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The Film Federation ... v. The Union Of India, ...
Structured Summary of the Court Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges an order of S. Natarajan, J., which refused the appellant's petition to be joined as a party-respondent in W.P. 9745 of 1984 and dismissed its petition to vacate a stay. The writ petition before the High Court (filed by the 3rd respondent) attacked the Constitutional validity of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1984. The original petitioner operates a video library business hiring out video cassettes to members for private home viewing.
The respondents in that writ petition were the Union of India and the Commissioner of Police. The High Court had granted a stay of the provisions of Sections 4(2), 5, 7 and 9 of the Amending Act. The appellant, Film Federation of India (an industry federation claiming to represent producers, distributors and other industry bodies), filed two petitions before the learned Judge: (1) to be impleaded as a party-respondent in the writ petition; and (2) to vacate the stay of the Amending Act. The learned Judge rejected the impleading petition but permitted the appellant to be heard without being formally made a party; the judge also dismissed the petition to vacate the stay on the ground that the appellant lacked status to bring such a petition. The present appeal challenges that refusal to order impleadment and to vacate the stay.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant (Film Federation of India) is a proper and/or necessary party to be impleaded as a party-respondent in a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the constitutional validity of a Central statute (the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1984).
- Whether private beneficiaries of a statute (here, the film industry represented by the appellant) may be joined as party-respondents in proceedings seeking to challenge the constitutional validity of that statute, or whether the Union/State alone must defend the enactment.
- Whether the appellant should be permitted to seek vacatur of the interim stay of sections of the Amending Act (i.e., whether it has the status to ask for dissolution of the stay).
- Whether prior allowances of impleadment in other fora (for example, the Supreme Court or in a different case concerning the Tamil Nadu Act) require the High Court to allow impleadment in this petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Chidambaram)
- The appellant is an apex federation directly and intimately connected with the film industry and its members are direct beneficiaries of the Amending Act, which is an anti-piracy measure enacted for the industry's benefit.
- Because the appellant and its members stand to be vitally affected by the outcome, it is a necessary and proper party to defend the validity of the Amending Act.
- The concept of locus standi has been given a wide interpretation and should allow beneficiaries of legislation to be heard when the legislation is attacked.
- The appellant has already been permitted to be impleaded in a writ petition concerning the same Amending Act pending in the Supreme Court (order dated 29 November 1984), and in an earlier challenge to a related Tamil Nadu statute one Judge of this Court had allowed the appellant to be added as a party-respondent; these precedents, it was argued, support impleadment here.
- The continuance of the stay would cause grave prejudice to the film industry and frustrate parliamentary objects of the Amending Act; hence the appellant also sought vacating the stay.
Opposing Arguments (as presented by Mr. Raman on behalf of the original petitioner)
- The appellant is neither a proper nor a necessary party and therefore has no right to be impleaded; when the validity of a statute is challenged, it is the State (Union/appropriate government) that is entitled and duty-bound to defend the enactment.
- Allowing beneficiaries to be impleaded would open the door to multiplicity of parties (every beneficiary or association could seek impleadment), causing procedural burdens and wasting court time because each beneficiary would claim a right to be heard.
- The appellant's true motive is to obtain vacatur of the stay; determining the validity of the enactment is for the appropriate government to decide whether and how to contest it.
