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K.J. Srinivasan And Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Hpcl And Ors.

Madras High Court
Jan 3, 1986
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Summary of Opinion (Second Appeal and Revision) — Remittal for Determination of Actual Physical Possession under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit property was a site which the original plaintiff had leased to the first defendant. The lease was determined and the plaintiff sued for recovery of possession and damages for use and occupation. The defendants resisted, relying on protections under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (referred to in the opinion as "the Act").

Independently, the second defendant filed an application under Section 9 of the Act seeking a direction to the plaintiff to sell the entire suit site at a court-fixed price. The plaintiff replied, in an additional counter and rejoinder, that the site had been sublet to N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and that the subtenancy had existed for more than 20 years; the rejoinder (as summarized by the first court) denied the allegation of subletting and instead described the relationship with N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai as one of dealership and a licence agreement under which the firm paid licence fees (Rs. 125 + Rs. 50 per month) and did not have tenancy rights or pay rent.

The first court considered both the suit and the Section 9 application together: it rejected the plaintiff's case of subletting, allowed the Section 9 application by the second defendant, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed (and appeals were prosecuted by the plaintiff's legal representatives after his death). The lower appellate court agreed with the first court on the relevant aspects, dismissed the appeals, but directed restoration of the suit to proceed further under the Act. The present second appeal challenges the judgment and decree in the appeal arising out of the suit, and a civil revision challenges the order in the appeal arising out of the Section 9 application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants (or the defendant claiming benefits under the Act) were in "actual physical possession" of the land and building within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, such that they could claim protection under the Act (including the consequences in relation to the Section 9 application).
  2. Whether the Section 9 application seeking direction for sale of the suit site is maintainable in law given the contention that the tenant had allegedly been out of possession (i.e., subletting or licence to a third party) and whether such factual aspects were properly considered by the courts below.
  3. Whether the lower courts erred in not adverting to the statutory requirement of actual physical possession (as reflected in Section 2(4) after amendment) and the line of precedent emphasising that requirement.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami)

  • The rejoinder filed by the plaintiff's side (as summarized in the first court's judgment) indicates that the defendants who claim benefits of the Act were not in actual physical possession; the tenant was out of possession.
  • Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act (after amendment by Tamil Nadu Act XXIV of 1973) requires continuance in actual physical possession as a condition for claiming benefits under the Act; therefore, if the tenant is not in actual physical possession, he cannot claim the Act's protections.
  • It is sufficient to establish that a third party (e.g., N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai) was in physical possession — whether by subtenancy or licence — because the crucial requirement for protection under the Act is that the tenant himself continues in actual physical possession.

Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. S. Ramasubramaniam)

  • The courts below did not concentrate on the aspect of actual physical possession, but the plaintiff's act of laying a suit for recovery of possession should be taken to imply that the plaintiff admitted the defendants were in actual physical possession.
  • Implicitly, the respondents contended that the lower courts' focus and findings (which rejected subletting and countenanced the Section 9 application) should stand.

Both sides, and the courts below, admitted that they did not sufficiently concentrate on and lead evidence regarding the question of the tenant's actual physical possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Mallik v. Fr. Joseph Sandanam Affirmation that, after the 1973 amendment (Tamil Nadu Act XXIV of 1973), continuance of possession and actual physical possession are necessary to claim protection under the Act. Used as an authority to support the proposition that actual physical possession is necessary for claiming benefits under the Act; the court relied on this as part of the body of precedent demonstrating the statutory requirement.
Haridas Girdhardas v. Varadaraja Pillai (1976) 89 L.W. 1 Held, after taking note of the extended definition introduced by the 1973 amendment, that the tenant must continue in actual possession of the land and building to claim protection. Relied on to show consistent judicial interpretation that actual possession is a prerequisite under the amended definition of "tenant".
Ananthakrishnan Nair v. Dr. Ramakrishnan (1977) 2 M.L.J. 98 Statement that the amended provision makes clear that continuance in possession and actual physical possession are necessary indicia for claiming protection under the Act. Cited as further supporting authority for the statutory interpretation favouring the requirement of actual physical possession.
T.R.P. Raja Sekara Bhoopathi v. Navaneethammal (1979) 92 L.W. 259 Dealt with subletting; held that physical and actual possession of the land and building is a sine qua non to claim statutory entitlements under Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act; if a tenant has parted with actual physical possession, he cannot claim benefits. Quoted and relied upon in passages emphasising that actual physical possession is the primordial requirement to claim benefits under the Act; used by the court as principal judicial guidance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by outlining the relevant factual matrix and the pleadings: the plaintiff sought possession after the lease was determined; the defendants claimed protection under the Act; the second defendant sought relief under Section 9 to compel a sale; and the plaintiff's rejoinder denied subletting and maintained the arrangement with N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai was by dealership and licence, not tenancy.

