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Ramakrishna Industrials Pvt. Ltd., v. P.R Ramakrishnan And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Balasubrahmanyan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of Shanmukham, J., which directed the appointment of a number of Advocates as Court Commissioners to take an inventory of the assets and accounts of a company located in Coimbatore. The company is the appellant. The appeal is filed under S. 483 of the Companies Act, 1956. A preliminary objection to the entertainability of the appeal was raised by Mr. Vasantha Pai for the contesting respondents. The company (appeal side) was represented before this Court by Mr. Bhiksheswaran. The interlocutory order under challenge was made very shortly after the admission of the winding-up petition; counsel for the company argued that the order was hastily made and that an interim inventory order could not be made at the stage of admission of the petition. The court below had given three stated reasons for appointing Commissioners: (1) a provision in Art. 38 of the company's Articles, (2) alleged serious charges against the company and its management, and (3) the fact that the company faced several legal proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal under S. 483 of the Companies Act, 1956, is maintainable — i.e., whether the company has shown that some right has been affected by the interlocutory order (preliminary objection to entertainability).
- Whether the trial court (Shanmukham, J.) was justified in appointing Court Commissioners to take inventories of the company's assets at the stage and in the manner in which the order was made (whether order was warranted on the facts and record).
- Whether the learned Judge acted without jurisdiction in making an interim inventory order at the stage of admission of the winding-up petition, in light of S. 443(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 1956 (interpretation of statutory provision said to restrict interim orders to the hearing stage).
- What is the scope of appellate review of discretionary interlocutory orders — whether an appellate court can re-examine discretionary orders for wrong reasons or non-judicial exercise of discretion.
Arguments of the Parties
Contestant Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Vasantha Pai)
- The appeal should not be entertained under S. 483 because the company has not shown any right affected by the inventory order — "you do not lose any assets by counting them".
- Counting the assets by court Commissioners is benign and only provides a contemporaneous picture; the company already prepares annual inventories for accounting, so the court's order is not unwelcome.
- The learned Judge was entitled to act on the pleadings and affidavits before him; the trial court is best placed to judge urgencies and the appellate court should not lightly upset discretionary interlocutory orders.
- It was also submitted (in related argument) that courts have inherent powers and that rules (R.9, Companies (Court) Rules) might inform the scope of powers — though the opinion addresses and critiques these submissions.
Appellant / Company Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Bhiksheswaran)
- The order was made hastily — closely following admission of the winding-up petition and after refusing a short adjournment of only a few hours requested by the company's intervening counsel (Miss Bhanumathi).
- The interim order was made barely minutes after admission; an interim inventory order should not be made at the admission stage and an order of that nature should be made only when the main winding-up petition is being heard.
- The learned Judge should have granted the short postponement sought so the company could prepare a counter-affidavit and properly place before the court the facts and documents necessary to oppose the interlocutory application.
- Questioned the jurisdiction of the learned Judge to pass the interim inventory order at the time he did — relying on an interpretation of S. 443(1)(c) of the Companies Act that such interim orders are to be made “on hearing a winding-up petition” (i.e., at hearing rather than at admission).
