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Rukmani Ammal v. The Union Territory ...

Madras High Court
Oct 18, 1983
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — W.Ps 798 & 833 of 1980; C.R.P 106 & 107 of 1980

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (same in both writ petitions) is an alienee from one R. Rukmani, wife of A. Ramalingam. The alienor (R. Rukmani) obtained the lands in question under a settlement from her husband on 16 March 1970. The alienation in favour of the petitioner is dated 3 December 1973.

Proceedings were initiated against A. Ramalingam under the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973 (Act 9 of 1974). The appointed day under the Act was 24 January 1971, and the Act commenced on 14 October 1974. Because the alienation in favour of the petitioner occurred after the appointed day but before the commencement of the Act, S. 4(4) of the Act was applied: the alienation was treated as non est and the lands were taken into account as the holding of A. Ramalingam.

The Authorised Officer held that the lands alienated shall continue to be the holding of Ramalingam; this decision was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. In W.P. 798 of 1980 the petitioner sought a writ of declaration that S. 4(4) of the Act is ultra vires Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India insofar as it concerned the petitioner. In W.P. 833 of 1980 the petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the Appellate Tribunal's order under the Act. The same substantive questions were raised in C.R.P. 106 and 107 of 1980 (two revisions), which the petitioner contended raised the same points as in the writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 4(4) of the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973 is ultra vires Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India as regards the petitioner (i.e., whether it unlawfully affects the petitioner's property rights or fundamental rights).
  2. Whether the Appellate Tribunal's order upholding the Authorised Officer's treatment of the alienation as non est (thereby including the land in the transferor's holding for ceiling purposes) should be quashed by certiorari.
  3. Whether the decision in B.E.K. Nattar v. Authorised Officer (L.R., A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 389), which construed an earlier version of S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act as not invalidating transfers, applies to protect the petitioner's title under S. 4(4) of the Pondicherry Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. V. Manivannan)

  • S. 4(4) of the Pondicherry Act is in pari materia with S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 prior to its substitution (i.e., the pre-amendment version), and therefore the ratio in B.E.K. Nattar (L.R.) should protect the petitioner's title — that is, such transfers are not expressly invalidated and the transferee's title remains unaffected.
  • The alienation in favour of the petitioner occurred long before the commencement of the Act; because the Act was passed before the 44th Amendment (which deleted the right to property as a fundamental right), the petitioner contended she remained entitled to claims under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 (i.e., deprivation of property without compensation).

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. S. Govindasami, Government Pleader for Pondicherry)

  • The language of S. 4(4) of the Pondicherry Act is not in pari materia with the pre-amendment S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act; instead, it is in pari materia with S. 23 as substituted by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974 (the post-amendment version), which declared such transfers to be and to have always been void for ceiling-fixing purposes.
  • Consequently, the petitioner cannot rely on the earlier decision in B.E.K. Nattar to protect the alienation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
B.E.K. Nattar v. Authorised Officer, L.R. (A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 389) The decision construed S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act (pre-substitution) as directing the Authorised Officer not to take certain transfers into consideration for fixing ceiling area but not declaring those transfers void; the transferee's title and possession were held not to be invalid and could not be interfered with. The Court held that the ratio in B.E.K. Nattar (which applied to the pre-amendment S. 23) was not applicable to S. 4(4) of the Pondicherry Act because S. 4(4) aligns in import with the post-substitution S. 23 (Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974), which declares such transfers to be void for ceiling-calculation purposes. Therefore the protection recognized in B.E.K. Nattar was unavailable to the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded primarily by textual and comparative statutory interpretation.

  1. The court set out the relevant statutory provisions: S. 4(4) of the Pondicherry Act and S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act in both its pre-substitution (pre-1974 amendment) and post-substitution (after Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974) forms, quoting the statutory language as recited in the opinion.
  2. The court observed that the pre-substitution S. 23 merely directed the Authorised Officer not to take certain transfers into consideration when fixing the ceiling area but did not declare those transfers void or address the transferee's rights — this construction was the basis of the decision in B.E.K. Nattar.
  3. The court then compared S. 4(4) of the Pondicherry Act with both versions of S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act. It concluded that S. 4(4) is not similar to the pre-substitution S. 23 in import; instead, while not word-for-word identical, S. 4(4) bears the same import and practical effect as the post-substitution S. 23 (as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974), which expressly declares the transfers to be and to have always been void for ceiling-fixing purposes.
  4. From this textual comparison the court derived the legal consequence that, under S. 4(4) of the Pondicherry Act, the alienations in question must be treated as non est in law for the purpose of calculating ceiling — i.e., the land alienated is to be taken into account as part of the transferor's holding.
  5. Because the court found the alienation itself to be null and void for the purposes of the statute, the petitioner did not derive any title or proprietary right under that alienation. On that basis the court rejected the petitioner's constitutional challenge under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 (relating to deprivation of property without compensation), reasoning that those arguments could not be sustained if no right in property had lawfully vested in the petitioner by operation of S. 4(4).
  6. The court noted that the constitutional vires of the Act more generally was not fully pressed or argued; but given the statutory construction outcome (that the alienation is non est), it was unnecessary to enter into a broader constitutional enquiry.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petitions W.P. 798 of 1980 and W.P. 833 of 1980 are DISMISSED. The two revisions, C.R.P. 106 and 107 of 1980, which raised the same points, are also DISMISSED. There is no order as to costs in respect of these proceedings.