- If private parties are routinely allowed to be impleaded, anomalous situations may arise where the State chooses not to appeal but an impleaded beneficiary would have the right to appeal, disrupting the normal position regarding who defends public legislation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| National Textiles Workers Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 753 | Workers (who supply labour) have locus to appear and be heard in winding up proceedings because they have an interest comparable to shareholders; they may appear to support or oppose a winding up petition until a winding up order is made. | The Court held that the ratio of this decision does not assist the present case because that decision dealt with the special relationship of workers to a company and procedural rights in winding up petitions; it is distinguishable from challenges to the constitutional validity of legislation, which involves governmental policy and is primarily for the State to defend. |
| P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam (Supreme Court decision on Article 136 jurisdiction) | The Supreme Court's Article 136 power is unique and may permit private parties (e.g., a murdered person's brother) to seek leave against an acquittal; illustrates that Art. 136 jurisdiction differs from Art. 226 relief in High Courts. | The Court noted this authority to explain that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 is not comparable to the High Court's original writ jurisdiction under Art. 226; thus the permissive approach under Art. 136 does not mandate a similar approach to impleadment under Art. 226. |
| Sukumaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (and connected petitions) – Division Bench decision (Ismail, J. & Sethuraman, J.) | The Division Bench dismissed petitions challenging a notification under Sections 3(1)(a) and 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 on the ground that the petitioners had not impleaded the respective employees or their representatives as parties. | The Court declined to follow that Division Bench view, stating the decision did not disclose the reasons for requiring impleadment of all employees and that such a requirement would have devastating consequences; the Court expressly refused to adopt that approach here. |
| General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad v. A.V.R. (K.V.R.) Sidhanti (Supreme Court) | Where administrative or policy decisions of general application are challenged, persons who might be affected (e.g., government employees) are at most proper parties and not necessary parties; non-joinder of such persons is not fatal to the petition. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision to support its conclusion that beneficiaries of a policy or statute are not necessary parties when the challenge is to the constitutionality of that policy/statutory rule; thus the appellant is not a necessary party. |
| Tamil Nadu Exhibition of Films on Television Screen through Video Cassette Recorders (Regulation) Act, 1984 — earlier challenge in this Court (reference to decision where the appellant was added as party-respondent by one Judge) | In that separate proceeding one Judge (Sathiadev, J.) had allowed the appellant-company to be added as a party-respondent. | The Court observed that that allowance in the earlier case does not conclusively decide the present question because it does not appear that the entitlement to be joined was fully debated in that earlier stage; the present case was decided on its own principles. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by analysing the nature of challenges to the constitutional validity of statutes and the role of the State in defending such enactments. The central pillars of the Court's analysis were:
- Primacy of the State's duty: A legislative enactment expresses governmental policy and it is the State (Union or State Government) which is primarily interested in and duty-bound to defend the constitutional validity of that legislation when it is challenged. Consequently, the usual and normal respondent in a challenge to a Central enactment is the Union of India.
- Distinction from private-rights litigation: The Court distinguished cases where private rights or representative public-interest enforcement are involved (where broad locus standi may be permitted) from cases where the constitutional validity of public policy embodied in a statute is in issue. Matters of statutory validity are to be adjudicated with the State as the principal defender.
- Practical and principled objections to impleading beneficiaries: If beneficiaries of a statute were routinely allowed to be impleaded as party-respondents, the Court noted practical difficulties and anomalous consequences: multiple beneficiaries and associations could demand party status, each would have a right to be heard and possibly to appeal, and courts would be obliged to hear numerous parties thereby multiplying and complicating proceedings. The Court considered such a result improper as a matter of principle and administration of justice.
- Existing procedural rule allowing hearing without impleadment: The Court relied on Rule 6 of Appendix IV of the Appellate Side Rules (as quoted in the opinion) which permits a person desiring to be heard in opposition to the petition to be heard if the court considers him a proper person to be heard; the learned Judge below complied with this by permitting the appellant to be heard without making it a party-respondent. The Court found this approach consistent with the rules.
- Distinguishing cited authorities: The Court examined authorities cited by the appellant (notably the National Textiles Workers Union decision) and explained why they were distinguishable or inapplicable. The National Textiles case dealt with the special relationship between workers and the enterprise in winding up proceedings and does not lend support for making beneficiaries of legislation into necessary or proper respondents in constitutional challenges. The Court also noted that the Supreme Court's unique Art. 136 jurisdiction cannot be equated with Article 226 jurisdiction of a High Court.
