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Namasivayam v. State .

Madras High Court
Jun 16, 1981
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 13 May 1977, officials of the Co-operative Land Development Bank, Sankarankoil, equipped with a distraint warrant, entered the house of the petitioner's father, Mr. Periaswami Pillai, at Vasudevanallur and removed movable articles (radio, fan, wall-clock, etc.) to recover money claimed to be due to the Co-operative Society. The petitioner's father lodged a report with the police alleging offences by five Bank officials under Sections 147, 454, 380, 506(ii) read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. When the police did not act on that report as desired, the petitioner's father filed a private complaint which the Magistrate forwarded to Sivagiri Police Station under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. The Inspector of Police at Puliyangudi investigated and filed a charge-sheet before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kovilpatti; that charge-sheet was returned to police to comply with certain procedural defects. Instead of complying, the police submitted its investigation report to the Magistrate and referred the case as a "mistake of law."

Twelve days after the incident (25 May 1977) one of the accused (a Co-operative official) lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging assault and criminal force against public servants, punishable under Section 353 IPC. That complaint was registered by police as Crime No. 332 of 1977 and investigated by the Inspector of Police, Puliyangudi. The initial investigation resulted in a finding that no offence was made out and the complaint was referred to the Magistrate as a "mistake of law." The Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Sankarankoil, recorded on 16 July 1977: "Read orders passed on the refer charge-sheet-Order-Recorded as mistake of law".

Subsequently, another Inspector of Police at Sankarankoil, acting on his own initiative, conducted fresh investigations into that same complaint and filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner under Section 353 IPC before the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Sankarankoil, numbered C.C. No. 366 of 1978. The petitioner seeks quashing of those proceedings in the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kovilpatti, having passed an order as "mistake of law" on the police report dated 16 July 1977, can take cognizance of the offence on a subsequent reinvestigation report submitted by the police.
  2. Whether, after a Magistrate records a police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. as "mistake of law", the police can re-investigate the same complaint and file a fresh charge-sheet without obtaining permission from the Court which passed that order.
  3. Whether Section 300 Cr.P.C. bars such a reinvestigation or subsequent trial in the circumstances of this case (as contended by the petitioner).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Once the police submitted a report and the Magistrate recorded it on 16 July 1977 as "mistake of law", the police cannot reopen the same complaint by reinvestigation and file a fresh charge-sheet without permission of the Court which passed that order.
  • The acceptance by the Magistrate of the police report recorded as "mistake of law" amounts to an acquittal or at least a final disposition in favour of the petitioner, which cannot be reopened except by a competent higher forum.
  • Reinvestigation and filing of a fresh charge-sheet on the same offence without the Court's permission is illegal and contrary to Section 300 Cr.P.C. (the petitioner relied upon Section 300 Cr.P.C. to argue a bar to re-trial/reinvestigation).

Public Prosecutor's Arguments (Respondent)

  • An investigating officer's act is administrative in nature; there is nothing to prevent the investigating officer from submitting another report in supersession of an earlier one, either on his own initiative or under the direction of higher authorities (Superintendent of Police or District Magistrate).
  • Even if the police initially report that no case is made out, the Magistrate retains power to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) or to order further enquiry under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; thus judicial control over investigations is limited.
  • The reopening of investigation by an Inspector of Police and subsequent filing of a charge-sheet is not illegal; reliance was placed on the decision in Rama Shankar v. State of U.P. and on an unreported judgment of Maheswaran, J., to support the view that subsequent charge-sheets may be filed in appropriate circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanna ((1980) 1 SCC 554 : AIR 1980 SC 326) Demarcation between police (executive) functions of investigation and judicial (Magistrate's) adjudicatory functions; once police completes investigation and submits report and the Court takes cognizance, police investigation function ends (subject to S.173(8)). The court relied on this decision to explain and reaffirm that investigation is an executive function and, once the Magistrate acts on the police report, the judicial function commences; this supports the view that Magistrate's orders on police reports are judicial acts and cannot be lightly reopened by executive officers.
Kamalapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal ((1980) 2 SCC 91 : AIR 1979 SC 777) Orders passed by a Magistrate under sub-section (3) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. (recording "no case"/"mistake of law") are judicial orders and form part of the judicial process; such orders cannot be treated as administrative acts separable from the judicial function. The court followed the majority judgment in Kamalapati Trivedi to hold that the Magistrate, in recording the police report as "mistake of law", acted judicially; therefore the Magistrate's order is final unless set aside by a higher forum, and police cannot reopen investigation without Court's permission.
Rama Shankar v. State of U.P. (AIR 1956 All 525) Authority for the proposition that an investigating officer may submit another report in supersession of an earlier one; that investigation is administrative and may be revisited. The Public Prosecutor relied on this case to argue that re-investigation and submission of a later/superseding report is permissible. The court acknowledged the rule but distinguished the facts — finding Rama Shankar inapposite to the present case where the Magistrate had judicially recorded "mistake of law".
Unreported judgment of Maheswaran, J., in Cri. R.C. No. 110 of 1980 dated 10 Feb 1981 Held (in that case) that withdrawal of a criminal case on administrative direction did not operate as a bar to subsequent filing of a charge-sheet where no charge-sheet had earlier been filed and no judicial order of acquittal had been passed. The Public Prosecutor cited this unreported judgment to support re-investigation. The court found the facts materially different from the instant case and observed that Maheswaran, J., had no opportunity to consider Kamalapati Trivedi; accordingly the unreported judgment was held not applicable to the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis strictly tied to the facts and statutory scheme set out in the Cr.P.C.:

  1. The court first rejected the petitioner's argument invoking Section 300 Cr.P.C., explaining that Section 300 applies where a person has been tried and convicted or acquitted by a competent court; here there had been no trial nor conviction or acquittal after trial, so Section 300 was inapplicable.
  2. The court examined the statutory and functional scheme of investigation under the Cr.P.C., referring to Section 5 and the provisions governing investigation (Sections 169, 170 and especially Section 173). It emphasized that the police investigation is preliminary and administrative: it consists of fact-finding, examinations, seizures, and formation of opinion for filing a charge-sheet under Section 173.
  3. The court quoted and relied upon State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanna to outline the clear demarcation between the executive's duty to investigate and the judiciary's role to adjudicate once cognizance is taken; investigation is primarily an executive function and the judicial function commences once the Magistrate takes cognizance.
  4. The court then considered the nature of Magistrate's orders under Section 173(3) Cr.P.C., following the majority judgment in Kamalapati Trivedi, to hold that when a Magistrate records a police report as "mistake of law" after scrutinising the report, the Magistrate is acting judicially and the order is a judicial order forming part of the judicial process.
  5. Applying these principles to the facts, the court noted that the respondent police had conducted a complete investigation into the complaint by the Co-operative official, submitted a report that no case was made out, and the Judicial Second Class Magistrate recorded that report as "mistake of law" on 16 July 1977. The Magistrate had applied his mind and exercised judicial discretion in arriving at that order.
  6. The court held that, once such a judicial order is passed by the Magistrate recording the police report as "mistake of law", the matter is final unless that order is challenged and set aside by a higher forum. Consequently, another Inspector of Police cannot reopen the investigation on the same complaint suo motu and file a charge-sheet without first obtaining permission from the Court which passed the order.
  7. The court acknowledged the Public Prosecutor's submissions and the authority in Rama Shankar that police may submit a subsequent report in supersession of an earlier report. However, it distinguished Rama Shankar and the unreported Maheswaran J. decision on their facts: in the present case the Magistrate had passed a judicial order recording "mistake of law" after due scrutiny, whereas the cited authorities did not involve a prior judicial order of that nature accepting the police report.
  8. The court accepted that if a police officer, after laying a charge-sheet or after submission of a report, obtains fresh information or particulars that materially supplement the earlier report, supplementary reports and further charge-sheets may be permissible. But that factual situation was not present here: the earlier report was a complete investigation, accepted (recorded as mistake of law) by the Magistrate, and there was no fresh complaint or higher-authority-directed re-investigation before the subsequent Inspector reopened the inquiry.
  9. On that basis the court concluded that the re-investigation by the Inspector of Police (Sankaranik oil) and subsequent filing of charge-sheet C.C. No. 366 of 1978 on the same complaint and same materials, without permission of the Magistrate who had recorded the "mistake of law", was illegal, perverse and contrary to law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C. No. 366 of 1978 (the charge-sheet filed after the re-investigation) are quashed.

Implications (Direct effect on the parties):

  • The immediate consequence is that the charge-sheet and all proceedings in C.C. No. 366 of 1978 against the petitioner are vitiated by illegality and have been quashed by the Court in these proceedings.
  • The Court held that a Magistrate's order recording a police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. as "mistake of law" is a judicial order; absent setting aside of that order by a higher forum, the police cannot reopen investigation and file a fresh charge-sheet on the same complaint and same materials without permission of the Court which passed the order.

