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Abdul Azeez Sahib v. Dhanabagiammal And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Abdul Sukkoor Sahib instituted O.S. No. 712 of 1966 in the District Munsif, Tindivanam, seeking an injunction restraining two defendants (respondents 1 and 15 in the revision) from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of certain suit properties. The trial court dismissed the suit, but on appeal the plaintiff succeeded and was awarded costs. The plaintiff died on 17-5-1971. The appellate decree was passed on 15-7-1971 without impleading the deceased plaintiff's legal representatives at that time.
Execution proceedings were initiated to recover the costs. The plaintiff's power agent's first execution petition was dismissed for non-payment of batta. Subsequently, a second execution petition was filed by the power agent of the plaintiff's legal heirs. In E.A. No. 804 of 1973, by consent, the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff were added as parties (they are the petitioner and respondents 2 to 14 in the present revision). In E.A. No. 805 of 1973, the power agent of the legal heirs was permitted to prosecute the decree.
An objection was raised that because the plaintiff was not alive when the appellate court passed the decree (15-7-1971), the decree was void and not executable. The executing court held that, since the legal representatives had been added as parties in E.A. No. 804 of 1973 with the consent of the defendants, the defendants could not challenge executability on that ground. On appeal, the lower appellate court held that the decree was void ab initio because it had been passed in favour of a deceased person, and accordingly the execution petition was not maintainable. One of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff filed the present civil revision against the lower appellate court's order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a decree passed in favour of a person who had died before the decree was pronounced is a nullity (void ab initio) or is only an irregularity capable of being set aside by appropriate proceedings, and therefore executable.
- Whether the executing court may refuse execution of a decree on the ground that the decree was passed in favour of a deceased person when the defendants have not availed themselves of ordinary corrective processes (appeal, revision or review) to set the decree aside.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (one of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff)
- Relying on precedents (Himangshu Bhusan Kar v. Manindra Mohan Baha, AIR 1954 Cal 205; Raddulal Bhurmal v. Mahabirprasad Bisesar Kalwar, AIR 1959 Bom 384), contended that a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity but an irregularity.
- Argued that where a court proceeds in ignorance of the plaintiff's death and passes a decree, that decree cannot be treated as a nullity; it may be wrong but must be set aside by appeal, revision, or review rather than treated as void ab initio.
- Submitted that because the defendants did not challenge the decree by appeal, revision, review, or by setting it aside in the suit, the executing court was not justified in refusing execution on the ground that the decree was passed in favour of a dead person.
Respondents' Arguments
- Raised an objection that since the plaintiff was not alive on the date the appellate court passed the decree (15-7-1971), the decree is void and therefore not executable.
- The lower appellate court adopted this contention and held that the decree was void ab initio and the execution petition was not maintainable on that basis.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Himangshu Bhusan Kar v. Manindra Mohan Baha, AIR 1954 Cal 205 | That a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity; the death not brought to the court's notice when the decree is passed is an irregularity and does not render the decree void ab initio. | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the impugned decree—though passed in ignorance of the plaintiff's death—was an irregularity and therefore capable of being set aside only by appropriate proceedings, not by treating it as void for the purpose of refusing execution. |
| Raddulal Bhurmal v. Mahabirprasad Bisesar Kalwar, AIR 1959 Bom 384 | Similar principle that a decree in favour of a deceased person is generally not a nullity and should be treated as an irregularity rather than as an absence of jurisdiction. | The court cited this decision to reinforce its view that the executing court must not refuse execution on the ground that the decree was passed in favour of a dead person where appropriate corrective remedies (appeal, revision, review) were available and not pursued by the defendants. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the sequence of events and the procedural posture of the execution proceedings. It noted that:
- The decree in question was passed on appeal while the original plaintiff had already died; the death was not brought to the appellate court's notice when the decree was pronounced.
- In execution proceedings, the executing court had allowed the legal representatives of the deceased to be added as parties by consent (in E.A. No. 804 of 1973) and took the view that the defendants could not later contend the decree was not executable on that ground.
- The lower appellate court, however, held that a decree passed in favour of a person who was not alive at the time of its passing is void ab initio and therefore not executable.