- Reliance on Supreme Court precedent on non-necessity of impleading affected persons: The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in the General Manager, South Central Railway case to reinforce that persons who might be affected by a policy decision are not necessary parties when policy or statutory rules are challenged; they may at most be proper parties. The Court found that principle applicable to the present case.
- Conclusion from principles and rules: Applying the above legal principles and the procedural rule permitting hearing without impleadment, the Court concluded that the appellant was neither a necessary nor a proper party to be made a party-respondent and that it was appropriate to dismiss the appeal seeking impleadment. The Court further considered the appellant's request to vacate the stay and dismissed the petition because the appellant lacked status to press such a petition as a party-respondent.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal is dismissed.
The Court held that the appellant, Film Federation of India, cannot be joined as a party-respondent in the writ petition challenging the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1984, because it is neither a necessary nor a proper party when the constitutional validity of a Central enactment is in issue. The Court affirmed the learned Judge's decision to permit the appellant to be heard without granting party status, and it dismissed the appellant's petition to vacate the stay on the ground that the appellant lacked the requisite status to seek that relief.
Implications and consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appellant will not be impleaded as a party-respondent in W.P. 9745 of 1984; the Union of India remains the appropriate respondent to defend the statute. The appellant may be heard in the proceedings but does not acquire the rights of a formal party-respondent (including, implicitly, the procedural consequences that attend formal party status).
- Effect on the stay: The appellant's petition to vacate the interim stay was dismissed because it lacked standing as a party to press that relief; the stay of the specified provisions of the Amending Act therefore remained in place pending further proceedings (subject to actions by the appropriate Government or the court).
- Broader doctrinal point: The Court articulated a principle that beneficiaries of legislation are not, as of right, necessary or proper parties to constitutional challenges to the statute and that the State is primarily responsible for defending public legislation. The Court cautioned against routine impleadment of beneficiaries, citing practical difficulties and potential anomalies.
- Costs: The Court ordered that there would be no order as to costs.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text of that opinion.
M.N Chandurkar, C.J
1. This is an appeal against the order of S. Natarajan, J. by which the appellant's petition for being joined as a party-respondent in W.P 9745 of 1984 has been rejected by the learned Judge. The original petitioner, the 3rd respondent, has filed a petition challenging the Constitutional validity of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1984. The petitioner carries on the business of running a Video library where it hires out to its members Video cassettes on a fixed hire to enable the hirers to view these cassettes in the privacy of their homes through a video cassette player attached to a television unit.
2. The respondents in the petition are the Union of India and the Commissioner of Police. It appears that the Commissioner of Police has been joined as a party, because the offences provided for in the Copyright Act have been made non-bailable and punishable with harsh and disproprotionate penalties without the owner of the copyright complaining about any infringement.
3. The learned Judge heard the petition and has granted a stay of the provisions of Ss. 4(2), 5, 7 and 9 of the Amending Act.
4. The appellant filed two petitions before the learned Judge, one for being impleaded as a party respondent to the petition and the other for vacating the stay order. The appellant is a Company known as Film Federation of India and claims to he an apex federation body of several associations from different States, such as Producers' Councils, Distributors' Councils, etc. The appellant claims to be directly and intimately connected with the film industry whose members earn their livelihood through the film industry. The appellant claims that the amendment which is an anti-piracy measure is enacted for the benefit of the cinema industry. The appellant has stated that it would be the most appropriate body to espouse the cause of the film industry since the film industry is interested in upholding the validity of the Act, and, therefore, the appellant is a necessary and proper party.
5. In a common affidavit filed, the appellant has asked for vacating of the stay order because the continuance of the stay order would cause grave prejudice to the film industry and would frustrate the objects for which the Parliament has enacted the Amending Act.