Broader precedent-setting:
This opinion applies and follows the legal principles as discussed (notably Kamalapati Trivedi and State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanna) to the facts. The opinion does not purport to state that it is creating a novel legal doctrine beyond its application of existing authority to the facts before the Court; its operative effect is to quash the impugned proceedings in the particular factual circumstances described.


End of summary. This summary is limited to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or authorities not explicitly mentioned therein.

Show all summary ...

1. It appears from the facts of the case that the officials of the Co-opertive Land Development Bank, Sankarankoil, on 13-5-1977 at about 2-30 p.m at Vasudevanallur, equipped with a distraint warrant, to discharge their official duties as public servants, entered into the house of the petitioner's father Mr. Periaswami Pillai for removing the articles and have thus removed the movable articles like Radio, fan, wall-clock, etc., from the house of the petitioner's father since the petitioner's father has not paid the money due and payable to the Co-operative Society. It further appears from the arguments advanced by the petitioner's counsel and from the petition filed by the petitioner, that the petitioner's father preferred a report before the police against the high-handed action of the five officials of the Co-operative Land Development Bank for offences under Sections 147, 454, 380, 506(ii) read with Section 149 I.P.C It was contended by the petitioner's father, that the Co-operative Land Development Bank officials have no authority to seize the articles from his house. The complaint lodged by the petitioner's father to the police did not materialise and hence, a private complaint was filed before the Court by the petitioner's father and the said complaint was forwarded by the Magistrate to Sivagiri Police Station under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C The Inspector of Police Puliyangudi investigated the complaint forwarded by the Magistrate and filed a charge-sheet before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kovilpatti. It is the contention of the petitioner that the charge-sheet was returned to the Police, to comply with some technical procedural defects. Thereupon, the police, instead of complying the defects, has submitted its investigation report to the Magistrate and referred the case as a mistake of law. According to the petitioner herein, this procedure adopted by the police is illegal and contrary to law but we are not concerned with this for the present. While this was so, one of the accused against whom a complaint was lodged by the petitioner's father, as a counterblast, sent a written complaint against the petitioner herein to the police on 25th May, 1977, (that is, twelve days after the incident) contending that the petitioner herein, on 13th May, 1977, while they were discharging their duties as public servants, has committed acts of assault and used criminal force against the Bank officials from discharging their duties, warranting the petitioner's conviction under Section 353 I.P.C This complaint sent by one of the accused, who is no other than the Co-operative official, was registered by the police as Crime No. 332 of 1977 against the petitioner herein under Section 353 I.P.C This complaint was investigated by the Inspector of Police, Puliyangudi, and some of the Co-operative officials were examined and thereafter it was found by the police that no offence as alleged has been made out against the petitioner and hence the complaint lodged by the Co-operative Official was referred to, as mistake of law. The Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Sankarankoil, to whom the police referred their investigation report, passed orders on 16th July, 1977, as follows: “Read orders passed on the refer charge-sheet-Order-Recorded as mistake of law”. Thereafter another Inspector of Police of Sankarankoil, out of his own initiation, conducted fresh investigations on the original complaint of the Co-operative official against the petitioner herein and on the basis of the fresh investigations on the old complaint, filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner under Section 353 I. p. C. before the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Sankarankoil, which is numbered as C.C No. 366 of 1978 which the petitioner seeks to quash in these proceedings.

2. The short contention of the petitioner is, that when once the complaint lodged by one of the Co-operative officials against the petitioner having been enquired by the police and the Magistrate on the report of the police passed an order as ‘mistake of law’ on 16th July, 1977, the police has no power to re-investigate the same complaint or to reopen the investigation at the instance of the Inspector of Police again, and file a charge-sheet against the petitioner under Section 353 I.P.C According to the petitioner, the acceptance of the report submitted by the police to the Magistrate on earlier occasion after due investigation by the police and passing an order by the Magistrate on the police report in respect of an alleged offence under Section 353 I.P.C alleged to have been committed by the petitioner “as mistake of law”, will amount to an acquittal of the petitioner, which has become final unless the said order of the Magistrate is reversed by a competent higher judicial forum. The other contention of the petitioner is, that re-investigation of the offence after passing of the order by the Magistrate as mistake of law and filing a charge-sheet against the petitioner on the same offence, without obtaining the permission of the Court, is illegal and contrary to S. 300 Cri P.C

3. The question for consideration is, whether the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kovilpatti, having passed an order as ‘mistake of law’ on 16th July, 1977, on the report submitted by the police against the petitioner after enquiry over the complaint of one of the Co-operative officials, can take cognizance of the offence on the reinvestigation report of the police.