The court then focused on the statutory definition of "tenant" in Section 2(4) as amended by Tamil Nadu Act XXIV of 1973, and specifically on Sub-clause (ii)(b), which speaks of a person who "continues in actual physical possession of such land and building." The court emphasised that the language of Clause (ii)(b) is unambiguous in requiring actual physical possession as a sine qua non for claiming the Act's protections.

To interpret the application of the statutory provision, the court surveyed and relied upon a line of decisions of this Court (Abdul Mallik; Haridas Girdhardas; Ananthakrishnan Nair; T.R.P. Raja Sekara Bhoopathi) which consistently hold that continuance in possession and actual physical possession are necessary indicia for claiming protection under the Act. The cited authorities were invoked to support the proposition that if a tenant has parted with actual physical possession (for example, by subletting or otherwise), he cannot claim the Act's benefits.

The court found that both courts below had not adverted to, or concentrated upon, the specific question whether the defendants claiming the benefits of Section 9 were in actual physical possession within the meaning of Section 2(4). The courts below had proceeded after repelling the plea of subtenancy and had accepted the Section 9 application, but without deciding the element of actual physical possession despite that issue arising on the pleadings (notably in the rejoinder denying subletting and describing licence/dealership arrangements).

The court noted that both parties admitted they had not adequately focused on or led evidence regarding actual physical possession. Given this lacuna and the centrality of actual physical possession to entitlement under the Act (as established by statute and precedent), the court concluded that justice required remittal to the lower appellate court to consider that specific question afresh.

The court expressly stated it would not disturb other findings of the courts below, but directed that the appeals be remitted so that the lower appellate court could examine whether the concerned defendant claiming benefits under Section 9 is in actual physical possession within the meaning of Section 2(4). The lower appellate court was ordered to permit the parties to adduce further oral and documentary evidence on that issue and to proceed in light of the observations and precedents mentioned.

The court also explained the practical consequences to be followed by the lower appellate court: if the Section 9 application is countenanced, the suit will have to abide the result in the application; if the Section 9 application is discountenanced, the suit will have to be decreed, since no other impediment appeared on record.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court granted relief in the form of remittal. It ordered as follows:

  • C.R.P. No. 1980 of 1979 is allowed.
  • S.A. No. 1521 of 1979 is allowed.
  • The judgments and decrees in A.S. No. 77 of 1978 and C.M.A. No. 9 of 1978 are set aside, and those appeals are remitted to the lower appellate court for reconsideration in the light of the observations and directions in this opinion.

The court directed that the lower appellate court permit the parties to place further oral and documentary evidence as they may deem fit on the question whether the concerned defendant claiming the benefits of Section 9 of the Act is in actual physical possession of the suit site within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act. The court did not disturb other findings of the courts below.

Practical consequences and costs:

  • The parties are to bear their respective costs up to and inclusive of the stage of the second appeal and the revision; further costs in the lis will abide the results before the lower appellate court.
  • The appellants in the second appeal are entitled to a refund of the court fees paid on the memorandum of second appeal.
  • The parties were directed to appear before the lower appellate court for further directions on 7th April, 1986.

Implications: The decision's direct effect is to remit the appeals for fresh consideration limited to the specific question of actual physical possession as a condition for entitlement under the Act, and to allow the parties to adduce further evidence on that point. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond applying existing statutory language and pre-existing judicial authorities on the necessity of actual physical possession; it primarily orders a remittal for adjudication in accordance with those principles.

Show all summary ...

1. The legal representatives of the deceased original plaintiff are the appellants in the second appeal. The respondents are the successors in right, title and interest of the original defendants. I do not propose to dwell in extenso over the factual details of the controversy since I am inclined to remit the matter back for a fresh consideration to the lower appellate court taking note of a point of law advanced by Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants. However, certain broad facts need delineation.

