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S. Balasubramanian. v. Shamsu Thalreez And Others.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Nainar Sundaram, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit (O.S. No. 66 of 1974 before the Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli) was instituted seeking a declaration that a lease claimed by the first defendant is null and void, that the first defendant has no right to enjoy the suit properties, and for recovery of possession with past and future damages. The suit alleged that under a wakfnama dated 20 December 1931 the properties were endowed to Hameem Palli Madrasa wakf and that the first plaintiff and certain defendants were the turn huqdars. It was alleged that the second defendant, without authority, leased the scheduled properties to the first defendant, and that the lease lacked consent of all huqdars and the sanction of the Wakf Board.
Prior litigation (O.S. 15 of 1969) had resulted in an injunction against defendants 2 to 4 and a decree declaring defendants 2 and 3 unfit to be muthavallis; the plaintiffs relied on this as additional ground to attack the lease. The first defendant contended that the lease was valid, that the second defendant was a trustee with power to lease, that the first defendant had been recorded as the cultivating tenant by the Record Officer, and that damages claimed were not sustainable. Defendants 2 and 3 supported the first defendant; defendants 4 and 5 were ex parte; the sixth defendant supported the plaintiffs.
The court below framed five issues: (1) validity of the lease executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant; (2) entitlement of plaintiffs to damages; (3) whether the first defendant is a cultivating tenant; (4) entitlement of plaintiffs to recover possession; and (5) reliefs to which plaintiffs are entitled. The trial court answered issues 1–3 in favour of the plaintiffs, held the plaintiffs entitled to possession and damages, and granted the decree with costs. The first defendant (the appellant) appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the lease in favour of the first defendant executed by the second defendant is valid.
- Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any amount by way of damages.
- Whether the first defendant is a cultivating tenant as claimed by him.
- Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession prayed for.
- To what reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled.
Arguments of the Parties
First Defendant / Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)
- The first defendant had been registered as a cultivating tenant under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act, 1969 (the Act) on 15 January 1973 (Ex. B1), and that registration is conclusive and final for want of further challenge under the Act.
- The validity of the Record Officer's order (Ex. B1) had not been specifically challenged by the plaintiffs by proper pleading; therefore the civil court cannot reexamine or sit in judgment over that order as if it were an appellate forum.
- As a subsidiary point, any alienation (including a lease) during the currency of an order of injunction does not necessarily render the lease void (this argument was advanced but not decided because the primary ground was sustained).
Plaintiffs / Respondents' Arguments (as recorded)
- The plaintiffs contended that the alleged lease was invalid because not all huqdars consented and the Wakf Board sanction was lacking; asserted that the first defendant was a trespasser.
- Counsel for the second plaintiff (Mr. T. Vadivelu) argued that the civil court could reopen the matter despite the decision under the Act and suggested that the Muthavalli was only a manager and that a lessee under him could not acquire the rights of a cultivating tenant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Periathambi Goundan v. The District Revenue Officer, Coimbatore, 93 L.W. 169 (Full Bench) | The Full Bench explained the scope of the authority of the Record Officer and other authorities under the Act, including that once a Record Officer determines that land has been let for cultivation by a tenant, the matters under Section 3(2) must be determined by the authority and, subject to qualifications regarding jurisdictional issues, the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by Section 16-A of the Act. | The court relied on this Full Bench ratio to hold that the Record Officer's registration (Ex. B1) governs and that the civil court cannot reopen or sit in judgment over the authority's determination except on recognized grounds (e.g., fraud, collusion) which were not pleaded or proved by the plaintiffs; this supported allowing the appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in these main steps, based on the material and law set out in the opinion:
- Fact of registration: The court accepted that Ex. B1 showed the first defendant was registered as a cultivating tenant under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act, 1969, and that this fact was also admitted in paragraph 7 of the first defendant's written statement.
- Failure to challenge: The court noted that neither the original plaintiff nor the second plaintiff filed any further pleading (for example, a reply) attacking Ex. B1 on tenable grounds cognizable by civil courts (such as fraud or collusion). Because no such plea was put forward, the court proceeded on the basis that the plaintiffs had not challenged the order as vitiated.
