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Dalmia Magnesite Cor... v. Regional Labour Comm...

Madras High Court
Nov 12, 1980
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The second respondent, Jayapal, was employed by the petitioner, Dalmia Magnesite Corporation, Salem, for seven years from 1 September 1969 to 15 October 1976, when he resigned. He claimed gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which the petitioner rejected on the ground that Jayapal had not completed “continuous service” as required by the Act. Jayapal filed an application before the Controlling Authority, which ruled in his favor. The petitioner appealed, and the appellate authority held that interruptions caused by leave or similar reasons are included in “continuous service” and that actual work for 240 days was not necessary to qualify under the explanation to Section 2(c) of the Act. The petitioner then filed this writ petition seeking to quash the appellate authority’s order dated 28 February 1978.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the second respondent had rendered “continuous service” under Section 2(c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, to qualify for gratuity.
  2. Whether an employee must have actually worked for at least 240 days in a year to be deemed in “continuous service” under Explanation 1 to Section 2(c) of the Act, or if the mere existence of the master-servant relationship for that period suffices.
  3. The correct interpretation of the term “actually employed” as used in Explanation 1 to Section 2(c) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The second respondent was unauthorizedly absent for numerous days each year, thus failing to complete “continuous service.”
  • To qualify under Explanation 1 to Section 2(c), the employee must have actually worked for at least 240 days in a year, excluding absences not covered by the Act’s definition of “continuous service.”
  • The appellate authority erred in holding that actual work for 240 days was not necessary and that the existence of the employment relationship alone sufficed.

Second Respondent’s Arguments

  • It is not necessary to have actually worked for 240 days; it is sufficient that the master-servant relationship existed for that period.
  • When holidays, leave with wages, and off-days are considered, the second respondent had effectively worked for 240 days in each year.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bombay Union Dyeing and Bleaching Mills v. Narayan Tukaram More [1980 — I L.L.N 352] Interpretation of “continuous service” and the meaning of “actually employed” under Explanation 1 to Section 2(c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Supported the view that “actually employed” means the employee must have actually worked for the requisite number of days (240 days), not merely have an employment relationship subsisting.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, particularly Sections 2(b), 2(c), and 4. Section 4(1) creates a right to gratuity contingent on rendering “continuous service” for not less than five years. Section 2(c) defines “continuous service” as uninterrupted service but includes interruptions caused by sickness, accident, leave, lay-off, strike, lockout, or cessation of work not due to fault of the employee. Such interruptions do not break continuity.

However, the court noted that if absences occur for reasons other than those specified, the service is interrupted and does not qualify as continuous service under the main definition. Explanation 1 to Section 2(c) creates a legal fiction allowing employees with interrupted service to be deemed in continuous service if they have been “actually employed” for not less than 240 days in the preceding twelve months (except in mines or seasonal establishments).

The court examined the meaning of “actually employed” and concluded that it requires actual work for the specified days rather than mere existence of the employment relationship. This interpretation avoids rendering the word “actually” redundant and aligns with statutory interpretation principles.

Supporting this interpretation, the court relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Bombay Union Dyeing and Bleaching Mills v. Narayan Tukaram More, which emphasized that “actually employed” connotes actual rendering of service for the requisite number of days.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the second respondent was unauthorizedly absent for many days each year and did not actually work for 240 days in any year except one. Therefore, he did not meet the requirement of continuous service for five years under the Act and was not eligible for gratuity.

Holding and Implications

The court quashed the impugned order of the appellate authority and allowed the writ petition, holding that the second respondent was not entitled to gratuity as he did not fulfill the statutory requirement of “continuous service” under Section 4(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The direct effect of this decision is the denial of gratuity to the second respondent. The court did not impose costs on the petitioner. No new precedent was established beyond the application and affirmation of existing legal principles concerning the interpretation of “continuous service” and “actually employed” under the Act.