- In the event the order were set aside, counsel also asked the appellate court to consider expunging the reports and inventories filed by the Commissioners from the record.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shankarlal Aggarwala's case, 35 Company Cases 1 = 1964-1 S.C.R 717 = A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 507 | The proposition that an appellate court should not entertain every appeal in winding-up matters merely because S. 483 provides for appeal; the appellant must show that some right has been affected by the order appealed from. | The Court considered this authority when addressing the preliminary objection on maintainability. The Court rejected the respondents' submission that the company had suffered no right affected by counting, and held the company had a good cause for complaint so the preliminary objection failed. |
| Evans v. Burilam (as cited) | Indicative of the modern trend in England that appellate courts do not treat discretionary orders as sacrosanct and may interfere where justice requires. | Used as an example of the shift in appellate approach to discretionary orders; the Court relied on this trend to justify examining the grounds on which the trial judge exercised discretion. |
| Charles Ostemion v. Johnson, 1942 A.C. 130 | Illustrative of English authority on appellate review of discretionary decisions (cited in support of interference with discretionary orders where appropriate). | Placed among the English authorities showing that appellate interference with discretionary orders is established; supported the Court's conclusion that it had both power and duty to examine the trial judge's reasons. |
| In re O.3 (Davies, L.J. — quoted) | Statement (quoted) reflecting reluctance to treat decisions as sacrosanct merely because they are said to be made in the exercise of discretion. | The Court quoted Davies, L.J.'s remark to support the proposition that discretionary orders are subject to appellate scrutiny and need not be immune from review. |
| Ward v. James, 1966 1 Q.B. 273 (Lord Denning, M.R.) | That an appellate court may examine the grounds on which a trial court exercised its discretion to determine whether those grounds are tenable and support the order made. | The Court relied on Lord Denning's statement to confirm that appellate courts should look into the stated grounds for discretionary interlocutory orders; this bolstered the Court's approach to reassess the trial judge's reasons for appointing Commissioners. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a sequence of discrete analytical steps:
- Addressing maintainability: The Court considered the respondents' preliminary objection based on Shankarlal Aggarwala's authority that appeals under S. 483 are not to be entertained unless some right is shown to be affected. The Court rejected the respondents' submission that counting assets causes no loss and held that the inventory order did in fact adversely affect the company (disruption of business, reputational harm and credit impact). Consequently the preliminary objection failed.
- On the haste of the order: The Court accepted the appellant's contention that the learned Judge acted hastily. The factual finding was that the winding-up petition was admitted on 13th July 1981 and, in response to an urgent application, the Judge denied a short adjournment (a few hours requested by intervening counsel) and proceeded to appoint Commissioners. The Court found no record-based prima facie reason to believe assets would be spirited away between that evening and the next morning; the Judge gave no finding that the company's request was delaying tactics or that there was imminent risk.
- Appellate review of discretion: The Court rejected the notion that appellate courts should rigidly refrain from unsettling discretionary interlocutory orders. Citing English authorities (including Evans v. Burilam, Charles Ostemion v. Johnson, In re O.3, Ward v. James), the Court held appellate courts have both the power and obligation to examine whether the grounds stated by a trial judge support the exercise of discretion. Thus, the Court undertook a substantive review of the reasons given by Shanmukham, J.
-
Examination of the three stated grounds: The Court analysed each of the judge's three reasons and found none sufficient to justify an immediate inventory order:
- Art. 38 of the Company's Articles: The Court held this Article did not establish the factual urgency or the necessity of a court-ordered inventory immediately upon admission; an article in the memorandum or articles is not proof of facts or urgency to compel such an order.
- Serious allegations against management: The learned Judge did not describe the allegations that made out a prima facie case for urgent inventory; on inspection the petition contained only two specific allegations, one dated transfer of share block in 1976 and a Board resolution circulated in early 1979; these did not, on reasonable evaluation, show imminent danger of assets disappearing.
- Multiple legal proceedings: The mere fact that the company faced several legal proceedings did not, without more, justify an immediate inventory order.
- On the nature and consequences of inventory orders: The Court emphasised that an order for taking inventory is not an easily reversible interlocutory act. Once commissioners had executed the inventory and filed reports, the act was done and could not be undone even if the order was subsequently set aside. The Court considered this irreversibility an important factor militating against making such orders without adequate hearing.
- Jurisdictional argument and statutory construction of S. 443(1)(c): The Court examined the appellant's submission that S. 443(1)(c) permits interim orders only "on hearing a winding-up petition", and thus no interim order could be made at the stage of admission. The Court rejected the restrictive reading. It reasoned that the section must be construed in the context of the court's traditional jurisdiction and that Parliament did not intend to derogate from the court’s plenary powers unless an explicit bar or clear implication exists. The presence of clauses enumerating powers in S. 443(1) did not imply exclusivity or that interim powers are confined only to the hearing stage. The Court concluded S. 443(1)(c) does not bar the court from making interim orders at the admission stage, and therefore the order did not suffer from want of jurisdiction on that ground.
- On the request to expunge Commissioners' reports: The Court declined the appellant's request to direct that the reports and inventories filed by the Commissioners be expunged, stating that the only matter before the appellate court was the setting aside of the order; the Court would not express what consequences the judgment would have on follow-up proceedings or records.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the interlocutory order of Shanmukham, J. appointing Commissioners and directing inventories. The Court's core ruling is:
ORDER OF SHANMUKHAM, J. SET ASIDE.