Implications and direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • For the purposes of fixing ceiling under the Pondicherry Act, S. 4(4) operates to treat transfers effected after the appointed day but before the commencement of the Act as if those transfers had not taken place; the alienations are treated as non est and the land is taken into account as part of the transferor's holding.
  • The decision in B.E.K. Nattar (construing the pre-substitution S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act) does not afford protection to the petitioner because S. 4(4) aligns with the post-substitution S. 23 which declares such transfers void for ceiling purposes.
  • Because the petitioner derived no property right by reason of the alienation (it being non est under S. 4(4)), the petitioner's challenge based on Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 was not sustained on the facts presented.
  • No broader pronouncement on the constitutional vires of the Act was made by the court because the statutory construction disposed of the petitions; accordingly, the opinion does not announce a new precedent beyond its application on the facts and statutory comparison in this case.

Note: This summary is confined to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No facts or inferences beyond those expressly recited in the opinion have been introduced.

Show all summary ...

W.Ps 798 and 833 of 1980

1. The petitioner is the same in both the writ petitions. A few facts are necessary to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner in these two writ petitions. The Petitioner is an alienee from one R. Rukmani, wife of A. Ramalingam. The alienor of the petitioner got the lands in question under a settlement from her husband on 16th March, 1970. The alienation in favour of the petitioner is dated 3rd December, 1973. Proceedings were initiated against A. Ramalingam under the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973, (Act 9 of 1974), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The appointed day under the Act is 24th January, 1971.

The date of commencement of the Act was 14th October, 1974. The alienation in favour of the petitioner having taken place after the appointed day, but before the commencement of the Act, the mischief of S. 4(4) of the Act apparently came into play and the alienation in favour of the petitioner was treated as non est and the lands were taken into account as the holding of A. Ramalingam, as if they had not been alienated at all. The concerned Authorised Officer held that the lands alienated shall continue to be the holding of Ramalingam. This order of the Authorised Officer was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. In W.P 798 of 1980, the petitioner has prayed for the issue of a writ of declaration, declaring that S. 4(4) of the Act is ultra vires Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India in so far as it concerned the petitioner. In W.P 833 of 1980, the petitioner has prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Appellate Tribunal under the Act referred to above.

2. Mr. V. Manivannan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would put forth two submissions. One is, the language used in S. 4(4) of the Act stands in pari materia with S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Act 58 of 1961), hereinafter referred to as the Tamil Nadu Act, prior to the substitution of that section by Tamil Nadu Act, 32 of 1974, which amendment was necessitated on account of a decision of a Bench of this Court in B.E.K Nattar v. Authorised Officer, L.R . A.I.R 1973 Mad. 389, the Bench having held that S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act does not, by express terms, invalidate such transfers and the title of the transferee will stand un-affected and cannot be interfered with by the Authorised Officer while fixing the ceiling area of the transferor, and the learned counsel urges that by application of the same ratio the alienation in favour of the petitioner and the resultant title will stand unaffected. In answer, Mr. S. Govindasami, learned Government Pleader for Pondicherry, submits that the language used in S. 4(4) of the Act is not at all in pari materia with the language used in S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act before its substitution by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974, and, on the other hand, the language of S. 4(4) of the Act is in pari materia with the language used in S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act, after its substitution by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974. S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act, prior to its amendment by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974, stood as follows:

“Authorised Officer not to take into consideration certain transfers or sub-divisions before publication of final statement: Subject to the provisions of S. 20 for the purpose of fixing, for the first time, after the date of commencement of this Act the ceiling area of any person, holding land on the date of the commencement of this Act in excess of 15 standard acres, the Authorised Officer shall not take into consideration—

(a) any transfer, Whether by sale (including sale in execution of a decree or order of a civil Court or of an award or order of any other lawful authority) or by gift (other than gift made in cotemplation of death) exchange, surrender, settlement or otherwise; or

(b) any subdivision (including sub-division by a decree or order of a civil court or any other lawful authority) whether by partition or otherwise affected on or after the notified date and before the date of publication of the final statement under S. 12 or 14.”

As it could be seen from the extract made above that provision merely stated ‘the’ authorised officer shall not take into consideration. This section was construed by the Bench of this Court in B.E.K Nattar v. Auhorised Officer (L.R), and the effect of the construction is found in the following passages in the judgement:—

“The direction in the section is to the authorised officer which is that, for the purpose of fixing, for the first time, the ceiling area of any person holding land on the date of the commencement of the Act in excess of 30 standard acres, he shall ignore any transfer, whether by sale or by gift, etc., effected on or after the notified date and before the date of the publication of the final statement under S. 12 or 14. In sharp contrast to S. 22, the Authorised Officer, While acting under S. 23, has not been given any power to declare such sale deed to be void. The section also does not say that the transfer by itself will be bad for any reason. The transfer is not rendered void either expressly or by any statement in the section. The section does not deal with the transferee's rights. …

As we read S. 23, we are unable to hold that the sale, in favour of the appellant is by any means invalid. It follows, therefore, that his title or possession cannot be interfered with. ..”