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JUDGMENT

1. The second respondent, Jayapal, was in the service of the petitioner, Dalmia Magnesite Corporation, Salem, for seven years from 1 September 1969 to 15 October 1976, on which date he resigned from service. The petitioner rejected the claim of the second respondent for gratuity on the ground that he had not put in “continuous service” as required under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The second respondent filed an application before the Controlling Authority under the Act. The petitioner contended that the second respondent had not actually worked for 240 days excluding the days of absence on account of sickness, accident, leave, lay-off, strike or lockout and weekly holidays and, therefore, he was not in “continuous service” as defined under the Act. The controlling authority negatived the contention of the petitioner and held that the second respondent was entitled to gratuity for the period of his service. The petitioner preferred an appeal under S. 7(7) of the Act. The appellate authority held that a reading of S. 2(c) of the Act would make it clear that interruption caused by leave of any kind whether with wages or without wages should be included in the term of continuous service and that the word “actually employed” occurring in explanation 1 to S. 2(c) of the Act was not the same as actually worked. The appellate authority further held that to attract the application of explanation under S. 2(c) of the Act, one need not actually work for not less than 240 days in a year. In these circumstances, the petitioner has filed this petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order passed by the appellate authority on 28 February 1978.

2. It is seen from Para 2 of the counter-affidavit that the second respondent was unauthorisedly absent for 94 days, 92 days, 78 days, 15 days, 28 days, 29 days, and 44 days every year on various dates from 16 October 1969 to 15 October 1976. In view of this unauthorised, absence, Sri T.S Gopalan contended that the second respondent had not put in “continuous service” for each year. Consequently he must have actually worked for atleast 240 days to fall within the explanation 1 to S. 2(c) of the Act and qualify himself for gratuity. Sri Gopalan argued that the view taken by the appellate authority that under the explanation an employee need not actually work for 240 days to be eligible for gratuity and that it would be sufficient if the relationship of master and servant existed for 240 days is erroneous.

3. On the other hand, Sri Chandru, the learned counsel for the second respondent, strenuously contended that it was not necessary to fall within explanation 1 to S. 2(c) of the Act an employee should have actually worked for 240 days. So long as the master and servant relationship existed for 240 days, the employee would fall under explanation 1 to S. 2(c) of the Act and he would be eligible for gratuity. In this case the learned counsel further contended, that if the number of holidays, leave with wages and off-days are taken into account it would be clear that the second respondent had worked for 240 days.

4. To decide the controversy between the parties it is necessary to refer to the relevant sections of the Act. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows:

“4. (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,—

(a) on his superannuation; or

(b) on his retirement or resignation; or

(c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease;

Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of employment of any employee is due to death or disablement:

Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to him shall be paid to bis nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs.

(2) for every completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months, the employer shall pay gratuity to an employee at the rate of fifteen days' wages based on the rate of wages last drawn by the employee concerned:

Section 2(b) states “completed year of service” means continuous service for one year. Section 2(c) states:

“‘continuous service’ means uninterrupted service and includes service which is interrupted by sickness, accident, leave, lay-off, strike or a lockout or cessation of work not due to any fault of the employee concerned, whether such uninterrupted or interrupted service was rendered before or after the commencement of this Act.

Explanation.— In the case of an employee who is not in uninterrupted service for one year, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service if he has been actually employed by an employer during the twelve months immediately preceding the year for not less than—

(i) 190 days, if employed below the ground in a mine; or

(ii) 240 days, in any other case, except when he is employed in a seasonal establishment.”