2. The suit property being a site was the subject-matter of a demise by way of a lease by the plaintiff to and in favour of the first defendant. That lease was duly determined and on such determination the plaintiff laid the suit for recovery of possession and for damages for use and occupation. The contesting defendants would resist the claim for recovery of possession and would plead that they would be entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (Act III of 1922), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. There was an independent application taken out by the second defendant under Section 9 of the Act to direct the plaintiff to sell the entire suit site for a price to be fixed by the Court. This application was resisted by the plaintiff and in the additional counter it was contended that the suit site has been sublet to one N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and the subtenancy is in existence for the past more than 20 years and therefore, the application under Section 9 of the Act is not maintainable in law. The import of the plea is to state that the tenant is out of possession. There was a rejoinder to this plea of the plaintiff and both the Counsel admit that the first court has correctly summed up the substance of this rejoinder in its judgment and the summing up runs in the following terms:

The allegation that the petitioner has sublet the premises to the firm N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- is wholly false and untenable. The said firm N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai are only dealers of the products of the petitioners at the suit site. The relationship between the defendant and the said firm is not one of chief tenant and sub-tenant and their relationship is governed by a dealership agreement in regard to supply of products.

Further a licence agreement regarding grant of leave and licence to use the suit site for the purpose of the said business and for using the superstructure and a licence to use the facilities put up by the petitioner/defendant on the premises also for the said business has been made. The said party has no rights in and over the suit property. But the petitioner only, has got the tenancy rights and the other rights. No amount is also paid by the firm N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai as rent. The said firm has under the licence agreement to pay a sum of Rs. 125/- per month as licence fee in consideration of the permission granted by the petitioner for the use of the premises and superstructure for the purpose of selling the products of the petitioner. Further in addition to this, they have to pay a sum of Rs. 50/- per month for using the facilities provided by the petitioner for the same purpose and therefore it is not correct to state that the firm N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai pays a monthly rent of Rs. 200 to the petitioner. There is also no subtenancy in favour of the said firm. Further subsequently the said firm have been only dealers of the petitioner's products for about 25 years by virtue of dealership agreement and licence agreement. Further the application filed by the petitioner is perfectly maintainable and they are entitled to receive compensation for the superstructure put up by them and there is also no question of any subtenancy and therefore the petitioner is entitled to claim the rights under Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act and the said rights also cannot be defeated.

3. Both the suit and the application were considered together by the first court and it repelled the case of sub-letting by the plaintiff and after considering the other aspects, countenanced the plea for sale of the suit site under Section 9 of the Act put forth by the second defendant and it also straightway dismissed the suit. There were appeals by the plaintiff as against the judgment and decree in the suit and the order in the application under Section 9 of the Act and they were prosecuted by his legal representatives on his demise pending the appeals. The lower appellate court also fell in line with the thinking of the first court on the relevant aspects and the result was the appeals was dismissed. However, the lower appellate court directed the restoration of the suit to prosecute the further process under the Act. The second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in the appeal arising out of the suit and the civil revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree in the appeal arising out of the application under Section 9 of the Act.

4. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, learned Counsel for the appellants, would urge that the very rejoinder, extract of the substance of which has been made above, amply bears out that the concern of the defendants who claimed the benefits of the Act is not in actual physical possession and if this fact is taken note of, such a tenant cannot claim the benefits of the Act. He drew my attention to the definition of a tenant in Section 2(4) of the Act after its amendment by Tamil Nadu Act XXIV of 1973. It is the admitted fact that only by virtue of a notification under Section 1(3) of the Act, the tenancy is covered by the Act. If this is so, Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act would certainly be attracted. For the purpose of appreciating the implications of the definition of a tenant in Section 2(4), I feel obliged to extract the same and it runs as follows:

'Tenant' in relation to any land:

(i) means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and

(ii) includes--

(a) any such person as is referred to in Sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement.

(b) any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement to which this Act is applicable under Sub-section (3) of Section 1 and who or any of his predecessors-in-interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building notwithstanding that--

(1) such person was not entitled to the rights under this Act by reason of the proviso to section 12 of this act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City 'Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972), or (2) a decree for declaration or a decree or an order for possession or for similar relief has been passed against such person on the ground that the proviso to section 12 of this act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972, (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972) disentitled such person from claiming the right under this Act and

(c) the heirs of any such person as is referred to in Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii)(a) or ii(b) but does not include a sub-tenant or his heirs.

The very language of Clause (ii)(b) is unambiguous when it speaks about the tenant who continues in actual physical possession of the land and the building. That actual physical possession is a sine qua non to claim and obtain the benefits of the Act has been countenanced by more than one pronouncement of this Court.

5. In Abdul Mallik v. Fr. Joseph Sandanam , V. Ramaswami, J. countenanced that as per the provision amended by Tamil Nadu Act XXIV of 1973, the continuance of possession of the land and actual physical possession are necessary for claiming protection under the Act.

6. In Haridas Girdhardas v. Varadaraja Pillai (1976) 89 L.W. 1, a Bench consisting of Veeraswami, C.J. and Natarajan, J. after taking note of the extended definition of a tenant introduced by Tamil Nadu Act XXIV of 1973, countenanced that he must continue in actual possession of the land and building.

