- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Tamil Nadu-Iii v. C. Jayalakshmi
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ismail, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The material facts were undisputed. The assessee sold a house property at No. 3F, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, Madras, which comprised two floors: the ground floor was used as the residence of the assessee's mother and the first floor was let out to the U.S. Embassy. The total capital gain on the sale was Rs. 2,04,813. The assessee claimed exemption under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the extent of 50% of the capital gains on the basis that half the building had been used as residence by the assessee's mother.
Procedurally, the ITO denied the claim partly because the property had not been declared as the assessee's residence in the immediately preceding assessment year (1966–67). On appeal the AAC held that the house must have been used "mainly" for residence and, because the first floor had been let out, refused the exemption. The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Madras Bench A), which allowed the appeal. The Commissioner of Income-tax sought a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act to this Court on two questions arising from the Tribunal's order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the meaning of the term "mainly" includes property partly occupied for residence and that such property qualifies for exemption under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
- Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that 50% of the capital gains should be exempt in terms of section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments (as presented to the Tribunal)
- Section 54 is a beneficial provision covering both owner-occupied property and property let out for rent.
- The word "mainly" in section 54 was intended to ensure that the exemption is not lost merely because a small portion of the building had been let out; a small let-out should not defeat the exemption.
- Therefore, where a substantial part is still used for residence (here, the ground floor), the assessee should be entitled to exemption proportionate to that residential use.
Revenue's Arguments (as presented to the Tribunal)
- The entire house property should be regarded as a single composite unit for the purposes of section 54.
- Since the first floor (admitted to be half the property) was let out to the U.S. Embassy, the building could not be said to be used mainly for residence by the assessee's mother.
- Therefore the exemption under section 54 should be denied.
Tribunal's Conclusions (summarized)
- The Tribunal held that section 54 includes both owner-occupied property and property let out on rent and that the word "mainly" was intended to avoid losing the benefit when only a small portion was let out.
- The Tribunal adopted the ordinary dictionary meanings of "mainly" (e.g., "generally; principally") and concluded that because the ground floor was used as residence, the house sold could be said to have been used mainly for residence.
- The Tribunal rejected the revenue's contention that the whole building must be treated as a single composite unit, reasoning that the definition of "capital asset" in section 2(14) is wide enough to include part of a house property.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis is textual and sequential and proceeds from the language of section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as reproduced in the opinion. The reasoning in the opinion can be summarized in the following steps, closely following the text:
- Textual focus on the qualifying clause: The Court emphasizes that the clause beginning with "which in the two years immediately preceding the date on which the transfer took place" qualifies the "capital asset" that was the subject of the transfer. Because the entire house was transferred and the capital gain arose from that transfer, the qualifying language must be read as referring to the entire house (the transferred capital asset) and not to some part of it.
- Interpretation of "mainly": The Court examined standard English dictionary meanings of the word "mainly" (quoting the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Chambers, and Universal English Dictionary) and concluded it means "for the most part; chiefly; principally." Therefore, the property sold must have been "principally" or "for the most part" used as a residence in the two years immediately preceding transfer.
- Application to facts found by the Tribunal: The Tribunal itself had found that one-half of the house was used as residence (ground floor) and the other half (first floor) was let out to the U.S. Embassy. Applying the ordinary meaning of "mainly," the Court concluded that the building could not be said to have been used mainly as a residence where half of it was let out. The Court stressed that the Tribunal's reasoning (that "mainly" preserves the exemption where only a small portion is let out) did not apply to these facts because the let-out portion was not a "small portion" but constituted half the house.
- Rejection of part-of-building approach for this transferred asset: The Tribunal had relied on a broad definition of "capital asset" under section 2(14) to justify treating part of the house as the relevant asset for section 54. The Court rejected that approach here because the capital asset that produced the gain was the entire house which had been transferred; hence the "which" clause and the requirement of "mainly" must be satisfied with reference to the whole transferred asset.
- Conclusion from textual analysis: On this textual reading and application to the specific facts, the Court found that the Tribunal erred in its application of section 54 to these facts and therefore answered the first referred question against the assessee.
- On the second question: The Court noted that the Tribunal's order nowhere expressly discusses entitlement to a 50% exemption except insofar as that was the claim made by the assessee and denied by the AAC; however, because the Court's answer to the first question disposes of the matter, it deemed it unnecessary to answer the second question and declined to do so.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's primary determinations were as follows:
- First referred question: Answered in the negative and against the assessee — the Tribunal was in error in holding that the term "mainly" could be satisfied so as to permit exemption under section 54 where one-half of the transferred house was let out.
