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Sree Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union Of India
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Balasubrahmanyan, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ petition raised the question of the extent of the Central Government's notification-based exemption from Customs duty on imported viscose staple fibre. The specific notification considered was No. 215/80-Cus., dated 1-11-1980, which purported to exempt viscose staple fibre and viscose tow falling within Chapter 56 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act when imported into India, "from so much of the duty of Customs leviable thereon under the said First Schedule as is in excess of 10 per cent ad valorem."
Procedurally, the court considered submissions on the meaning and scope of that notification and the applicable statutory scheme (the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act). A preliminary objection as to territorial jurisdiction was raised by the Customs, but the court declined to enter into that objection after dealing with the merits. The court vacated the rule previously made, dismissed the writ petition with costs, and awarded counsel's fee of Rs. 1,000.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Central Government notification (215/80-Cus., dated 1-11-1980), issued in exercise of Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, exempts only the basic Customs duty (leviable under the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act) or also exempts the additional/countervailing import duty levied under the Customs Tariff Act (e.g., under Section 5(1) and related provisions).
- What is the quantum of exemption on the basic Customs duty for imported viscose staple fibre under the notification, and whether any countervailing duty remains payable at the import stage.
Arguments of the Parties
Customs Department's Arguments
- It is common and prudent practice when drafting exemption notifications to particularise precisely which kind of Customs duty is being exempted (i.e., to specify whether the exemption covers basic duty, additional/countervailing duty, or both).
- The department's counter affidavit produced illustrative examples showing that prior notifications have identified the particular duty to which exemption applied, supporting the view that the instant notification must be read narrowly.
- A preliminary objection was raised that the writ petitioner could not properly invoke the court's jurisdiction under Article 226 merely because the petitioner's spinning mills were situated in Ramnad, Tamil Nadu; the department argued that the cause of action had arisen outside the State (at the port of entry, Cochin), where the customs assessing officers are located.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the writ petitioner's specific legal arguments on the matters in issue beyond seeking the relief under the notification and contesting the department's position; the judgment records that the merits were "fully argued by both sides" but does not set out the petitioner's submissions in detail.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in the following sequence, based entirely on the text of the opinion:
- Statutory distinction between duties: The court emphasized the need to distinguish among different varieties of Customs duties — particularly the basic Customs duty (what the Customs Act, 1962 charges and which is described in S.12 of that Act and the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act) and the additional (countervailing) duty levied under the Customs Tariff Act. The court explained that these duties have distinct statutory personalities and different statutory bases.
- Source and operation of duties: The court described the institutional arrangement: the Customs Act, 1962 is the Code governing Customs administration and contains the charging section; the Customs Tariff Act lists dutiable items and rates in its First Schedule (imports) and Second Schedule (exports) and also statutorily levies an independent additional duty (countervailing import duty) in its own right (referencing Sec. 3 and related provisions of the Tariff Act).
- Scope of exemption power: The court noted that Section 25 of the Customs Act grants the Central Government the power to exempt from Customs duty by notification, and that a separate power of exemption exists in relation to countervailing import duties (by reason of Section 3(6) of the Tariff Act read with Section 25 of the Customs Act), because the additional duty is a different duty.
- Textual construction of the notification: The court examined the wording of notification 215/80-Cus. It observed that the notification expressly states it is issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act and refers to exemption "from so much of the duty of Customs leviable thereon under the said First Schedule as is in excess of 10 per cent ad valorem." The court treated the absence of any invocation of Section 3(6) of the Tariff Act (or any explicit reference to additional/countervailing duty) as an important indication that the exemption was confined to the basic duty described in the First Schedule.
- Legal consequence of the distinction: Because the countervailing duty is levied under a different provision of the Tariff Act (specifically under provisions such as Section 5(1) of the Tariff Act), and not "leviable under the First Schedule," the court concluded that the notification's reference to duties leviable under the First Schedule does not encompass the additional/countervailing duty. The court applied the interpretive principle "expressio unises et exclusio alterius" (as used in the opinion) to reinforce that the express reference to the First Schedule excludes other duties not described therein.
- Practical computation and outcome: The court noted that the basic customs duty on viscose staple fibre under Chapter 56 was 140% ad valorem; the notification therefore exempts so much of that duty as is in excess of 10% — i.e., an exemption of 130% ad valorem on the basic duty, leaving 10% ad valorem payable. The Customs department did not dispute the applicability of that exemption on the basic duty. However, the countervailing (additional) duty of Rs. 4 per kilogram (leviable independently) was not within the notification's exemption and therefore remained payable at the import stage.
