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R. Govindarajulu And Another v. S. Dharman And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, by order dated 1 February 1980 in O.P. 182 of 1979, dismissed a petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, seeking compensation of Rs. 75,000 for the death of one Mohan in a motor accident on 7 December 1978. The appellants intend to prefer a civil miscellaneous appeal to this Court against that Tribunal order. The appellants claim indigence and have filed an application under Order 44, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P. Code) for leave to file the appeal as indigent persons. The Office of this Court raised a note querying the maintainability and propriety of invoking the C.P. Code provisions (specifically O. 44 and related provisions) in respect of the proposed appeal under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this High Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, can permit an appellant to invoke Order 44 of the Civil Procedure Code (and thereby Order 33) to prosecute an appeal as an indigent person.
- Whether the practice, procedure and powers of the High Court as an ordinary appellate civil court apply to appeals under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act where the special statute and rules are silent as to appellate procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Learned counsel for the appellants (Mr. R.S. Venkatachari) submitted that once an appeal lies to this Court, the full practice, procedure and provisions relating to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court are attracted; the Civil Procedure Code is not excluded insofar as the High Court's appellate powers are concerned. Therefore, in appeals under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the appellants should be permitted to invoke Order 44 (appeals by indigent persons) and, through it, Order 33 (institution of proceedings by indigent persons) of the C.P. Code.
The opinion does not set out any specific arguments advanced by the respondent(s) in opposition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kamaraju v. The Secretary of State for India, 1 I Mad. 309 | Early authority that an appeal directed to an ordinary court imports the ordinary incidents of procedure of that court (appeal to District Court treated as regular appeal). | Used as historical support for the proposition that appeals to ordinary courts attract ordinary appellate procedure. |
| National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster General (House of Lords) | Where a question is referred to an established court "without more", it imports that ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court and any general right of appeal attach. | Cited to support the general rule that appeals to established courts bring with them the court's ordinary procedural incidents and appellate rights. |
| Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao | When appeal is to an ordinary court and statute does not exclude ordinary procedure, Civil Procedure Code rules apply; ordinary incidents of litigation are excluded only by specific provision. | Relied upon to show that, absent specific exclusion, appeals under special statutes are governed by ordinary civil procedure. |
| Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara, A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 12 | Where a legal right is in dispute and ordinary courts are seized, the ordinary rules of procedure apply even if the legal right arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal. | Quoted to reinforce that High Court appellate jurisdiction attracts ordinary procedural rules where the special statute is silent. |
| Hem Singh v. Basant Das | Referenced as a case relied on in Adaikappa; the specific proposition is not separately extracted in the opinion text. | Noted as one of the authorities relied upon in support of the principle stated in Adaikappa. |
| M.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros | Once an appeal reaches the High Court under a statute that merely provides for appeal, the High Court must determine it according to its own rules of practice and procedure; the decision by a single Judge is a judgment within the Letters Patent. | Applied to show that appeals conferred by special statutes are to be dealt with by the High Court in its ordinary appellate manner. |
| Collector, Varanasi v. G.S. Misra | High Court functions as a 'court' (not as a persona designata) when seized of appeals under statutory provisions; absence of special procedure means appeal disposed in same manner as other appeals per HC practice. | Used to support the proposition that the High Court should act as the High Court and employ its ordinary procedures in statutory appeals absent express contrary provision. |
| Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjuri Raha | When the High Court is seized of an appeal under a special statute, unless there is a specific rule to the contrary, the rules of practice and procedure applicable to civil appeals will govern. | Relied on to uphold competency of using ordinary rules of practice and procedure in appeals under special statutes. |
| Dehli Municipality v. Kuldip (Full Bench, High Court of Delhi) | Decision by a single Judge in appeal under S.110-D of Motor Vehicles Act is a 'judgment' under the Letters Patent; High Court in such appeals acts as the High Court (not as a tribunal) and the appeal is in ordinary civil jurisdiction. | Quoted to demonstrate that appeals under S.110-D are to be treated as ordinary civil appeals before the High Court. |