Consequences and immediate implications (as derived from the opinion):
- The interlocutory order directing appointment of Court Commissioners and taking of inventories is held untenable on the grounds stated by the learned Judge and because it was passed without affording the company an adequate opportunity to be heard; accordingly that order is set aside.
- The Court refused to make any declaration about the legal effect or admissibility of the reports and inventories already filed by the Commissioners; it declined to order them expunged, observing that the appellate remit is to pass an appellate order, not to pronounce upon all follow-up consequences.
- There will be no order as to costs between the parties in this appeal.
- The opinion articulates and applies principles on appellate review of discretionary interlocutory orders and on construction of S. 443(1)(c) of the Companies Act, but the practical, immediate effect ordered by the Court is limited to setting aside the trial judge's inventory order and making no costs order.
VCS.
Balasubrahmanyan, J.
1. This appeal is from an interlocutory order of Shanmukham, J. The order directed the appointment of a number of Advocates as court Commissioners to take an inventory of the assets and accounts of a company in Coimbatore. The company is the appellant before us. It contends that the order is wrong.
2. Mr. Vasantha Pai, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, raises a preliminary objection. He says that we should not entertain this appeal.
3. The appeal is filed under S. 483 of the Companies Act, 1956. This section provides for an appeal against any order passed by a court of first instance in a winding up matter. The section says that an appeal is available against such an order in the same way as an appeal is available from any other order of a court for which the law provides. This is the substance of the words of the section. They are fairly wide words in which the appeal provision is cast. But, the Supreme Court in Shankarlal Aggarwala's case . 35 Company Cases 1 = 1964-1 S.C.R 717 = A.I.R 1965 S.C 507. have said that a court of appeal cannot entertain any and every appeal in a winding up matter merely because the section provides for it. They said that the appellant must show the appellate court that some right has been affected by the order in question. Quoting this position, Mr. Vasantha Pai raised the query: what is it that the company has lost by this order? You do not lose any assets by counting them, he said, although by not counting them there is a chance of some assets being lost sight of. He pursued this line of argument further, thus. The Company every year prepares inventories for its balance sheet. They are a necessary part of annual accounting. The inventory order passed by Shanmukham, J. cannot be unwelcome since it only gives the company a picture, here and now, of its assets. Nobody need have to wait for the position to emerge by the year-end to find out an uptodate account of the assets.
4. We find Mr. Pai's contentions extremely naive. Especially that bit about the learned Judge's order being entirely to the good of the Company. It sounds a little like a School Master claiming that caning a pupil is for his own good. In our judgment, there is no comparision between annual stock taking and what is involved in the order under appeal. Here is a company having a machine shop, a newspaper printing press and a textile mill, at Coimbatore, all of them in full swing, not to speak of the godowns, administrative offices, and other establishments. Into such places descended the Advocate Commissioner armed with the order under appeal, clamouring that all normal business be laid aside to let them enter into a meticulous count of the stock, the machinery and other bric-a-brac. We have no doubt that it not only affects the production for the duration, but puts off the staff from transacting even pressing business with their customers. And because it is a court order that operates against the company, the news of it tends to spread affecting the company's name and credit in the market. Annual stock taking does not have these harmful side effects, even though business is suspended while the stock is being taken. This is because the clientele knows that it would be so, because, just about the same time must of them would also be engaged in a similar puasuit. Closing the shop doors during annual stock taking does not evoke the wrong kind of publicity.
5. We are for discouraging frivolous appeals under S. 483 of the Companies Act and also appeals against formal orders. But, this order of Shanmukham, J. is a hurt against the company. The Company has a good cause for complaint, even if counting of of assets by the court Commissioners may not diminish either the quantum of assets or their value. We hold that the preliminary objection fails.
6. In the appeal, the submissions were addressed by Mr. Bhiksheswaran who argued the company's case. One was that the orders was much too hasty. The other was that it was made barely within minutes of the admission of the winding up petition. It was urged that an interim order cannot be made by a company court excepting when the main winding-up petition is actually being taken up for hearing.
