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Rajeswari v. United India Insurance Co., Madras And Another
Structured Summary of Court Opinion (M.O.P. 523 of 1982)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed M.O.P. 523 of 1982 before the Additional Subordinate Judge II, Chengalpattu, claiming compensation under S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act for the death of her husband in a motor accident that occurred at 7:30 p.m. on 13-7-1982 near Kothari Chemicals on Ennore Express Road. The deceased was driving van TN 7815 at the time. The petitioner sought transfer of the proceedings to the Claims Tribunal at Madras because all witnesses resided in Madras and it would be extremely difficult to have them attend multiple hearings in Chengalpattu; she asserted that transfer would not prejudice any party.
The petition was brought invoking S. 24 and S. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) and, with the court's permission during hearing, Article 227 of the Constitution was also invoked.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, invoking its supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, can order transfer of a pending claims petition under the Motor Vehicles Act from one Claims Tribunal to another.
- Whether the absence of a statutory provision in the Motor Vehicles Act for transfer of proceedings, or the presence of S. 24 C.P.C., prevents the High Court from ordering such a transfer.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner relied on inconvenience and practical difficulty: all witnesses to be examined are in Madras, making attendance at multiple hearings in Chengalpattu burdensome.
- Transfer of proceedings to the Claims Tribunal at Madras would not prejudice any party and would serve convenience and justice.
- The petition was initially filed under S. 24 and S. 151 C.P.C.; Article 227 of the Constitution was later included with leave of the court.
First Respondent (Insurance Company)'s Arguments
- The insurance company contended that proceedings cannot be transferred by invoking S. 24 C.P.C., and therefore the petition was not maintainable.
- Reliance was placed on a prior decision of the court (Veralakshmi Sundar v. Meeran) holding that when the Motor Vehicles Act does not provide for transfer of petitions between Tribunals, the High Court is not empowered to effect such transfers.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 | Article 227 confers on the High Court a power of "judicial" superintendence, distinct and independent of other revisional jurisdictions; supervisory power extends to tribunals. | The court relied on this case to support the proposition that Article 227 gives the High Court constitutional supervisory powers over tribunals, which can include judicial functions such as ordering transfers. |
| State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji, AIR 1968 SC 1481 | Article 227 cannot be limited by any Act of the State Legislature; supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping subordinate tribunals within limits of their authority and ensuring they obey the law. | The court treated this as authoritative that Article 227's supervisory power is not circumscribed by statute and thus can support transfer of proceedings despite statutory schemes. |
| Maharaia Kumar Gajbir Singh v. Sathir Singh, AIR 1968 Punj & Har 301 | Even if S. 24 C.P.C. cannot be invoked for transfer, the High Court has ample powers under Article 227 to transfer a case to another court. | The court cited this decision to show precedent for Article 227 being used to order transfers when statutory provisions are absent or inapplicable. |
| Pyda Venkatanarayana v. Thota Ramaswami, AIR 1955 Andhra 40 | Article 227 is distinct from Article 226 and confers on the High Court supervisory power over judicial matters decided by courts/tribunals in the State; suitable ground for transfer of proceedings was recognized. | The decision was used to illustrate that Article 227 has been applied to transfer matters between judicial officers/registrars where appropriate. |
| Veralakshmi Sundar v. Meeran, (1980) 2 Mad LJ 106 | When the Motor Vehicles Act contains no provision for transfer of petitions between Tribunals, the High Court is not empowered to transfer proceedings pending before an Accidents Claims Tribunal to another Tribunal. | The first respondent relied on this court decision; the present court discussed it as taking a contrary view to the broader supervisory power under Article 227 and considered its reasoning in light of higher authority. |
| Annamalai v. M. Arumugaswami, (1982) 95 Mad LW 687 | High Court's power under Article 227 cannot be used to override substantial legislative provisions; statutory restrictions on Tribunal jurisdiction (territorial limits) can be altered only by legislative amendment. | The court considered this decision but rejected the proposition that Article 227 must yield to statutory limitations in all cases; it treated the reasoning as over-restrictive in view of Supreme Court authority. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining the scope of Article 227 as established by higher authority. It set out the text of Article 227 and relied on Supreme Court decisions (notably Waryam Singh and State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji) holding that Article 227 confers on High Courts a power of judicial and administrative superintendence over courts and tribunals, and that this supervisory jurisdiction cannot be limited by legislative enactments.