- Legal rule on exclusion of civil jurisdiction: The court explained the well‑established principle that where a statute creates an authority to decide specified questions and provides a statutory mechanism for further challenge, a general suit in a civil court on those matters will be barred—particularly where the statute declares the determination of the authority to be final—subject to recognized exceptions (fraud, collusion, etc.).
- Precedent application and qualification: The court summarized the Full Bench decision in Periathambi Goundan v. The District Revenue Officer (93 L.W. 169) which clarified that certain jurisdictional questions (for example, whether land has been let for cultivation by a tenant at all) are matters the Record Officer must decide before he can go on to other particulars under Section 3(2); and that once the Record Officer has concluded that land was let for cultivation, to that extent the civil court's jurisdiction is barred by Section 16-A—subject to the qualification that jurisdictional issues are not made exclusively immune from civil court scrutiny if the civil court decision precedes the administrative decision or if fraud/collusion is shown.
- Application to the present facts: Applying that principle, the court held that the Record Officer's order (Ex. B1) was a determination under the Act that must govern unless set aside by a process known to law. Because the plaintiffs had not pleaded or proved any grounds (fraud, collusion, etc.) to vitiate Ex. B1, the civil court could not sit in appellate judgment over the Record Officer's determination in the subsequent suit for possession.
- Disposition of subsidiary points: The court observed that other arguments (for example, whether an alienation during an injunction renders a lease void, or whether a lessee under a muthavalli can obtain cultivating-tenant rights) were advanced by counsel but were not considered because the primary statutory ground supporting the appellant prevailed.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside; and the suit stands dismissed.
Consequences and implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The first defendant's registration as a cultivating tenant under the Act (Ex. B1) was held to govern and to provide a defence to the plaintiff's action for possession; accordingly the plaintiffs' decree for possession and damages was set aside and the suit dismissed.
- Procedural consequence: The civil court was held not to be entitled to re-adjudicate or sit in judgment over the administrative determination made under the Act in the absence of a successful challenge to that administrative determination by a process available under the Act or other recognized legal remedies (e.g., proof of fraud or collusion), which were not pleaded or proved here.
- Costs: The court made no order as to costs in the suit or in the appeal.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applied prior Full Bench authority to interpret the exclusion of civil jurisdiction under the Act; the court did not state that it was creating a new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles and authority.
End of summary — based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.
Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. The first defendant in O.S No. 66 of 1974 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, is the appellant in this appeal. The first respondent is the second plaintiff and respondents 2 to 5 are defendants 2 to 4 and 6 in the suit. It must be noted that the original plaintiff died and the second plaintiff got added as his legal representative in the suit itself, The suit was filed for a declaration that the lease claimed by the first defendant is null and void and the first defendant has no right to enjoy and consequently, the relief of possession was also asked for with damages, past and future. The suit was filed on the following allegations:— Under the wakfnama, dated 20th December, 1931, the suit properties were the subject matter of endowment to Hameem Palli Madrasa wakf absolutely and the first plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 are the turn huqdars. The second defendant without any authority, leased the scheduled properties to the first defendant. The aileged lease in favour of the first defendant is not valid since all the huqdars had not consented for the same and the second defendant alone could not permit the first defendant to enter into and cultivate the suit properties. The sanction of the Wakf Board is lacking. The first defendant is only a trespasser. In O.S 15 of 1969 on the file of the court below, an order of injunction was obtained against defendants 2 to 4, not to effect any transfer of the suit properties in any manner and subsequently, the suit was decreed, declaring that defendants 2 and 3 are unfit to be the muthavallis. The plaintiffs claimed that on this ground also, the alleged lease is null and void. The first defendant contested the suit stating that the lease in his favour is valid and is for the benefit of the wakf; the second defendant was the trustee of the scheduled properties on the relevant date and he had authority to lease; the litigation in O.S 15 of 1969 is irrelevant and; could not affect the contractual obligations; the first defendant has been recorded as the cultivating tenant of the scheduled properties by the Record Officer. Tirunelveli, and it could not be questioned and assailed by the plaintiff; and further, the claim for damages is not sustainable. We are not very much concerned with the written statement of defendants 2 and 3, who sailed with the first defendant, because we find that they have not prosecuted their defence effectively before the court below. Defendants 4 and 5 remained ex parte. The sixth defendant supported the case of the plaintiff. Reflecting the controversy that arose on the pleadings of the parties, the court below formulated and set forth the following issues for its decision:—
“1. Whether the lease in favour of the first defendant executed by the second defendant is not valid?