| Shanti Devi v. G.M. Harayana Roadways (Full Bench, Punjab & Haryana) | High Court, while hearing appeals under S.110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, acts as a 'court' and the proceeding does not retain the character of arbitration on appeal. | Cited to support the conclusion that High Court appellate jurisdiction in these matters is ordinary appellate jurisdiction. |
| Union Co.op Ins. Society v. Lazarammal (Bench of this Court) | When this Court entertains an appeal, all provisions relating to its appellate jurisdiction are attracted; appeal against Tribunal order is to the High Court and not to another tribunal. | Invoked to support that the appellate powers and procedures of the High Court apply to appeals under the Act. |
| K. Chandrasekhara Naik v. Narayana (Full Bench, High Court of Karnataka) | Except for providing appeal to the High Court under S.110-D, the Act does not lay down procedure; where special Act is silent, appellate jurisdiction must be exercised as High Court exercises its general appellate jurisdiction. | Used to substantiate that High Court's practice and procedure govern appeals under the Act when the Act is silent. |
| Triloki Nath Bhargava v. Jaswint Kaur (High Court of Punjab & Haryana) | Once the High Court is seized of an appeal under S.110-D, the rules of practice and procedure of the High Court apply and cross-objections under O.41, R.22 C.P.C. can be filed. | Applied to support the competency of cross-objections and the application of CPC procedural rules in appeals under the Act. |
| State v. K. Padma Rani (High Court of Andhra Pradesh) | Upheld the competency of cross-objections in an appeal before the High Court under the Act. | Cited to show acceptance by other High Courts of cross-objections in such appeals. |
| Smt. Gurdev Kaur v. Rash Behari Das (High Court of Calcutta) | Countenanced the competency of filing cross-objections in appeal to the High Court under the Act. | Used as additional authority supporting procedural competencies such as cross-objections in appeals under the Act. |
| Darshna Devi v. Shree Singh (High Court of Punjab & Haryana) | Held that the Claims Tribunal is a civil court for the purpose of Order 33 of the C.P.C. (as stated in the opinion). | Noted by this Court as a pronouncement drawing attention to the applicability of O.33 to Tribunals having trappings of a civil court. |
| State of Harayana v. Darshna Devi (Supreme Court) | Supreme Court approved the reasoning in Darshna Devi that Order 33 will apply to Tribunals which have the trappings of the civil court (as noted in the opinion). | Referenced to indicate Supreme Court approval of the proposition, though this Court stated the point did not strictly arise for decision in the present matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the central question as whether, when exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, this High Court can permit invocation of Order 44 of the C.P.C. (appeals by indigent persons) and thereby Order 33 (institution by indigent persons), to enable appellants to prosecute an appeal to this Court as indigent persons.
The Court first set out the statutory and regulatory context: Claims Tribunals are constituted under Sections 110 and 110-A to 110-E of the Act and function within those provisions; the State Government has rule-making power under S.111-A, and the Tamil Nadu Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals Rules, 1961 (the Rules) regulate Tribunal proceedings. The Rules contain provisions relating to fees and exemptions (Rule 20) and incorporate certain provisions of the C.P.C. "so far as may be" (Rule 18). Section 110-C(2) gives Claims Tribunals powers of a civil court for specified purposes. The Court noted it was not deciding whether Claims Tribunals themselves may invoke Order 33 to permit institution of proceedings by indigent persons.
The Court then turned to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under S.110-D, which provides a right of appeal to the High Court within the prescribed time (subject to the statutory monetary bar for amounts less than Rs. 2,000). The Court observed that S.110-D merely directs that appeals lie to the High Court and does not circumscribe the practice, procedure or powers of the High Court in hearing such appeals.
Relying on a series of authorities (from this High Court, other High Courts, the Privy Council and the House of Lords), the Court expounded the consistent principle that where a statute directs an appeal to an ordinary court without prescribing or limiting the appellate procedure, the ordinary incidents of appellate procedure, practice and powers of that court attach. The Court quoted and summarized numerous decisions to the effect that absent explicit statutory exclusion, the High Court must exercise its appellate jurisdiction in the same manner as other civil appeals and that procedural devices (such as cross-objections and the faculties available under the C.P.C.) are available unless specifically withdrawn by statute or rules.
Applying that legal principle to the present question, the Court concluded that Order 33 (institution of proceedings by indigent persons) and Order 44 (appeals by indigent persons) are available to appellants prosecuting an appeal to this High Court under Section 110-D, because the Act and the Rules do not expressly circumscribe the High Court's ordinary appellate practice and procedure in this regard. The Court noted that Order 44 contemplates that appeals by indigent persons shall be dealt with in the same manner as institution of original proceedings by indigent persons (i.e., by reference to Order 33).
