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Ismail, C.J. — Summary of Opinion on Rule 8‑C of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959
Factual and Procedural Background
These consolidated writ petitions challenge the validity of Rule 8‑C of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (the "Tamil Nadu Rules"), which was introduced by G.O. Ms. No. 1312 (Industries Department) dated 2nd December 1977 and came into force on 7th December 1977. Rule 8‑C provided that, from 7th December 1977, no lease for quarrying black granite shall be granted to private persons and enabled the State Government itself to engage in quarrying or to grant leases to State‑owned corporations, subject to the consent of private landowners.
A large number of writ petitions (listed in the opinion) were filed seeking declarations, writs of mandamus and certiorari challenging Rule 8‑C on constitutional and statutory grounds. The State filed a common counter‑affidavit explaining the administrative reasons for introducing the rule (concerns about inadequate industry set‑up, unsafe and wasteful mining, exports of raw blocks rather than finished products, and lessees not developing systematic mining). The Court limited the contest to two principal legal points urged by petitioners' counsel and proceeded to decide the matter.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 8‑C, which prohibits the grant of quarrying leases for black granite to private persons (and permits the State or State corporations to quarry), is within the rule‑making power conferred on the State Government by Section 15(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (the "Act").
- Whether the term "regulating" in Section 15(1) of the Act includes a power to prohibit the grant of leases to private persons (i.e., whether a power to "regulate" can be read as authorising prohibition).
- Whether Articles 298 and 19(6) of the Constitution require a law enacted by the legislature (as distinct from subordinate legislation such as rules) to authorise the State to carry on trade or to exclude citizens, and if so, whether Rule 8‑C (particularly clause (2)) is invalid for want of legislative authorisation.
- Whether Rule 8‑C applies to patta (private) lands where the owner himself seeks to quarry black granite (i.e., whether the Rule can be invoked to prevent private landowners from quarrying their own land).
- What relief and consequential directions follow if Rule 8‑C is held invalid (including treatment of applications filed before 7th December 1977 and orders rejecting or granting leases based solely on Rule 8‑C).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as summarized by the Court)
- V. K. Thiruvenkatachari, appearing for a petitioner, advanced two main points: (a) under Articles 298 and 19(6) of the Constitution only a "law" made by the legislature can authorise the State to carry on the business of quarrying to the exclusion of citizens; such authorisation cannot properly be effected by an executive rule; and (b) the word "regulating" in Section 15(1) of the Act does not comprehend a power to prohibit the grant of mining or quarry leases to private persons.
- The petitioners relied on authorities (including the Federal Court decision in Bhola Prasad v. King Emperor and certain English and Commonwealth cases) for the proposition that a statutory power to "regulate" ordinarily does not include a power to prohibit.
State's Arguments (as summarized by the Court)
- The Acting Advocate‑General accepted the general proposition that "regulate" does not normally include a power to prohibit, but contended that Rule 8‑C does not amount to a prohibition within the meaning of Section 15(1) because Section 15(1) permits the State to make rules in respect of "minor minerals" generally and the impugned rule purportedly addressed only a single minor mineral (black granite). The State argued that a rule prohibiting leases in respect of a single minor mineral could not be impugned as exceeding rule‑making power under Section 15(1).
- The State relied upon the rule‑making power under Section 15(1) as the constitutional source of power for R.8‑C and did not point to any other source of power in the record.
Government's Factual Justification (common counter‑affidavit)
- The Government explained that earlier amendments (Rules 8‑A and 8‑B) sought to control quarry leases by allowing collectors to sanction leases for industrial use and by centralising grant of black granite leases at the State level. Despite that, many lessees had not developed industries, had engaged in wasteful or unsafe quarrying, exported raw blocks rather than finished goods, and in many cases did not operate their leases or were speculative. Because of these ongoing problems the Government decided (by G.O. Ms. No. 1312 dated 2nd December 1977) that no further leases for black granite should be granted to private entrepreneurs and that the Government or its wholly owned corporations might quarry or be granted leases (subject to consent of private landowners).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| H. C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore (Supreme Court) | Holds that the word "law" in Article 19(6), as defined in Article 13(3)(a), includes subordinate legislation such as rules, notifications and regulations. | The Court relied on this decision to conclude that a rule made by the State Government can constitute "law" for the purposes of Article 19(6); accordingly the petitioner's contention that only primary legislation could operate under Article 19(6) was rejected insofar as it related to clause (2) of Rule 8‑C. |
| Bhola Prasad v. King Emperor (Federal Court) | Discusses the scope of a power to "regulate" and includes the proposition (following English authorities) that a power to regulate does not necessarily include a power to prohibit. | The petitioners relied on this authority for the proposition that "regulate" does not include prohibition. The Court accepted the general proposition but proceeded to analyse whether Section 15(1) in the Act could authorise the specific prohibition in Rule 8‑C and ultimately held that Rule 8‑C exceeded State rule‑making power under Section 15(1). |
| United Provinces v. Atiqu Begum (cited within Bhola Prasad) | Example cited regarding the breadth of legislative competence in a List entry (showing that some entries permit broad powers that may include prohibition in certain contexts). | Referred to in the course of the Bhola Prasad discussion; the present Court reproduced the Federal Court's survey of authorities but made its decision based on the specific statutory scheme of the Mines and Minerals Act and the definition of "minor minerals". |
| Dick v. Badart (English authority) | Held that a statutory power to make by‑laws "for regulating" certain activities did not authorise a by‑law that in effect excluded a category of persons from the activity (i.e., that a power to regulate does not include a power to prohibit). | Quoted in Bhola Prasad and referenced by the Court as part of the authorities supporting the proposition that "regulate" does not include prohibition; used to frame the legal debate though the Court's final decision rested on the construction of Section 15 and the definition of "minor minerals". |
| Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo (Canadian authority) | Held that a power to "license, regulate and govern" a trade did not authorise a by‑law that prohibited the trade in a substantial area. | Referred to via Bhola Prasad for the same proposition about the limits of a power to regulate; the present Court considered those authorities in its analysis of whether "regulating" includes prohibition. |
| Attorney General of Ontario v. Attorney General of Canada (Judicial Committee) | Discusses limits on power to "regulate" trade and commerce, holding that regulation power did not include power to prohibit traffic in intoxicating liquors. | Referred to by Bhola Prasad and noted by the Court as part of the line of authority showing that "regulate" may not include prohibition; the Court nonetheless grounded its ultimate conclusion on statutory construction of the Mines and Minerals Act. |
| The Special Officer, Town Planning Committee, Madras v. Narayanadas Gupta (Madras High Court, 2 Apr 1980) | Principle that an application made and pending before an authority prior to the coming into force of a new legal requirement cannot be saddled with requirements introduced after the application was filed if the delay in disposal was by the authority. | The Court applied this principle to hold that applications for leases filed sufficiently in advance of 7th December 1977 could not be rejected on the basis of Rule 8‑C if the delay in disposal was attributable to the authorities; such applications must be disposed of without reference to R.8‑C. |
| Viswam Granite ... v. Collector of South Arcot (V. Ramaswami, J., Madras High Court; judgment dated 6 Mar 1979) | Analysed scope of Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules and held that Rule 8‑C did not apply to the case where the owner of private (patta) land sought to quarry black granite by himself; Rule 8‑C would govern leasing of quarrying rights to third parties but not an owner's own quarrying. | The present Court noted that this decision had not been appealed by the Government and accepted its reasoning as applicable: even if R.8‑C were valid, it would not preclude a landowner from quarrying his own patta land; with R.8‑C declared invalid the petitioners' position became stronger. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded methodically. It first set out the constitutional entries (Entry 54, List I and Entry 23, List II of the Seventh Schedule), the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (the "Act") and relevant statutory provisions: Sections 2, 3(e), 4–13, 13(1) (rule‑making power of the Central Government), and Section 15 (rule‑making power of State Governments in respect of minor minerals). The Court recited the 1972 amendment to the Act which expanded the language of Section 15 and added a proviso concerning royalty.
The Court reviewed the sequence of State rules: Rule 8 (original), Rule 8‑A (1973), Rule 8‑B (1975) and finally Rule 8‑C (by G.O. dated 2nd December 1977). It then confined the legal contest to two principal points proposed by petitioners' counsel: (1) whether the State could, by rule (and not by primary legislation), authorise the exclusion of private persons from quarrying (the Article 298 / Article 19(6) argument); and (2) whether the word "regulating" in Section 15(1) includes the power to prohibit the grant of leases to private persons.
On the constitutional point concerning Article 19(6), the Court held that the word "law" in Article 19(6) must be read as defined in Article 13(3)(a), which expressly includes subordinate legislation (ordinances, orders, by‑laws, rules, regulations and notifications). The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in H. C. Narayanappa to endorse that understanding and therefore rejected the contention that only primary legislation could authorise the State to carry on quarrying to the exclusion of private persons; a valid rule could amount to "law" under Article 19(6). The Court observed, however, that this point primarily related to clause (2) of Rule 8‑C and not to clause (1).
On the statutory construction point, the Court accepted the general proposition (as supported by Bhola Prasad and English/Canadian authorities) that a power to "regulate" ordinarily does not include an incidental power to prohibit. The petitioners relied on that line of authority to argue that Section 15(1)'s power to "make rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases" could not be read as authorising a complete prohibition of grants to private persons.
The State's counter‑argument was that Section 15(1) empowers rule‑making in respect of "minor minerals" generally and that Rule 8‑C dealt only with a single minor mineral (black granite); the State contended that piecemeal rules addressing particular minor minerals would be within the scope of Section 15(1). The Court rejected that approach for the following reasons, explicitly grounded in the record:
- The statutory definition of "minor minerals" in Section 3(e) is not exhaustive; it includes specific items (building stone, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than for prescribed purposes) and then proceeds to include "any other mineral which the Central Government may... declare to be a minor mineral." Because the statute contemplates an open‑ended category and central notification, the Court found it untenable to allow the State to validly enact a series of rules each prohibiting leases for separate named minor minerals (i.e., to permit piecemeal prohibitions) without exceeding the statutory power.
- The Government relied solely on Section 15(1) for its power to make Rule 8‑C; no other statutory source was identified in the record that could validate a blanket prohibition. Consequently, if Section 15(1) did not permit the prohibition enacted by Rule 8‑C(1), the Rule would be beyond the rule‑making power and therefore void.
Applying these considerations, the Court concluded that Rule 8‑C(1) — which forbade the grant of quarry leases for black granite to private persons — was void as being beyond the scope of Section 15(1). Because clause (2) of Rule 8‑C (enabling the Government or State corporations to quarry or be granted leases) was logically dependent on the prohibition in clause (1), clause (2) could not stand independently once clause (1) was invalidated; thus clause (2) also fell.
The Court then addressed consequences and equitable considerations. It held that:
- Applications for grant or renewal of leases that were filed sufficiently in advance of 7th December 1977 and were kept pending by the authorities could not be lawfully dismissed afterwards by invoking Rule 8‑C; authorities were required to dispose of such applications without reference to Rule 8‑C irrespective of the Rule's validity.
- Rule 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Rules (which requires renewal applications to be made 60 days before expiry) and the underlying purpose of that time‑limit mean authorities must allow reasonable time for processing; unduly long pendency cannot be rectified by applying a subsequently made rule to prejudice applicants who filed in time.
- The Court accepted the reasoning in Viswam Granite (V. Ramaswami, J.) that Rule 8‑C, even if valid, would not operate to preclude a private patta owner from quarrying black granite in his own land (Rule 8‑C was aimed at leasing to third parties). The Government had not appealed that decision and the present Court treated it as applicable; with Rule 8‑C invalidated the petitioners in such cases were in a stronger position.