7. On the first head of criticism of the learned Judge's order, there is no denying the speed which attended it. The winding-up petition was admitted by the learned Judge on 13th July, 1981. Closely following the admission, an application for appointment of Commissioners was moved before the learned Judge as an urgent motion. The Company got wind of the winding up petition. It stationed a lawyer in the company court to take notice and oppose an ex parte order. The order of Shanmukham, J., shows that Miss Bhanumathi, a member of the Bar, intervened and asked for time till the next day morning for filing an affidavit in opposition. The learned Judge, however, turned down this request and proceeded to pass the order. We are informed from the Bar that it was about 4 pm on the day when the learned Judge passed the order. The request of Miss Bhanumathi, if granted, would have meant deferring the hearing of the application by a few hours. Not more than that. But, the learned Judge proceeded on the footing that the matter did not brook even this little postponement. It is Mr. Bhiksheswaran's submission that the learned Judge did not do the right thing when he hustled the interim order in this manner.
8. We are inclined to accept this contention as legitimate. After all, the adjournment asked for was not a matter of days, but hours. The heavens were not going to fall down, as the saying goes in between one evening and the next morning. The learned Judge acted as though there was not a moment to be lost. But, the order does not point to any circumstance, even a prima facie belief, that there was a risk of the accounts or the assets being spirited away by the company if given a breathing time. The learned Judge did not think that the company had no case to put forward in the interlocutory application. On the contrary, he gave ample time to file a counter-affidavit. The learned Judge did not, and could not, say that the request of the company amounted to delaying tactics, for, the company had asked only for the barest minimum interval of time to prepare its affidavit in opposition. The Company had to have copies of the petition for winding up and of the affidavit in support of the interlocutory application. These had to be studied for the counter-affidavit to be prepared. And yet, the postponement asked for was only till the next morning when the court assembled and commenced its work. The learned Judge was apparently willing to give a long time to the company to file a counter-affidavit, after the Commissioners were appointed; but, he was not prepared to give a short time for the same purpose before any such order was made. This only shows the learned Judge's overpowering sense of urgency for an interim order to be passed. There are times when the courts must act swiftly with the velocity of sound, if possible, if their acts should have any meaning at all. We do not, however, think that this was one such occasion. We believe that in the vast majority of cases justice would carry well, with self imposed speed-limits.
9. Mr. Pai said that the learned Judge did go into the case for urgency. The winding up petition was before him. The affidavit in support of the application was before him. And he was entitled to act on the basis of his own individual judgment of the situation from what he gathered from the papers before him. We agree that in the din and clamour of trial litigation, the trial court is the best Judge of the competing claims of urgency, on the one hand and deliberation, on the other. Even so, since the order can be passed only from what is on record, and not from what is not on record, an appellate Court is quite capable of finding out whether the record justifies the order. In this case, we do not find anything in the winding up petition or in the supporting affidavit which would have compelled any reasonable mind to believe that between ons evening and the next morning the Company would have irretrievably altered the assets position.
10. Mr. Pai reminded us that the order under appeal is a discretionary order passed by the learned Judge in an interlocutory application. There are certain norms, he said, which courts of appeal should observe while dealing with a discretionary order of a court of first instance. He urged that we ought not to upset the order of Shanmukham, J. merely on the score that in his place we would have acted differently, given the chanee.
11. This enunciation of the limit of appellate review of discretionary orders is out of date. In the good old days it was thought that an appellate court will not set aside discretionary orders, unless the discretion was exercised in a non-judicial way. Appellate courts, however, no longer treat discretionary orders with excessive respect. They are just like any other orders. The appellate Judges feel free to interfere with the discretion exercised by the court below not only where it had acted non-judicially, but also where it had given wrong reasons. This is the trend in England, the home of the doctrine of judicial discretion. See, for example, Evans v. Burilam, and Charles Ostemion v. Johnson . 1942 A.C 130., Davies, L.J in the Court of Appeal, in In re O.3, went to the extent of remarking—
“I am quite unable to subscribe to the view that a decision must be treated as sacrosanct because it was made in the exercise of ‘discretion’ so to do might well perpetuate injustice.”
Lord Denning, M.R in Ward v. James . 1966 1 Q.B 273, said that an appellate court can go into the grounds on which the trial court has exercised its discretion in order to find out if those grounds are tenable and if they support the order made. We are therefore, satisfied that we not only have the power, but we own an obligation to ourselves as an appellate court to examine Shanmukham, J.'s order to see if the grounds stated by him support his decision to appoint Commissioners.