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any amount by way of damages?
3. Whether the first defendant is cultivating tenant as claimed by him?
4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession prayed for?
5. To what reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled?
On issues Nos. 1 to 3, the court below came to the conclusion that the lease in favour of the first defendant, executed by the second defendant, is not valid; the first defendant is not a cultivating tenant, as claimed by him; and the plaintiff is entitled to damages as claimed in the suit. As a result, on issue No. 4, the court below held that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession during his term as turn huqdar and granted the plaintiff the decree as prayed for with costs. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the court below.
2. Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the first defendant— the appellant herein, amongst other contentions, would primarily submit that the first defendant, even as early as 15 January, 1973, as per Ex B 1, got himself registered as a cultivating tenant under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act 10 of 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and that order has become conclusive and final for want of further agitation over it under the Act; and even otherwise, the validity of that order has not been challenged specificaliy by the plaintiff by taking any appropriate pleading setting forth tenable grounds therefor even though this contention has been put forth by the first defendant in paragraph 7 of his written statement, which we shall presently advert to, and the authority constituted under the Act having passed that order, the civil court cannot sit over in jadgment over that order and adjudicate the propriety or otherwise of such an order, as if it is an appellate forum. We find that this submission of the learned counsel deserves acceptance. Irrespective of the other contentions raised by the parties in the suit, the fact remains that as per Ex. B 1, the first defendant got himself registered as a cultivating tenant under the Act. This fact has been clearly referred to in paragraph 7 of the written statement of the first defendant, which runs as follows —
“This defendant has been accepted as the cultivating tenant of the suit property by the Record Officer (Tahsildar), Tirunelveli. Under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969 this defendant's name has been entered in the register, maintained for that purpose. The entry in the register of tenancy rights cannot be questioned or assailed in a court of law. Under S. 15 of the said Act, the entry should be presumed to be true and correct until the finding is altered or set aside by the forums specified therein.”
Significantly, neither the original plaintiff nor the second plaintiff chose to put forth any further pleading, such as a reply statement, attacking the order on any tenable ground to be countenanced by civil courts, such as fraud, collusion, etc, and seeking to set aside the said order on any such basis. Hence, we have to proceed on the basis that the plaintiffs have not put forth any plea attacking this order, as standing vitiated on any tenable ground, such as fraud, collusion, etc., so as to come within the purview of the civil court's jurisdiction.
3. Where an authority is constituted under an Act of legislature, conferring on him jurisdiction, for the purpose of determining questions arising under it and if that authority has exercised the jurisdiction vested in him and has rendered his determination, and furthermore as against the said determination, the machinery for further agitation has also been delineated in the Act itself, then the general remedy of suit before a civil court will be barred. This is more so when the provisions of the Act say that the determination of the ultimate authority under it is final. There are exceptions to the above rule, such as where orders have been obtained by fraud, collusion, etc. As stated above, we are not facing any such plea put forth by the plaintiff.