The Court then proceeded to dispose of the several categories of writ petitions before it by applying the legal conclusions above to the specific reliefs sought (declarations, mandamus, certiorari) and to the factual posture in individual petitions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court declared that Rule 8‑C of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (as introduced by G.O. dated 2nd December 1977 and brought into force on 7th December 1977) is void and beyond the rule‑making power of the State Government under Section 15(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. Clause (2) of Rule 8‑C, being dependent on clause (1), also falls.
Implications and direct consequences ordered by the Court (as set out in the opinion):
- The writ petitions that sought declarations that Rule 8‑C is invalid were allowed and writs of declaration issued in those matters (the opinion lists numerous W.P. numbers for which declarations were granted).
- Writ petitions seeking writs of mandamus directing the Government to consider applications for grant or renewal of mining leases without reference to Rule 8‑C were allowed; mandamus was issued in the listed matters.
- Writ petitions seeking quashing of Government orders rejecting or granting leases solely on the basis of Rule 8‑C were allowed; certiorari was issued to quash those orders and the affected applications were to be considered afresh without reference to Rule 8‑C.
- Applications filed sufficiently in advance of 7th December 1977 that the Government or Collector had kept pending could not be dismissed later by invoking Rule 8‑C; the authorities were obliged to dispose of such applications without reference to Rule 8‑C irrespective of whether it was valid.
- With respect to private patta lands, the Court accepted the earlier decision (Viswam Granite) that Rule 8‑C would not apply to a private owner who wished to quarry his own land; with Rule 8‑C declared invalid the petitioners in such cases obtain stronger reliefs (declarations and directions as set out in the opinion).
- The Court ordered no costs in any of the writ petitions; writs of mandamus and other directions as indicated in the opinion were to follow.
- An appeal (W.A. No. 480 of 1979) against an earlier dismissal became infructuous in view of the main judgment and was dismissed without orders as to costs.
Note: The Court did not purport to lay down that all executive rules may authorise exclusion of private persons in every context; its decision was founded on the statutory scheme (Section 15(1) and the statutory definition of "minor minerals"), the absence of any other source of executive power in the record, and the specific form and effect of Rule 8‑C. The Court emphasised that Rule 8‑C exceeded the rule‑making power conferred by Section 15(1) and was therefore void.
Ismail, C.J
1. A single point regarding the validity of R. 8-C of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1959, introduced by way of amendment with effect from 7th December, 1977. arises in all these cases, even though the attack on the validity of the said Rule was mounted from different angles by different counsel appearing for the petitioners In these writ petitions.
2. Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India reads as follows:—
“Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by low to be expedient in the public interest.”
Entry 23 of List II of the same Schedule to the Constitution of India reads as under:—
“Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.
3. The Parliament, with reference to Entry 54 of List I referred to above, enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, Central Act 67 of 1957, hereinafter referred to as the Act. S. 2 of the Act states—
“It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should lake under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided.”
S. 3 Of the Act defines certain expressions which include the expression ‘minor minerals’, which according to S. 3 (e) means ‘building stone, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral”.
4. Ss. 4 to 13 are provisions dealing with certain general rectrictions on undertaking any prospecting of mining operations, S. 13(1) enables the Central Government by notification in the official Gazette, “to make Rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minerals and for the purposes connected therewith.” Without prejudice to the generality of sub-S.(1) of S. 13, sub-S.(2) of S. 13, enumerates certain matters with reference to which provision may be made in the Rules.
5. S1.4 originally stated that the provisions of Ss. 4 to 13 (inclusive) shall not apply to prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals. S. 15 which is important reads as follows—
“15 (1) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make Rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals and for perposes connected therewith.
(2) Untill Rules made under sub-S.(1). any Rule made by state Government regarding the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of minor minerals which are in forcs immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue in force,”
It is unnecessary to refer to the other provisions of the Act. However, it is important to refer to an amendment made to the Act by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Amendment Act, 1972, By this amending Act certain amendments of considerable significance were made. As far as S. 15 is concerned, in sub-Ss.(1) and (2) thereof, for the words ‘prospecting licences and mining leases’ wherever they occurred, the words ‘Quarry leases mining leases or other mineral concessions” were substituted. An entirely new sub-S. (3) to S. 15 was introduced to the following effect:—
‘'The holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession granted under any rule made under sub-S, (i) shall pay royalty in respect of minor minerals removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager employee, contractor or sub-lessee at the rate prescribed for the time being in the rules framed by the State Government in respect of minor minerals:
Provided that the State Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty in respect of any minor mineral for more than once during any period of four years-
In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 13 of the Act, the Central Government framed the rules called “the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960” hereinafter referred to as the Central Rules. Similarly, pursuant to the powers conferred by S. 15 (1) of the Act the State Government framed the Rules called the ‘Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 19(9” hereinafter referred to as the Tamil Nadu Rules.
6. Rule 8 of the Tamil Nadu Rules dealt with lease of quarries to private persons. In 1973, Rule 8-A was introduced by the State Government to following effect—
“8-A. Lease to the Industries—Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Rule 8 the Collector may sanction leases in favour of applicants who require the minerals for their existing industry or industries or, who are having a distinct industrial programme to utilise the mineral in their owl industry. The lease amount to be collected from any such applicant shall be an amount equal to the average of the lease amount for the preceding three years or the average of setgnorage fee specified in Rate 8 for the preceding ten years, whichever is higher, in adition to the ordinary agreement.
In 1975, the Government made another Rule; namely, Rule 8-B to the following effect—
“8-B—Lease of quarries in respect of black granite to private persons—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Rr. 8 and 8.A the authority competent to grant leases in respect of quarrying black granite shall be the State Government.
(2) An application for the grant of a quarrying lease in respect of any land shall be made to the Collector of the District concerned in the prescribed form in triplicate and shall be accompanied by a fee of Rs. 100. The Collector shall, after scrutiny, forward the application along with his remarks to the Director of Industries and Commerce who shall technically scrutinise the industrial programme given by the applicant and forward the application with his remarks to the Government”.
