- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Pushpa Iyenger v. Indian Airlines Corporation And Others
Structured Summary of the Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is an air-hostess employed by Indian Airlines Corporation. She fell sick on 14 October 1982 and, although she claims to have sent a telegram on 16 October 1982 to notify a medical officer, she did not return to duty until 16 March 1983 after obtaining a medical fitness certificate. The corporation issued a chargesheet dated 21 March 1983 alleging absence without prior intimation from 14 October 1982 to 15 March 1983 and that three letters addressed to her had been returned unserved. The petitioner explained that her address had changed (of which the corporation was aware), that daily pick-up transport collected her at her new residence, and that the communications had been sent to her old address; she also asserted she had sent the telegram but the chargesheet did not reflect that telegram.
After evidence that a telegram had been received (a Post and Telegraph Department communication showed receipt by a pharmacist on 17 October 1982, who said he had forwarded it to the doctor), a second chargesheet dated 23 November 1983 alleged misbehavior with security guards on 2 and 14 November 1983 when she visited Airlines House for the earlier enquiry. She replied to the second chargesheet on 12 December 1983. The corporation proposed to have the second enquiry conducted with R. Pushpavanam as presenting officer.
The petitioner requested permission to engage a lawyer to defend her at the enquiries (asserting that Pushpavanam was a law graduate and legally trained) but the request was refused by letter dated 13 January 1984. She filed Writ Petition No. 595 of 1984 seeking relief, relying on Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Nadkarni.
Writ Petition No. 5015 of 1985 raised similar complaints, referring to an impugned communication dated 6 January 1985 regarding the third charge and again complaining that she was denied a lawyer when the presenting officer (Sri A.A. Samuel) was legally trained in domestic enquiries.
A third chargesheet was framed on 17 February 1985 alleging that petitioner ran a private business (“Sai Pushpa Paradise”) contrary to regulations; she replied on 25 April 1985 and requested an advocate for an enquiry scheduled on 30 April 1985.
The petitioner was placed under suspension on 6 March 1985 and was not paid subsistence allowance because the corporation relied upon an attachment notice from the Commercial Tax Officer (Madras-1) dated 28 December 1984 for recovery under S. 26 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 of Rs. 2,92,926 from amounts payable by the corporation to her.
The corporation contended that (a) the charges were supported by relevant material and the petitioner had already been found guilty on the first charge and punished (reduction in time-scale by one stage without cumulative effect for one year), (b) the presenting officers were law graduates or legally trained employees but were full-time employees (not practising advocates) and standing order 32 precluded outside legal representation, and (c) the petitioner could have secured a co-employee to present her case as provided by standing order 32 and had not shown otherwise.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the refusal to permit the petitioner to engage an advocate of her choice for the domestic disciplinary enquiries was illegal, unjust or contrary to the principles of natural justice.
- Whether, when the employer engages legally trained presenting officers to conduct/prosecute disciplinary enquiries, equality under Article 14 of the Constitution requires that the delinquent employee be permitted similar assistance even when standing order 32 generally prohibits outside legal representation.
- Whether standing order 32, which excludes outside representation and permits assistance only by a co-employee, operates so as not to violate principles of natural justice when the employer uses legally trained presenting officers.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner (through counsel Sri K. Chandru) relied upon Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Nadkarni to argue that when the nature, complexity and imbalance of disciplinary proceedings favour the employer (especially where the employer is using legally trained presenting officers), a delinquent employee must be allowed to engage a legal practitioner to ensure a fair and impartial enquiry.
- It was argued that standing order 32 should not be mechanically applied so as to deny a reasonable opportunity of defence when the presenting officers are legally trained and experienced; the imbalance and complexity require permitting outside legal assistance in order to secure fairness.
- Reference was made to A.K. Roy and Olga Tellis and other authorities to support the propositions that equality under Article 14 and the substantive requirements of fairness and protection of livelihood (Article 21 context in Olga Tellis) may require permitting legal assistance in appropriate cases.