4. We must countenance that on the question of a person getting registered as a cultivating tenant, the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act is ample enough to determine the controversy relating to the factum of demise, the subject matter of demise, the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant and the propriety, factual and legal, of the demise and such other jurisdictional issues. While considering the question of exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court by virtue of Sec. 16-A of the Act, a Full Bench of this Court, in Periathambi Goundan v. The District Revenue Officer, Coimbatore . 93 L.W 169., set out the ratio in the following terms—
“… For instance, the statutory requirement for the preparation of a record under the Act is that the land must have been let out for cultivation by a tenant. A controversy may arise whether the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant at all. The question to be considered is, whether the determination of that controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act so as to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court under S. 16-A. From the language of S. 3 (2) it cannot be stated that the determination of that controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act, though the determination of that controversy is basic and fundamental to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Record Officer and the other authorities under the Act. The very object of the Act is to provide for the preparation and maintenance of record of tenancy rights in respect of agricultural lands and therefore if there is no tenancy in respect of a land, there is no question of any further particulars being determined. This aspect is made clear even from the definition of the expression ‘land owner’ occurring in S. 2(5) of the Act because according to the said definition, ‘land owner’ means the owner of the land let for cultivation by a tenant and includes the heirs; assignees, or legal representatives of such owner or persons deriving rights through him. Consequently, the controversy as to whether a particular piece of land has been let for cultivation by a tenant or not is one constituting the jurisdictional issue which a Record Officer has to decide before he can determine any other matter under the Act. But that controversy cannot be said to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act, because to hold so will enable the statutory authorities to assume jurisdiction by erroneously deciding the jurisdictional issue. If the controversy arises, the authorities functioning under the Act have necessarily to decide the same, because a decision on that controversy alone will determine the jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act. If the decision is that the land has been let out for cultivation by a tenant, then the Record Officer will have jurisdiction to determine the further particulars provided for in Sec. 3(2) of the Act. If, on the other hand, the decision of the controversy is that the land has not been let for cultivation by a tenant, there is no question of there being any tenancy rights in respect of the said land and consequently, there is no question of the Record Officer ascertaining or determining any further particulars in this behalf. Therefore, if such controversy arises, that controversy cannot be said to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act, and any determination of that controversy by the authorities can be said to be only incidental to the assumption of jurisdiction by the authorities under the Act. Subject to this qualification, it can be held that once the Record Officer or any other authority functioning under the Act has come to the conclusion that the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant, the matters provided for in S. 3(2) have to be determined by the Record Officer, or other authority functioning under the Act, and to that extent the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred under Sec. 16-A of the Act”.
If a controversy arises on any of the aspects, referred to by roe, above, the authority functioning under the Act has also jurisdiction to decide the same, because a decision over that controversy alone will determine the jurisdiction of the authority functioning under the Act to proceed further to determine any other matter under the Act. The fact that the controversy over the above aspects were not raised, put in issue and decided by the authority under the Act is of no legal consequence to whittle down the binding nature of the ultimate order. In such a case also the ultimate decision with regard to cognizance of tenancy rights by the authority under the Act will govern Hence, we cannot subscribe our support to the view now advanced by Mr. T. Vadivelu, learned counsel appearing for the second plaintiff, that the civil court, in spite of the decision rendered by the authority under the Act, could reopen the matter and give a different decision on this question. It would be a different matter if the matter had gone to the civil court and a decision had been rendered by the civil court on these questions anterior to the decision of the authority under the Act and the civil court thereby holding that the lease in favour of the first defendant by the second defendant could not be legally sustained and has got to be ignored in the eye of law. The Civil Court can certainly go into these jurisdictional issues, which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authcrity under the Act. But, such is not the case here. When the authority constituted under the Act has decided the ultimate question under the Act within his jurisdiction and competency and which he is enjoined to decide in the proceedings under the Act, it is not open to the civil court in a subsequent suit to sit in judgment over the same, as if it is an appellate authority and render a different decision. As we stated above, we are not called upon to test a plea properly put forth in the his that the order passed by the authority stands vitiated on any ground like fraud, collusion, etc. We do not find any plea and furthermore there is no proof. In the said circumstances, the order Ex B 1, passed by the authority under the Act will have to govern until and unless it is set aside by any process known to law, including the process, if any, available under the Act and that will provide an answer for the first defendant to the action for possession prosecuted by the second plaintiff. Sustaining this ground put forth by the learned counsel for the first defendant, the appellant herein, we are obliged to interfere in appeal.
5. We must also record that Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned counsel for the first defendant, advanced the argument that any alienation, including a lease, during the currency of any order of injunction, will not make the lease itself a void one. Equally so, Mr. T. Vadivelu, learned counsel for the second plaintiff, advanced a submission that the Muthavalli fulfilled only the character of a manager, the property vesting in the Almighty, and a lessee under him cannot acquire the rights of a cultivating tenant. We have no occasion to go into these aspects, because we have sustained the primary ground of attack put forth by the learned counsel for the first defendant, appellant herein. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside; and the suit will stand dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs, both in the suit and in this appeal.
VCS.
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