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Government Of India v. English Electric Company Of India Ltd., Madras

Madras High Court
Mar 18, 1985
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals challenge a judgment of Mohan J. that allowed a batch of writ petitions and remitted the matters for fresh consideration of whether items manufactured by the respondent-company—described as PVC coated Periglass sleevings or silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings—fall within certain entries of the Indian Customs Tariff (Items 72-C, 73(1), 82(3), 87, or Item 53 dealing with "textile manufacture not otherwise specified").

Facts not in dispute: the respondent imported Periglass/Silicon-elastomer-coated glass sleevings from the English Electric Co. Ltd., UK. The goods were described by shippers as raw materials/components of particular specification and were assessed at clearance under Entry 82(3) of the Customs Tariff. The respondent protested and claimed refund of excess duty.

Procedural history: The Assistant Collector assessed the goods under Entry 82(3) read with Entry 15A of the Central Excise Tariff and rejected classification under Entry 73. The Appellate Collector confirmed that order. A revision petition to the Ministry of Finance found the goods assessable under Entry 53 and not Entry 73 or 83. The respondent filed writ petitions in this Court challenging the Ministry's order. The learned Single Judge held the articles do not fall under Entry 53 and remitted the matter to decide whether they fall under Items 72-C, 73(1) or 87. The appellants challenge that remittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether PVC coated Periglass sleevings or silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings qualify as "textile" and thus fall under Item 53 ("textile manufacture not otherwise specified") of the Indian Customs Tariff.
  2. If they do not fall under Item 53, whether they should be classified under other identified tariff entries (specifically Items 72-C, 73(1) or 87, or otherwise under Entry 82(3) or similar entries).
  3. Whether the High Court (and this Court) may interfere with departmental classification decisions under Article 226 of the Constitution, or whether classification is exclusively a matter for the departmental authorities.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellants contended that on a technological and dictionary-based understanding, glass fabric made of glass fibre (including PVC coated Periglass sleevings) is a textile and therefore falls under Item 53 of the Customs Tariff.
  • The appellants further argued that classification of goods is a matter for the departmental authorities and that the High Court should not interfere with such classification decisions made under the taxing statutes (Article 226 challenge should be limited).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent argued the term "textile" should be understood in its popular or common parlance sense (the sense in which it is used by those dealing in such goods), not in a narrow scientific or technological sense. In common parlance, glass fibre or fabric made of glass fibre is not understood as a "textile".
  • The respondent relied on Supreme Court authority (Indo International Industries) and other precedents to support the proposition that revenue/tax items are to be interpreted in their popular or commercial meaning where no statutory definition exists.
  • The respondent relied on a prior decision of this Court (Standard Batteries Ltd. v. Appraiser) where the court held fiberglass sleevings do not fall within the ordinary meaning of "textile".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indo International Industries v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P — 1981 ELT 325 Where a taxing enactment does not define a term, the term should be understood in its popular or commercial meaning rather than a scientific/technical meaning. The Court relied on this principle to prefer the popular/commercial sense of "textile" over a purely technological/dictionary sense in classifying the sleevings.
Ramavatar Budhiaprasad v. Asst. Sales Tax Officer, Akola — 1961 — 1 SCR 279 Words not defined in a taxing statute should be construed in common parlance (example: "vegetable" not to be taken in the botanical sense for exemption purposes). The Court cited this decision to reinforce that statutory terms in revenue laws are to be read in their popular meaning, supporting the conclusion that glass fabrics are not "textiles" in common parlance.
Standard Batteries Ltd. v. Appraiser, Appraising Dept. — 1981 Taxation Law Report 2792 Held that "fibreglass sleevings" do not come within the ordinary meaning of "textile" as commonly understood. The Court expressly agreed with Padmanabhan J.'s view in that decision and adopted it here as persuasive authority that fiberglass/PVC-coated sleevings are not "textile" for Item 53.
Union of India v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. — (1975) 1 SCC 341; AIR 1975 S.C. 760 Explains limits of judicial interference in classification: courts should not substitute factual findings for departmental authorities unless there is no identifiable, uniform and determinate test or unless authorities proceeded on an erroneous or improper interpretation; fiscal legislation requires clear standards. The Court cited this authority to explain when it is appropriate for courts to interfere with departmental classification decisions and to justify remitting classification to the authorities only where a clear criterion exists or where the authority's approach was erroneous. The Court used it to explain the scope of interference under Article 226.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the relevant tariff entries (Item 53 — textile manufacture not otherwise specified; Item 73(1) — certain electrical instruments/apparatus; Item 82(3) — synthetic resins and articles made of plastics; Item 87 — residuary class). The central dispute was whether PVC-coated Periglass sleevings (glass-fibre fabric coated with PVC or silicone elastomer) constitute a "textile" so as to be classifiable under Item 53.