- The petitioner asserted that she could not secure a suitable co-employee ("friend") of the type contemplated by standing order 32 to match the expertise of the presenting officers and that intimidation/harassment would deter co-employees from helping her; she stated she had no adequate assistance inside the corporation.
Respondent-Corporation's Arguments
- The corporation maintained that the charges were based on relevant material and that the petitioner had already been found guilty on the first charge and punished; therefore, nothing further survives for consideration in respect of that charge.
- Standing order 32 (framed under S. 45 of the Air Corporation Act) precluded engaging an outside legal practitioner; the petitioner could be assisted by a co-employee and nothing prevented her from availing that facility.
- The presenting officers were full-time employees (not enrolled or practising advocates). The presenting officer in the first matter (Pushpavanam) was a law graduate but had not practised at the Bar; the subsequent presenting officer (K. Sampathkumar) had a diploma in social work (now recognised as leading to an M.A.) and had legal training as part of the diploma; Sri A.A. Samuel had attended training on departmental enquiries. The corporation argued these personnel were not external advocates and hence refusal to permit an outside counsel did not violate standing orders.
- The corporation disputed the petitioner's claim that she could not obtain a co-employee to assist, noting there were about 19,000 employees (about 3,600–4,000 in the southern region) and asserting that co-employees commonly assist in such enquiries.
- The corporation denied mala fides and motivation in framing the charges and asserted the third charge arose from information received from the Commercial Tax Officer and records of the taxation department.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni [1983-I L.L.N 314] | Where rules are silent and employer engages legally trained persons to prosecute, denying the delinquent the right to engage a legal practitioner can be unfair; silence in rules does not prevent the authority from permitting legal representation to secure a fair enquiry. | The court relied on this decision to support the petitioner's claim that, in appropriate circumstances, a delinquent should be permitted legal representation to avoid unfairness and imbalance; the judgment excerpts were used to explain circumstances when permission to engage a legal practitioner is warranted. |
| A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : AIR 1982 SC 710] | Although Article 22(3)(b) may prohibit legal representation for detenues, Article 14 (equality) may require that a detenu be allowed legal assistance if the authority permitting legal assistance to itself would otherwise create inequality. | The court applied the principle that where an authority (or State) takes the aid of legally trained persons, Article 14 may oblige that equality be preserved by allowing the other party similar facilities; the decision was used to show that a prohibition may yield to equality concerns. |
| Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [(1985) 3 SCC 545] | Recognition that a statute may validly exclude rules of natural justice where the legislature intended such a departure (example given: s.314(1) Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888). | The court cited Olga Tellis to observe that standing order 32 does not necessarily violate natural justice simply because it excludes outside representation; if the prohibition is validly made, the State cannot be told to act contrary to a valid standing order unless Article 14 is contravened. |
| Brooke Bond India (P) Ltd. v. Subba Raman (S.) [1961 — II L.L.J 417] | Referenced (as among authorities dealing with representation/assistance in disciplinary proceedings); used for background jurisprudence on fairness in enquiries. | The case was cited (through Board of Trustees authority) as part of the jurisprudential background supporting the proposition that assistance in enquiries may be necessary for fairness; the judgment references it as supporting precedent. |
| Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Workmen [1965 — I L.L.J 426] | Referenced as part of authorities dealing with conduct of enquiries and fairness (cited in Board of Trustees context). | Used as part of the chain of authorities (via Board of Trustees) that inform when legal assistance should be permitted to ensure a fair hearing. |
| C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin [1972 — I L.L.J 465] | Referenced among authorities dealing with enquiry/representation principles. | Cited in support of petitioner's submissions and referred to by the court as part of the authorities on disciplinary enquiries and fairness. |
| Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Ahmedabad Co-operative Department Stores [1979-I L.L.J 60] | Authority for proposition that if a delinquent is unaided and the opportunity to defend is illusory, principles of natural justice are violated. | Relied upon to show that an effective opportunity to defend is required and that being left unaided can amount to violation of natural justice. |
| Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra [(1978) 3 SCC 544 : AIR 1978 SC 1548] | Cited among authorities concerning procedural fairness and related constitutional protections. | Referred to by petitioner’s counsel to show the importance of fair procedures; the court listed it among cases relied upon but did not expand beyond citation. |
| Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [1981-I L.L.N 270] | Referenced regarding consequences requiring lawyers in serious cases and the need for fair procedures. | Cited by petitioner’s counsel as supporting the proposition that serious consequences increase the need for legal representation; the court noted the citation but did not elaborate further. |
| Other cases listed by petitioner (Dr. Subba Rao; Ramesh Chandra Verma; Nripendra Nath Bagshi; Nitya Ranjan Bohidar; Muniswamy; N.H. Hoskot; Kavitha Movie House v. P.M. Mary; and an unreported judgment of this Court) | These were cited by petitioner’s counsel to underline the general legal principle that statutory corporations and authorities must observe fair play and that legal assistance aids enforcement of rule of law. | The court recorded these citations as relied upon by petitioner’s counsel and noted them, but stated that in light of conclusions reached they are not dealt with in extenso in the order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the primary question as whether refusal to permit the petitioner to engage an advocate violated principles of natural justice. The analysis proceeded by examining standing order 32 (which excludes outside representation and permits only assistance by a co-employee) against the authorities relied upon by both sides.
The court recognized two competing legal propositions from precedent:
- Decisions such as Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Nadkarni support the proposition that when rules are silent and the employer uses legally trained persons to present its case, denying a delinquent the right to engage a legal practitioner can be unfair and violate the right to a reasonable opportunity to defend (an essential principle of natural justice).
- A.K. Roy establishes that a statutory or constitutional prohibition (for example in Art. 22(3)(b) regarding detenues) does not always prevent the application of Article 14: if the authority or body takes the aid of legal assistance, equality may require that the opposite party also be allowed similar assistance to avoid discrimination.
The court also noted Olga Tellis, which indicates that where the legislature has validly intended to exclude natural justice rules, such exclusion may stand; hence if standing order 32 is a valid prohibition, the employer (a State within Art. 12) cannot be required to act contrary to it unless Article 14 is infringed.
The decisive aspect of the court's reasoning was factual and contextual: the corporation had itself chosen to appoint presenting officers with legal training or experience in conducting departmental enquiries (initially R. Pushpavanam, a law graduate; subsequently K. Sampathkumar with a diploma including legal instruction; and A.A. Samuel with training and experience). Having taken that step, the corporation created a potential imbalance between a well-equipped presenting officer and a delinquent employee who, in the petitioner's case, could not secure a co-employee of comparable competence or was deterred from doing so by fear of victimisation.
The court accepted the petitioner's contention that "friend" under standing order 32 contemplates a co-employee capable of matching the presenting officer's expertise and that such a person was not realistically available to the petitioner despite the corporation's large workforce. The court emphasized that a mere numerical assertion of employees does not negate the petitioner's inability to obtain an appropriate assisting co-employee. If the corporation, in its interests, departs from the standing orders by appointing legally trained presenting officers, Article 14 may be invoked to prevent the corporation from creating an imbalance in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings.
The court declined to adjudicate issues relating to the attachment order from the Commercial Tax Department and the non-payment of subsistence allowance because those matters were not challenged in the present writ petitions and appropriate remedies must be pursued in other proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petitions are allowed with costs. The court awarded counsel fees of Rs. 500 in each writ petition.
Implications
- Direct consequence: The petitioner succeeds in the writ petitions; the court grants relief (the judgment concludes by allowing the petitions and awarding costs and counsel fees).
