ORDER:

1. The plaintiff in O.S No. 99 of 1958, Principal District Munsif's court, Nagarcoil, which is a Trust, is the petitioner in this civil revision petition. Admittedly, the Trust owned two items of properties in survey No. 382/730 and survey No. 382/731 of an extent of 60 cents and 29 cents respectively in Nagarcoil. A lease of these lands was granted by the Trust to one Padakalingam in 1106 (1930) on payment of a rent of Rs. 36 per month. The interest of the lessee was assigned in 1106 (1930) by Padakalingam to Gabriel, who in turn assigned it in favour of one Ramaswami Mudaliar in 1107 (1931) from whom Swami Mudaliar secured a further assignment in 1109 (1933). Swami Mudaliar put up certain buildings and the respondent herein purchased the buildings from Swami Mudaliar in 1119 (1943) on payment of a consideration of Rs. 4,475. Thereafter, in 1120 (1944) the Trust had leased out the properties in favour of the respondent herein fixing the period of lease as six years on a monthly rent of Rs. 37.59 and also providing that on the expiry of the lease, the respondent should receive 2/3 of the value of the buildings and improvements and surrender possession to the Trust and this was incorporated in a document styled as ‘Tharapattom’. The respondent did not pay any rent whatever to the Trust after 31st January, 1951, which led to the issue of a notice by the Trust on 12th October, 1953, demanding possession of the property leased out on receipt of the value of compensation. The respondent did not comply with this demand of the Trust and thereupon on 7th December, 1953, a suit in ejectment in O.S 151 of 1953 was filed by the Trust represented by its Managing Trustee, and this was later transferred to the District Munsif's court, Nagarcoil and numbered as O.S 99 of 1958. In that suit, an application in I.A 2153 of 1958 was taken out for the appointment of a Commissioner to value the buildings and the superstructures and they were valued by the Commissioner at Rs. 10,009. Objections were filed to the report of the Commissioner and subsequently, the court directed the filing of calculation menus and ultimately, the court fixed the value of the buildings put up at Rs. 14,982/60. On this valuation an objection was raised by the respondent herein that even on the basis of 2/3 of Rs. 14,982.60, the District Munsif's court, would have no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. This objection was upheld and the Trust was ordered to pay court fees on 2/3 of the value ascertained and also to present the plaint to a proper court and against this order, an appeal was filed by the Trust in C.M.A 16 of 1960 and that appeal was allowed and the order of the learned District Munsif was set aside. Against that order, the respondent filed a civil revision petition in C.R.P 2390 of 1960 and that was also dismissed on 6th October, 1961. In resisting the suit, the respondent questioned the maintainability of the suit on the ground that all the trustees were not impleaded as parties and also the quantum of value of the improvments made by the respondent. On 13th June, 1962, the learned District Munsif negatived the objections raised by the respondent and held that a clear case for evicting the respondent had been made out. Regarding the value of the improvements, the finding arrived at earlier fixing the value of the improvements at Rs. 14,982.60 was affirmed and a decree in ejectment was passed directing the surrender of possession of the property by respondent with the buildings thereon on payment of 2/3 of Rs. 14,982.60. A separate enquiry into the mesne profits was also directed under O. 20, R. 12, C.P.C Against this, A.S 116 of 1962 was filed by the respondent herein and that appeal was allowed by the Sub Court, Nagarcoil, and the suit was remanded to enable the impleading of all the trustees and also to ascertain the value of the improvements by a Commissioner. Against that order of remand, the petitioner filed C.M.A 272 of 1963 and the remit order was set aside and the appellate court was directed to call for a finding regarding the quantum of improvements which was duly called for and submitted. However, in the course of the appeal, the respondent raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the civil court has no jurisdiction as the provisions of the Rent Control Act would apply. This objection was upheld and the suit was dismissed, though the quantum of improvements was refixed at Rs. 15,022.60. The petitioner preferred S.A 1770 of 1967 against this judgment and decree and on 27th April, 1971 the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge was set aside and that of the trial court was restored, subject to the modification that the petitioner will be entitled to recover possession of the suit properties on payment of 2/3 of Rs. 15,922.60. During the pendency of the second appeal, an application in C.M.P 2533 of 1968 was filed by the respondent under S. 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that on 13th December, 1967, the provisions of the Act had been extended to Nagarcoil town with the result that the respondent was entitled to claim the benefits of that Act and call upon the petitioner to sell the site to him. That application was also taken up along with S.A 1770 of 1967 and C.M.P No. 2533 of 1968 filed by the respondent herein was dismissed on the ground that the notification extending the provisions of the Act to Nagarcoil municipal town would not cover non-residential buildings and therefore, the respondent will not be entitled to file such an application. Subsequently, on 29th November, 1972, the petitioner filed an E.P and deposited 2/3 of Rs. 15,022.60 as directed by the decree in S.A 1770 of 1967 and when matters stood thus, on 31st May, 1975, G.O.Ms No. 1285 was passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu extending the provisions of the Act to Nagarcoil municipal town area in respect of non residential buildings and this was published in the Gazette on 25th June, 1975. On 25th July, 1975, the respondent filed E.A 298 of 1975 purporting to be under S. 9 of the Act and claiming that the petitioner should be directed to sell the properties to him for a price to be fixed by court on such terms and conditions as the court may deem fit. That application was resisted by the petitioner herein on the ground that the respondent had delayed execution proceedings at every stage and that the application claiming the benefits of S. 9 of the Act was a frivolous and vexatious one when an earlier similar application had been disposed of finally. The petitioner also contended that having deposited the value of the improvements as per the decree in S.A 1770 of 1967 in time, the petitioner had become the owner of the building and that would preclude the respondent from claiming any rights under the Act. Another objection was also raised that the respondent being only an assignee of the original lease cannot claim the sale of the property to him.