- Second referred question: The Court held it unnecessary to answer the second question (whether 50% of the capital gains should be exempt) in view of its answer to the first question.
Implications (direct effects):
- The Tribunal's allowance of the assessee's appeal on the basis that the property was "mainly" used as residence was set aside to the extent that the Tribunal erred in law in its application of section 54 to these facts.
- Because the Court resolved the primary interpretive question against the assessee, the claimed exemption proportional to 50% (based on one floor being residential) cannot be sustained under the reasoning accepted by this Court.
- No broader precedent beyond the textual interpretation in this case is declared; the opinion limits itself to the text of section 54 and its application to the facts found in this case.
- The Commissioner is awarded the costs of the reference; counsel's fee of Rs. 500 was directed.
This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion. It does not add facts or materials not set out in the opinion itself.
Ismail, C.J:— Under s. 256(1) of the I.T Act, 1961, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench A at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu-III, Madras, has referred to this court, for its opinion, the following two questions:
“1. Whether, bn the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the meaning of the term ‘mainly’ includes property partly occupied for residence and that it qualifies for exemption under section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that 50% of the capital gains should be exempt in terms of section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”.
2. The facts are not in controversy. The house property, door No. 3F Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, Madras, comprises of the ground floor and the first floor. The ground floor was used for the purpose of the residence of the assessee's mother, and the first floor was let out to the U.S Embassy. The total capital gains that was earned by the assessee on the sale of the property was Rs. 2,04,813. The assessee claimed that 50% of the capital gains was not taxable under s. 54 of the I.T Act, since half of the building was used as residence by the assessee's mother. The ITO negatived this claim on the ground that a perusal of the wealth-tax and income-tax records for the immediately preceding assessment year 1966-67 revealed that the property had not been declared as the residence of the assessee in that assessment year. On appeal, the AAC held that, in order to get the benefit under s. 54, the house sold by the assessee should have been used mainly for purposes of residence and that, since, admittedly, the first floor had been let out to the U.S Embassy, the assessee was not entitled to get the benefit under s. 54 of the I.T Act, 1961. Against the order of the AAC, the assessee filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.
3. It was contended, before the Tribunal for the assessee that s. 54 was a beneficial provision covering owner-occupied property as well as property let out for rent, that the use of the word “mainly” in that section was intended to see that the benefit was not lost merely because a small portion of the building had been let out by the assessee and that the attempt of the revenue to put an unduly narrow interpretation of that section so as to deprive the assessee of the benefit under s. 54 was totally unwarranted. Before the Tribunal, the contention of the revenue was that the entire house property, No. 3F, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, should be taken as one composite unit, that since, admittedly, the first floor comprising half of the extent of the property had been let Out to the American Embassy, the building could not be said to be used by the assessee's mother mainly for purposes of residence and that, therefore, the benefit claimed under s. 54 had been, rightly negatived. On these rival contentions put forward before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held:
“………Section 54 includes both owner-occupied property as well as property let out on rent…. The use of the word ‘mainly’ in, section 54 is intended’ to see that the benefit is not lost merely because the owner happened to let out a small portion in the building for rent. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘mainly is, ‘generally; principally’. Since, admittedly, the entire ground floor was used as residence by the assessee's mother, the house sold by the assessee can be said to have been used mainly for residence of her mother. The revenue's contention can stand only when section 54 contemplates exclusive and whole use of the building for purpose’ of residence by the assessee's mother. The use of the word ‘mainly’ in section 54 deprives much of the force in the contention of the revenue., The other contention of the revenue that the entire building at No. 3F, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar, Madras-20, should be taken as one composite unit for purposes of section 54 is bereft of merit, since the definition of ‘capital asset’ under section 2(14) is so wide in its import that it can take in its ambit any house property as well as part of the house property. The interpretation that the entire building should be taken as one composite unit for purposes of section 54 is not, therefore, warranted by a plain reading of the section.”
4. On the above findings, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee. It was with reference to this order of the Tribunal that the Commissioner applied for and obtained a reference of the two questions enumerated in the beginning of this judgment, for the opinion of this court, under s. 256(1) of the I.T Act, 1961.