6. The prayer for being joined as a party and for vacating the stay order was strenuously opposed on behalf of the original petitioner. The learned Judge has rejected both the petitions holding that though the amendment has been made with a view to safeguard the revenues of the public exchequer as well as the interests of the producers, it is only the concerned Government which is entitled to defend a legislation made by the Union Parliament or a State Legislature, when it is attacked on the ground of unconstitutionality. The learned Judge held that private parties, however much interested they may be in the outcome of the proceedings, cannot seek parity of status or treatment with the Government in such matters. The learned Judge took the view that the appellant could at best be an intervener or an observer and render assistance to the court when determining the question of validity. Taking any other view, according to the learned Judge, would mean that in every petition filed to challenge the validity of a Central or State Act, the beneficiaries under the Act would seek impleadment in the proceedings and take the litigation to a personal level between it or themselves, on the one hand, and the petitioners, on the other.
7. Though the petition for impleading was rejected, the learned Judge directed that the appellant could be heard in the proceedings, but without a right to get itself impleaded as a party-respondent and be given an opportunity to make its representations on the merits of the case. Having made the above observations, the learned Judge dismissed the petition for vacating the stay order on the ground that the appellant will not have any status to file such a petition.
8. Challenging the view taken by the learned Judge, it is vehemently contended by Mr. Chidambaram that the appellant is vitally interested in sustaining the validity of the Amending Act because the members of the appellant-company are the beneficiaries for whose benefit the amendment in the Copyright Act was made. The learned counsel also contended that the Amending Act has also been challenged in the Supreme Court and the appellant-company has already been allowed to be impleaded at its instance in the writ petition pending in the Supreme Court by order dated 29th November, 1984 made during the vacation. According to the learned counsel, since the Supreme Court has allowed the appellant-company to be joined as a party to a petition pending in the Supreme Court, in which the same amending Act has been challenged, there is no reason why the appellant-company should be given a different treatment in this Court when the subject matter of the writ petition is the same as in the Supreme Court.
9. By way of a precedent, it is pointed out that when a similar legislation, namely, the Tamil Nadu Exhibition of Films on Television Screen through Video Cassette Recorders (Regulation) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tamil Nadu Act’) was challenged in this Court, one of us (Sathiadev, J.) had allowed the appellant-company to be added as a party-respondent. It may be noted that certain provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act were struck down by the Division Bench of this Court and in the appeal pending in the Supreme Court the judgment of this Court has been stayed. In addition to this, it is also urged that the concept of locus standi is now given a very wide interpretation, and if the appellant is interested in sustaining a legislation which is made for their benefit, the appellant should be allowed to be joined as a party respondent.
10. Mr. Raman has vehemently opposed the petition for the appellant being impleaded as a party-respondent. According to him, the appellant is neither a proper nor a necessary party and has no right to be made a party. Mr. Raman has vehemently contended that it is for the State or the Union of India, as the case may be, to satisfy the court that the impugned statute is a valid statute, and if a private litigant or a citizen is allowed to be joined as a party in a case where a legislative enactment is challenged, then it is possible that any number of persons who are beneficiaries of the statute would come forward wanting to be joined as parties arid this will necessarily involve a cumbersome procedure and the court will then be bound to hear each of the individual beneficiaries which would involve waste of time. The learned counsel also pointed out that the sole object of the appellant for getting impleaded is to have the stay vacated. This position is not in dispute. According to the learned counsel, it is for the appropriate Government to decide whether and how far it will agitate the contest involving the validity of an enactment.