The court reviewed decisions supporting the use of Article 227 to order transfers (Maharaia Kumar Gajbir Singh; Pyda Venkatanarayana) and contrasted them with decisions taking a restrictive view (Veralakshmi Sundar; Annamalai). It analyzed Annamalai's statement that Article 227 cannot be used to alter "substantial provisions" of statutes (for example territorial jurisdiction under the Motor Vehicles Act) and characterized that view as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's declarations that Article 227's supervisory power is not circumscribed by statute.
On this basis the court concluded that the absence of an express provision in the Motor Vehicles Act authorizing transfer does not, by itself, deprive the High Court of its constitutional supervisory power under Article 227 to transfer proceedings between tribunals where circumstances warrant. Applying those principles to the facts, the petitioner's difficulty in procuring attendance of witnesses in Chengalpattu and the fact that the accident occurred on the outskirts of Madras supported the exercise of supervisory power to transfer the matter for convenient and just adjudication.
Holding and Implications
Petition allowed; transfer of the proceedings to the Tribunal at Madras was ordered.
Consequences:
- The petition was allowed and the transfer, as prayed, was granted; the court ordered no costs.
- The court's reasoning affirms that, in its view and consistent with Supreme Court authority cited, Article 227 confers on High Courts a supervisory power to transfer proceedings between tribunals even where the Motor Vehicles Act contains no express provision for such transfer, when circumstances justify it.
Note: This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what appears in the text.
1. Petitioner filed M.O.P 523 of 1982 on the file of the Additional Sub. Judge II. Chengalpattu claiming compensation under S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, since her husband was killed in a motor accident that took place at 7-30 p.m on 13-7-1982, near Kothari Chemicals in Ennore Express Road, when he was driving the van TN 7815. She claims that all the witnesses to be examined are in Madras and it would be extremely difficult for her to take all the witnesses to attend several hearings by Tribunal, located in Chengalpattu and by transfer of the proceedings, none of the parties to the proceedings would be prejudiced, if the Tribunal at Madras is directed to hear the matter.
2. On behalf of the first respondent-Insurance Company, it is stated that by invoking S. 24, C.P.C, the proceedings cannot be transferred, and hence, this petition is not maintainable. This petition is filed by invoking S. 24 and S. 151, C.P.C and during the course of the hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner sought for permission to include Art. 227 of the Constitution and, accordingly it has been granted.
3. Article 227 of the Constitution of India reads as follows—
“(i) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may—
(a) call for return from such courts:
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts: and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.
(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein:
Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under Cl. (2) or Cl. (5) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.”
4. Supreme Court, in dealing with the scope and ambit of Art. 227, held in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, that it confers on the High Court a power of ‘judicial’ superintendence apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. It was observed that material part of Art. 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of S. 107 of the Government of India Act. 1915. Except that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article also to Tribunals. It was a case wherein the Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1940 were held to be Tribunals, functioning within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh. Repelling the contention that Cl. (2) of Art. 227 confers on the High Court only administrative superintendence over subordinate courts and tribunals, it was held that when Cl. (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Cl. (1). Such a restricted power is not contemplated in Article 227.
5. In State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji, AIR 1968 SC 1481, considering the scope of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227, it was held that Art. 227 cannot be limited by any Act of the State Legislature and its supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to see that they obey the law.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would then refer to Maharaia Kumar Gajbir Singh v. Sathir Singh, AIR 1968 Punj & Har 301. which took the view that, even assuming that S. 24, C.P.C cannot be invoked, for transfer of a case to another court. High Court has got ample powers under Art. 227 to transfer the same.
7. In Pyda Venkatanarayana v. Thota Ramaswami, AIR 1955 Andhra 40. Art. 227 was held to be entirely distinct and different from Art. 226 and that Art. 227 confers upon High Court a power of supervision over all judicial matters decided by any court or tribunal within the State, and therefore, in that case, it was held that it was eminently a fit and proper case in which power of superintendence should be exercised for transferring the election petition to another Deputy Registrar for disposal.