Applying the legal principles from the cited authorities, the court concluded that a decree passed in ignorance of the death of a party is a mere irregularity and does not amount to an absence of jurisdiction or a nullity. The court emphasized that where the matter of death was not raised to the court that passed the decree, the proper course for an aggrieved party would be to seek redress by appeal, revision or review or to set aside the decree by appropriate proceedings—procedures which the defendants did not pursue in this case.
Because the defendants had not invoked any of these corrective mechanisms, the court held that the executing court was justified in permitting execution and that the lower appellate court erred in treating the decree as void ab initio.
Holding and Implications
CIVIL REVISION ALLOWED; ORDER OF THE LOWER APPELLATE COURT SET ASIDE; ORDER OF THE EXECUTING COURT RESTORED.
Implications and direct effects:
- The court restored the decision of the executing court, thereby permitting execution of the decree for costs awarded on appeal notwithstanding that the plaintiff had died before the decree was passed.
- The court held that the decree passed in ignorance of the plaintiff's death was an irregularity and not a nullity; accordingly, the executing court was not justified in refusing execution on that ground where the defendants had not sought to set aside the decree by available remedies.
- Costs were ordered to be borne by the parties themselves (each party to bear its own costs).
The opinion does not elaborate broader precedent-setting implications beyond the direct effect on the parties; its decision rests on established authorities and on the immediate procedural facts that the defendants did not challenge the decree by appeal, revision, review, or other appropriate proceedings.
1. One of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff who has obtained a decree for costs against the defendants has filed this civil revision petition. The defendants and the other legal representatives of the deceased decree holder are the respondents.
2. One Abdul Sukkoor Sahib filed a suit in O.S No. 712 of 1966 on the file of the District Munsif, Tindivanam, for injunction against the two defendants (respondents 1 and 15 herein) restraining them from interfering with plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. The suit was dismissed, and on appeal, the suit was decreed and the plaintiff was awarded costs. The plaintiff died on 17-5-1971. Without impleading his legal representatives, the appeal was disposed of on 15-7-1971. The plaintiff's power agent filed an execution petition for recovery of costs and the petition was dismissed since batta was not paid. A second execution petition was filed by the power agent of the legal heirs of the plaintiff. In E.A No. 804 of 1973, by consent, the legal representatives of the plaintiff were added as parties and they are the petitioner and respondents 2 to 14 herein. In E.A No. 805 of 1973, the power agent of the legal heirs of the deceased plaintiff was permitted to prosecute the decree. An objection was raised that as the plaintiff was not alive when the appellate Court passed the decree on 15-7-1971, the decree is void and is not executable. The executing Court held that in E.A 804 of 1973 the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff were added as parties with the consent of the defendants, and it is not open to the defendants to contend that the decree is not executable. On appeal, the lower appellate Court held that since the decree came to be passed in favour of the deceased plaintiff, it is void ab initio and is not executable and as such, the execution petition is not maintainable. Against this order of the lower appellate Court, one of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff has filed the civil revision petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the two decisions reported in Himangshu Bhusan Kar v. Manindra Mohan Baha, AIR 1954 Cal 205 and Raddulal Bhurmal v. Mahabirprasad Bisesar Kalwar, AIR 1959 Bom 384, contended that a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity, and the fact of death not brought to the notice of the Court when it passed the decree is only an irregularity and it cannot have the effect of making the decree void ab initio and the decree is executable. Where the Court proceeds with the case in ignorance of the fact of death of a person and passes a decree, that decree cannot be treated as a nullity. It may, no doubt, be a wrong decree, but it will have to be set aside by taking appropriate proceedings like appeal, revision or review. Generally speaking, a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity, though a decree passed against a dead person can be construed as a nullity. Even if there is abatement of the suit, that would not make the decree passed in the suit as one without jurisdiction and the executing Court is not entitled to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the plaintiff was not alive on the date when the decree was passed in his favour.
4. In the instant case, as the defendants have not chosen to challenge the decree either by way of appeal, revision or review, or to have it set aside in the suit itself by appropriate proceedings, it is not open to the executing Court to refuse execution of the decree on the ground that the decree has been passed in favour of a dead person.
5. As the decree passed in ignorance of the death of the plaintiff is a mere irregularity and cannot have the effect of making the decree as one without jurisdiction, the lower appellate Court's finding that the decree is void ab initio is clearly erroneous.
6. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed and the order of the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the executing Court is restored. Parties to bear their own costs.
7. Petition allowed.
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