4. I may at the outset state that the contention of the petitioner that under Sec. 300 Cri. P.C cognizance of the offence under Section 353 I.P.C by the Magistrate is barred, has no substance. Sec. 300 Cri. P.C contemplates that a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent iurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried once again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence, for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-s. (1) of S. 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. In this case, the matter was not tried nor the petitioner has been convicted or acquitted after trial and hence the applicability of Section 300 Cri. P.C to the facts of this case does not arise.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner having failed in his attempt to convince me with reference to the applicability of Section 300 Cri. P.C contends, that the complaint of one of the Co-operative officials to the police against the petitioner under Section 353 I.P C, having been referred to as a mistake of law by the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Sankarankoil, on 16th July, 1977, and the Magistrate having passed an order and recorded as mistake of law on the enquiry of the police report, it does not he at the hands of the respondent Police to hold reinvestigation of the same complaint and file a charge-sheet before the Magistrate and the Magistrate erred in law in framing 3 charge against the petitioner under Section 353 I.P.C There is some substance in the contention of the petitioner's counsel.

6. Section 5 Cri. P.C provides that an offence under the Penal Code shall be investigated, tried or inquired in accordance with the provisions contained in the Cri. P.C Investigation of offences are two in nature, one is cognizable and the other is non-cognizable. With reference to cognizable offences, when the complaint is received with respect to such commission of the offence, the concerned police officer takes up the investigation. In the case of non-cognizable offences, the police officer does not investigate without the order of a competent Magistrate. According to the scheme of the Code, investigation is preliminary to a case being put up for trial for a cognizable offence. Investigation starts, on an information relating to the commission of an offence given to a police officer in charge of the police station. Investigation generally consists of various steps, namely, enquiry by the officers or ascertainment of facts and circumstances of the case from the complaint, proceeding to the spot by the officer concerned on the allegations of the complaint and discovery and arrest of suspected offender and the collection of evidence for the arrest of the offender relating to the commission of the offence which in turn may consist of examination of various persons including the accused person and the reduction of the statement into writing with reference to seizures in mahazars and formation of opinion as to whether on materials collected by the police officers, there is a case to place the concerned person in action against whom, complaint is lodged before the Magistrate for trial and filing of the charge-sheet under S. 173; Cr. P.C Ss. 169 and 170 Cr. P.C do not contemplate submission of any report by the police officer to the Magistrate although they do state what the police has to do. In either case the final report of the police is;to be submitted; to the Magistrate under sub-s. (1) of S. 173 Cri. P.C If the Magistrate, on the other hand, disagrees with the report submitted by the police, then the accused comes into the picture and thereafter he has a right to be heard and to adduce evidence in support of his innocence. But in case an order is passed by the Magistrate under S. 173(3) Crl. P.C in agreement with the police report that there is no case against the person accused, it goes in favour of the person accused. But it is open to the Magistrate to agree with the police report and take cognizance of the offence under S. 190(1)(b) or to take the view that the facts disclosed do not make out an offence and decline to take cognizance. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. J.A.C Saldanna (1980 Cri LJ 98 at page 109) : ((1980) 1 SCC 554 : AIR 1980 SC 326 at pp. 337, 338):

“There is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under S. 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the Police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in S. 173(8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary, to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent ad-judication between the police and the Magistrate”.

7. In the instant case, on an investigation of the complaint lodged by one of the Co-operative officials against the petitioner, the report was registered as Crime No. 332 of 1977 and investigation was conducted by the Inspector of Police and a report was submitted to the Magistrate to the effect that there is no case or merit in the report with the result, the Magistrate has passed an order under S. 173 Crl. P.C to the effect that the entire matter is recorded as mistake of law. I may further state that before passing such an order, the Magistrate scrutinises the complaint and the report submitted by the police on the complaint and the Magistrate acts judicially. Orders passed by a Magistrate either on the police report to the effect, that no case had been made out, or taking cognizance by the Magistrate of the offence levelled against the petitioner are such orders, that they cannot be viewed separately and considered different from the entire judicial process of which they are intended to form a part. I am taking this view following the majority judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Kamalapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal (1979 Cri LJ 679 at page 698) : ((1980) 2 SCC 91 : AIR 1979 SC 777 at p. 796) which reads as follows:—

