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Seetha v. Government Of Tamil Nadu And Another

Madras High Court
Jun 12, 1984
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (V. Ramaswami, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition was filed by the wife of the detenu, Duraiswamy Mudaliar, seeking a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondents to produce the detenu and set him at liberty.

By an order dated 7-12-1983 the District Magistrate, Chingalpattu, detained Duraiswamy Mudaliar under S. 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (the Act), on the ground that detention was necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

The grounds of detention referenced two criminal charges under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act: Crime No. 1894 of 1982 — possession (13-10-1982) of chloral hydrate and selling it to toddy shop owners (charged under S. 4(1)(a) of the Prohibition Act); and Crime No. 446 of 1983 — possession of 15 packets of chloral hydrate and manufacturing/selling an intoxicating liquid called Kalvari (charged under S. 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(i) of the Prohibition Act).

The detaining authority relied, in making the detention order, on a confessional statement of the detenu admitting possession, manufacture and sale of chloral hydrate/Kalvari. The petitioner challenged the detention principally on the ground that reliance on that confessional statement vitiated the detention order.

The writ petition was allowed by the court. The order of detention was set aside and the respondents were directed to set the detenu at large immediately.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether reliance by the detaining authority on a confessional statement made to police (and referred to in the grounds of detention) vitiates an order of preventive detention under S. 3(1) of the Act.
  2. Whether the protections embodied in S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act (which renders confessions made to police inadmissible in criminal proceedings) apply, by analogy, to proceedings for preventive detention under the Act.
  3. Whether the ordinary rules of criminal jurisprudence (for example, the rule that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt) are to be imported into preventive detention proceedings, and the extent to which precedents about admissibility of police statements in other proceedings are applicable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the detaining authority relied on the detenu's confessional statement when making the detention order, and that such reliance vitiates the order.
  • It was argued that, under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, confessional statements made to police are inadmissible in evidence and therefore could not have been lawfully taken into account by the detaining authority.

Respondent's (Public Prosecutor's) Arguments

  • The learned Public Prosecutor contended that confessions made to a police officer are inadmissible in evidence only "as against a person accused of any offence" in a criminal trial, and that such confessions can be used in proceedings other than the criminal trial for the offence in respect of which the confession was made.
  • He argued that preventive detention proceedings under the Act are not criminal trials: the detenu is not accused in a trial and the detention is preventive rather than punitive. Evidence before the detaining authority functions as information to satisfy the subjective decision-maker.
  • The Public Prosecutor relied on judicial decisions (including Kailash v. State of U.P. and State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya) to support the contention that criminal evidentiary rules are not fully applicable to preventive detention proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kailash v. State of U.P., (1984) 2 SCC 397 : AIR 1983 SC 317 (1983 Cri LJ 452) Whether copies of confessional statements referred to in grounds of detention must be supplied to the detainee; rule that failure to supply may deny opportunity to make representations. The court noted that Kailash holds that unless copies of such confessions are served on the petitioner it will amount to a denial of opportunity to make proper representations. The court emphasized that Kailash is not authority for the proposition that confessional statements may be relied on in preventive detention proceedings.
Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 2 SCC 493 : AIR 1981 SC 1068 (Cri LJ 597) Construction of S. 162 Cr.P.C. — statements recorded by police in course of investigation are barred from use only in trials/enquiries in respect of the offence under investigation; such statements can be used in other proceedings (e.g., Art. 32/226) if otherwise relevant. The court invoked Khatri's reasoning that S.162 Cr.P.C. creates a limited bar and does not prevent use of police-recorded statements in other proceedings. Applying the logical reasoning of Khatri, the court concluded that confessional statements made to police could not be relied on by the detaining authority for preventive detention.
State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya, (1981) 4 SCC 216 : AIR 1981 SC 2005 (1981 Cri LJ 1686) Addresses limits of writ/judicial review in preventive detention: High Court erred in importing criminal standard (proof beyond reasonable doubt) into preventive detention review under Art. 226. The Public Prosecutor relied on this case; the court here held that the decision does not support the Public Prosecutor's contention that criminal evidentiary rules (in toto) are inapplicable by analogy. Instead, the case is authority that the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not to be imported into preventive detention review. It does not justify disregarding the protections analogous to S. 25 Evidence Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytic steps, relying only on the materials and authorities referenced in the opinion:

  1. Nature of S. 3(1) detention order: The court recognized that an order under S. 3(1) of the Act is made on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and is not open to an objective test. Nevertheless, because the order is based on subjective satisfaction, it is important to ascertain whether any inadmissible material (here, a confessional statement) improperly influenced that subjective satisfaction.
  2. Consequence of reliance on inadmissible confession: The court explained that if the detaining authority relied on a confessional statement which could not lawfully be taken into account, the detention order would be vitiated because it may be impossible to determine what influence that confession had on the authority's satisfaction that detention was necessary.
  3. Analysis of admissibility: The petitioner relied on S. 25 of the Evidence Act, which renders confessions made to police inadmissible in criminal proceedings. The Public Prosecutor argued that such confessions are inadmissible only "as against a person accused of any offence" and therefore can be used in other proceedings like preventive detention.
  4. Precedential guidance — Kailash and Khatri: The court examined Kailash (which held that if confessional statements are relied on in grounds of detention, copies must be supplied or it will deny opportunity to make representations) and Khatri (which held that S.162 Cr.P.C's bar on use of police statements is limited to trials/enquiries and does not apply to other proceedings if the statement is otherwise relevant).
  5. Application of Evidence Act principles by analogy: The court considered S. 24 and S. 25 of the Evidence Act and concluded that S. 25 was enacted to guard against extraction of confessions by police through inducement, threats or similar malpractices. Even if S. 25 is not in terms applicable to preventive detention proceedings, the court held that the rule embodied in S. 25 must be applied by analogy to preventive detention, otherwise the mischief S. 25 seeks to prevent would be perpetuated in detention proceedings.
  6. Rejection of the Public Prosecutor's broad argument: The court rejected the Public Prosecutor's contention that criminal jurisprudence rules are wholly inapplicable (by analogy) to preventive detention. The court distinguished the limited holding in State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya (that the standard of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not to be imported into preventive detention) from the broader proposition that no criminal-evidentiary protections may apply even by analogy.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: On the basis that the detaining authority relied on the detenu's confessional statement and that the protections of S. 25 of the Evidence Act should apply by analogy to preventive detention, the court concluded that the detention order was vitiated. Because the petitioner was entitled to relief on this ground alone, the court did not examine other grounds.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petition was allowed. The order of detention was set aside and the respondents were directed to set the detenu (Duraiswamy Mudaliar) at large immediately.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence for the parties is the immediate release of the detenu pursuant to the court's order.
  • The court held that the protections embodied in S. 25 of the Evidence Act — which render confessions made to police inadmissible — should be applied by analogy to preventive detention proceedings under the Act, and that reliance on such confessions in making detention orders may vitiate those orders.
  • The opinion clarifies that while the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not to be imported into preventive detention review, that does not mean that all criminal-evidentiary protections are excluded from consideration by analogy; in particular, the court applied the rationale of S. 25 by analogy to prevent the mischief of police-extracted confessions influencing detention decisions.
  • The opinion does not, on its face, state whether it intends to lay down a binding precedent beyond the resolution of this petition. The direct legal effect announced in this opinion is the quashing of the particular detention order and the release of the detenu.

This summary is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

V. Ramaswami, J.:— This petition has been filed by the wife of the detenu, Duraiswamy Mudaliar, praying for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondents to produce the detenu and set him at liberty forthwith.

2. By an order dt. 7-12-1983 the husband of the petitioner one Duraisamy Mudaliar was directed to be detained and kept in custody at the Central Prison by the District Magistrate Chingalpattu in exercise of his powers under S. 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (for short the Act) on the ground that it was necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detenu was charged for an offence under S. 4(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu 1 Prohibition Act in Crime No. 1894 of 1982 on the ground that he was found to be in possession on 13-10-1982 of chloral hydrate and has been selling the same to toddy shop owners. Again, he was charged in Crime No. 446 of 1983 for a similar offence under S. 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act on the ground that he was in possession of 15 packets of chloral hydrate and was manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquid called Kalvari which is an illicit liquor within the meaning of the Prohibition Act. These two charges under the Prohibition Act and the activities are mentioned as the grounds on which the detention order was made. It is seen from the grounds of detention and the counter-affidavit now filed in this case that the confessional statement of the detenu admitting the possession of chloral hydrate and preparing the intoxicating liquid called Kalvari and selling the same, had been relied on by the District Magistrate while he made the detention order. The main point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that such reliance on the confessional statement of the detenu while making the order of detention vitiates the entire order. There is no dispute that an order made under S. 3(1) of the Act is not open to objective test as it is one made on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned. Therefore, even if the other evidence on record would justify an order of detention, if the confessional statement made by the detenu could not have been relied on, the order is liable to be set aside as it may not be possible to determine what influence his confessional statement had on the mind of the authority in satisfying himself as to the need for making an order under S. 3(1) of the Act. Therefore, if the confessional statement could not have been taken into account by the detaining authority the whole order will become vitiated. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, such confessional statements are inadmissible in evidence and that therefore could not have been taken into account by the detaining authority. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that confessions made to a police officer is not admissible in evidence only “as against a person accused of any offence” and that it could be used in any proceedings other than the offence in respect of which that confession was properly made. According to the learned Public Prosecutor in proceedings taken under the Act for preventive detention, the cetenu is not accused of any offence, he is not put on any trial and that it is only a preventive action taken by the detaining authority in order to prevent him in acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In that sense, it is not a punitive provision and all the evidence collected are in the nature of information furnished to the detaining authority in order to enable him to come to a proper conclusion especially when the matter is one of subjective satisfaction. In this connection, the learned Public Prosecutor also relied on certain decisions which we may note immediately. The first of the decisions is Kailash v. State of U.P, 1983 Cri LJ 452 : ((1984) 2 SCC 397 : AIR 1983 SC 317). That was a case in which a person was detained under the provisions of National Security Act pursuant to an order made by the District Magistrate. The detention was challenged in proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution on various grounds. One of the grounds was that a confessional statement made by the detenu which is referred to in the grounds of detention had not been supplied to the detenu. It was contended that it was not necessary to supply copies of such confessional statement. The Supreme Court held that unless such copies were served on the petitioner, it will amount to a denial of opportunity to make proper representations. This is not an authority for the proposition that confessional statement could be relied on in proceedings for preventive detention.