The Court expressly refrained from deciding the broader question—addressed in other authorities—whether Order 33 applies to Tribunals themselves as a general matter, noting that the specific question did not strictly arise for decision in the present matter.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that it is competent for the appellants to invoke Order 44 of the Civil Procedure Code, and thereby Order 33, to prosecute an appeal to this High Court under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act as indigent persons. The Court directed that the Office of this Court will number the application for permission to prefer the appeal as indigent persons if it is strictly in order with the relevant provisions of the C.P.C., and will post the matter for orders.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that appellants seeking to appeal to this High Court under Section 110-D may, in appropriate cases and where the application complies with the C.P.C., invoke Order 44 (and Order 33 by parity) to seek leave to prosecute the appeal as indigent persons.
- The Court applied and reaffirmed the established principle that where an appeal is directed to the High Court by statute without prescribing or limiting appellate procedure, the High Court's ordinary practice and procedural powers (including relevant provisions of the C.P.C.) are available unless specifically excluded by statute or rules.
- The Court did not express a definitive opinion on the separate question whether Order 33 applies to Claims Tribunals themselves as a general proposition; it noted that this question did not strictly arise in the present matter and therefore refrained from deciding it.
- No novel legal principle was announced; the decision applies established authorities to permit invocation of O.44/O.33 in the particular procedural context of appeals to this High Court under S.110-D.
VCS.
Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. The matter comes before us on a note by the Office of this Court regarding maintainability. The Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras has passed an order on 1st February, 1980 in O.P 182 of 1979, dismissing the said petition preferred under S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act IV of 1939, hereinafter referred to as the Act, by the appellants in the proposed civil miscellaneous appeal, for a compensation of Rs. 75,000, relatable to the death of one Mohan in a motor accident on 7th December, 1978. The proposed civil miscellaneous appeal is directed against the order of the Claims Tribunal. Pleading that they are indigent persons the appellants have filed a petition under O. 44, R. 1, C.P Code, hereinafter referred to as the Code, for leave to file the appeal as indigent persons. The Office of this Court felt a difficulty and a doubt as to the propriety of the appellants invoking the provisions of the Code and that too, O. 44 and the allied provisions of the Code, in the proposed appeal before this Court.
2. The Claims Tribunals under the Act got constituted by and they function and exercise powers within the ambit of the relevant provisions in the Act found in Ss. 110, 110-A to 110-E, except S. 110 D which relates to appeals to this Court. The State Government, under S. 111-A is invested with powers to make rules to effectuate the provisions of Ss. 110 to 110-E. We find that pursuant to this power, the Tamil Nadu Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals Rules, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, have been framed. The Rules so framed practically regulate the proceedings before the Claims Tribunals. R. 20 deals with fees for proceedings and sub-R. (2) thereof gives the discretion to the Claims Tribunals to grant exemption from the payment of fees prescribed. R. 18 enumerates certain provisions of the Code, which are to apply so far as may be to proceedings before the Claims Tribunals. S. 110-C(2) should also be taken note of when it states that the Claims Tribunals shall have all the powers of a civil court for specified purposes. In this appeal proposed, we are not concerned with the powers of the Claims Tribunals to invoke this provisions of O. 33 of the Code and permit any person to institute proceedings before them as indigent persons. That question does not arise for consideration at all before us.
3. So far as this Court is concerned, appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal lies to it under S. 110-D which runs as follows—
‘Appeals:—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-S. (2) any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that, the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees.”
That ambit of the powers of this Court in appeal is not touched at all either by the provisions of the Act or the rules. R. 19 merely speaks about the form of the appeal and R. 20 lays down the court-fees payable on appeal. The question that arises for consideration in such a contingency is as to whether this Court, in the exercise of its appellants powers, can permit the invocation of O. 44 and thereby O. 33 of the Code, to enable a person to prefer an appeal under the Act to this Court as an indigent person. That is the question that has directly arisen before us for consideration.
4. Mr. R.S Venkatachari, learned counsel for the appellants, would submit that when once an appeal lies to this Court, all the practice, procedure and provisions relating to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court will be attracted and there is no exclusion of the Code in the exercise of appellate powers by this Court in the appeals against the awards of Claims Tribunals, under the Act. There is substance in this submission. This Court is not constituted as a special Tribunal to hear appeals under the Act. S. 110-D merely states that any person aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribunal may within the time prescribed prefer an appeal to the High Court, and the matter is left there. When the statute directs an appeal to an ordinary civil court, without in any manner circumscribing the practice, procedure and powers of such court as a civil appellate court, the court will have to deal with the appeals with all the trappings and powers as an ordinary civil court of appeal. This is the fundamental rule that has been uniformly countenanced and applied by courts.