5. From the above sections it is evident that S. 4(1) creates a right in an employee to get gratuity and it enjoins an obligation on the employer to pay gratuity to an employee on the termination of his employment in one of the modes set out in the section provided the employee has rendered “continuous service” for not less than five years. The definition of “continuous service” states that absence due to sickness, accident, leave, lay-off, strike or a lockout or cessation of work not due to any fault of the employee concerned will not bring about an interruption in service. In other words a service even though interrupted due to above causes will be deemed to be uninterrupted and falling within the definition of “continuous service.” To put it differently the days during which an employee is absent for the reasons mentioned in the definition of “continuous service” will be counted as a part of uninterrupted service. Therefore, if the service of an employee is only interrupted by any of the reasons mentioned in the main definition of “continuous service” still the said service will be deemed to be uninterrupted and taken to be continuous service. On the other hand, if the service is interrupted by causes other than those which are mentioned in the definition, the service will be deemed to be interrupted and the said service will not fall within the definition of “continuous service.” Explanation 1 to S. 2(c) of the Act provides for cases where a service is interrupted by reasons other than those mentioned in the main definition of “continuous service.” Explanation 1 creates a fiction. Under the said explanation, a person who is not in uninterrupted service for one year shall be deemed to be in “continuous service” if he has been actually employed by the employer during the twelve months immediately preceding the year for not less than 190 days in case of a person employed below the ground in a mine and 240 days in any other case except when he is employed in a seasonal establishment. Under this explanation even services which are not uninterrupted for a period of one year, tested in the light of the definition, can be deemed by a fiction to be an uninterrupted service provided the employee has been actually employed for not less than 190 days if employed below the ground level in a mine and 240 days in any other case except in the case of a seasonal establishment.

6. In this case as I have already stated, it is not disputed that the second respondent has been absent unauthorisedly for a number of days during all the seven years he was in the service of the petitioner. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the second respondent has been in uninterrupted service with the petitioner. It, therefore, naturally follows that he has not been in continuous service within the meaning of the main part of the definition of “continuous service” under S. 2(c) of the Act.

7. Then the question arises whether the second respondent can be deemed to have been actually employed with the petitioner for 240 days within meaning of explanation 1 to S. 2(c) of the Act. The answer to this question will naturally depend on the interpretation to be given to the words actually employed. While it is the case of Sri Gopalan that to fall within explanation to S. 2(c) of the Act the second respondent must have actually worked for 240 days, it is the contention of Sri Chandru that it will be sufficient if the relationship of master and servant existed for a period of 240 days. On a reading of the whole of S. 2(c), I am inclined to take the view that in order to fall within explanation 1 an employee should have actually worked for 240 days and it will not be sufficient if the relationship of master and servant subsists for 240 days. If an employee has been absent for any number of days only by reason of sickness, accident, leave, lay-off, strike or a lockout or cessation of work not due to any fault of “the employee concerned,” then his services will not be deemed to be uninterrupted and will be taken to be continuous service irrespective of the number of days for which lie has been absent in that year. However, if the employee has been absent for any reason other than the reasons mentioned in the main part of the definition, his services will not be deemed to be uninterrupted and, therefore, continuous. It is to provide for cases where an employee has put in only interrupted service for a period of one year the explanation 1 to S. 2(c) of the Act has been introduced to enable him to be eligible to get gratuity notwithstanding the fact that his service was interrupted. In such cases, the explanation provides that the employee will be eligible for gratuity provided he has been actually employed for 240 days. Reading the main definition as well as the explanation 5 together it is clear that the Parliament had while using the word “actually” before the word “employed” intended that the employee should have actually worked for 240 days. Otherwise, the word “actually” could have been a surplusage. It is one of the principles of interpretation that no word in the statute should be considered to be redundant. If really the Parliament meant that an employee would be entitled to gratuity if he had been employed for 240 days in cases other than mines and for 190 days in the case of mines, there was no necessity for the Parliament to define “continuous service” as uninterrupted service and to have included in uninterrupted service, service interrupted by sickness, accident, leave, lay-off, strike, or a lockout or cessation of work not due to any fault of the employee concerned.