- On the underlying legal position: The court's reasoning reiterates that while standing orders may validly exclude outside legal representation, where the employer itself employs legally trained presenting officers and thereby creates an imbalance, Article 14 can require that comparable facilities be extended to the delinquent to ensure fairness. The judgment applies established authorities (particularly Board of Trustees v. Nadkarni and A.K. Roy) to the facts before the court.
- Broader precedent: The judgment applies existing precedent to the facts but does not purport to lay down any novel legal proposition beyond those lines. The court recorded other authorities relied upon but noted they were not dealt with in extenso.
- Excluded matters: The court expressly refrained from deciding issues concerning the attachment order and subsistence allowance, indicating those matters are to be pursued in appropriate proceedings and are not resolved by this judgment.
Costs awarded: Counsel fees of Rs. 500 in each writ petition. Other remedies (attachment, subsistence allowance) not determined in this order.
JUDGMENT
1. Petitioner in these two writ petitions is an air-hostess employed in Indian Airlines Corporation. She would state that on 14 October 1982, as she fell sick, she could not report to duty, but sent a telegram to the medical doctor on 16 October 1982, regarding her continued illness. It was only on 16 March 1983, she was fit to report to duty and after securing a medical fitness certificate reported to duty on that date. As officials in the first respondent-corporation were motivated, a chargesheet, dated 21 March 1983, was issued falsely claiming that she had absented from duty from 14 October, 1982 to 15 March, 1983 without prior intimation, and further claiming that three letters addressed to her have been returned unserved. She gave her explanation claiming that in spite of having changed her residential address which was to the knowledge of the corporation and as every day the pick-up transport had come and taken her from the place where she was living, the three communications have been sent to her old address, and that she had sent an intimation to the duty officer on the day of her illness and followed it by telegram, which was not at all referred to in the imputations made as against her, and, therefore, the chargesheet is baseless in spite of an enquiry fixed to be held.
2. To prove that she sent a telegram, she got a communication from Post and Telegraph Department, which is to the effect that it was received by the pharmacist on 17 October 1982, and when he was cross-examined be admitted having received it and sent it to the doctor. Therefore, when they could not justify the charges framed against her, in order to harass her, a second chargesheet was framed on 23 November 1983, stating that she has misbehaved with the security guards oh 2 November, 1983 and 14 November, 1983 when she came to the Airlines house for participating in the enquiry, which was held on the first charge-sheet. She having been rudely dealt with by the security staff at the instance of motivated persons of the corporation, on 14 November, 1983 itself, she had mentioned this to the enquiry officer and followed it up by a telegram, dated 16 November, 1983 of what had been done by security personnel and others. To this chargesheet, she gave a reply on 12 December 1983, and in spite of it, on the second charge, the enquiry was to be conducted by the second respondent, and one R. Pushpavanam was to function as presenting officer.
3. As objected to on the earlier occasions, even though first respondent was represented by an officer, who is a legally trained person and herself unable to secure a friend as required under standing order 32 of Standing Orders (Regulations) Concerning Discipline and Appeals in Indian Airlines Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the regulations), she sought permission for engaging a lawyer to defend herself. Sri Pushpavanam is a law graduate and an experienced and legally trained person in conducting enquiries, and hence, principles of natural justice would be violated unless she is allowed to be defended by a lawyer. On this request being rejected by letter, dated 13 January 1984, she preferred Writ Petition No. 595 of 1984, resting her claim on what has been held in Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni [1983-I L.L.N 314].
4. Writ Petition No. 5015 of 1985 is also preferred seeking for similar relief, but with reference to impugned communication, dated 6 January 1985, on the plea that in respect of the third charge framed against her, she is again deprived of having a lawyer to defend her, when the presenting officer Sri A.A Samuel is an experienced person and legally trained to conduct domestic enquiries.