3. In Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 2 SCC 493 : AIR 1981 SC 1068 : (Cri LJ 597) the Supreme Court considered whether statement recorded by a police officer in the course of investigation Under Chapter XII Cr. P.C could not be used in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution. It was the contention of the State in that case that S. 162 of the Cr. P.C bars the use of such statements. The Supreme Court pointed out that by the express terms of S. 162, Cr. P.C the bar is applicable only where such statement is sought to be used “at any enquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made”. But this protection “is unnecessary in any proceeding other than an inquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation and hence the bar created by the section is a limited bar. It has no application, for example in a civil proceedings or in a proceeding under Art. 32 or 226 of the Constitution, and a statement made before a police officer in the course of investigation can be used as evidence in such proceeding, provided it is otherwise relevant under the Evidence Act”. The Supreme Court came to this conclusion on the ground that S. 162. Cr. P.C has been enacted for the benefit of the accused and to protect him against over jealous police officers and untruthful witnesses and that this protection was however unnecessary in any proceedings other than an inquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigation and hence the bar created by the section is a limited bar. If we apply the same logical reasoning, we have no doubt that the confessional statement made by a detenu could not be relied on by the detaining authority for the purpose of preventive detention also. S. 24 of the Evidence Act states that a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused “by any inducement, threat or promise of having reference to the charge against the accused person etc. etc”. Section 25 is enacted to guard against confessional statements being extracted by the police and to prevent obtaining statement by oppression; torture, undue influence and any other malpractices. Section 25 presumes a confessional statement given to a police officer could have been obtained under circumstances mentioned in S. 24 itself. If that is the scope and purport of S. 25 of the Evidence Act, we think, that even if S. 25 in terms is not applicable to proceedings taken under the Act, the rule of that provision by analogy would be equally applicable to such proceedings as otherwise the very mischief sought to be prevented by the provisions of S. 25 will be very much in the proceedings under the Act. We are of the view that the protection given to an accused person by S. 25 of the Evidence Act, shall be equally applied to a person detained under the provisions of the Act as well. In fact the Supreme Court has invoked the principles of the provisions of the Evidence Act and other provisions in enactments though they are not specifically applicable to writ proceedings. For instance the principles of res-judicata provided under S. 11 of the Civil P.C, though in terms are not made applicable to Art. 226 has been applied by the Supreme Court by analogy. That was on the ground that the very basi so S. 11 C.P.C is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and that principle is equally applicable to the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We are therefore of the view that the principles of S. 25 of the Evidence Act by analogy will have to be applied even in respect of preventive detention under the Act.

4. The learned Public Prosecutor then contended that the rules of criminal jurisprudence in general are not applicable to preventive detentions and that therefore even by way of an analogy the provisions of S. 25 of the Evidence Act should not be invoked. In this connection the learned Public Prosecutor relied on the decision in State Of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya., (1981) 4 SCC 216 : AIR 1981 SC 2005 : (1981 Cri LJ 1686). We are unable to agree that this decision of the Supreme Court supports the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. That was a case where the High Court of Gujarat while quashing an order of detention applied the rule that the guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. While allowing the appeal the Supreme Court held with reference to the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution that the writ jurisdiction conferred on the High Court is only to see whether the order of detention has been passed on any material before it and the Court cannot go further and examine whether the material was adequate or not and that in interfering with the order of preventive detentions, the High Court had misapplied the rule of proving the guilt beyond reason able doubt as if it were a criminal proceedings. This decision is only a authority for the proposition that the rule of Criminal Jurisprudence that guilt shall be proved beyond reasonable doubt is not to be imported in the case of preventive detention. In the case of preventive detention the orders are made on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned while in Criminal proceedings, it is a judicial order which is open to question in further proceedings in an objective manner. We are therefore unable to agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the rules of Criminal Jurisprudence as a whole are not applicable even by an analogy to the proceedings under the preventive detention. Since we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to the relief even on this ground alone, it is not necessary for us to go into the other grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The order of detention is set aside and the respondents are directed to set at large the detenu immediately.

6. Petition allowed.