“……And yet it can hardly, be argued that the presiding officer of the Court does not act as a Court when passing such an order. Really, the right to adduce evidence and be heard is to be taken into consideration as being available at one stage of the proceedings or the other. Thus in the case of an order passed by a Magistrate under sub-sec. (3) of S. 173 of the Code in agreement with the police report does not call for any hearing or the production of any evidence on the part of the accused, as it goes in his favour. If the Magistrate, on the other hand, disagrees with the report submitted by the Police and takes cognizance of the offence, the accused comes into the picture and thereafter shall have the right to be heard and to adduce evidence in support of his innocence. Viewed in this context, all orders passed by a Magistrate acting judicially (such as orders of bail and those passed under sub-sec. (3) of S. 173 of the Code discharging an accused or orders taking cognizance of the offence complained of) are parts of an integral, whole which may end with a definite judgment after an inquiry or a trial, or earlier according to the exigencies of the situation obtaining at a particular stage, and which involves, if need be, the adducing of evidence and the decision of the Magistrate on an appreciation thereof. They cannot be viewed in isolation and given a character different from the entire judicial process of which they are intended to form a part”.

8. In the instant case, the Magistrate, after receiving the report from the police lodged by the complainant herein, took his judicial discretion applied his mind on the police report as to how the report is to be dealt with, and thereafter passed an order on 16th July, 1977, as “Recorded as mistake of law”. When once such an order is passed against the petitioner herein by the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Sankarankoil on the report submitted by the Sub Inspector of Police, the matter becomes final and another Inspector of Police, Sankarankoil, cannot reopen the investigation suo motu without taking permission of the Court which passed such an order, and file charge-sheet against the petitioner as has been done in this case.

9. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that an investigating officer is required to submit his report and if no case is made out, still the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of the case. He further contends that if, on the report of the police, the Magistrate is not satisfied, still the Magistrate can order further enquiry under S. 156(3) Cri. P.C and the Court has no judicial control over investigations and over the manner or the circumstances in which an investigating officer makes his report under S. 173 Cri P.C According to the Public Prosecutor, the investigating officer's act is wholly administrative and, therefore, there is nothing to prevent the investigating officer submitting another report in supersession of the earlier one and he can do it on his own initiative or under the direction of the Superintendent of Police or the District Magistrate, and hence, the learned Public Prosecutor contends, that reopening of the investigation by the Inspector of Police before submitting the charge-sheet against the accused is not illegal and there is no illegality in proceeding and re-investigating the case, against the petitioner and by such re-investigation it cannot be said that there is any illegality committed by the investigating officer in submitting the charge-sheet after previously submitting his final report to. Court. To substantiate his argument, reliance is placed by the learned Public Prosecutor on a decision reported in Rama Shankar v. State of U.P (AIR 1956 All 525) : (1956 Cri LJ 1037).

10. There is no doubt that an investigating officer's act is wholly administrative and there is nothing to prevent the investigating officer to submit another report in supersession of an earlier one and he can do it on his own initiative or under the direction of the higher officials or the District Magistrate. Reliance is also placed by the learned Public Prosecutor on an unreported judgment of Maheswaran, J. in Cri. R.C No. 110 of 1980 dated 10th Feb., 1981. That was a case where the petitioner accused was charged for an offence under S. 409 IPC. The petitioner/accused in that case contended that the Government, after due enquiry and on basis of the report received from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, ordered the case registered against the accused as Crime No. 56 of 1973 on the file of Kollencode Police Station be withdrawn and on the basis of that order the Inspector concerned filed a report before Court praying permission to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court granted permission. Thereafter a fresh charge-sheet was presented and the Court took cognizance of the offence and the case was numbered as C.C No. 253 of 1979. The petitioner/accused in that case contended that the subsequent filing of the charge-sheet is motivated and is the result of political vendetta and, therefore, the charge-: sheet should be rejected. The learned Judge, after going through the facts of the case, observed:

“The Government memo referred to only states that the case registered in Crime No. 56 of 1973 on the Kollencode Police Station against the revision-petitioner, Ex. President of the Munchirai Co-operative Land Development Bank be withdrawn. In my view, the withdrawal of the case in Crime No. 56 of 1973 does not operate as a bar for filing a charge-sheet subsequently for the same offence, for earlier no charge-sheet was filed. Further, it is reported that the Court has merely recorded the letter of the Sub Inspector of Police dropping action. No order of acquittal or an order operating as such, was passed by the Court. There is, therefore, no impediment in filing a charge-sheet subsequently as no charge-sheet was filed in Crime No. 56 of 1973”.