11. There is no doubt that the Amending Act was sought to be enacted by way of an anti-piracy measure to protect the interests of the several persons connected with the production and distribution of cinematograph films. It is also true that the concept of locus standi is a growing concept but the locus standi as a growing concept has been interpreted with a view to enable an easy approach to a court of justice for relief. In our view, a matter involving the Constitutional validity of a statute must be considered on a different footing than cases where either rights of private parties are involved or some member of the public is seeking to agitate the enforcement of certain rights on behalf of a section of the public who are entitled to the benefit of those rights. A legislation, whether it is a State Legislation or Central Legislation, is always intended for the benefit of the citizens generally or of a section of the public. But so far as the Constitutional validity is concerned, primarily it is the State Government or the Union Government as the case may be, which is not only interested but is duty bound to have the validity of the legislation sustained, when its Constitutional validity is challenged. If a principle is accepted that every person for whose benefit a legislation is made is entitled to be heard with regard to the Constitutional validity, it would be difficult to distinguish between a beneficiary or set of beneficiaries, and another beneficiary or set of beneficiaries, the interests of the public may be represented by more than one Association and if one Association is allowed on a matter of principle to be joined as a respondent enabling it to canvass the constitutional validity of the impugned enactment, then it would be difficult to prevent any other Association or even an individual not to allow itself or himself to be joined as parties. Such a course, if adopted is beset with innumerable difficulties in so far as such matters are concerned. We are concerned here more with a matter of principle than the limited question as to whether the appellant is entitled to be joined as a party respondent. Admittedly, the ground on which the appellant wants to be joined as a party respondent is that it is vitally interested in seeking that the validity of the Amending Act is sustained because the members of the appellant-company are beneficiaries of the Amending Act. It is only if the principle is accepted that a beneficiary of a statute is entitled to be heard in addition to the State or Union Government, as the case may be, in support of a statutory enactment, that the appellant can be allowed to be joined as a party. We are afraid if this principle is accepted in the case of a statutory enactment, there will be numberless persons or Associations who may claim to be joined as parties as they are beneficiaries of the impuged enactment, and once they are joined as parties, the court cannot decline to hear them because they will have a right to be heard. Such a course, in our view, would be wholly improper because at the very threshold such persons or associations are not at all either proper or necessary parties to a petition when the statute is challenged. The appellant cannot be considered either as proper party or a necessary party. It is clearly not a necessary party. Relief is claimed only against Union of India and no other party. This is not a matter involving any individual rights and it is enough that the Union of India is a respondent when the question of validity of the Central enactment is to be adjudicated upon. It is enough if the Union of India is on record even if a declaration of invalidity is to be granted. The presence of any additional party is wholly unnecessary.
12. The appellant cannot also be considered as a proper party because for the adjudication of the validity of a State or Central enactment, the presence of any other party is not at all necessary. The question as to whether a person is a proper party arises only when the rights canvassed by the plaintiff or the petitioner are to be adjudicated and it is not possible to properly adjudicate those rights in the absence of some other party. In that sense, such a question can not arise where the only question involved is with regard to the constitutional validity with which the State Government or the Union of India is alone interested.
13. The mere fact that the appellant has been allowed to be joined as a respondent in the Supreme Court will not enable the appellant to be joined as a party respondent to the petition. The proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India are governed by the rules in Appendix IV of the Appellate Side Rules. There is no specific rule providing for any particular respondent to be joined and, therefore the normal rule must be that a party against whom a relief is asked must be joined as a respondent. Such a party in a case like the instant one is only the Union of India. R. 6 then reads as follows—
“At the hearing of the petition, any person who desires to be heard in opposition to the petition and appears to the court to be a proper person to be heard, shall be heard, notwithstanding that he has not been served with notice, and subject to such conditions as to costs as the court may deem fit to impose.”
This rule specifically refers to a person who desires to be heard in opposition to the petition being heard but that is only if it appears to the court to be a proper person to be heard. The learned Judge has not declined to hear the appellant, what he has declined to do is to make the appellant a party respondent in the petition. Such a course cannot be said to be contrary to the requirements of R. 6.
14. The circumstance that in a similar petition challenging the Tamil Nadu Act, the appellant was joined as a party-respondent by itself will not conclude the matter because it does not appear that the question as to whether the appellant was entitled to be joined was not seriously debated at that stage.