7. Later by G.O Ms. No 1312, Industries Department, dated 2nd December 1977, the Government made the impugned Rule under S. 15 of the Act and the said Rule reads as follows:—
“8-C. Lease of quarries in respect of black granite to Government Corporation etc-(1). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, on and from 7th December 1977, no leas for quarrying black granite shall be granted to private persons.
(2) The Government themselves may engage in quarring black granite or grant leasss for quarrying black gfanite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by the State Government;
Provided that in respect of any land belonging to any private person, the consent of such person shall be obtained for such quarrying or lease.
8. The circumstances leading to the making of the above rule have been set out by the State of Tamil Nadu in the common counter affidavit filed in these cases as follows—
“I submit that the leases for black granite are governed by the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, under which originally there was scope for auctioning of quarries of minor minerals. In amendment issued in the G O. dt. 6th December 1972. under R. 8-A, it was indicated that the Collector may sanction leases in favour of applicants, who are having an industries programme to utilise the minerals in their own industry. This provision is applicable to all minerals including black granites. However, it was found that there were several cases where lessees who obtained the black granite areas on lease by auction were not quarrying in a systematic and planned manner taking into consideration the welfare and safety measures of the workers as well as the consevtice of minerals. Even after the introduction of the amendment under R8-A in most cases, the Industry set up was of a flimsy nature more to eircumvent the rule than to really introduce industry including mechanised putting and polishing. The lessees were also interested only in obtaining the maximum profit in the shortest periord of time without taking into consideration proper mining and development of the mineral. There has also considerable wastage of raw materials due to wasteful mining. Therefore, Government issued a further amendment as R. 8-B wherein the competent authority to grant leases in respect of quarrying black granite was transferred from the Collector to the State Government level. They also prescribed a standard form and an application fee to be paid with the application. The amendment states that the Director of Industries and Commerce shall technically scrutinise the Industrial programme given by the applicant while forwarding the same to Government. At the same time. In the G O. issued along with amendment. It was stated that if any of the State Government Organisations like Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Ltd. Tamil Naiu Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd. Tamil nadu industrial Development Corporation Ltd is interested to obtain a lease for black granite in a particular area, perforence will be given to Government undertaking over other private enterpreneurs for granting the bases applied for by them However, in spite of these amendments to regulate the grant of mining leases, there were a large number of lesees (exceeding ‘40) who were engaged in mining without proper technical guidance or safety measures, etc, for the workers. These lessees made a strong representation to the then Government in 1974 expressing that though they had given assurance to set up industries to use the granites, they were not able to do so for various reasons. They also represented that they should be allowed to export the raw blocks of black granites. Therefore, Government had issued a Government Order dated 15th February, 1977 relating to relaxation of the ban of export of raw blocks and provision for setting up a polishing or finishing unit was not made a pre-requisite. They have also stated that the terms and conditions for the existing leases would remain in force. However, on as examination of the performance of the lessees over the past several years. It has been found that excepting in a very few cases, none of the lessees had set up proper industries or developed systematic mining of the quarries, The exports continue to be mainly of the raw black granite materials and not cut and polished slabs A large number of the leasts were not operating either due to speculation or lack of finance from the lessees. Therefore, Government decided that there should be no farther grant of lease to private enterpreneous for black granite. This was mentioned In G.O Ms. No. 1312, Industries dated 2nd December, 1977”,
9. It is the said R. 8-C, brought in to force by the G.O referred to above, that is challenged in the present batch of cases. Wide ranging arguments were advanced. be-fore us based on Entry 54 of List I and entry 23 of List II of the Seventh schedule to the constitution of India as wall as Arts, 301 to 304 of the Constitution of India. Having regard to the attack from this angle, a number of decisions were also cited to support the contention of the petitioners herein. However, having regard to the stand of the Stats Government as well as the power which the State Government exercised, in our opinion, such questions are not relevant and It is not necessary to go into any of them. We feel that the two points urged by Sri V. K. Thiruvenkatacharl appearing for the petitioner in W.P 4467 of 1977 alone have relevancy in this behalf and hence we proceed to consider those two points,
10. Thee first argument of Mr. V. K. Thiruvenkatachari is that having regard to the language of Arts. 298 and 12(6) of the the Constitution of India only the Legislature can make a law authorising the State Government to exclusively earry on the business of raining operations and no such authorisation can be validty effected by means of a rule made by the Government. The second argument of the learned counsel is that in any event, the word ‘regulating’ occurring in S. 13(1) of the Act cannot include power to prohibit leases in favour of private persons.
11. As far at the first point is concerned, Art. 298 of the Constitution deals with power of the State to carry on trade etc., and states—
“The executive power of the Union and of each State skill extend to the carrying on of any trads or business and to acquisition, holding and disposal or property and the making of contracts for any purpose,
Provided that—
(a) the said executive power of the Union shall, in so far as such trade or business of such purpose is not, one with respect to which Parliament may make laws, be subject to each State, to legislation by the State; and.
(b) The said executive power of each State shall, ia so far as such trade or business of such purpose is not me with respect to which the State Legislature may nuke laws be subject to legislation by Parliament.”
Art. 19(6) of the Constitution reads as follows—
“Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clauss shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it studs imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, resonable restrictions on the exercise or the right nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as tt relates to or prevent the State from making any law relating to—(1) the professional or technical qualification necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business; or (II) the carrying on by the Stats, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, Industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise”
12. In our opinion, Art. 298 itself may not be of much assistance to support the contention of the learned counsel. In view of this only, great stress was laid on the language of Art. 19(6), particularly with regard to the expression “prevent the State from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citzens or otherwise” and it was contended that only a law made by a legislature can authorise a State to carry on trade or business to the exclusion of the citizens. In our opinion, this argument is not sound. With reference to the language of Art. 19 (6), the word ‘law’ occurring therein has to be understood as defiled in Art. 13(3) (a), that is, as including any Ordinance, Order, bye-law. Rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law. If so, even a rule made by the Government which is otherwise valid will constitute a law for the purpose of Art. 19 (6). In fact, the decision of the Supreme Court in H. C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore,1 supports this conclusion of ours. In that case, the Supreme Court observed—
“In any event, the expression ‘law’ aa defined in Art. 13O) (a) includes any ordinance, order, by law, rule regulation-notification, custom etc, and the scheme framed under S. 68-C may properly be regarded as ‘law’ within the meaning of Art, 19(6) made by the State excluding private operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranted by Art. 19(1)(g).”