- Jurisdictional preliminary: Although the Customs raised a preliminary objection regarding the territorial scope of Article 226 jurisdiction (arguing the cause of action arose outside the State where the petition was filed), the court stated that, having gone into the merits which were fully argued, it would not further consider that jurisdictional objection in detail.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is dismissed with costs and the rule previously made is vacated.
Direct implications for the parties (as stated in the opinion):
- The writ petitioner is entitled to the exemption in respect of the basic Customs duty to the extent specified in the notification — meaning exemption of 130% ad valorem out of the basic 140% rate, so that basic duty remains chargeable only at 10% ad valorem.
- The notification does not extend to the additional/countervailing import duty (leviable at Rs. 4 per kilogram in this case); that duty is not exempted and must be paid by the writ petitioner at the import stage.
- The court awarded costs and fixed counsel's fee at Rs. 1,000.
Broader implications: The opinion focuses on statutory construction of the particular exemption notification in the light of the separate statutory bases for basic and additional Customs duties. The text does not assert the creation of any general new precedent beyond the application of established principles of statutory interpretation (including expressio unises et exclusio alterius) to the facts; no further or broader implications are discussed in the opinion.
Summary prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond that opinion has been added or inferred.
Balasubrahmanyan, J.:— The issue which is raised in this writ petition is about the extent of the coverage of the exemption from Customs duty on imported viscose staple fibre under a Central Government notification of 198.
2. The answer depends on our being able to distinguish between different varieties of Customs duties and the nature of each. It also depends on our understanding of the precise terms of the notification under which exemption from duty has been granted to viscose staple fibres. In this country we now have various duties of customs, called basic duty, additional duty, auxiliary duty and surcharge. The first two alone are in point for the present discussion. The Customs Act, 1962 deals with Customs duty proper, which people refer to as the basic duty. The Customs Act is a per manent Code for the Customs. It establishes the administrative hierarchy for the management of duties of customs; it lays down the assessment procedure; it contains enforcement provisions, such as, penalties and prosecutions, and confiscation of contraband; it also provides for exemptions, etc. and, perhaps most important of all, the Act also lays down or declares the charge of Cus toms duty. S. 12 of the Act is the charging section. Somewhat in the manner of the Income Tax Act, which relegates the actual rates of income tax to the annual Finance Acts, S. 12 of the Customs Act too relegates the enumeration of dutiable goods and the prescription of rates of duty to a different enactment called the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. This Tariff Act, as its name indicates, and as its statutory function undoubtedly is, carries a tariff, that is to say, a list or rather, two lists. One is the First Schedule, which lists out the dutiable import items and the corresponding rate of import duty against each item. The other is the Second Schedule, which gives a list of dutiable export items and the corresponding rate of export duty on each item. But it is a mistake to suppose that the Customs Tariff Act only carries the tariff and nothing else. It goes farther and levies, in proprio vigore, or on its own force, as it were, an addi tional duty, which is over and above, and distinct and separate from, the basic Customs duty leviable under S. 12 of the Customs Act. This additional duty statutorily so-called, is also known in the trade as the countervailing import duty. The implication of this additional levy is clear from the charging sec tion, Sec. 3 of this Act. While the section declares the levy of this ‘additional duty’ on import items, to know which imports are dutiable and by how much, we are asked to refer to the Central Excise Manual. For this section adopts, as the rates of additional duty, the very rates of Central excise leviable on like goods locally manufactured. The intention obviously is to afford a degree or protection to the local manufacturer by loading the imported variety with an additional import duty. With the charge to additional duty laid down in this fashion, the Customs Tariff Act proceeds to adopt the whole gamut of the provisions in the Customs Act for effectuating that charge. See Sec. 3(6) of the Customs Tariff Act.
3. For those who read the Customs Act, therefore, the Customs Tariff Act is compulsive reading. Otherwise, we would not know that goods are dutiable, and how much duty such goods would have to pay. For those who read the Customs Tariff Act, the Central Excise Manual is compulsive reading, for otherwise, we would not know what imported goods are subjected to the countervailing duty and to what extent and at what rates. What is more, for those who wish to know when and where and how to pay the countervailing import duty under the Customs Tariff Act, the Customs Act is compulsive reading, for it alone provides the complete Code for collection, recovery and the rest.
4. This inter-marriage of statutes relating to a plurality of duties of customs should not block our perception of their distinct and separate identities. To repeat, the basic customs duty is levied under the Customs Act on such goods and at such rates as are set out in the first and second Schedules to the Customs Tariff Act. The additional Customs duty is levied, independently, under the Tariff Act, at the rates and on the types of goods mentioned in the Central Excise Acts. It will not do to mix up the two kinds of duties.