15. It is true that in National Textiles Workers Union v. P.R Ramakrishnan . A.I.R 1983 S.C 753 the Suprme Court has held that the workers of a company are entitled to appear at the hearing of the winding up petition and whether to support or to oppose it so long as no winding up order is made by the Court and that the workers have a locus to appear and be heard in the winding up petition both before the winding up petition is admitted and and an order of advertisement is made as also after the admission and advertisement of the winding up petition until an order is made for winding up the company. The Supreme Court also held that if a winding up order is made and the workers are aggrieved by it, they would also be entitled to prefer an appeal and contend in the appeal that no winding up order should have been made by the Company.
16. It has to be noted that the above decision has to be read in the light of the view which the Supreme Court took in relation to the workers vis-a-vis the company. In paragraph 6 the Supreme Court pointed out that it is not only the shareholders, who have supplied capital, who are interested in the enterprise which is being run by a company but the workers who supply labour are also equally, if not more, interested because what is produced by the enterprise is the result of labour as well as capital. The workers were held to have a special place in a socialistic pattern of society as producers of wealth as much as capital. The Supreme Court also has pointed out the distinction between a right to make an application for winding up and a right to oppose a winding up petition. In paragraph 7 it was pointed out that merely because the right to apply for winding up a company is not expressly given to the workers, it did not mean that they cannot appear to support or oppose a winding up petition which is properly filed by one of the other persons specified in S. 439. The reason for that decision is also apparent from the observations made in paragraph 8 where the Supreme Court pointed out. ..
“…If the interest of the workers has to be taken into account, the workers must have a say because they know best where their interest lies and they must have an opportunity of placing before the Court relevant material bearing upon their interest.”
The ratio of the said decision, in our view, cannot be of any assistance in the present case. We are dealing with a legislative enactment which is the outcome of implementation of a policy which is adopted by the Government. A legislative enactment is intended to give effect to some policy and implement it. Private litigants or persons who happen to be beneficiaries of such a policy enacted in the form of legislation can really have no say in a matter which is exclusively within the domain of the Governmental activity. It is primarily and wholly for the Government to support its own legislation, though in case the Court wants some assistance, the court can permit a party to intervense, but that is for the limited purpose of assistance to the court for deciding the dispute before it. An anomalous situation may arise if a beneficiary is allowed to be joined as a party-respondent in a case where if the petition is allowed, the State may be advised not to pursue the matter further, while the party respondent by virtue of being a respondent would have a right of appeal. Thus an anomalous situation would be created where though the Stale does not desire to challenge the decision of the High Court, a party respondent would insist upon canvassing the validity of an enactment.
17. Some reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in P.S.R Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam in which the Supreme Court was dealing with the scope of Art. 136 which, according to the Supreme Court is a unique jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and it is open to the Supreme Court to grant special leave and entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of private parties. That was a case in which against an acquittal of the accused in a case of murder, a brother of the murdered deceased who was neither a complainant nor a first informant asked for leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution and leave was granted. The power of the Supreme Court under Art. 136 is, as the Supreme Court quoted, a unique jurisdiction and the original jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the High Court cannot be compared with that jurisdiction.
18. It may, however, be stated that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union of India has no objection to the appellant being joined as a respondent. That concession, however, is not relevant for deciding a question which has been so exhaustively and vehemently argued on both sides. Having given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced before us, notwithstanding the modern trend of widening the concept of locus and with a view to make accessibility to courts of justice easy, we are satisfied that in the instant case, wherein what is sought to be done is not to put the law in motion, but to make an attempt to defend a legislation, the appellant cannot be said to be either a proper or necessary party, nor can he be allowed to be joined as a party respondent. Consequently, this appeal must fail and is dismissed.
19. When this order was ready for being delivered, the learned counsel for appellant has brought to our notice a decision of Ismail, J. (as he then was) and Sethuraman, J. dismissing Sukumaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, and connected petitions, which challenged the validity of the notification issued under Ss. 3(1)(a) and 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 31st December, 1976 and holding that—
“The petitioners have not impleaded the respective employees or the representatives of the employees as parties to the writ petitions”.