The opinion surveyed dictionary and technical literature describing glass fibre and glass fabrics: definitions from the Concise Oxford Dictionary and Chambers, and technical texts (George S. Brady, Employment of Textiles, K.L. Leavenstein) showing that glass fibres can be made into fine filaments and woven into fabrics and are used for insulating and related industrial purposes. The appellants relied on this technological/dictionary material to argue the products are textiles.

The Court then considered the appropriate mode of interpretation for taxing enactments where terms are undefined. It reiterated the established principle (citing Indo International Industries and Ramavatar) that in revenue statutes terms should ordinarily be given their popular or commercial meaning rather than a purely scientific or technical meaning, unless the enactment defines the term. Applying that principle and the earlier decision of this Court in Standard Batteries (which held fiberglass sleevings are not textiles in ordinary parlance), the Court concluded that although technically glass fabrics might be treated as textiles, that technological sense does not correspond to the popular meaning of "textile".

The Court therefore held that PVC coated Periglass sleevings and silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings do not fall within the expression "textile" for Item 53.

The appellants' submission—that classification is a matter exclusively for departmental authorities and that courts should not interfere under Article 226—was considered. The Court declined to accept that absolutist position. It observed that judicial interference is inappropriate where departmental conclusions are not perverse or based on a wrong test; however, the Court may interfere if authorities proceeded on an erroneous view or improper interpretation of statutory expressions. The Court cited Union of India v. Tata Iron & Steel to explain the appropriate limits of judicial review in classification disputes, including the difficulty of remanding when there is no identifiable, determinate standard.

Having concluded the goods do not fall under Item 53, the Court accepted the Single Judge's approach to remit the classification question to the departmental authorities to determine whether the goods fall under Items 72-C, 73(1) or 87 (or some other appropriate entry). The Court therefore upheld Mohan J.'s remittal order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that PVC coated Periglass sleevings and silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings do not fall within the expression "textile" and therefore do not fall under Item 53 of the Indian Customs Tariff. The order of Mohan J. remitting the classification question to the authorities was upheld and the writ appeal was dismissed with costs (counsel fee Rs. 500).

Implications and direct effects:

  • The immediate consequence is that the goods in question are not classifiable under Item 53 as "textile manufacture not otherwise specified."
  • The matter is remitted to the concerned departmental authority (the third respondent) to determine the correct tariff classification (whether under Items 72-C, 73(1), 87 or another entry). The Court directed that final orders on classification be passed within six months from the date of the judgment.
  • The Court clarified the scope of judicial review: departmental classification decisions will not be interfered with unless they are perverse, mala fide, based on a wrong test, or founded on an improper interpretation of statutory language. Thus no broad new precedent displacing departmental primacy was created; rather, the decision applied established principles about popular meaning in revenue statutes and about when courts may intervene in classification disputes.

Costs and further direction: Writ appeal dismissed with costs; counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 500. The Court ordered the third respondent to pass final classification orders within six months.

Show all summary ...

1. These appeals are directed against the judgment of Mohan J. allowing a batch of writ petitions and remitting the cases for fresh consideration of the question as to whether the items manufactured by the respondent-company such as PVC coated periglass sleevings or silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings will fall within Items 72-C, 73(1) or 87 of the Indian Customs Tariff.