8. The above conclusion of mine is supported by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bombay Union Dyeing and Bleaching Mills v. Narayan Tukaram More [1980 — I L.L.N 352], where a similar question arose for consideration. There, an employee claimed gratuity on the basis that he was in employment for twelve years, but the employer paid him gratuity only for four years and contended that for the rest of the service, the employee did not actually work for 240 days in a year and that he was absenting himself without leave almost every year and that he would not be entitled to gratuity for the year during which he had not actually worked for 240 days in a year. The Labour Court which was the controlling authority negatived the contention of the employer and granted the claim of the employee. The Industrial Court on appeal by the employer held that the employment or being employed had to be interpreted as comprising the subsistence of relationship of employer and employee and not necessarily rendering of actual work or being on duty or performing work. It is the orders of the Labourt Court and the Industrial Court that are challenged before the Bombay High Court. It was held as follows [vide headnotes in 1980 — I L.L.N 352 at 353-354]

“While the main part of the definition in S. 2(c) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, deals generally with the concept of ‘continuous service,’ the first explanation deals only with the case of an employee who is not in uninterrupted service for one year. By that explanation, in the case of those who are not in uninterrupted service for one year, the Legislature has introduced a fiction and by the fiction it is provided that if the employee has been actually employed by an employer within the twelve months immediately preceding the year for not less than 190 days, if employed below the ground in a mine, or 240 days in any other case, except when he is employed in a seasonal establishment, then such employee shall be deemed to be in continuous service. An artificial meaning has, therefore, been given to the words ‘continuous service’ by fictionally treating an employee who is not in uninterrupted service for one year as being in continuous service provided he is actually employed for the number of days referred to in the explanation …

It is important to bear in mind that in the explanation 1 the Legislature has used the words ‘actually employed.’ If it was contemplated by the first explanation that it was enough that there was a subsisting contract of employment, then it was not necessary for the Legislature to use the words ‘actually employed.’ One cannot attribute redundancy to the Legislature and when the Legislature has deliberately used the words ‘actually employed,’ in the context of the definition of continuous service, it is clear that those words contemplate that the employee who wants to take benefit of the explanation must show that he had actually worked for 240 days during the period of twelve months immediately preceding the year in question. Giving any other meaning of the words actually employed’ would defeat the purpose of enacting the explanation. There is intrinsic evidence in the explanation itself apart from the words used, that the words ‘actually employed’ contemplate actual work or actual rendering of service. It is therefore, quite clear that for the purpose of the first explanation, an employee must show that he has actually rendered service for the number of days specified in the explanation.

For the purposes of continuous service or uninterrupted service, absence resulting only in the circumstances specified in the inclusive part of the definition could be taken into account. Absence for any other reason or on account of any other circumstance would clearly have the effect of interrupting the service and, the moment such interruption of service occurs, the employee would clearly be one who cannot be said to be in an uninterrupted service. Once the employee falls into the category of those who are not in an uninterrupted service, then the only provision which may enable him to get the benefit of gratuity is explanation 1. Explanation 1 gives only one criterion for deciding whether a person is deemed to in continuous service. That criterion is that he has to be actually employed for not less than 240 days if he is not employed in a seasonal establishment or below the ground in a mine.”

9. To sum up, “continuous service” under S. 2(c) of the Act means uninterrupted service for one year. Absence of an employee for reasons mentioned in the main definition of S. 2(c) will not cause interruption in service. If an employee is absent for any other reason or on account of any circumstances other than that mentioned in the main definition in S. 2(c) of the Act, he cannot be said to be in uninterrupted service. In such cases, to be eligible to receive gratuity he must fulfil the conditions in explanation 1 to S. 2(e) of the Act according to which he must have actually worked for not less than 240 days if he is not employed in seasonal establishment or below the ground in a mine. Tested in the light of the above principles, it will be seen that the second respondent worked for 240 days and above only in one year, i.e, in the year 16 October 1974 to 15 October 1975. In all other years, he has not actually worked for 240 days as required under explanation I to S. 2(c) of the Act. It, therefore, follows that he has not been. In “continuous service” for a period of five years which is necessary to acquire eligibility for the payment of gratuity under S. 4(1) of the Act. The impugned order is, therefore, quashed. The writ petition is allowed but under the circumstances without costs.