12. The learned Judge has given three reasons for his order. They are: (1) that Art. 38 of the Company's Articles clearly indicates an inventory in the winding up proceedings, (ii) that there were many serious charges levelled against the Company and those who are running it now; and (iii) that the company is obliged to face a number of legal proceedings. Not one of these grounds, in our judgment, justifies an order for inventory.
13. Art. 38 of the Company's Articles, relied on by the learned Judge, does not, in our view, provide any justification for the order for inventory. A mere provision in an Article of this kind is by itself no proof of the existence of facts, much less their urgency, which would justify an order of inventory against the Company. What, after all, the Article carries is nothing but a special provision to the effect that in the event of a deadlock in the management leading to a winding up, the distribution of assets among members might be in specie or of the proceeds on realisation of the assets. This Article might in some measure, be regarded as an indication of the importance of safeguarding and properly accounting the company's assets. But, even in the ordinary modes of winding up where the ultimate distribution is to be of the proceeds of assets, it is equally important to have a proper account of the assets and to safeguard them for the duration of the winding up. And yet, we have not heard of any statutory provision, or statutory rule, or even a court ruling, which lays down that in every case which comes before it the winding up court must order an inventory forthwith, as an indispensable first step, before the court decices upon anything else.
14. Another ground relied on by the learned Judge in his order is that there are serious allegations against the company. The learned Judge does not, however, state, even ever so briefly, what are the allegations which, in his opinion, make out a prima facie case for an urgent order of appointment of Commissioner. We have studied the winding up petition to see if the allegations therein have a bearing on the demand for an inventory of assets by court Commissioners. Apart from a diffuse averment that those who now run the company are attempting to sell or fritter away the Company's resources, the winding up petition contains only two specific allegations against them. One relates to an actual transfer of a block of certain shareholdings held by the company as an investment, in favour of Vysia Bank in discharge of the company's outstanding dues to the Bank. The other is about the sale of a building in Madras, a building site in Coimbatore and some equity shares. The transfer of shares to Vysia Bank took place way back in 1976. As for the Board resolution, if was circulated early in 1979. There is no knowing whether even this resolution was implemented, and, if so, how and when. Whatever importance these allegations might assume in the winding up petition, can they, on any reasonable standard of judgment, justify the view that unless an inventory is taken, there is imminent danger of assets going underground and hence the order must go without a moments delay? In our view, such a conclusion would not be reasonable on any evaluation of the allegations.
15. The third and last reason that weighed with the learned Judge is about the Company having to face even now, a number of legal proceedings. This remark can hardly offer a justification for the order under appeal. Practically, anybody can be dragged to court nowadays. That there are collateral proceedings against the company is, therefore, no reflection at all on it, in the absence of any indication of some adverse remarks or other against the company in such proceedings which might tend to provide some prima facie support, at least, for the issue of an interlocutory order in the winding up.
16. We must conclude, therefore, that not one of the reasons stated by the learned Judge in his order justifies it. Nor does the order carry conviction when considered in juxtaposition with two other orders passed by the learned Judge on the same evening. One was in an application for an interim injunction, in which he granted an interlocutory order as prayed for. The other was in an application for appointment of a provisional liquidator, in which he merely ordered notice. It is possible that the learned Judge was struck by the overlapping of the reliefs as between the three interlocutory motions. Even so, the order under appeal does not evince any clear perception of priorities.
17. We like to imagine that if the learned Judge had given a reasonable and adequate opportunity, to the Company to place its objections, there is just a, chance that he might have avoided passing an order for inventory. In any case, there would have been no room for the comment that the decision was taken without due consideration.