5. On 17 February 1985, first respondent framed the third chargesheet claiming therein that while in service as air-hostess, petitioner had conducted a business, styled as “Sai Pushpa Paradise,” at No. 5/1, Kasi Chetty Lane, Madras, and it had been closed down on 1 July 1983, and it being contrary to the regulations, she was called upon to send her representations. She sent a reply on 25 April 1985, calling for permission to engage an advocate in the enquiry to be held on 30 April 1985.
6. She was also placed under suspension on 6 March 1985, and had not been paid any subsistence allowance, because first respondent had taken up the stand that consequent to the intimation received from Commercial Tax Officer, Madras-1, dated 28 December 1984, seeking for recovery under S. 26 of Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, a sum of Rs. 2,92,926 from the pay, allowance, gratuity and any amount due to her payable by the corporation towards the arrears of sales tax due to the department, no amount could be paid to her.
7. On behalf of the respondent-corporation, it is claimed that the charges framed against her are based on relevant materials and as for the first charge framed, she had been found guilty and a punishment of reduction in time-scale by one stage without cumulative effect for one year, had already been imposed, and the presenting officer was only a law graduate, who was never enrolled at the Bar or practised as an advocate and he is a full-time employee of the corporation and petitioner having participated in the enquiry and competent authority having imposed the aforesaid punishment, nothing further survives for consideration. Her request for assistance of the lawyer had been denied under standing order 32 framed under S. 45 of the Air Corporation Act, and nothing precluded her from availing of the services of co-employee.
8. As for the second charge, she had been informed of her right under standing order 32 and her claim that she could not secure the services of anyone of 19,000 employees of the corporation, of which nearly 3,600 are in southern region itself, cannot be believed. In all the enquiries held, co-employees having come and defended the delinquents, the allegation made that if any co-employee is to defend her such a person would be victimised is baseless and untrue.
9. Sri Pushpavanam was not a legally trained person though a law graduate and being a full-time employee of the corporation, the decision relied upon by her would have no application. Her request for change of venue and enquiry officer was turned down as there was no substance in her request.
10. Regarding the third charge framed against her, no motive could be attributed even in respect of this charge because the corporation came to know about her involvement in a private business contrary to the regulations only on receiving intimation from the Commercial Tax Officer, stating that she is in arrears of sale tax to the tune of Rs. 2,92,926. The charges themselves would show that they are the outcome of what are found in the records of the taxation department, and on the basis of forms and returns submitted by her. As for Sri Samuel, he is not a law graduate and not a legally trained person and had attended only one training on procedures for conducting domestic enquiry, and, therefore, principles of natural justice are not violated in rejecting the request of the petitioner to engage a lawyer. The vague allegations of mala fides and motivation in relation to more than one charge framed in the proceedings are thoroughly baseless.
11. The foremost point is, whether the refusal to permit petitioner to engage an advocate of her choice is illegal and unjust, and opposed to principles of natural justice?
12. Sri. K. Chandru, learned counsel for the petitioner, relies upon Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni [1983-I L.L.N 314] (vide supra), to claim that, in spite of standing order 32 of the regulations, by taking into account the nature of charges framed, the complexity of the processing involved, the imbalance to be suffered by her in facing a disciplinary proceeding presented by an officer having legal equipment and experience in conducting domestic enquiries and it would deprive her of a fair and impartial disciplinary proceeding being conducted, in which she could prove the falsity of the charges, will have to be taken into account, instead of merely proceeding on the basis that there is no such provision found in the standing orders.