5. In our opinion, the matter is very simple and flows directly from the language of the section. Section 54(1) of the I.T Act, 1961,. reads as follows;
“54. (1) Where a capital gain arises from the transfer of a capital asset to which the provisions of section 53 are not applicable, being buildings or lands appurtenant thereto the income of which is chargeable under the head ‘Income from house property’, which in the two years immediately preceding the date on which the transfer took place, was being used by the assessee or a parent of his mainly for the purposes of his own or the parent's own residence (hereafter in this section referred to as the original asset), and the assessee has within a period of one year before or after that date purchased, or has within a period of two years after that date constructed, a house property for the purposes of his own residence, then, instead of the capital gain being charged to income-tax as income of the previous year in which the transfer took place, it shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions of this section, that is to say, —
(i) if the amount of the capital gain is greater than the cost of the house property so purchased or constructed (hereafter in this section referred to as the new asset), the difference between the amount of the capital gain and the cost of the new asset shall be charged under section 45 as the income of the previous year; and for the purpose of computing in respect of the new asset any capital gain arising from its transfer within a period of three years of its purchase or construction, as the case may be, the cost shall be nil; or
(ii) if the amount of the capital gain is equal to or less than the cost of the new asset, the capital gain shall not be charged under section 45; and for the purpose of computing in respect of the new asset any capital gain arising from its transfer within a period of three years of its purchase or construction, as the case may be, the cost shall be reduced by the amount of the capital gain.”
6. Thus, it will be clear that the language of the section contemplates an identity of the capital asset transferred and the property being used mainly for the purpose of residence. Consequently, the view of the Tribunal that the entire house should not be taken as a whole for considering the question under s. 54 is erroneous. The word “which” occurring in the clause, “which in the two years immediately preceding the date on which the transfer took place”, naturally qualifies the capital asset which was the subject-matter of the transfer. In this particular case, there is no controversy that the entire house was transferred and the capital gains arose out of such transfer. If so, naturally the word “which” must qualify the entire house and not any part thereof.
7. The next question to be considered is what exactly is the meaning of the word “mainly” occurring in the clause, viz., “which in the two years immediately preceding the date on which the transfer took place, was being used by the assessee or a parent of his mainly for the purposes of his own or the parent's own residence”. The word “mainly” is a simple English word not capable of giving rise to any difficulty in understanding it in the context in which it occurs. According to the Shoyter Oxford English Dictionary, the meaning of the word “mainly” is “for the most part; chiefly; principally According to the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1972 Edn., the meaning of the word “mainly” is “chiefly; principally According to the Universal English Dictionary edited by Henry Cecil Wyld, the meaning of the word, “mainly”, is “chiefly; to the greatest extent; in the main; for the most part Consequently, it is clear that the property sold should have been put to use principally as residence for the two years immediately preceding the date of the transfer. In this case the ground floor was kept by the assessee's mother for her residence and the first floor was let out to the U.S Embassy. In fact, the claim of the assessee itself would show that one-half of the house was kept by the assessee's mother, and the other half was let out to the U.S Embassy. If so, it cannot be said that the building in question was mainly, used for the purpose of the residence of the assessee's mother view of this we have no hesitation whatever in holding that the Tribuning was in error in this behalf. It is not easy to understand the reasoning of the Tribunal that the use of the word “mainly” in s. 54 was intended to see that the benefit was not lost merely because the owner happened to let out a small portion in the building for rent. As a general proposition, having regard to the language of s. 54, there can be no quarrel with the above proposition. But that proposition has no application to the facts actually found by the Tribunal, because in this case it was not a small portion of the building that was let out to the U.S Embassy. Similarly, the view of the Tribunal, that the interpretation that the entire building should be taken as one composite unit for purposes of s. 54 was not warranted by a plain reading of the section, is also not sound, because there is no question of any building being taken as one composite unit, because what should be considered with reference to the user as residence is the property which was sold and which has given rise to the capital gains. Under these circumstances, we are clearly of the opinion that the Tribunal erred in its application of s. 54 to the facts of this case as found by it and, therefore, we answer the first question referred to this court in the negative and against the assessee.
8. As far as the second question is concerned, nowhere does the order of the Tribunal refer to the assessee herein being entitled to exemption in respect of 50 per cent, of the capital gains, unless it be that that was the claim made by the assessee before the AAC who negatived it and the Tribunal, when it allowed the appeal, must be deemed to have granted that relief. In our opinion, in view of our answer to the first question, it is unnecessary to answer the second question and we hold so.
9. The Commissioner is entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee Rs. 500.
Alert