18. In interlocutory matters the safest guide for a court to act on is not whether a prima facie case is made out for an interim order, but where the balance of convenience lies, as between the parties. This latter test really provides the requisite safety valve to the court's conscience. For, it always behoves the Court to make sure that any interim order it is about to make is capable of being unmade at the earliest opportunity if the situation so demands, or if realisation dawns on the court that the interim order ought never to have been made in the first place. Judicial expiation of this sort can be readily available in some kinds of interlocutory orders, interim injunctions, for example. For, today's injunction can always be vacated tomorrow, or the day after, if it is found ill-advised or rash. And the party affected can afford to ignore the brief interlude. Not so an order for taking out inventories. An order of this nature, when made, is made once and for all, even though at in called an interim order. Witness what happened in this case. Soon after the order was made, with the warrants of commission supplied to them the Commissioners went to Coimbatore, visited the company's various establishments, and busied themselves taking out inventories. The Commissioner's reports and their lists of inventories have since been filed into court. The company might cry hoarse about it all, as it is now doing, but it can only do so, ex post facto. Things have been done under that order. They cannot now be undone. Indeed, even the setting aside of the learned Judge's order in this appeal would not matter a tittle now. It is said that after passing the interim order, the learned Judge gave a date for the final hearing of the matter and also granted some weeks' time to the company for filing its counter-affidavit. We wonder what good it would do, to the company to file a counter-affidavit when the Commissioners appointed by court had already done their job and, as Mr. Bhiksheswaran would describe it, the damage had already been done. Even if, at the final hearing the court comes to realise that the order was quite a mistake, that cannot restore the status quo.
19. To the judicial mind it must for ever be a matter for regret if it should commit a mistake, not unavoidably, but owing to a procedural inoiscretion. But, judicial regret without the means of setting right judicial error would be a frustrating experience. To adopt Katherine Mansfield out of context, regret is an appalling waste of energy; you cannot build on it; it is only fit for wallowing in. We grant that where parties are fully heard and an order is passed, that order too, if wrong, has the same effect on the party aggrieved, as much as a wrong order passed without hearing him. But, then, it would at least save the court from being stricken with conscience, if whatever, is done is done after a full-blooded hearing. We, therefore, regard it as quite a caution that where interim orders can do things which afterwards cannot be undone, courts had better not pass such orders at all, or at least not pass orders without hearing those who might be affected thereby.
20. These, then, are our reasons for holding that the order of Shanmukham, J. cannot be sustained. This conclusion of ours is enough to dispose of the appeal in favour of the company. We would therefore, examine the other argument of Mr. Biksheswaran wherein he questioned the jurisdiction of the learned Judge to pass the order at the time he did. Learned counsel rested his contention on his interpretation of S. 443(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 1956 and the implication he derived therefrom. According to this contention, the learned Judge was in error in passing an interim order at the stage of admission of the winding up petition, the suggestion was that an order of this kind can issue, under S. 443(1)(c) of the Act, only at the time of hearing the winding-up petition, and not before.
21. A perusal of the section shows that it deals with the powers of the winding-up court while hearing a winding-up petition. In that context. Cl. (c) of S. 443(1) provides that the court may, instead of dealing with the winding-up petition finally, one way or the other, prefer to make some interim order or other, and call it a day. The actual words of S. 443(1)(c) are to the effect that ‘on hearing a winding-up petition the court may make any interim order that it thinks fit’. Mr. Biksheswaran sought to read into this provision an implied bar of the court's jurisdiction to pass interim orders at the stage of admission of the winding-up petition.
22. Learned counsel's argument is seemingly based on the rule ‘expressio unius et exclusio alterius’. What is expressed excludes what is left unexpressed. Like any other canon of construction this one will have to be handled with care; otherwise it will misfire. In our opinion, the rule has a limited application. It will apply to exclude one of a pair of opposites where one alone is expressly mentioned. Where for instance, there is a sign board ‘women’ at the entrance to a place, every one of us laymen included would readily recognise that it is no place for ‘man’, but is meant exclusively for the other sex. The logic of this rule of construction cannot, however, fit in with S. 443(1)(c). The section has to be construed in the context of the main springs of Parliament's resolve to entrust jurisdiction in company matters to longestablisned common law courts under the existing dispensation, rather than to special tribunals set up or to be set up under the statute. This is one indication we must go by in construing the relevant provision. Another is that, even while requiring the court to be the forum of company law proceedings in certain matters, Parliament had not said, or even hinted at, in any provision in the Companies Act, anything which tends to disturb the court's traditional rule and status. Incidentally, this is in marked contrast to what the Tamil Nadu State Legislature did in some of the Estates Abolition Acts. Under these Acts, the final appeal lay to the High Court but, in the process, the High Court itself was downgraded in status as a mere tribunal with appellate powers. It is however, quite different with the Companies Act Among the matters entrusted by this Act to the Court, the winding-up of companies is the most important. In our judgment, the investiture of the court with the winding-up jurisdiction, as of other powers, must be interpreted as adding to the gamut of the court's existing jurisdiction. It would be a mistake to interpret the statute as stripping the court of all its powers first, and then conferring on it only such powers as are permitted, by S. 443(1) and other related provisions. We are satisfied that having regard to the scheme of the Companies Act, we cannot read any provision in the statute which relates to the jurisdiction of courts, as being in derogation of the full plenitude, of the court's powers under the common law, unless we can find in it a clearly expressed, or equally clearly implicit, bar or restriction of the court's jurisdiction.