13. In Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni [1983-I L.L.N 314] (vide supra), after the enquiry started, regulation 12(8) came into force to the effect that an employee may take the assistance of any other employee to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner unless the said presenting officer is a legal practitioner or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. After referring to Brooke Bond India (Private), Ltd. v. Subba Raman (S.) [1961 — II L.L.J 417], Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. v. Workmen. [1965 — I L.L.J 426], C.L Subramaniam v. Collector Of Customs, Cochin, Cochin [1972 — 1 L.L.J 465] and A.K Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : AIR 1982 S.C 710], it was held that, there being no inhibition in the regulations precluding a lawyer being engaged by the delinquent employee, and taking note of an array of law officers engaged to conduct an enquiry as prosecutors and that there would be an imbalance in defending the case of the delinquent employee, to ensure fairness and justness in conduct of an enquiry, he was allowed to engage a legal practitioner. It was held that denial of such a reasonable opportunity to a delinquent employee would be a violation of one of the essential principles of natural justice, viz., that a person against whom an enquiry is held must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Navinchandra Shakerchand Shah v. Ahmedabad Co-operative Department Stores [1979-I L.L.J 60], is also relied upon to show that, even if a delinquent is unaided and unhelpful, and the opportunity to defend is illusive, then principles of natural justice are violated.
14. A.K Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : A.I.R 1982 S.C 710] (vide supra), is for the proposition that, in spite of a specific prohibition found in Art. 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India denying a detenu to consult a legal practitioner or to be defended by him yet Art. 14 would come into play, if the Advisory Board enabled the detaining authority to take the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser. Hence it was held that the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner.
15. Sri Chandru would submit that in spite of a constitutional prohibition as found in Art. 22(3)(b), the equality of opportunity having been thus recognised, the presenting officers in both the enquiries are persons well-versed in conducting disciplinary proceedings and also legally trained and hence standing order 32 would not deprive her of being defended by an advocate.
16. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [(1985) 3 SCC 545], is touched upon to claim that, under Art. 21, right to life includes right to the means of livelihood, and when petitioner is unable to get a co-employee to defend her job, reliance on standing order 32 is done to prevent her from counter-acting the motivated charges framed against her, taking advantage of her inability to effectively participate in the enquiry. The other decisions relied upon are Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State Of Maharashtra [(1978) 3 SCC 544 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 1548], and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [1981-I L.L.N 270], to show that when likely consequences are more serios need for a lawyer is all the more necessary.
17. The right to be defended by a legal practitioner is not a fundamental right. It was held in A.K Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : A.I.R 1982 S.C 710] (vide supra), that
“denial of legal representation is not denial of natural justice per se, and, therefore, if a statute excludes that facility expressly, it would not be open to the Tribunal to allow.”
18. There is a specific exclusion made in standing order 32 of any outside representation in any circumstance. In Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkami [1983-I L.L.N 314] (vide supra), the regulation enabled the delinquent to have a legal practitioner if the presenting officer appointed is a legal practitioner. In dealing with the scope of this regulation, the following relevant portions in Para. 10, at page 318 of 1983-I L.L.N deserve to be extracted for comprehending as to what extent this facility had been extended:
“… Now if the rules prescribed for such an enquiry did not place an embargo on the right of the delinquent employee to be represented by a legal practitioner, the matter would be in the discretion of the enquiry officer whether looking to the nature of charges, the type of evidence and complex or simple issues that may arise in the course of enquiry, the delinquent employee in order to afford a reasonable opportunity to defend himself should be permitted to appear through a legal practitioner … We are faced with the situation where when the enquiry commenced, the rules neither provided for permitting the delinquent employee to be represented by an advocate nor an embargo was placed on such appearance. The rules were silent on this point … In this enquiry the employer would be represented by two legally trained minds at the cost of the Port Trust while the first respondent was asked either to fend for himself in person or have the assistance of another employee such as Nadkarni who is not shown to be a legally trained person but the delinquent employee cannot engage legal practitioner at his cost. Can this ensure a fair enquiry? The answer is not far to seek. Apart from any legal proposition or formulation we would consider this approach as utterly unfair and unjust. More so in the absence of rules, the Chairman of the appellant was not precluded from granting a request because the rules did not enact a negative inhibition …”
19. Hence, if a rule has been enacted inhibiting participation of an outsider (legal practitioner), but at the same time extending an opportunity of being defended by a co-employee, then it cannot be said that there is a denial of principles of natural justice (sic) if what are contemplated occasion, when enquiries are held:
20. In Olga Tells v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [(1985) 3 SCC 545] (vide supra), while dealing with the exclusion of priniciples of natural justice in S. 314(1) of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, it was held by the Supreme Court that the said section was valid, because there is a presumption that the Legislature had intended to depart from rules of natural justice. Standing order 32 does not contemplate deprivation of opportunity of being defended, and hence it cannot be claimed that it is in violation of any one of the essential principles of natural justice. As pointed out in A.K Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : A.I.R 1982 S.C 710] (vide supra), so long as a prohibition exists, and such a prohibition is valid, first respondent, which is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, cannot be told to act contrary to a valid standing order, unless Art. 14 is contravened.