The Division Bench took the view that in the event of the petitioners succeeding in the writ petitions, the persons who would by really affected would be the employees and they have not been impleaded as parties, and in their absence, no relief can be given to the petitioners therein. We are unable to follow the view taken by the Division Bench, firstly because the judgment does not disclose the reasons which weighed with the Division Bench when they took the view that all the employees who will be affected by the quashing of the notification under the Minimum Wages Act were necessary parties to the petition. Secondly, the view taken by the Division Bench seems to run counter to the decision of the Supreme Court in the General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad v. A.V.R Sidhanti . W.P 300 of 1977..
20. We have read the order of the learned Judges of the Division Bench, and we are of the view that the effect of the observations made by the Division Bench would be devastating. The notification under the Minimum Wages Act fixed the minimum rates of wages for employees in hotels and restaurants with reference to different categories of employees working therein. It appears from the order that the petitioners in the petition before the Division Bench were carrying on business in hotels and restaurants in areas within the limits of the Municipalities of Madurai, Coimbatore, Salem and Tiruchi. If the order of the Division Bench is to be complied with, then if a petition is filed in a representative capacity by hotel owners every employee in hotels and restaurants in all the cities will have to be made parties, which is next to impossible. The mere fact that the persons for whose benefit the notification fixing minimum wages was issued would be adversely affected will not make such employees necessary or proper parties to the petition, because no relief is asked against them. As a matter of fact, when a petitioner comes to court challenging a particular Government order, which is for the benefit of several people, the relief to be granted depends only upon the validity of the impugned action of the Government. If the impugned action of the Government it held to be constitutionally invalid, the mere fact that persons for whose benefit the action was taken would be deprived of that benefit, does not make it necessary for all those affected persons to be made parties. In the decision of the Supreme Court in the General Manager, South Central Railway Secunderabad v. K.V.R Sidhanti cited supra, the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that where policy decisions are challenged, the Government servants, who will be affected, if the challenge to the policy decision is upheld, are not necessary parties at all. The Supreme Court in that decision was concerned with certain administrative rules of general application, regulating (sic) absorption in permanent departments, fixation of seniority, pay, etc., of the employees of the erstwhile grain-shop departments. One of the objections raised before the Supreme Court was that the petitioners did not implead about 120 employees who were likely to be affected by the decision in the case, and since those employees were necessary parties, their nonjoinder is fatal to the petition. Repelling this objection, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 20 of the judgment as follows—
“As regards the second objection, it is to be noted that the decisions of the Railway Board impugned in the writ petition contain administrative rules of general application, regulating absorption in permanent departments, fixation of seniority, pay, etc. of the employees of the erstwhile grain-shop departments. The respondents-petitioners are impeaching the validity of those policy decisions on the ground of their being violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The proceedings are analogous to those in which the constitutionality of a statutory rule regulating seniority of Government servant is assailed. In such proceedings the necessary parties to be impleaded, are those against whom the relief is sought, and in whose absence no effective decision can be rendered by the court.
In the present case, the relief is claimed only against the Railway which has been impleaded through its representative. No list or order fixing seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis particular individuals, pursuant to the impugned decisions, is being challenged. The employees who were likely to be affected as a result of the re-adjustment of the petitioner's seniority in accordance with the Board's decision of October 16, 1952 were at the most, proper parties and not necessary parties, and their non-joinder could not be fatal to the writ petition.”
These observations, in our view, indicate that the view taken by the Division Bench in W.P No. 300 of 1977 is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court.
21. The above mentioned decision of the Supreme Court lends support to the conclusion which we have already reached that the appellant is not a necessary party to the petition at all. The observations of the Supreme Court, which indicate that administrative rules regarding seniority were analogous to statutory rules, and the proceedings in the writ petition challenging the administrative order were analogous to those in which the constitutionality of a statutory rule is challenged apply with equal force to the matter before us. What is challenged before us is the statute itself, and in such a case, in our view, as already indicated, the only necessary and proper party is the Union of India. Accordingly, as already indicated, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
VCS.
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