7. In Ananthakrishnan Nair v. Dr. Rama-krishnan (1977) 2 M.L.J. 98, Ramaprasada Rao, J. as he then was, held that the amended provision makes it clear that continuance in possession of the land and actual physical possession of the land and building is a necessary indicia for claiming protection under the Act.

8. In T.R.P. Raja Sekara Bhoopathi v. Navaneethammal (1979) 92 L.W. 259, Ramaprasada Rao, C.J. dealt with a case of subletting, and it was contended before the learned Chief Justice that since the tenant had parted with actual physical possession of the land and building to a third party, the tenant could not claim the benefits of the Act. The learned Chief Justice observed as follows:

On a fair reading of Section 2(4)(ii)(b) of the Act, it is clear that such a physical and actual possession of the land and building is a sine qua non to project the benefits or statutory entitlement under the Act. If that were not the intendment of this piece of legislation, then the very foundation of its objective would be lost .... I am, therefore, of the view that the primordial requirement for a tenant to claim the benefits under the Act is that he should be in actual physical possession of such land and building.

9. I find the two courts below have not adverted to and concentrated on this aspect and adjudicated, it and they were content to proceed with the matter after repelling the plea of subtenancy put forth by the plaintiff. According to Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, the substance of the averments in the rejoinder extracted above, do indicate that the tenant is out of possession or in other words, he is not in actual physical possession. Further, the learned Counsel would submit that how N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai derives rights to be in possession be it under a subtenancy or under a licence would not matter much and it is enough if it is found that he is in possession because, for the tenant to seek the benefits of the Act, he must show that he is in actual physical possession and that element is glaringly lacking in the present case.

10. In answer to the above submissions projected by the learned Counsel for the appellants, Mr. S. Ramasubramaniam, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, would submit that admittedly the concentration in the courts below was not at all on this aspect and the plaintiff having consciously laid the suit for recovery of possession from the defendants must be deemed to have admitted that the defendants are in actual physical possession. Though I appreciate the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the concentration before the courts below was not on the aspect of the tenant's actual physical possession of the suit site, yet, it is not possible to straightway draw an inference that the plaintiff admitted the defendants to be in actual physical possession, from the mere fact that he laid the suit for recovery of possession from the defendants alone. The pleadings in the application under Section 9 of the Act cannot be lost sight of and there is a specific plea of subleasing to N.P.S. Shanmugam Pillai and it was only in answer to this plea, the rejoinder, the substance of which has been already extracted, had come to be filed. This is a question which does arise on the pleading already on record. But the only lacuna the judgments of the courts below have suffered is that they have not adverted to and concentrated on this aspect of actual physical possession of the tenant, and adjudicated the said question after adverting to the statutory provisions and the principles laid down by the pronouncements of this court, though not any other pronouncement on this point. Both the sides admit that the parties were also at fault, in that they did not concentrate on this aspect and lead the requisite evidence therefor. I do not want the cause of any party to suffer on this ground and in my view, the interests of justice and the interests of parties require an order of remittal to the lower appellate court for it to advert to the question as to whether the concerned defendants who claim rights under Section 9 of the Act is in actual physical possession within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act taking guidance from the principles enunciated by the pronouncements of this court referred to above as well as any other pronouncement relevant on the point. It is needless to state that if the application under Section 9 of the Act is to be countenanced the suit will have to abide the results in the application adhering to the provisions therefor set out in the Act. If on the other hand, the application under Section 9 of the Act has got to be discountenanced, the suit will have to be decreed since no other impediment, factual or legal, seems to stand in its way. I make it clear that I have not disturbed the other findings of the courts below. Accordingly, C.R.P. No. 1980 of 1979 is all lowed and equally so S.A. No. 1521 of 1979 is allowed and the judgments and decrees in A.S.No. 77 of 1978 and C.M.A. No. 9 of 1978 are set aside and the said appeals A.S. No. 77 of 1978 and C.M.A. No. 9 of 1978 will stand remitted to the file of the lower appellate court for it to consider the same in the light of the observations and directions given above. The lower appellate Court will permit the parties to place further evidence, both oral and documentary, as they may deem fit, on the question as to whether the concerned defendant who claims the benefits of Section 9 of the Act is in actual physical possession of the suit site within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs upto and inclusive of the stage of the second appeal and the revision. Further costs in the lis will abide the results before the lower appellate court. The appellants in the second appeal are entitled to refund of the court fees paid on the memorandum of second appeal. The parties are directed to appear before the lower appellate court to take further directions on 7th April, 1986.