In view of this, we reject the contention of the learned counsel. However, we may point out that this contention has relevance only to R. 8-C (2). but not R. 8-C(i) of the Tamil Nadu Rules.
13. As far as Rule 8-CI) is concerned, the argument, as we have already pointed out, is that S. 15(1) of the Act confers power on the State Government to make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of min or minerals and for purposes connected therewith and that the word ‘regulating’ occurring’ in the said section will not comprehend a power to prohibit the grant of mining leases to private persons. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the detision of the Federal Court in Bhola Prdsad v. King Emperor. In that case, the Government of Bihar by a Notification issued under S. 19(4) of the Bihar’ and Orissa Excise Act 1915 prohibited the possession by any person of country liquor and of certain drugs in the areas specified in the notification. In an appeal arising out of a prosecution and conviction under the said notification, the High Court at Patna held that the Provincial Government had no power, as the law then stood, to make a notification prohibiting the public generally within the Province or any part thereof from possessing intoxicating liquor. In consequence of this decision the Governor of Bihar enacted a Governor's Act, namely, the Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act (1940), which amended S. 19 (4) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act (1915). Under the Amending Act, a fresh notification was issued in the tame terms as the original notification and the validity of the amended Notification was upheld by the High Court. When the matter was taken up on further appeal to the Federal Court, the Federal Court upheld the decision of the Patna High Court. Before the Federal Court, it was contended that having regard to the language of S. 100 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the relevant Entry, namely, Entry No. 31 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the said Act, the Provincial Legislative or the Government did not have power to prohibit the possession of liquor by any person. In that context, reliance was placed on certain English authorities construing the scope of the word ‘regulate’ occurring in a statute. The relevant observations of the Court are as follows—
“In support of his first contention, learned coun-sel boidly argued that S. 100 (3) of the Constitution Act, which gives a Provincial Legislature power to make laws for a province or any part thereof ‘wlth respect to’ any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List has not given power to introduce either total or partial prohibition in the province by reason of only that among the matters in the list with respect to which a Proviclal Legislature is empowered to legislate are those set out in Entry No. 31; intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs. A power to legislate with respect to intoxicating liquors could not well be expressed in wider terms, and would, in our opinion; unless the meaning of the words used is restricted or controlled by the context or by other provisions in the Act, undoubted include the power to prohibit intoxicating liquors throughout the Province or in any specified part of the Province. This Court has already held in the United Provinces v. Atiqu Begum . 1940 F.C.R 110 at 135=53 L.W 397 F.C that the power to legislate with respect to the collection of rents (List II entry 21) includes the power to legislate with respect to the remission of rents as well as their collection and there is a dictum in one of the judgments in that case that the power to legislate with respect to ‘fisheries’ List II Entry 24) would include the prohibition of fishing altogether in particular places or at particular times,. But, it is said, the context does in fact require a more restricted meaning to be given to the general words at the beginning of Entry No. 31, inasmuch as ‘intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, is followed by the words ‘that is to say, the production manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs’. In our opinion these words are explanatory or illustrative words and not words either of amblifi-cation or limitation. It is difficult to conceive of legislation with respect to intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs which did not deal in seme way or other with their production, manufacture, possession; transport purchase or sale; and these words seem apt to cover the whole field of possible legislation on the subject We were however referred to three English authorities, which it was alleged, justified a different conclusion these authorities do not seem to us to bo relevant, for they were concerned with the meaning and effect of a statutory power to ‘regulate’ and It was held in alt three cases that a power to regulate does not Include a power to prohibit. The first case was Dick v. Badart . 1987 10 Q.B.D 737. In that case a dock company, who were undertakers under a special Act, had made by laws prohibiting workmen of a spccified class from working on board any vessel in the dock unless authorised by the Company or unless permission in writing had previously been obtained from the superintendent of the dock. The Company had statutory powers to make-by law (among oil or purposes) for regulating snipping, unshipping and amoving of all goods within the limits of the dock and for regulation the duties and coaduct of all persons, where the servants of the undertakers or not, employed in the dock It was held that the by-law excluding that particular class of workmen was beyond the powers conferred by the Act; first, because S. 13 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847. which was incorporated in the Special Act, had declared that, subject to certain specified conditions in any special Act authorising the construction of any dock, the harbour docks and pier should be open to all persons for the shipping and unshipping of goods and secondly, because a power to make by laws, for regulating the duties and conduct of persons employed in the dock could not authorise a by-law excluding a specified class of persons In the Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo in Act of the Ontario Legislature had given local authorities the power to make by laws for licensing, regulating and governing hawkers and petty chap men; and this was held not to authorise a by-law prohibiting hawkers from plying their trades at all in a substantial and important portion of the city, Lord Davty observing—‘Their Lordships think there is marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation for governance of it’ and indeed the power to regulate and govern seems to imply a continued existence of that which is simply a continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed’. Attention was also drawn to other sections of the Act, which gave power to make bye-laws ‘preventing’ or regulalting or ‘preventing or regulating and licensing, thus indicating that a power to prohibit, when it was intended that it should be given, was always given by express words. The observations of Lord Davey were quoted with approval by Lord Watson, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Att. Gen of Ontaria v. Att Gen of Canada in which it was decided that the power given to the Dominion parliament by S. 91 (2) of the British North America Act to make laws for the regulation of trade and commerce did not enable the Dominion Legislature to enact legislation to prohibit the traffic in intoxicating liquors. We see no reason to dissent from the view that a power to regulate doss not include a power to prohibit, but since neither the word ‘rcgulation’ Itself nor any other comparable expression appears in entry No. 31 it does not appear necessary to pursue the argument further. A power to regulate may well imply the continued existence of the thing to be regulated; but no such implication can arise from the word-in the entry which, as we have said, only explain or illustrate the, more concise expression which immediatly precedes them”.