8. On behalf of first respondent, reliance was placed on the decision of this court in Veralakshmi Sundar v. Meeran, (1980) 2 Mad LJ 106. Which took the view that when Motor Vehicles Act does not contain any provision for transfer of a petition from one Tribunal to another. High Court is not empower-ed to transfer the proceedings pending before an Accidents Claims Tribunal to another Tribunal. Referring to the scheme of the Act. It was held that Accidents Claims Tribunal having been constituted to take away the jurisdiction of the civil Court relating to compensation which would arise under Act, and that only appellate power having been conferred on the High Court under Motor Vehicles Act, and when exercise of powers by High Court could arise only on appeal being preferred, and no supervisory jurisdiction having been conferred on the High Court over Accidents Claims Tribunal, the pending proceedings before Tribunals cannot be transferred. The mere circumstance that the High Court is the appellate or revisional authority does not empower the exercise of powers of transfer, over claims filed for compensation and pending before Tribunals.
9. The decision of this court in Annamalai v. M. Arumugaswami, (1982) 95 Mad LW 687 was also referred to. The question as to whether Art. 227 would be invoked, was considered in this decision, and it was held that though this power can be exercised by High Court either administratively or judicially. The High Court cannot supervise the legislature as it could go against substantial provisions in legislative enactments. It was then observed therein as follows:—
“……In other words, whatever powers Art. 227 confers on the High Court, an amendatory legislative power cannot be one of them. It has already been noticed that by a substantive provision in the Motor Vehicles Act. The jurisdiction of a Claims Tribunal is severely confined to adjudication of claims arising out of accidents occurring strictly within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It follows that this statutory restriction on the Tribunal's jurisdiction can be altered only by legislative amendment, and not by any other mode. However omnicompetent the High Court can be under Art. 227, surely it cannot, by its flat, alter the place of occurrence of a motor accident. The accident spot is an unalterable fact. It follows, therefore, that the High Court would be powerless, even under Art. 227 to change the jurisdiction of Tribunals by exercising, the power of transfer. It can only do so if it has the power, which it has not, of pretending that the accident in question has occurred in the area over which the transferee Tribunal presides and not in the area where it actually took place. I am satisfied that the High Court has no jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution to transfer any pending accident case from the Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over it to any other Tribunal having jurisdiction over any other area.”
10. In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court above referred, in (1982) 95 Mad LW 687. The view taken that when by substantial provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, jurisdiction of a Claims Tribunal having been confined to adjudication of claim arising out of accidents occurring strictly within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, the statutory restriction existing can be altered only by legislative amendment and not by any other mode, and hence. However, omnicompetent the power that could be exercised by High Court under Art. 227, it cannot be exercised as to go against the substantial provisions in legislative enactments, cannot be correct.
11. In AIR 1968 SC 1481 above referred to it has been clearly held that the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals under Art. 227 cannot be limited by any Act of the Legislature. When it has been repeatedly held by Supreme Court that the power of superintendence is both judicial and administrative, to proceed on the basis that for exercising powers under Article 227. One should look to the Legislature because exercise of powers under the said Article in a particular manner would go against the substantial provisions of the enactment: overlooks the fact that the power exercised under Art. 227 is a constitutional power, and no legislative enactment can take away or circumscribe or nullify the exercise of supervisory powers conferred by the Constitution on High Courts.
12. In the light of what has been held by the Supreme Court, as above referred, when the power of transfer of proceedings within its jurisdiction is part of its supervisory jurisdiction, absence of any provision having been made in Motor Vehicles Act, for transfer to be effected would not deprive the High Court of the power to transfer pending proceedings from one tribunal to another, if circumstances warrant.
13. When petitioner had stated that she is placed in a disadvantageous position in taking witnesses all the way to Chengalpattu from Madras, and as the accident had taken place in the outskirts of Madras and the Claims Tribunal at Madras could hear the matter with least inconvenience to any of the parties to the proceedings. This is a fit matter wherein, as prayed for transfer requires to be ordered. Hence, this petition is allowed. No costs.
14. Petition allowed.
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