2. The facts which are not in dispute are these: The respondent in these appeals imported Periglass Sleevings or Silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings against invoices of the English Electric Co. Ltd. Stafford, United Kingdom. The goods were styled as raw materials and components by the shippers and were to be of a particular specification. They were assessed at the point of clearance for home consumption under Entry 82(3) of the Indian Customs Tariff. The respondent protested against the said assessments and claimed refund of excess duty. After a personal hearing, an order was passed by the Assistant Collector of Customs holding that the Periglass Sleevings are assessable under Entry 82(3) of the Indian Customs Tariff read with Entry 15A of the Central Excise Tariff and that the same will not fall within Entry 73 as claimed by the respondent. The respondent took the matter in appeal to the Appellate Collector of Customs, the second appellant herein, who confirmed the orders of the Assistant Collector of Customs, the third respondent. Thereafter, revision petition was preferred to the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue and Insurance, Government of India, the first appellant herein, which, by its order dated 28-3-1974 held that the Periglass Sleevings were assessable under Entry 53 of the Indian Customs Tariff and that they will not fall either under Entry 73 or under 83 of the Indian Customs Tariff as contended by the respondent manufacturers. It is at this stage, the respondent came before this Court seeking to quash the orders of the first appellant disallowing its claim that the article will fall under Entry 73 or Entry 83 of the Indian Customs Tariff. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petitions held that the articles in question will not fall under Entry 53 of the Indian Customs Tariff and that therefore the authorities have to go into the question as to whether the article falls either under 72-C, 73(1) or 87 of the Indian Customs Tariff. They said view of the learned Judge has been challenged in these appeals filed by the appellants. Thus, the question for consideration in these appeals is, whether the PVCs coated Periglass Sleevings or Silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings can be treated as a textile attracting Item 53 of the Indian Customs Tariff. Entries 53, 73(1), 82(3) and 87 which are relevant in this connection are set out below:

Item No. Name of Article Nature of duty Standard rate of duty Preferential rate of duty if the article is the pro-duce or manufacture 53. Textile Manufacture not otherwise specified. Revenue 100 per cent ad valorem (Burma) 10 per cent ad valorem

3. Entry 73(1) states as follows:

Preferential revenue 60 per cent ad valorem The United Kingdom 73(1) The following electrical instruments apparatus and appliances other than those specified in Item No. 73(16) and parts thereof, not otherwise specified 50 per cent ad valorem (Burma) 10 per cent ad Valorem namely:—

Electrical control gear and transmission of gear, namely, switches (excluding switch boards) fuses and current breaking devices of all sorts and descriptions designed for use in circuits of less than ten amperes and at a pressure not exceeding 250 volts and regulators for use with motors designed to consume less than 187 watts, insulated copper wires and castles, anyone or more of which not being one specially designed as a pilot core, has a sectional area of less than 8-064 square millimeters and metals and alloys of not more than equivalent conductivity, not otherwise specified, and line insulators including alsocloats connectors leading in tubes and the like, of types and sizes such as are ordinarily used in connection with the transmission of power for purposes other than industrial and the fittings thereof but excluding electrical earthenware, brassware and porceline ware otherwise specified.

Entry 82(3) is as follows:—

82(3)(a) Artificial or synthetic resins not otherwise materials in any form, whether solid not otherwise pasty or as powder, granules or flakes or in the form of moulding powders Revenue 100% ad valorem (b) Articles made of plastics the following, namely, tubes, rods, sheets, foils sticks, other rectangular or profile shapes, whether laminated or not and whether rigid or flexible including lay flat tubings and polyvinyl chloride sheets Revenue 100% ad valorem Entry 87 runs thus— 87. All other articles not otherwise specified. Revenue 60% ad valorem 10% ad valorem

Item 53 of Customs Tariff deals with textile manufacture not otherwise specified. Item 73(1) deals with electrical instruments, apparatus and appliances other than those specified in item 73(16) and parts thereof not otherwise specified. Item 82(3) deals with Synthetic resins and plastic materials in any form, whether solid or liquid or pasty or as powder. Item 87 is a residuary class dealing with all other articles not otherwise specified. If the Periglass sleevings which is a fabric material coated with PVC could be construed as a textile, then, it will come under item 53 dealing with textile manufacture not otherwise specified. If the same is considered as not a textile, then it will not fall under item 53 and naturally the authorities have to consider whether it falls under either 72, 73 or 87 as has been directed by the learned Judge. Therefore, the controversy is only as regards the question as to whether the Peri-glass Sleevings which is coated with PVC can be considered to be a textile. The word ‘textile’ has not been defined in the statute. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘textiles’ as ‘of weaving, woven, suitables for weaving, fabrics materials’. The Chambers Dictionary of Science and Technology Volume II defines textiles at page 1174 as ‘Term used loosely to describe any fibres, yarns or clothes, woven, felted or bonded.’ The Chambers Dictionary of Science and Technology—Volume I at page 518 defines ‘glass fibre’ as follows—

“(Glass, textiles). Glass melted and then drawn out by steam through special bushings into fibres of 5.10 micrometres diameter, which may be spun continuously into threads and woven into tapes and clothes by normal process, or may be formed into pads and quiltings, rigid, bitumen bounded or loose”.