2. The Principal District Munsif, Nagarcoil, on a consideration of the rival contentions of both parties found that even as an assignee, the respondent can maintain an application under S. 9 of the Act, but that the dismissal of the earlier application filed by the respondent in C.M.P 2533 of 1968 and the attainment of the finality of the rights of parties as decided in S.A No. 1770 of 1967 would preclude the respondent from putting forth a claim to rights under S. 9 of the Act even though the respondent had not delivered possession of the property pursuant to the decree in favour of the petitioner. The extension of the provisions of the Act to the area in question on 31st May, 1975 long after the decree finally adjudicating the rights of parties on 27th April, 1971 was held to be of no avail, as new rights created owing of to the delaying tactics of the respondent could not, according to the learned District Munsif, be permitted to defeat the terms of the decree. In this view, the application under S. 9 filed by the respondent herein was dismissed. Aggrieved by this, the respondent herein preferred an appeal in C.M.A 6 of 1976, Sub-Court, Nagarcoil. The learned Subordinate Judge took the view that as the decree in O.S 99 of 1958, Principal District Munsif's court, Nagarcoil, has not been fully satisfied and since the respondent continued to remain in possession of the land as well as the buildings and since the respondent has also established that he is entitled to receive compensation, the application filed by the respondent would be in order and the extension of the provisions of the Act only on 31st May, 1975 would not in any manner preclude the respondent from claiming the benefits of statutory rights. In that view, the dismissal of the application in E.A 298 of 1975 was set aside and the matter was remitted to the learned District Munsif to ascertain the area of the land which should be sold to the respondent as well as the price payable in respect thereof by the respondent with a further direction that other steps should also be taken by the court below in order to dispose of the matter in accordance with law. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this civil revision petition.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that at the time when the provisions of the Act were extended to the area in question, the rights of parties had already crystalised under the judgment and decree in S.A 1775 of 1967 so that such rights had remained unaffected by the extension of the provisions of the Act and have to be recognised and given effect to. In addition, it was also pointed out that by virtue of the provisions of the lease deed as well as by the application of the law relating to fixtures, and under the decree in S.A 1770 of 1977, the petitioner had become virtually the owner of the superstructure, so that on that date, when the provisions of the Act were extended, there was no dual ownership in the land and the building in order to attract the applicability of S. 9 of the Act. It was the further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that such rights in the petitioner, which had been recognised and upheld by a judgment and decree of court, cannot be interfered with or annulled or modified by the exercise of legislative power to disobey or disregard the decisions of court and that the respondent, after the passing of the decree against him, would only be in the position of a trespasser and therefore, his position cannot be put on a par with that of a tenant so as to enable him to claim the benefits of S. 9 of the Act. It was also contended that the I egislature has no power to widen the amplitude of a legislative Entry and therefore, the treatment of a tenant whose tenancy had expired and who would be only in the position of a trespasser, as a tenant for the purposes of the Act was irregular and not in order. An objection that the decree in that case was only one, viz., that passed by this Court and that the application, if at all, under S. 9 of the Act, could be filed only before this Court and not before the executing Court, which was concerned only with the execution of the decree and not varying it, was raised. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that though the decree in S.A 1770 of 1967 had granted the relief of possession to the petitioner, there was no declaration therein of the right of the petitioner to the superstructure and therefore the petitioner cannot claim on the strength of the decree that the superstructure had become his on the passing of the decree or even on the date, when the provisions of the Act were extended. Reference was made to Ss. 12 and 13 of the Act, to contend that the respondent will be entitled to rights under the Act, notwithstanding any contract or any provision of law including the law of fixtures as laid down in S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The wider definition of the expression ‘tenant’ occurring in the Act was relied upon to enable the availing of the benefits of the Act by a person like the respondent who had continued in possession of the property despite the passing of a decree against him, which however, had remained unexecuted. In other words, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that until such time as possession of the property is parted with by the tenant, the provisions of S. 9 of the Act would continue to apply. It was further submitted that having regard to S. 10 of the Act read with S. 9, the application was properly laid before the executing court. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the expression ‘tenant’ would also include an ‘tex-tenant’ for the purposes of enacting the legislation and no objection, therefore, can be taken to the conferment of the status of tenants, even on persons, who had continued to remain in possession of the property despite the determination of the lease or the passing of a decree in ejectment against them. Attention was also drawn to the circumstance that no objection in this form was raised earlier and that the petitioner ought not therefore be permitted to put forth such a contention in the course of a revision arising under the provisions of the Act.