5. As early as 1888, a Full Bench of this Court in Kamaraju v. The Secretary of State for India . 1 I Mad. 309., had occasion to consider the scope of the appeal to the District Court under S. 10 of the Madras Forest Act V of 1882 and it found that it was a regular appeal to the District Court, which is a court of regular jurisdiction from the decrees of which a second appeal ordinarily lay to this Court.
6. In National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster General,2 the observations of the House of Lords run as follows:
‘When a question is stated to be referred to an established court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches”.
(See A.I.R 1976 A.P 122 and 126)
7. In Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao,3 the proposition countenanced by the Privy Council runs as follows—
“Though an appeal from the District Judge to the High Court is not provided for in the Madras Forest Act, in a claim to lands which have been notified as reserved forest lands under the Act, such an appeal will lie under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Where in such proceedings the District Court is reached, that court is appealed to as one of the ordinary courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the rules of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable. In such a case, the ordinary incidents of litigation could only be excluded by specific provisions to that effect.
—Head note.
8. In Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara . A.I.R 1948 P.C 12=61 L.W 52 P.C the principle has been set out in the following terms, and while doing so, the earlier pronouncemets of the Privy Council, the one already referred to above in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao and the other in Hem Singh v. Basant Das,5 were relied on—
“The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such disputes the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto as an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal.” (page 14)
9. In M.S Thread Co. v. James Chandwick and Bros,6 after stating that a decision given by a single Judge of a High Court in an appeal preferred nnder S. 76 of the Trade Marks Act, constitutes a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, it has been held as follows—
“Ordinarily after an appeal reaches the High Court, it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. Thus, S. 76, Trade Marks Act, confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by S. 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his judgement becomes subject to appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act.”
—Head note.
The pronouncement of the House of Lords in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster General,7 and those of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India v. Chillikani Rama Rao, and Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara, have been relied on.
10. In Collector, Varanasi v. G.S Misra the question arose as to whether, while acting under S. 19(1)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, the High Court functions as a court and not as a designated person, and it has been laid down as follows—
“The High Court of a State is at the apex of a State's judicial system. It is a court of record and it is difficult to think of a High Court as anything other than a ‘Court.’ No judicial power was ever entrusted to the High Court except as a ‘court’ and whenever it decides or determines any dispute that comes before it, it invariably does so as a ‘court.’ That apart, when S. 19(1)(f) specifically says that an appeal against the order of an arbitrator lies to the High Court, there was no justification for thinking that the legislature said something which it did not mean. Furthermore, neither the Act, nor the rules framed thereunder prescribe any special procedure for the disposal of appeals under S. 19(1)(f) and appeals under that provision have to be disposed of in the same manner as other appeals to the High Court according to its own rules of practice and procedure.” —Headnote.
11. In Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjuri Raha, a Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh observed as follows, while upholding the competency of cross-objections under O. 41, R. 22 of the Code in an appeal under the Act:
“…as soon as this Court becomes seized of an appeal, even where an appellate jurisdiction is conferred under a special statute, the rules of practice and procedure of this Court applicable to a civil appeal, will, in the absence of any specific rule to the contrary govern such appeal.” —page 13
While doing so, the Bench relied on Secretary of State for India v. Challikani Rama Rao, N.S Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros.
12. In Dehli Municipalitiy v. Kuldip, a Full Bench of the High Court of Delhi had occasion to consider the nature of jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal and of the High Court under the Act. The Headnote in the report has practically brought out the ratio laid down by the Full Bench and the relevant passages therefrom stand extracted as follows—
“A decision given by a single Judge of the High Court in appeal under S. 110. D of the Motor Vehicles Act, against an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, is a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent.
The question, whether a particular decision of the High Court is a judgment or is only a determination turns on the connected question whether the decision is given by the High Court acting as a High Court or whether it is given by it acting as a Tribunal or a persona designata.
The theory that an appeal takes colour from the original proceeding is not to be carried too far. Three aspects to be considered are—(1) the nature of the Tribunal, (2) the nature of the proceeding before it, and (3) the nature of the decision given by it. It would not be correct to say that merely because the Tribunal was not a court or the proceeding before it, was not a suit or its decision was not a judgment but an award, the High Court hearing appeals against its decision would not be a court or the proceedings before the High Court Would not be in its ordinary jurisdiction or that the decision of the High Court on such appeal would not be a judgment. Therefore, even if the Original proceeding took place before the Arbitrator, resulting in an award, the appeal to the High Court will not turn the High Court itself into a persona designata for an Arbitration Tribunal and will not, therefore, make the judgment of the High Court an award.
