the purpose for which it is meant. Drilling, trimming and chamferring lead to the completion of a manufactured product, namely, brake lining adaptable to the use in a particular vehicle. The facts in this case stand on a stronger footing than those in the case in W.A No. 411 of 1980. After ash is transformed into tooth-powder, it loses not only its identity but also its commercial name, character and use. It might” be that if the tooth-powder is put into the water, the ash can be obtained. But this is wholly irrelevant in the teeth of the definition of ‘manufacture’ occurring in section-2(f) of the Act. I have already pointed out that by the process adopted by the petitioner, what was originally ash was turned into tooth-powder which has a distinct and different name as a commercial commodity and which has a character and use quite different from its component part, namely, ash-vibuthi. To reiterate, the process had led to the completion of a manufactured product namely, tooth-powder. Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that the process adopted by the petitioner is a manufacture within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act and therefore, its products ‘Gopal Tooth Powder (Packets), Gopal Tooth Powder (Tin Round) and Jet Tooth Powder’ are subject to excise duty. The Division Bench in W.A No. 411 of 1980 - 1980 ELT 775 (Mad.) The Brakes India Ltd. Padi v. The Superintendent of Central Excise had noticed several decisions such as Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. (AIR 1963 SC 791 : 1977 ELT (J 199); South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1968 SC 922) : 1978 ELT 3 336 (SC); Union of India v. Hindu Undivided Family Business known as Kamla Mansukhrai Redari ((1970) 2 SCC 472 : AIR 1971 SC 2333) : 1978 ELT (J 389) (SC); Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia ((1973) 1 SCC 7 : AIR 1973 SC 425), Extrusion Processors Pvt. Ltd. v. N.R Jadhav, Superintendent of Central Excise - (1974 Tax. L.R 1655); Metro Readywear Company v. Collector Of Customs (1976 K.L.T 642) : 1978 ELT (J. 520) (Ker.); The Deputy Commissioner Sales Tax, Ernakulam v. M/s. PIO Food Packers (1980 Supp SCC 174 : AIR 1980 SC 1227) : 1980 ELT 343 (SC); Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [1985 (20) ELT 179 (SC)] and as I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench, I am avoiding referring to several citations brought to my notice by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. They are Commissioner, Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. Bechu Ram Kishorilal (38 STC 236); Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Union of India [1980 E.L.T 268 (Bombay)]; State of Tamil Nadu v. Natarajan (48 STC 315 Mad.); Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. PIO Food Packers (46 STC 63); Commissioner Of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. (35 STC 493); State of Gujarat v. Sukhram Jagannath (50 STC 76); B. Dar Laboratories v. State of Gujarat [22 STC 160 (Guj.)] and State Of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. ((1977) 1 SCC 643 : AIR 1977 SC 879).

17. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.

Order:— This petition coming on further orders on this day in the presence of Mr. C. Daniel, Advocate for the petitioner and of Mr. R. Joshi, Additional Central Government Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondent the court made the following order:

The writ petition was dismissed with costs by my order dated 2.5.1986 However, I did not fix the costs and therefore, the matter is posted before me. Taking into consideration the points involved, I fix the advocate's fee at Rs. 500 (Rupees Five hundred only).