4. In order to appreciate these contentions, it would be first necessary to refer to the precise terms of the decree obtained by the petitioner in this case. It has earlier been seen that the suit was originally decreed, but it was dismissed on appeal and the decree of the trial court was restored in S.A 1770 of 1961. The decree, which had been granted in S.A 1770 of 1967 was one of restoration of the decree of the trial Court, with a modification in respect of the figure mentioned therein, viz., instead of Rs. 14,982.60, the amount of Rs. 15,022.60, was substituted. Under the terms of the decree, the respondent was directed to put the petitioner in possession of the property with buildings on payment of 2/3 of Rs. 15,022.60, besides granting some other reliefs, which are not very material. It is thus seen that the decree in this case was only a simple decree in ejectment and there is absolutely nothing in the decree to indicate that the petitioner's right to the superstructure put up by the respondent herein has in any manner been declared. All that the decree says is that the respondent should put the petitioner in possession of the property on payment of certain amounts. It is true that these amounts had also been deposited into court by the petitioner on 2nd December, 1972, but the respondent had not, in spite of it, surrendered possession of the property in accordance with the decree in ejectment or even withdrawn the amount deposited. The terms of the decree do not confer on or declare the rights of the petitioner to the superstructure and therefore, under the terms of the decree, the petitioner cannot claim to have become the owner of the superstructure on the day when the decree was passed or even on the day when the amount was paid by the petitioner. The respondent not having surrendered possession of the property, despite the deposit of the amount by the petitioner, the petitioner was obliged to recover possession of the property through court and that was the reason why the petitioner resorted to the filing of the execution petition. It was in the course of the petition, the respondent came forward with the application under S. 9 of the Act. It is thus seen that the decree does not declare the right of the petitioner to the superstructure nor has possession of the superstructure been delivered by the respondent to the petitioner. In the absence of any declaration of the ownership of the superstructure in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner cannot claim that nothing further remained to be done on the date of the extension of the provisions of the Act or the right in the property had already vested in the petitioner pursuant to the decree granted in S.A No. 1770 of 1967. In addition, under S. 13 of the Act, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act would stand excluded in their applicability to matters governed by the provisions of the Act and therefore, S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act in so far as it relates to fixtures, would not be applicable and the petitioner cannot, therefore, on the strength of that provision, claim the superstructure as belonging to him. Similarly, S. 12 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, provided that nothing in any contract made by a tenant shall take away or limit his rights under the Act. This would mean that in spite of the stipulation in the Tharapattom executed by the respondent that he shall surrender possession of the property on receipt of the compensation of 2/3, he would still be entitled to the rights under the benefits of the Act. Originally, the proviso to S. 12 of the Act stated that stipulations made by the tenant as to erection of the building in so far as they relate to the building erected after the date of the contract, will not be affected by S. 12 of the Act. But, by the Madras City Tenants Protection Act (Amendment Act 4 of 1972) by S. 3, that proviso was omitted and a further provision was also made that it shall be deemed always to have been omitted. S. 4 of Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1972 also declares that stipulations made by a tenant in writing in so far as they relate to the buildings erected after the date of the contract shall, to the extent such applications take away or limit the rights under the principal Act, be and always be deemed to have been, null and void and further that the tenant shall always be deemed to have been entitled to the rights under the Act. By the terms of the decree in this case as well as by the provisions of Ss. 12 and 23 of the Act referred to above, it is clear that the petitioner cannot claim that rights have become crystallised or finalised so that the petitioner had become the owner of the superstructure even on the date on which the decree was passed or that he had otherwise so become the owner either by the application of the law of fixtures under S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act or by the terms of the lease deed executed in his favour by the respondent. On the date, therefore, when the provisions of the Act were extended on 31st May, 1975, making them applicable to non-residential buildings in Nagarcoil municipal town, the petitioner had not secured ownership to the superstructure as such and therefore, the dual ownership of the land and the buildings in the petitioner and the respondent respectvely continued so as to make S. 9 of the Act applicable, subject of course, to the other requirements of that provision being satisfied.

5. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the respondent could claim to be a tenant for purposes of the Act. In this connection, the definition of ‘tenant’ as found under S. 2(4) of the Act is important which is as under:—

“(4) ‘Tenant’ in relation to any land—

(i) means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and

(ii) includes—

(a) any such person as is referred to in sub-Cl. (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement.

(b) any person who was a tenant in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement to which this Act is applicable under sub-S. (3) of S. 1, and who or any of his predecessors-in-interest had erected any building on such land and who continues in actual physical possession of such land and building notwithstanding that—

(1) such person was not entitled to the rights under this Act by reason of the proviso to S. 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act 1972, (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972), or

(2) a decree for declaration or a decree or an order for possession or for similar relief has been passed against such person on the ground that the proviso to S. 12 of this Act as it stood before the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Tamil Nadu Act 4 of 1972) disentitled such person from claiming the right under this Act, and

(c)… … …”

The inclusive definition of a tenant was incorporated in Cl. (ii) of Sub-S. (4) of S. 2 of the Act by Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1973. According to that definition, any person, as is referred to under S. 2(4)(i) of the Act, who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, would also be a tenant. The continued retention of the possession earlier held by the tenant is one of the vital requirements in this inclusive definition. In this case, the tenancy in favour of the respondent was for a period of six years from 1944, and though the tenancy expired or determined by efflux of time, the respondent had continued to remain in possession of the land. It is thus seen that under the inclusive definition under S. 2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act, the respondent would be a tenant. It has also to be remembered that S. 10 of the Act makes applicable S. 9 of the Act to decrees for ejectment which had not been executed before the date with effect from which the provisions of the Act are extended to such area. That would mean that if a decree in ejectment had been passed against a tenant who continues to remain in possession of the property, and the decree had remained unexecuted on the day on which the provisions of the Act had been extended to the area in question, the tenant can avail the benefits of S. 9 of the Act. It would suffice to notice the decision in Syed Oomer Sahib v. Gopaul and others . 47 M.L.J 350 wherein it has been laid down that the tenant intended by S. 9 of the Act is a person who is threatened with ejectment as the result of legal proceedings instituted against him, but has not in pursuance of those proceedings been actually ejected and that it is immaterial whether or not the proceedings resulted in a decree which might lead, but has not led, to an actual ejectment of the tenant. It is thus clear that in this case, the respondent had continued to remain is possession of the property after the determination of the tenancy in his favour and had not yielded up possession of the property to the petitioner but was also entitled to compensation under the decree in respect of the superstructure and would therefore be entitled to the benefits of S. 9 of the Act read with S. 10 thereof.