4. While dealing with glass fibre, George S. Brady in his book ‘Materials Handbook’ at page 366 says as follows—

“The fine flexible fibres made from glass used for heat and sound insolation, fire proof textiles, acid resistant fabrics, retainer mats for storage batteries, panel boards, filters, and electrical insulating tape cloth and rope. It is distinct from mineral wool in that it is a glass made to define formulation with a uniformity not found in mineral wool. Molten glass strings cut easily into thread like strands, and this spun glass was earlier used for ornamental purposes, but the first long fibres of fairly uniform diameter were made in England by spinning ordinary molten glass on revolving drums. The original fibre was about 0.0001 in diameter. It was called Glass Silk and Glass Wool and the loose blankets for insulating purposes of were called Navy wool. The term navy wool is used still for the purposes of insulating blankets faced on both sides flamesproofed fabric, used for duct and pipe insulation and sound proofing. Glass fibres are now made by letting the molten glass drop through tiny orifices and blowing with air or stream to attenuate the fibres. The usual composition is that of a soda lime glass, but it may be varied for different purposes. The glass low in alkali have high electrical resistance while those of higher alkali are more acid resistant. They have very high tensible strength, up to about 400.0000 psi but the breaking strength, of years is expressed in pounds for any given yarn. The fibre glass fibres of the Owens—Corning Fibreglass Co are made standard diameters from 00,00028 to 0,008 in staple glass fibres is usually from woven on regular textile machines. Fibre glass yarns are marked in various sizes and toists in continuous or staple fibres, and with glass compositions varied to suit chemical or electrical requirements.? Vitron Yarn of glass fibres, Inc is a piled low twist yarn for braided insulation for wire. Glass sewing thread has a high twist. The minimum breaking strength of the 0.0014 in thread is 12 lb.”

5. In Employment of Textiles, 2nd Edn. at page 40, this is what is stated about Glass Fibres—

“A group of textile fibres and yarns is made of glass. The reason they are pliable and can be woven when most glass is brittle is that the individual fibres are extremely fine so fine that it takes from 100 to 12,500 filaments fibres to make a fine yarn. The finest filament is one quarter denier or B-2 micrones in diameter”.

6. In the Book ‘The Manufacturing Technology of Continuous Glass Fibres, by K.L Leavenstein’ at page 259 it is stated as follows—

“A large proportion of glass fibre reinforcing material is sold as woven roving…….”

7. Based on the above definition of textiles occurring in the various dictionaries and also the definition of glass fibre, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the PVC coated glass fabric made of glass fibre will have to be taken as textile and therefore, it should be taken to fall under item 53. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that when the statute does not define ‘textiles’ that expression has to be understood in a popular sense i.e, the sense in which it is used in common parlance and that in common parlance a glass fibre or a fabric made of glass fibre has never been understood as a textile. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent an expression occurring in statute in the absence of a definition cannot be understood either in the dictionary sense or in the technological sense but in a popular sense. In support of the said submission, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Indo International Industries v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P—1981 ELT 325, where the Supreme Court has observed—

“It is well settled that in interpreting items in statutes like Excise Tax Acts or Sales Tax Acts, whose primary object is to raise revenue and for which purpose they classify diverse products, articles and substances resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms of expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. If any terms or expressions has been defined in the enactment then it must be understood in the sense in which it is defined but in the absence of any definition being given to the enactment the meaning of the term in common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted.”