Relying on the above observations, it was contended that the State Government had no power to make the impugned rule, as the impugned rule prohibts the grant of leases to private citizens and such prohibition cannot be comprehended by the expression ‘regula-ting’ occurring in S. 5(1) of the Act.
14. The learned acting Advocate General appearting on behalf of the State of Tamil Nddu did not dispute the basic contention that the word ‘regulate’ does not include a power to prohibit However, what he Contended was that the impugned rule does not prohibit the grant of leases. According to the learned acting Advocate General, the power to regulate under S. 15 (1) of the Act is in respect of minor minerals generally and therefore unless: the State Government makes a rule prohibiting grant of mining leases in favour of private persons with respect to all the minor minerals, the State Government cannot be accused of having prohibited the grant of mining lease in respect of minor minerals to private individuals in excess of their powers under S. 15(1) of the Act. In other words, the argument is that the present rule prohibits the grant of mining leases in respect of a single minor mineral and that therefore the said rule cannot be said to be in excess of the powers of the State Government under S. 15 (1) of the Act.
15. We are unable to accept this argument. If this argument is accepted, the result will be curious. We have already extracted the definition of the term ‘minor minerals’ occurring in S. 3 (e) of the Act. The said definition dose not stop with referring to building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, but proceeds to refer to ‘any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be minor mineral.’ Consequently, there is no exhaustive definition of the ‘minor minerals’ in the statute itself. If the contention of the learned acting Advocate General is accepted, the result will be that the Government can go on making rules prohibiting grant of mining leases in respect of specified minor minerals and each one of them will be valid, because none of them prohibits the grant of mining leases in respect of all the minor minerals. On the face of it, such a contention is an untenable one and there tore we reject the same.
16. It may be noted that the State Government in the very Government Order under which they have made the impugned rule purported to exercise their powers only under S. 15 (i) of the Act and if that power is not available to the State Government under that section, certainly the rule in question would be in excess of the rule making power of the State Government. No other source of power for the State Government to make the rule in question was brought to our notice.
17. Consequently the conclusion is irresistible that the impugned rule is void, as being beyond the rule making power of the State Government under S. 15 (1) of the Act.
18. We have already referred to the fact that the first argument of Mr. V.K Thiruvenkatachari with reference to the language of Art. 298 and Art. 19 (6) of the Constitution of India will have relevancy only to clause (2) of Rule 8-C. Even though we have rejected that argument, clause (2) cannot stand independently of clause (1) of R 8-C, because clause (2) of R. 8-C is merely a consequence of the prohibition relating to grant of mining leases in respect of black granite to private persons. Once it is held that clause (1) of R. 8-C is void on account of the fact that the State Government exceeded their rule making authority in making that rule, clause (2) which is dependent thereon and is merely a consequence thereof will also have to go.
19. In the light of the above conclusion of ours, we shall now dispose of the prayer contained in the different cases before us.
20. In W. P. Nos. 4467 of 1977, 567 of, 1978, 1356 of 1978, 1664 of 1978, 1665 of 1978, 2433 of 1978, 2614 of 1978, 2615 of 1978, 3024 of 1978, 3081 of 1978, 3174 of 1978, 2307 of 1978, 3996 of 1978, 21 of 1979, 22 of 1979, 1933of 1979, 5176 of 1979, 3883 of 1978, and 3899 of 1978, the relief prayed for is the issue of a writ of declaration declaring that the impugned Rule is invalid and illegal and in view of the conclusion we have come to, these writ petitions will stand allowed and a writ of declaration as prayed for will issue in each one of these writ petitions.
21. In W. P. 1369 of 1978, 1511 of 1978, 1512 of 1978, 1858 of 1978, 2933 of 1978, 3051 of 1978, 3530 of 1978, 3669 of 1978, 3824 of 1978, 4608 of 1978, 232 of 1979, 2447 of 1979. 5364 of 1979 and 5450 of 1979. the prayer is for the issue of a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to consider the applications made by the petitioners for grant or renewal of mining leases without reference to the impugoed Rule. In vieiw of our conclusion on the principal question these writ petitions also will stand allowed and in each one of them a Writ of Mandamus as prayed for will issue.
22. In W. P. Nos. 1102 of 1978, 1308 of 1978, 1484 of 1978, 513 of 1978, 2939 of 1978 and 3101 of 1978, the prayer is to quash the order of the Government declining to grant or renew the mining leases in the light of the impugned rule and to issue a Writ of Mandamus to the Government to reconsider the applications of the petitioners without reference to R. 8-C. Here again for the reasons already given, these writ petitions will stand allowed and the orders of the Government rejecting the applications of the petitioners will stand quashed and a Writ of Mandamus will issue in each of the Writ petitions directing the Government to consider the applications of these petitioners without reference to the impugned Rule.
23. In W. P. Nos. 4676 of 1978 and 72 of 1979, the prayer is for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the orders rejecting the applications of the petitioners therein, while the prayer in W. P. 4766 and 4793 of 1978, is for issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the orders granting the lease to the Tamil Nadu Minerals Ltd. Since the rejection of the applications of the petitioners or the grant ot lease to the Tamil Nadu Minerals Ltd, was based solely on the impugned Rule, these writ petitions, namely, W. P. Nos. 4676 of 1978 and 72 of 1978 and 4766 and 4793 of 1978 will also stand allowed and a writ of certiorari will issue in each case as prayed for. The result of this will be that the applications of the petitioners in these writ petitions also will have to be considered without reference to the impugned Rule.