11. The facts in that case are different from the facts in the instant case. That apart, Maheswaran, J., had no opportunity of considering the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kamalapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal (1979 Cri LJ 679). Under the circumstances, the unreported judgment of Maheswaran, J., cited by the learned Public Prosecutor is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

12. The point that is argued and urged by the learned counsel Mr. Krishnan appearing for the petitioner in the instant case is, that when once an enquiry report is submitted by the police to the Magistrate under S. 173 Cr. P.C and the Magistrate having acted on such report which was based on the due investigation by the Police, and on the basis of such report when the Magistrate passes an order “Recorded as mistake of law”, the order is a judicial order and the matter ends there, unless the said order is agitated before a higher forum. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends, that the police, in the instant case, on the same complaint, lodged by one of the Co-operative officials and on the same facts, having submitted a report as “referred”, cannot re-investigate the case again, at the instance of another Inspector of Police and submit another report superseding the earlier report and lay a charge-sheet against the petitioner without taking permission of the Magistrate who passed the order as “Recorded as mistake of law”. I agree with the contention of the petitioner's counsel. There must be a limit for investigation of the complaint by the police. The police cannot at the instance of one officer after enquiry, say that there is no case against the petitioner and that report having been accepted by the Magistrate, subsequently at the instance of another police officer, as in this case Inspector of Police, say that there is a case against the petitioner. The contention of the learned counsel is to allow prosecution to send another report to the Magistrate who has already passed a final order over the report of the police that there is no case made out against the petitioner, the Magistrate ought not to have taken on his file the charge-sheet, as he has done in this case, against the petitioner over the same complaint.

13. I may at this stage state that if a police officer after he lays a charge-sheet gets information or additional information he can still investigate and lay further charge-sheet. Where the first report made by the police to the Magistrate, though was incomplete, contained all the particulars and a supplementary report containing all the particulars is filed subsequently giving the particulars and details of the witnesses who are merely formal witnesses, the first report is in fact a complete report as required by S. 173(2)(i) Cr. P.C and it is not vitiated by the mere fact that the supplementary report is filed subsequently. But that is not the case here. In this case, the police had once put up a detailed report after complete investigation and on the basis of the report filed by the respondent before the Magistrate against the petitioner the Magistrate passes an order, which is judicial in nature, to the effect that there is no case and the complaint is recorded as ‘mistake of law’. The Magistrate, while passing the order, exercised his judicial power and discretion and it is an ‘order’ and unless that order is set aside, reinvestigation of the case on the same complaint not by the Superintendent of Police but at the instance of the Inspector of Police for the same offence is an illegality. I can understand if the respondent agitates the earlier order passed by the Magistrate on 16th July, 1977 which was recorded as ‘mistake of law’, at a higher forum and at the same time, starts reinvestigation of the case at the instance of the Superintendent of Police or the Magistrate, and a charge-sheet is filed against the petitioner, then there is some substance in it. But that is not the case here. In this case the Magistrate has not taken cognizance at all in the earlier police report submitted by the respondent under S. 173 Cr. P.C had there been the police report against the petitioner pending before the Magistrate, and if no order is passed on the police report by the Magistrate and if the respondent, while the report is pending before the Magistrate, holds a further detailed inquiry and collects several other particulars of the offence committed by the petitioner and submits a further report, then it can be said that the further investigation by the respondent is not barred when the cognizance of the offence has yet to be taken by the Magistrate. But the case before us is, that there is no cognizance at all of the earlier enquiry report, and when once the Magistrate passes an order as ‘mistake of law’ on the earlier enquiry report submitted by the police, it is a judicial order, for, the Magistrate has passed the said order after applying his mind on the report submitted by the police, and taking cognizance of the same offence by the Magistrate on a re-investigation of the case by the police without any fresh complaint by the complainant and without obtaining any permission from Court, is illegal, perverse and contrary to law and should not be allowed to sustain and has, therefore, to be set aside. Accordingly, on the facts of the case, I am of the view that the respondent cannot embark on the re-investigation of the matter on the complaint lodged by one of the Co-operative officials, on the same facts and on the same materials of the case and on the same cause of action which was already referred to as a mistake of law and now file a charge-sheet before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kovilpatti, who has numbered the case as C.C No. 366 of 1978 and I am of the view and I hold that the entire proceedings against the petitioner in C.C No. 366 of 1978 are vitiated with illegality, and have to be, and are accordingly quashed and this petition is allowed.

14. Petition allowed.