6. The objection relating to the treatment of an ex-tenant as a tenant for the purposes of the Act and the rendering of judgments and orders of courts ineffective by this process may now be considered. It is common ground that the Act would fall within Entry 18, of List II of the VII Schedule to the Constitution of India which runs thus—

“18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization”.

While conceding that the Legislature has power to make laws which would fall within the scope of the Entry referred to above, what is urged is that there is no power to widen the amplitude of an Entry and make laws with a view to unmake or undo judgments and that a construction which would make the provisions of the Act as well as the decision of courts stand, should be adopted and therefore, a tenant who continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy (in other words, a trespasser) cannot make an application under S. 9 as a tenant. Though the learned counsel for the respondent raised an objection that it is not open to the petitioner to raise such an objection in the course of a civil revision petition, it is not necessary to consider that objection in detail, as the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits is not acceptable. The rule in regard to the interpretation of the scope and amplitude of the Entries in the List is indeed well settled in that the Entry should be construed in the widest sense as comprehending the subject matters of legislation. The question whether the expression ‘tenant’ in Entry 18 of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution of India would include a person whose term under the contract of tenancy had expired, had come up for discussion and decision with reference to buildings, agricultural land, etc.

7. The Privy Council in Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Satya Niranjan Shaw and another, had to consider whether the word ‘tenant’ used in the Calcutta Rent Act (Bengal Act 3 of 1930) which regulated the letting of buildings in Calcutta in the years immediately following the First World War would include a person whose term of contract of tenancy came to an end. The objection raised was that at the time when the application was made by the Bank, they were not tenants, as their term had expired by efflux of time or forfeiture and therefore that would not enable the grant of a certificate under S. 15(1) of the Calcutta Rent Act. In dealing with this, the Privy Council referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Remon v. City of London Real Property Co.,2 where Lord Justice Scrutton said—

“Whom did they mean to include in the term ‘tenant’. If a tenant by agreement whose tenancy had expired was not within those terms the whole purpose of the Act would have been defeated.”

Applying this, the Privy Council held that to uphold the objection would be to adopt too narrow a construction of the words and that in order to give a working effect to the Act, it is necessary that the words ‘landlord’ and tenant’ must include, as they often do in ordinary parlance, ex-landlord and ex-tenant.

8. The Federal Court in the United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begnm and others,3 was considering the question of the legislative competence of the Regularisation of Remissions Act, 1938 (Act XIV of 1938) with reference to Entry 21, in List II of the Government of India Act, 1935. In construing the scope of the expression ‘land’, Gwyer, C.J stated at page 78 as under—

“… … ..I think however that none of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.”

9. In Santhanakrishna Odayar v. Vaithilingam the validity of the provisions of Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals (Protection) Act (14 of 1952) was challenged, among others, on the gronnd that S. 6 of that Act in so far as it provided that persons, whose tenancy had come to end, should have rights as tenants, is not a law relating to landlord and tenant, because that relationship had ceased at the date of the Act. In repelling this argument, the Bench observed at page 339 as follows—

“… … …But that is to take too narrow a view of the Entry. It has been repeatedly held that the provisions of the Constitution should be construed not in a narrow or pedantic sense but as extending to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which could fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it (Vide United Provinces v. Atiqua Begum. The Tenants continuing in possession after the termination of the lease are termed tenants at will and with reference to them, the legislation falls within the terms of Entry 18, even strictly construed… … …In any event, that will be legislation relating to land. We must accordingly hold that Madras Act XIV of 1952 is within the powers of the State Legislature under Entry 18 of List II.’