24. We may also point out that there are a number of cases in which applications have been made sufficiently early to the making of the Rule in question, namely. Rule 8-C on 2nd December, 1977, and they have been rejected subsequently in the light of the said Rule. We are clearly of the opinion that the Government have no right to keep such applications pending unduly for a long time and thereafter dismiss the same in the light of R. 8-C. In fact in such cases, the Government will be under an obligation to dispose of the applications without reference to R. 8-C irrespective of whether R. 8-C is valid or not.
25. Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Rules deals with renewal of leases. Sub-R. (2) of that Rule expressly states that every application for renewal shall be made to the Collector, sixty days prior to the date of expiry of the lease. The intention underlying the requirement that an application for renewal should be made sixty days prior to the date of expiry of the lease is that the competent authority will be able to process and scrutinise the application within the said sixty days so that by the time of the expiry of the original lease, it would be in a position to pass orders renewing the lease or rejecting the application for renewal. If so, the Government are not entitled to keep an application pending for unduly long time and thereafter apply R. 8-C and reject the application on that ground.
26. What we have said with reference to renewal will also apply to an application for the grant of mining leases even though the sixty days time limit may not strictly apply to the same. Yet the Government can taken only a reasonable time for scrutinising and disposing of the application.
27. For instance, the following table will indicate the date on which the application for grant of a lease or renewal of renewal of lease was made and what happened to the said application, till the date when the writ petitions were filed:
Date of application Sl. No. 1 No. of writ petition 2 Date of application for grant of lease 3 for renewal of lease 4 Date on which rejected 5 Whether pending on the date of writ petition 6 1. 4467 of 1977 9—10—76 pending 2. 1102 of 1978 24—11—75 2—3—78 3. 1308 of 1978 1—3—76 9—2—78 4. 1356 of 1978 3—9—76 pending 5. 1511 of 1978 23—1—76 pending 6. 1512 of 1078 11—5—76 pending 7. 1513 of 1978 10—1—76 9—2—78 8. 2413 of 1978 31—5—76 15—2—78 9. 3614 of 1978 1—10—75 pending 10. 2615 of 1978 24—11—75 pending 11. 2933 of 1978 3—9—76 pending 12. 2939 of 1978 29—10—75 13. 3881 of 1973 3—9—76 pending 14. 3669 of 1978 10—12—76 2—1—78 15. 4676 of 1978 9—10—76 17—5—78 16. 5364 of 1979 22—12—76 22—5—78 17. 4793 of 1978 3—9—76 pending 18. 3883 of 1978 13—10—76 pending 19. 3899 of 1978 13—10—76 pending
28. We are clearly of the opinion that irrespective of the validity of R. 8-C, the Collector as well as the Government were not justified in keeping those applications pending unduly for long time and thereafter rejecting the same on the ground of prohibition contained in the impugned rule. Even if the rule had been valid, it was the bounden duty of the authorities to have disposed of those applications without reference to the rule in question, because the petitioners had filed their applications sufficiently in advance of the coming into force of the impugned rule and they could not be penalised for the action of the Government in delaying the disposal of their applications. As a matter of fact, recently in The Special Officer, Town Plaining Committee, Madras v. Narayanadas Gupta judgment dated 2nd April, 1980, a Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party, has held with reference to an application filed by a person before the Corporation of Madras for the sanction of a building plan on 13th December, 1973, that the Corporation could not insist upon the compliance with the requirements of S. 49 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu Act 35 of 1972), which was brought into force only in 1975, that when the application for building licence was made in December, 1973, the said Act, was not in force and if the application had been disposed of without undue delay, the Corporation could not have insisted upon the party obtaining planning permission under S4, of the Tamil Nadu Act 35 of 1977, and that simply because there had been some delay in the disposal of the application by the Corporation, the legal right which the party had to have his application disposed of in accordance with the law then in force, could not be affected by the super-imposition of the requirement of S. 49 of the Tamil Nadu Act 35 of 1972. A petition forspecial leave to appeal to Supreme Court was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, the principle underlying the said decision will squarely apply to those cases where applications made by the parties either for the grant of a lease or for the renewal of a lease have been kept pending unduly for long time, that is, till the coming Into force of the impugned rule.
29. W. P. Nos. 3344, 3580 and 3581 of 1978, 2303, 3144, 2568, 3793, 4163, 4164, 4289, 4368, 4558, 5713, and 3666 of 1979 raise a slightly different point. The lands involved in these cases are the patta hods of the petitioners themselves. The question for consideration is, irrespective of any other consideration, whether R. 8-C can be invoked with reference to such lands.