5. We can now turn to exemptions from duties. Under Sec. 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, the Central Government is given the power of exemption, by notification. The exercise of this power to exempt may be selective as to goods, selective as to duties, and selective as to the quantum of exemption. A similar power of exemption exists in the Central Government as respects countervailing import duties as well. See Sec. 3(6) of the Tariff Act read with Sec. 25 of the Customs Act. This separate power is necessary because additional duty is a different duty from the basic duty.
6. Having regard to the statutory power of exemption, its scope and the manner of its exercise, it is in every case, a matter of construction of the concerned notification issued by the Central Government as to what the coverage of the exemption is; whether it is confined to the basic duty alone, or the countervailing duty alone, or both.
7. The text of the Central Government's notification in this case is as under:—
“215/80-Cus., dated 1-11-1980.—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) the Central Government being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, exempts viscose staple fibre and viscose tow, falling within Chapter 56 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1957 (51 of 1957] when imported into India, from so much of the duty of Customs leviable thereon under the said First Schedule as is in excess of 10 per cent ad valorem”, (proviso omitted).
8. The Notification says that it is being issued in exercise of the powers of the Central Government under Sec. 25 of the Customs Act, 1962. The notification does not say that it is issued also in exercise of the Central Government's additional powers of exemption under Sec. 3(6) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. This is one indication that the notification does not cover the countervailing duty on imported viscose staple fibre. The text of the notification makes the position clearer still. Mark the use by the Government of the expression so much of the duty of customs leviable, under the first schedule to the “Customs Tariff Act, 1962”. Can we say, consistent with our understanding of the separate personalities of the basic Customs duty, on the one hand, and the additional duty, on the other that the latter kind of Customs duty also is a duty ‘leviable under the First Schedule’ to the Tariff Act? The answer is ‘no’. The additional or countervailing duty is leviable only under Sec. 5(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, and not under Schedule I of that Act. The answer is as simple as all that, once the differentiation between the two kinds of customs duties properly sinks in our minds.
9. Mr. K.N Balasubramaniam, learned counsel for the Customs department, said that in drawing up the notification for exemption it has always been the practice of the Central Government to take care to particularise what precisely is the kind of duty with reference to which exemption is being granted. The department's counter affidavit carries some illustrative examples showing this practice. We are not surprised that this precaution is taken in the wording of the notification what with the variety of customs duties in the field. It is true that the notification in this case does not say or indicate that basic duty alone is the subject of exemption. Nor does it expressly exclude the additional duty from the purview of the exemption. But the pertinent reference in the notification to the First Schedule to the Tariff Act only means and implies a coverage of exemption restricted to the basic ad valorem duty and does not include the countervailing duty. This is a case we must apply the principle ‘expressio unises et exclusio alterius’.
10. The basic customs duty leviable on viscose staple fibre under Chapter 56 of the First Schedule to the Tariff Act is 140% ad valorem. In view of the Central Government notification, the writ petitioner would be entitled to exemption of 130% out of 140% and be taxed only on 10% ad valorem. As we earlier demonstrated, the extent of exemption is clear enough from the pointed words used in the notification. The Customs department does not deny the exigibility of 130% exemption ad valorem in basic duty. The stand they take, which we have accepted is that the notification does not touch the countervailing duty at all, leviable at Rs. 4 per kilogram. This duty, not being the subject of exemption, has got to be paid by the writ petitioner at the import stage. We see no other go for the writ petitioner.
11. Learned counsel for the Customs in the course of his argument raised a preliminary objection. He said that the writ petitioner could not in this case properly invoke this court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution merely because the spinning mills of the writ petitioner is situate in Ramnad in Tamil Nadu. Learned counsel, however, did not dispute that the Central Government, against whom also the writ petitioner has prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ, pervades the length and breadth of the Indian Union, including Tamil Nadu. But learned counsel's stand is that the cause of action for this writ petition had arisen wholly outside the State. He pointed out in this connection that Cochin, in Kerala State, is the port of entry for the writ petitioner's consignments of viscose staple fibre and it is also the place where the assessing officers of the Customs department have the seat of their officers. Having gone into the merits of the case, which were fully argued by both sides before us, we do not think we can serve any body's useful purpose by entering into a discussion of this objection as to jurisdiction.
12. In the result, the rule already made by this court is vacated and the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 1000.
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