10. In Bhutya v. Radhakisanlal Shiashankarlal Izardar and others the question that was considered was whether the Legislature by enacting Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy Laws 1921, can confer on a person who has ceased to be a tenant, rights of tenancy. The objection raised was that in the exercise of powers to legislate under Entry 18 of List II to Schedule VII of the Constitution, the Legislature could not confer rights on persons who are not tenants. In repelling this argument the Division Bench stated as under (at page 52):

“It is true that the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases after the expiry of the lease and tenant holding over cannot be said to be in lawful possession of the property… But that is beside the point., ….The power to legislate with respect to land tenures is something wider than the power to regulate the relation of landlord and tenant. That power must be held to include not merely the power to create new tenures but also afford security to those coming on the land by reason of an existing tenure.

The security in the instant case is afforded by conferring permanancy of tenure in favour of those who originally came on the land under a precarious tenure but have continued to occupy it for a prescribed number of years. To deny such a power would be to read limitations into the Entry which are not there.

That apart, in view of the decision in Remon v. City of London Real Property Co. . 1921-1-K.B. 49 H. which was approved by the Judicial Committee in Karnani Industrial Bank v. Satya Niranjan Shaw . A.I.R 1928 P.C 227 I=55 M.L.J 464=28 L.W 8621 the words ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ in ordinary parlance as well as legislative practice must be held to include an ‘ex-landlord’ and an ‘ex-tenant’. The scope of the Entry enabling the Legislature to legislate with respect to the relation of landlord and tenant cannot then be construed narrowly as contended by the respondents.”

11. A similar question came to be dealt with in C.N Subramania Iyer v. Dharmalinga Padayachi and another . 1959-1-M.L.J 1 F.B while considering the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The objection raised was that the Act dealt not merely with tenants whose terms are current but also with tenants who are in possession after the expiry of the terms limited by their respective contracts and that the ex-tenants would not be within the amplitude of the power of the Legislature to legislate on the subject, viz, item 18, List II of Schedule VII. Subrahmanayan, J. dismissed the argument with the following observations at page 11—

“It is well settled that words used in the Seventh Schedule should be construed in their widest sense as denoting only subject-matters of legislation. Tenancy legislation both in this country and in England has always been regarded as not limited to the regulations of the terms of existing tenancies but as extending also to the prescribing of lease on which tenants, whose terms have expired, could continue in possession as tenants. The Calcutta Rent Act (Bengal Act 111 of 1920) regulated letting of buildings in Calcutta in the years immediately following the First World War. Questions arising under the Act were ultimately decided by the Privy Council in Karnani Industrial Bank v. Satya Niranjan Shaw. Their Lordships held that the word ‘tenant’ used in that Act included a person whose term under the contract of tenancy had come to an end, and added that the word ‘tenant’ had similarly been construed by the English Court of Appeal in considering questions arising on legislation under the Increase of Rent Act, 1920. Tenancy to which reference is made in the judgments of this Court in Sundararaja Iyer v. Sub Collector, Dindigul, and in R.C 86 of 1954 related net merely to ‘tenants’ strictly so called but also to ex-tenants. The statute considered in the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, was enacted after the coming into force of the Constitution. By the Act, certain rights of tenants, which had become extinguished by the operation of an earlier statute, were revived and kept in force. Even in cases where decrees for the eviction of tenants had been obtained aid the tenancies had been finally put an end to in that manner, the Act restored the tenants to the position they had held before the termination of the tenancy. I hold that the term ‘tenant’ in Item 18 of List if of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution includes an ex-tenant. It follows that the circumstance that the Act impugned in this case confers rights on persons who were let into possession on tenancy agreements but who continue after the expiry of the terms of their tenancy would not take the Act beyond the scope of Art. 246(3) and item 18 on list II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.’