8. Reliance is placed also in Ramavatar Budhiaprasad etc. v. Asst. Sales tax Officer, Akola—1961—1—SCR 279, wherein the question arose as to whether betel leaves fell within item ‘vegetables’ so as to earn exemption from sales tax and the Supreme Court had held—

“that word ‘vegetable’ had not been defined in the Act, and that the same must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance and so construed it denoted those classes of vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen garden and are used for the table and did not comprise betel leaves within it and, therefore, betel leaves were not exempt from taxation.”

9. The respondent also relied on the decision of this court in Standard Batteries Ltd. v. Appraiser, Appraising Dept.—1981 Taxation Law Report 2792, wherein the identical question came up for consideration and Padmanabhan J. has held—

“‘Fibreglass sleevings’ do not come within the ordinary meaning of the word ‘textile’ or the sense in which the word ‘textile’ is commonly understood in ordinary parlance. The fibre glass sleevings used in the manufacture of plastic glass tubes, are in turn used in the manufacture of miner cap lamps batteries, and not as a variety of textile manufacture. Therefore, the fibre glass sleevings do not fall within the category of textiles manufactures covered by item 53 of the Customs Tariff.”

10. We are in entire agreement with the view expressed by Padmanabhan J. in that case as also the view taken by Mohan J. which has been questioned in these writ appeals. Though as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that in a technological sense the glass fabrics which is made of glass fibre could be treated as textiles, yet, it will not fit in with the popular sense or a sense in which it is used in common parlance. We, therefore, hold that the PVC coated periglass sleevings or silicon elastomer coated glass sleevings will not fall within the expression “textile”. The learned counsel for the appellants then contends that whether an item of manufacture will fall within a particular entry is a question to be decided by the departmental authorities and such a classification cannot be interfered with by this Court acting under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are not, however, inclined to agree with the said submission. It is true that the High Court cannot interfere with the decision of the Central Excise authorities in the matter of classification unless the decision is perverse or mala fide or it is based upon a wrong test. But, if on arriving at the finding the concerned authorities proceeded on erroneous view or on an improper interpretation of the statutory expression this Court is entitled to interfere with the decision arrived at by the Excise authorities. The following observations of the Supreme, Court in Union of India v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. - 1977 E.L.T (J 61) (S.C) : (1975) 1 SCC 341 : AIR 1975 S.C 760 at page 772 are pertinent in this connection:—

“It is not for the High Court nor for this Court to come to a conclusion on facts as to whether the product can truly come under the description of skelp that, undoubtedly, would require some evidence be taken at the level of the taxing authority, provided, however, there is an identifiable, uniform and determinate test by which skelp can be properly distinguished from strip. In the mass of documents filed before us and the extensive arguments addressed at the Bar with regard to the definitions called from various dictionaries, hand books and authorities, we are not at all surprised that the three authorities came to the same conclusion by depending upon their own chosen tests. A particular type of strip may according to certain definitions be skelp and according to others not skelp. This, however, cannot be permitted in a fiscal legislation which by all standards should adopt a clear definition of an excisable item which is incapable of giving rise to a confounding controversy as in this case unless the matter is beyond doubt in view of the popular meaning or meaning ascribed to the term in commercial parlance. In the absence of any clear criterion to determine what is skelp and not strip, no useful purpose would be served by even remanding the matter to the Excise authorities for a decision after taking necessary evidence. It is only when a taxing law provides for a clear and unequivocal test for determination as to whether a particular product would fall under strip or skelp it may be possible for the authorities to address itself to the evidence submitted by the parties in order to come to a decision on the basis of the test. This is, however, not possible in this case in view of the fact that there is no identifiable standard. The best way to define the product for the purpose of excise duty in appropriate terms demarcating clearly the distinction between the two terms.”

11. As we had held that the articles in question do not fall within item 53 of the Customs Tariff, the question will arise as to under what tariff item they will fall. It is for that purpose, the learned single Judge had remitted the matter to the authorities concerned. The order of Mohan J. has, therefore, to be upheld. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 500 one set.

The matter has been posted before us for being mentioned. It is pointed out by the learned counsel on either side that because of the pendecy of the appeals, no orders could be passed by the authorities in pursuance of the earlier order passed by the learned single Judge and that as such this court may fix a time limit for the disposal of the matter finally, as directed by the learned Single Judge. We direct the third respondent to whom the matter has been remitted by the learned Single Judge to pass final orders in the matter classifying the goods in question within six months from this day.