21. The other contention is that in spite of a constitutional prohibition found in Art. 22(3)(b), Supreme Court having held that Art. 14 shall not be breached, when first respondent is engaging a legally trained person conversant with ‘domestic enquiries, it must also be extended such a facility (to petitioner). Standing orders do not provide for a presenting officer to be appointed by Corporation and yet in both the matters, it had chosen to appoint presenting officers, who are trained in disciplinary proceedings with considerable legal background. In Writ Petition No. 595 of 1984, the presenting officer is Sri R. Pushpavanam, Assistant Manager/Personnel Services. He is admittedly a law graduate and has acquired expertise in conducting disciplinary proceedings. In spite of being fully aware that there is no provision in standing orders for a presenting officer to be appointed, Corporation had chosen to enlist the services of a legally trained person, and, therefore, in the light of what is held in A.K Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : A.I.R 1982 S.C 710] (vide supra), in spite of a prohibition existing, once the authority chooses to take the aid of the legal practitioner or legal adviser or legally trained person to present its case, to avoid breach of Art. 14 of the Constitution, a similar facility should not be denied to the delinquent. It is apposite to extract the following sentences found therein to show that devices should not be adopted to bring about imbalance as between employer and the employee:
“… Regard must be had to the substance and not the form since, especially in matters like the proceedings of Advisory Boards, whomsoever assists or advises on facts or law must be deemed to be in the position of a legal adviser. We do hope that Advisory Boards will take care to ensure that the provisions of Art. 14 are not violated in any manner in the proceedings before them …”
This directive was given in spite of the prohibition found in Art. 22(3)(b). Therefore, realising that by retention of Sri Pushpavanam any longer, petitioner would succeed in securing the assistance of an advocate, an affidavit, dated 12 November 1984, is filed stating that a decision had since been taken to change the presenting officer and that one Sri K. Sampathkumar, Assistant Manager/Personnel Services, is appointed in the place of Sri Pushpavanam, and that he being not a law graduate, the basis on which the writ petitioner demanded the assistance of a legal practitioner no longer exists. It shows that corporation is bent upon to deprive her of being effectively defended in spite of herself more than once repeating that she was unable to secure a friend in the corporation.
22. As for Sri Sampathkumar, he has secured a diploma from Madras School of Social Work and it is one recognised under Factories Act. It is stated that this diploma course has since been recognised as leading to M.A Degree, and that after rule 4(b) of the rules framed under the Factories Act, such, a person is qualified to be appointed as welfare officer and during the study of diploma course, laws are taught, and hence, he has acquired a legal equipment, which would enable him to have a distinct advantage over that of the petitioner, who is unable to secure the assistance of anyone of the employees in the corporation. He has already acted as a presenting officer in one case and conducted one enquiry.