In hearing the appeal under S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the High Court must be held to be acting as a High Court, and not as a Tribunal, in as much as the claim for compensation for negligence is a common law right not created by a statute and the claim is considered by the Tribunal in its entirety without limitation, with the result than an appeal to the High Court is made in its ordinary civil jurisdiction. In fact, an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 lies to the Supreme Court, against the determination or order of a Tribunal. The High Court also has the superintendence over other Courts and Tribunals under Art. 227 of the Constitution. It has never been doubted that the Supreme Court and the High Court act as the Supreme Court and the High Court in functioning under Arts. 136 and 227 of the Constitution respectively and do not act as an Arbitrator or a Tribunal in doing so. For the same reason, the High Court would also act as the High Court and not as a tribunal in hearing the appeal under S. 110-D of the Act.”
13. In Shanti Devi v. G.M Harayana Roadways, a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, following Collector, Varanasi v. G.S Misra, held as follows—
“The High Court while hearing appeals under S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, acts as a ‘court’ and a proceeding even if at its inception has semblance of an arbitration proceeding, does not retain its character as such in appeal.” —Headnote
14. A Bench of this Court in Union Co.op Ins. Society v. Lazarammal observed as follows, and upheld the competency of entertaining cross-objections in an appeal before this Court under the Act:—
“…It must be remembered that when once an appeal is entertained by this Court, all the provisions relating to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court are attracted. It is true that all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the Tribunal, because, it is a creature of the Statute, but the appeal against the order of the Tribunal is to the High Court and not to any other Tribunal constituted under the statute.” —page 380
15. In K. Chandrasekhara Naik v. Narayana, the competency of cross-objections to the High Court in an appeal under the Act was upheld by a Full Bench of the High Court of Karnataka and it has been countenanced as follows:
“Except providing for an appeal to the High Court under S. 110 D, the Act does not expressly lay down the procedure to be followed by the High Court in dealing with appeals filed before it. The Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules also do not contain any provisions as to such procedure. In such a contingency the special Act being silent in regard to the procedure by the appellate court, such an appellate jurisdiction has to be exercised in the same manner as the High Court exercises its general appellate jurisdiction and that the appeal so filed must be regulated by the practice and procedure of the High Court.”
—Headnote
16. A Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Harayana in Triloki Nath Bhargava v. Jaswint Kaur, recapitulated the principle and held that in an appeal against an award of the Claims Tribunal under the Act, there could be cross-objections and the principle taken note of runs as follows—
“As soon as the High Court becomes seized of an appeal under S. 110-D, the rules of practice and procedure of the High Court becomes applicable to the appeal as there is no special rule to the contrary in the Act or the rules framed thereunder and, therefore cross-objections under O. 41, R. 22 C.P.C, can be filed.” —Headnote
17. In State v. K. Padma Rani, a Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh also upheld the competency of cross-objections in an appeal befroe the High Court under the Act. Equally, a Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, in Smt. Gurdev Kaur v. Rash Behari Das countenanced the competency of filing cross-objections in appeal to the High Court under the Act.
18. Thus, we find that uniformly it has been countenanced that the High Court, while hearing an appeal under the Act, exercises its ordinary appellate powers and should follow its practice and procedure as are normally atributable to it as an ordinary appellate court; and in the absence of any circumscription or regulation of the said powers, the rules of practice and procedure, and power as per the provisions of the Code can be legitimately invoked for the purpose set out therein in the matter of dealing with such an appeal. O. 33 of the Code deals with institution of proceedings by indigent persons. O. 44 deals with appeals by indegent persons and it contemplates that appeals by indigent persons shall be dealt with in the same manner as institution of original proceedings by indigent persons. In this view, we have to hold that it will be competent for the appellants to invoke the aid of O. 44 and thereby O. 33 of the Code.
19. Our attention has been drawn to a pronouncement of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Darshna Devi v. Shree Singh, wherein Koshal, C.J as he then was, held that the Claims Tribunal is a civil court for the purpose of O. 33 of the Code. In State of Harayana v. Darshna Devi, the Sipreme Court approved the reasoning of Koshal, C.J as he then was in Dharshna Devi v. Shree Singh, that O. 33 will apply to Tribunals which have the trappings of the civil court. This question does not strictly arise for consideration before us, as we stated above, and there is no need to express any opinion about the same in this matter.
20. The Office of this Court will first number the application for permission to prefer the appeal under the Act as indigent persons if the said application is strictly in order with the concerned provisions of the Code, and post the same for orders.
VCS.
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