12. In the light of the principles laid down in the cases referred to above, no exception can he taken to the conferment of the status of a tenant by the provisions of the Act enacted in the exercise of the legislative power under Entry 18 on a person who continues to remain in possession, even after the determination of the tenancy in his favour. It may be seen that though the interpretation of the Entry referred to above would normally include an ex-tenant within the scope of the legislation, that has been more explicit under the Act by bringing within the scope of the inclusive definition of tenant, a person whose tenancy had been determined, but who continues to remain in the possession of the property. It must be remembered that the avowed object of the provisions of the Act is to secure to the tenant, who conforms to the requirements of the Act, the land over which he has put up a superstructure. To exclude tenants who would otherwise fulfil the requirements of the Act on the ground that the tenancy in their favour had ceased or otherwise determined, would not, advance or promote, the object of the legislation. Under these circumstances, the contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced.

13. All that the provisions of the Act seek to declare is that notwithstanding the determination of the tenancy in favour of a tenant, if he continues in possession, then, he will be entitled to the benefits of the Act. Similarly, the Legislature has also declared that despite any stipulation in any contract or despite the application of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, a tenant against whom a decree has been passed but which had not been executed and who remains in possession of the property, will be enabled to take advantage of the provisions of the Act. All that hat been declared by these provisions in the Act is that the provisions in the Transfer of Property Act and the stipulations in the contract would all be not valid and enforceable but that the provisions of the statute as declared by it should prevail, though there may be judgments or decrees or orders contra. But, that is not the same as saying that by legislation, the judgments or decrees of court have been nullified.

14. The question whether the application before the executing court was properly laid may now be adverted to. The objection raised by the petitioner on this score is that there is only one decree and that would be the decree in the Second Appeal and therefore, the executing court, in the course of execution, if it should entertain the application under S. 9 of the Act, would be varying the decree passed by this Court and therefore, the application under S. 9 of the Act, if at all, should have been filed only before this Court. S. 9 of the Act has been made applicable to decrees in ejectment or orders under S. 43 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act which have been executed before the date with effect from which the provisions of the Act are extended to such area, by S. 10 of the Act. There is no indication in the section as to the court before which an application in such cases claiming the benefits of S. 9 of the Act can be filed. But even so a combined reading of Ss. 9 and 10 of the Act would indicate that it is the court before which the execution proceedings are taken that has to consider the application under S. 9 of the Act and also give effect to the result of those proceedings in the decree as provided under S. 9(3)(b) of the Act. It would also be useful in this connection to refer to the decision in P. Kanniappa Chettiar and others v. K. Ramachandra Iyer and. There, after the passing of the decree, in the suits, the provisions of Madras Act 3 of 1922 came into operation, while the decrees had remained unexecuted. In the applications in the appeals filed under S. 9 of the Act, it was contended that that section has no application where a decree for ejectment had been made and this would be so, despite the pendency of an appeal from the decree and irrespective of whether the decree had been executed or not. Schwabe, C.J speaking for the Bench, held after referring to the language of S. 9(3) that the applications invoking S. 9 were properly made in the pending appeals and that if the appeals had not been pending, the applications could have been properly made before the City Civil Court, as it was the intention of the Act that after the decree and before its execution, the application could be made to the Court having control of the suit. This view also stands to reason. In a case where a decree had remained unexecuted the court which finally passed the decree may not always be the court which is obliged to execute the decree and in such a case, difficulties may arise as to the court before which the application under S. 9 of the Act has to be filed. In cases where suits and proceedings in ejectment are instituted, those courts where the proceedings are so laid, would be the competent courts to entertain the applications under S. 9 of the Act. In other cases, where the decree already obtained had remained unexecuted and execution proceedings are pending, the executing court would be the proper court to entertain such an application, as statutorily, the responsibility of passing further consequential orders depending upon the result of the application under S. 9 of the Act has also been entrusted to the court which deals with the application under S. 9, and such a course would be possible only if the application under S. 9 is laid before the same court, which is also the court which executes the decree. Having regard to these considerations, the objection that the application should have been properly laid only before this Court and not before the executing court, is without substance.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the court below holding that the respondent is a tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act and that his application under S. 9 of the Act has got to be further considered, dealt with and disposed of in accordance with law is quite correct under the circumstances and does not call for any interference in the exercice of revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, that order is upheld and the civil revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

VCS.