23. As for Sri A.A Samuel, who is concerned with the third set of charges framed and which are involved in Writ Petition No. 5015 of 1985, he has conducted 20 enquiries and acted as presenting officer in ten cases and he is a B.Sc, M.B.A, and has studied in Xavier Labour Relations Institute, Jamshedpur. He had attended a training programme on fundamentals of conducting departmental enquiries in 1981. In spite of change of presenting officer in Writ Petition No. 595 of 1984, the situation put as against the petitioner, is not in any manner changed. She has to face more than one disciplinary proceeding. In spite of herself pointing out that the corporation had falsely claimed that it had not received her telegrams, dated 16 October 1982, she had been found guilty. This is indicative of how far she is handicapped in defending herself in disciplinary proceedings. Standing order 32 is of no assistance to her because she is unable to get the assistance of a co-employee to defend herself. To this, the corporation pleads that there are 19,000 employees in its roll, of which nearly 4,000 are in southern region. That would not mean that all of them are her friends. In times of distress, in the whole world not a single friend could be secured; this is not uncommon. To get a friend or a colleague to assist may not be a problem, when a person has status, position, financially sound or affluence and the like, but when these are lost, it is the friend who becomes scarce. It is then stated that she had not furnished the names of persons whom she had approached, but refused to help her. She had already stated that none had come forward to help her, because they will have to face harassment from officials of the corporation. If she is to disclose their names what they want to aviod they would suffer. Ability to secure an effective and equally placed friend, to match the expertise relied upon by the corporation to put forth its indictments through a well-trained person, is not easily achievable, even if some friends exist. Corporation would not state that its choice of presenting officer is not based on capabilities and that persons unacquainted with what they are to do are being put on the job. To expect a likewise choice to be made by a delinquent from among her friends may not be easy. A friend in standing order 32 is not the usual friend available, but a friend to match presenting officers of corporation. She will certainly have atleast a few friends of the formal type to chat with, to go out, to dress alike or who allows to be confided with, etc. The inability she pleads is of the type of friends which standing order 32 contemplates and when it is not achievable, Art. 14 of the Constitution comes into play, as pointed out in A.K Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271 : A.I.R 1982 S.C 710] (vide supra). Such of those delinquents who are able to secure a friend to match the presenting officer would certainly avail/and are availing themselves of standing order 32. But in a given case, if a delinquent has no friends in the corporation as will happen to a newly recruited person or is unable to secure a person who would be a match to the presenting officer, then the relief claimed cannot be denied. At this juncture, it will be worth remembering that, in spite of there being no provision in the standing orders for having a presenting officer, it is the corporation which has chosen to appoint such presenting officers in its interests, treating the standing orders as if they are directory in nature. If it thinks that it could go outside the standing orders and bring about an imbalance in the disciplinary proceedings, then Art. 14 holds the field.
24. Sri K. Chandru, learned counsel for the petitioner, refers to the following decisions to show that fair play should be the hallmark for statutory corporations and that a legal practitioner helps and aids in enforcing rule of law, etc.
Dr. Subba Rao v. State of Hyderabad [A.I.R 1957 A.P 414].
Ramesh Chandra Verma v. R.D Verma [A.I.R 1958 All. 532].
Nripendra Nath Bagshi v. Chief Secretary [A.I.R 1961 Cal. 1] (D.B).
Nitya Ranjan Bohidar v. State [A.I.R 1962 Ori. 78] (D.B).
Muniswamy v. State of Mysore [A.I.R 1964 Mys. 250] (D.B).
C.L Subramaniam v. Collector Of Customs, Cochin [1972 —I L.L.J 465].
N.H Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra [(1978) 3 SCC 544 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 1548].
Kavitha Movie House v. P.M Mary [1979-I L.L.N 397].
Unreported judgment of this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 3367 and 3563 of 1977, dated 29 July 1980.
In the light of the conclusions above arrived at, they are not dealt with in extenso as part of this order.
25. Learned counsel for the petitioner also dealt with the attachment order received from Commercial Tax Department and the failure to pay subsistence allowance. As the order of attachment received by corporation had not been challenged or assailed as unenforceable, and as these aspects do not form part of these writ petitions, remedies, if any, available to petitioner will have to be worked out in appropriate proceedings, and hence those contentions are not dealt with in this order.
26. Hence, these writ petitions are allowed with costs. Counsel fees Rs. 500 in each writ petition.
Alert