3. There is no dispute that it is only with a view to get over the construction put up by the Bench of this Court in the above decision and in order to make the intention clear and to prevent persons transferring surplus lands or making sub-divisions after the notified date and before the publication of the notification under, sub-S. (1) of S. 18 and thereby defeating the purpose of the ceiling law, the amendment was thought about and was introduced. This is quit evident from the statement of objects and reasons for Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974. S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act after its substitution by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974 reads as follows—

“Transfers of sub-divisions made or effected before the publication of notification under sub-S. (I) of S. 18—(1) Subject to the provisions of S. 20. for the purpose of fixing for the first time after the date of the commencement of this Act, the ceiling area of any person holding land on the date of the commencement of this Act in excess of 30 standard acres—

(a) any transfer, whether by sale, (including sale in execution of a decrree or order of a civil court or of an award or order of any other lawful authority) or by gift (other than gift made in contemplation of death), exchange, surrender, settlement or otherwise; or (b) any subdivision (including subdivision by a decree or order of a civil court or any other lawful authority) whether by partition or otherwise; effected on or after the notified date and before the publication of a notification under sub-S. (1) of S. 18 shall be and shall be deemed always to have been, void and accordingly the authorised officer shall calculate the ceiling area of such person as if no such transfer or sub-division had taken place.

Explanation: This sub-section shall, on and from the 15th day of February, 1970, have effect as if for the figure and words ‘30 standard acres’ the figures and words ‘15 standard acres’ had been substituted.

(2) It shall be the duty of the authorised officer to include the land so transferred or sub-divided, within the ceiling area of the transferor or the persons who held the land immediately before such sub-division as the case may be, as if no such transfer or subdivision had taken place”.

The impact of this provision on transfers effected on or after the notified date and before the publication of a notification under sub-S. (1) of S. 18 is emphatic and such transfers shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, void and accordingly the authorised officer shall calculate the ceiling area of such person as if no such transfer had taken place. S. 4(4) of the Act reads as follows—

“In calculating the extent of land by any person, any land which was transferred by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned by that person after the appointed day but before the commencement of this Act, shall be taken into account as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned, as the case may be”.

The language used in S. 4(4) of the Act is different from the language used in S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act, before its substitution by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974. This is quite patent and apparent. A comparative reading, on the other hand, of S. 4(4) of the Act with S. 23 of the Tamil Nadu Act after its substitution by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974 leaves no room for doubt in the mind of this Court that though the language used is not, word by word, similar, yet, the import and implications are portently one and the same. In S. 23 of Tamil Nadu Act, after its substitution by Tamil Nadu Act 32 of 1974, it is declared and enjoined that the authorised officer shall calculate the ceiling area of such person as if no such transfer or sub division had taken place. Similarly, in S. 4(4) of the Act the language used is —the land, subject matter of transfer in question shall be taken into account as if such land has not been transferred. The effect of both the provisions is that the concerned alienation is non est in the eye of law and lands alienated will continue to be the holding of the land owner for the purpose of the statu es. This is the patent and unambiguous resutt of the provisions. If this is the import and implication of the provision, viz., S. 4(4) of the Act, then the efficacy and the force of the decision of the Bench of this Court in B.E.K Nattar v. Authorised Officer, (L.R) is no longer available for the petitioner to have the alienations in her favour protected and left unaffected in spite of the proceedings under the Act against the land owner.

5. The actual submission made by Mr. V. Manivannan, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the alienation in favour of the petitioner took place long prior to the commencement of the Act, and the Act, by itself, does not provide for payment of compensation to such alienees, and hence the provision of the Act will come within the mischief of Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India. This submission was on the basis that the deletion of the right to property from the array of fundamental rights will not deprive the petitioner of the arguments available to her prior to the coming into force of the 44th Amendment of the Constitution of India, with effect from the 20th June, 1979, since the Act was passed prior to that date. This argument could be built and countenanced if otherwise tenable only if any right in property lawfully vested in and existed with the petitioner. By operation of the provision of S. 4(4) of the Act, the petitioner derived no right in the property since the very alienation is non est in the eye of law, and in the said circumstances I am not able to appreciate and sustain the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Of coarse, Mr. S. Govindaswami, learned Government Pleader for Pondicherry, made his own submissions counter acting those made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf. But as I do not find necessitated to go into this question since I have found on an assessment of the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the alienation itself has to be treated as null and void and non est in the eye of law and there was no derivation of right in property in favour of and conferment of right in property on the petitioner. Otherwise, the Constitutional vires of the Act itself was not put in issue and argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. For all these reasons, I am obliged to discountenance the case of the petitioner and as a result these two writ petitions will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

C.R.P 106 and 107 of 1980—Mr. V. Manivannan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in these two revisions, submits that the points arising in these two revisions are the same as those urged in the above two writ petitions. The very same reasonings govern the revisions also. Hence, these two revisions are also dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

VCS.