30. A similar matter came up before V. Ramtswami, J, In Viswam Granite No. I fourth Trust Link St. Madras by its partner V. D. Venkatarajan v. Collector of South Areot Dt. at Cudialore judgment dated 6th March, 1979. In that case, the petitioner had applied to the Collector of South Arcot for permission to quarry black granite stones with effect from 20th September, 1978 in S. No. 419/3 in Semangalam village, South Arcot Dt. of an extent of 41 cents, being his patta lands. He also issued a notice under R. 19 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 and stated that he would abide by the rules and regulations and enter into an agreement and pay seigniorage and other dues due to Government at prescribed in the Rules. His application was returned by the Collector with a note that “the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Industries Department, Madras-9 may be addressed as the Government are the Competent authority to sanction the black granite quarry lease”. It is against that return the petitioners came to this Court with the writ petition for the issue of a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus praying for the quashing of the endorsement, dated 31st August, 1978 and directing the Collector to exercise his jurisdiction under Rr. 19 and 22 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. The defence of the Government was that in the light of R. 8-C of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, the competent authority in respect of grant of lease of black granite was the Government and that the Collector could not entertain any application. The learned Judge, after elaborately analysing the scope of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules has pointed out—
“The rules have been divided Into five section, S. 1 deals with the short title, extent, application and commencement. S. II is captioned at Government lands in which the minerals belong to the Government-’ The heading given in S. 111 is ‘Ryotwad lands and other lands on intermediary tenure in which Government have claim only to a share of the minerals.’ The heading given to 8.IV is ‘Lands in which the minerals do not belong to Government’ S.V contains miscellaneous provisions Though the rules are numbered seriatim from 1 to 37. a group of Rules are brought within each of the sections Thus in S.II Rules 1 to 16 are contained and in S.III, Rules 17 to 34 are contained. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner. Rules 3 to 6 are only applicable to lease of quarrying right in Government lands and that, therefore. Rules 8-B and 8-C which are rilled on by the Government Pleader, are applicable only in respect of lease of quarrying right to Government lands. But In respect of the quarrying right in private lands, the Rules contained in S. III alone are applicable and if so construed, there is no restriction in respect of quarrying of black granite in private lands except that the petitioner will have to apply for permission and agree to pay seigniorage and comply with the other conditions mentioned in the Rules and the agreement. The scheme of the Rules do show that the Rules in S.II are intended to apply for lease of quarrying right in Government lands and S.III is applicable for exercise of the quarrying right by the owner of land either by himself or by leasing the same to third parties The miscellaneous provisions contained in Rules 36 and 37 are applicable to both categories. Even so, the argument of the learned Government Pleader for the respondent is that Rules 8-B and 8-C are wide enough to include the quarrying of black granites even in private lands and a restriction is placed on the right of the person to quarry black granites”.
After observing as above, the learned Judge proceeded to state—
“In construing the rules, too much emphasis should not be made on the heading given in the sections. We are, by and large, governed by the actual wordings used in the rules rather than headings given in the sections There is heading given even for each one of the Rules apart from the main heading given in the sections. Thus though the Rules could be construed as pack of Rules irrespective of the grouping in sections, still I am unable to agree with the respon dent that Rule 8-C in any way restricts the right of a owner of a private land to quarry black granites by himself. Accordingly, I am proceeding to consider Rule 8-B and 8-C as applicable for both private lands and Government lands I am also proceeding on the assumption that Rule 8-C is valid, I am referring to this aspect because in a number of writ petitions, the validity of Rule 8-C is raised and it has not been settled by this court whether the rule is valid or not Learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to proceed in this case on the assumption that Rule 8-C is valid and still wants to assert his right to quarry in his own land”
After extracting Rules 8-B and 8-C, the learned Judge proceeded to conclude—
“It may be seen from Rule 8-B that the Rule could be invoked notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained la Rules 8 and 8-A alone and it does not qualify the other Rules. Rules 8 and 8- A deal with leases of quarrying right in Government lands. This Rule, therefore, does not enable the Government Pleader to contend that the authority competent to grant lesse in respect of quarrying of black guanite from private lands is also the State Government learned Government Pleader then relied on Rule 8-C as a non obstante clause qualifying every one of the Rules While the learned Government Plader is well founded in his contention that Rule 8-C qualifies every one of the Rules his contention that even in respect of cases where the owner wants to quarry black granites from his own land, he has to get permission of the Government cannot be accepted. In my opinion, it will apply only to cases where a private owner wants to lease his rights to quarry black granite from his land to a third party. Rules 19 and 33 do recognise the right of the owner to lease his Quarrying right in his land to third parties. Rule 8-C will govern only such leasing of the rights but will not apply to a case where the owner himself wants to quarry. Learned Government Pleader lays stress on clause (2) which enabled the Government to engage in quarrying black, granite themselves or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by the State Government. The latter part of this provision to grant leases for quarrying black granite will certainly refer to the lands belonging to Government and not to private lands. It is true the Government themselves may engage in quarrying black granite and that provision may enable the Government to take leases of the private right in private lands as well; But the Government might or might not engage themselves in such activity, Cl. (2) is only an enabling provision and that could not control the right of the individual owner to quarry black granite in his land. As and when the Government chose to exercise its right to quarry even in private land, the private owner may lose his right but this also could be done only with the consent of the owner as the proviso restricted the right of the Government requiring the consent of the individuals to be obtained. Whatever that may be the provision in R. 8-C could not be applied to a case where the owner wants to quarry black granite by himself. In such a case, the competent authority to give permission and impose such conditions as they may choose and also collect seigniorage is the Collector and not the Government”.
Admittedly, the Government have not preferred any appeal against the above judgment of V. Raodaswami, J. Further, the learned acting Advocate General was not able to bring to our notice any consideration or circumstance to hold that the conclusion of the learned Judge is erroneous.
30. Consequently with regard to private lands where the owner himself wanted to quarry black granite, the decision of the learned Judge will apply, even on the assumption that R. 8 C is valid. When that Rule has been declared to be invalid by us, the case of these petitioners becomes stronger. In these writ petitions, the petitioners will have a writ of declaration since they were prevented from quarrying in their own lands only because of the impugned Rule. These writ petitions will also stand allowed and there will be a declaration as prayed for in each case.
31. In W.P No. 2559 of 1979, though the petitioners originally applied to the Collector in respect of patta lands as well as proromboke lands, the relief in the writ petition is restricted only to patta lands. In view of this, this writ petition also will stand allowed and the proceedings of the Collector, dated 31st January, 1978 will stand quashed and a writ of Mandamus will issue to the said Collector to consider the application of the petitioners in respect of their patta lands, on merits, under Rr. 19 and 22 of the Tamil Nadu Rules,
32. There will be no order as to costs in any of these writ petitions. Writs of Mandamus, etc., will follow.
W.A No. 480 of 1979—This appeal is preferred against the order of dismissal passed by V. Ramaswarmi, J. on 2nd July, 1979, in W.M.P 3586 of 1979 in W. P. 2447 of 1979. As the main writ petition itself has been disposed of by our judgment in W. P. Nos. 4467 of 1977 batch this day, this appeal has become infructuous and it is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
VCS.
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