23. We think it necessary for courts to construe statutes such as the Companies Act, according to the wisdom of Parliament and according to the folly of the draftsman. S. 443(1) is a case in point. The section sets about enumerating the different ways in which the court can tackle a winding-up petition when it comes before it for hearing. The section, in this context, enumerates the court's powers. But, there are certain things which go without saying or ought to. Adjournment, for instance, is one of them, you cannot regard it as a remarkable aspect of judicial power. And yet, Cl. (b) of S. 443(1) very seriously mentions adjournments as one of the ways in which the court can give a disposal to the petition on the day of the bearing. This is quite an inane provision. Even without it, nobody would contend and certainly not practising lawyers, that a winding up court has no power to adjourn the petition, but must get on with it even at the first hearing. Nor, for that matter, would anyone argue that because of Cl. (b) of S. 443(1), which refer to the passing of interim orders. The presence of this clause in S. 443(1) cannot mean that, but for it the court will have no power to pass any interim orders at any time, or, because of its presence in S. 443(1), its existence or exercise on other occasions must be ruled out. Courts and lawyers should read Acts, of Parliament sensibly. They should not match the denseness of the draftsman with a dithering denseness on their part. We are satisfied that S. 441(1)(c) has not the hidden meaning which Mr. Bhiksheswaran attributes to it, namely, that no interim order can be passed by a winding up court at the time of admission of the winding-up application.
24. Mr. Vasantha Pai submitted before us that a winding up court has an inherent power to pass interim orders at any time. This argument is directed to answering Mr. Biksheswaran's objection to jurisdiction, but it really goes along with Mr. Biksheswaran's interpretation of S. 443(1)(c) and is in tacit acceptance of it, which we have earlier rejected.
25. Mr. Pai referred to R. 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules to spell out the theory of inherent powers. R. 8, it is plain to sec. is of no help. It occurs in the statutory Rules, and is applicable only in so far as the Rules are concerned. The text of the rule itself clearly says so. If there is a lacuna in the statute, a mere rule cannot design to supply it. The Supreme Court is the rule making authority which has framed the Companies (Courts) Rules. As a judicial tribunal it might be open to the Supreme Court to spell out the company court's powers from the statute, as we have done in the foregoing paragraphs. Paradoxically enough, however, what the Supreme Court can do by way of interpretation in an activist manner, as a court of construction, it cannot bring about in subordinate legislation, in the same activist manner as a rule-making authority. Be that as it may, we would prefer to rest our decision, rather, on the scheme of the Act and on the very words of S. 443(1)(c) to hold that the court's power to pass interim orders at any time it thinks fit in the course of winding up proceedings is not expressly or impliedly barred under the Companies Act. Turning to the case on band, our conclusion is that whatever other defects the learned Judge's order under appeal might hold, it does not suffer from want of jurisdiction.
26. At the conclusion of his argument, Mr. Biksheswaran urged that in the event of our setting aside the order appointing Commissioners and the direction for taking inventories, we might also consider the feasibility of making an added declaration that the reports and inventories filed by the Commissioners in the winding up proceedings ought not to be treated as part of the record but must stand expunged. We do not think we should accede to the learned counsel's request For, all that is before us in this appeal is the order of the learned Judge. We are setting aside that order. What effect our judgment holds is not a matter on which we should animadvert. As an appellate court we can only pass an appellate order. We cannot be explaining what its consequences will be, either in law or on facts, on follow up proceedings.
27. Having considered the order of Shanmukham, J. with the care and respect which it deserves, we are of the view that the grounds on which the order is founded are untenable. What is more, the passing of the order without affording the company an adequate bearing cannot be justified. These defects in the order can only be cured by setting it aside. We accordingly do so. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs.
VCS.
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