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C. Subramania Mudali v. Srinivasa Pillai And Anr.
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant's property was sold in execution of a decree against him. The auction-purchaser obtained a sale certificate and applied to the executing court for delivery of the property. On the day the application was called, it was dismissed for default because nobody appeared in court; the auction-purchaser's counsel of record was absent (it later transpired he had discontinued practice and withdrawn from courts). The auction-purchaser moved the executing court to set aside the dismissal, but that application was filed beyond the 30-day period prescribed and so was accompanied by a separate application for condonation of delay. The judgment-debtor (the appellant) opposed the condonation application. The executing court overruled the objection, allowed the condonation application and set aside the dismissal. The appellant appealed against that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the old Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (as expressly referred to in Or. 21, R. 105(4) of the local rules) or the new Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an application for condonation of delay in execution proceedings.
- Whether, in construing a rule (Or. 21, R. 105(4)) that expressly refers to the old S. 5, the court should treat that reference as pointing to the corresponding provision in the re-enacted Limitation Act, 1963 under S. 18 of the General Clauses Act (i.e., should a statutory reference be read to mean the subsequent re-enactment).
- Whether Or. 21, R. 105(4) is a “special law” within the meaning of S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 such that the provisions of Ss. 4–24 of the Limitation Act (including S. 5) would apply only insofar as they are not expressly excluded by that special or local law.
- On the merit: whether the executing court rightly exercised its discretion to condone the delay in setting aside the dismissal for default given the circumstances (absence and conduct of the counsel of record).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Chandran)
- Rely on S. 5 as it appears in the Limitation Act, 1963 (the new S. 5), which expressly excludes applications arising under the execution chapter of the Civil Procedure Code — thus, the new S. 5 governs and limits relief in execution proceedings.
- Where a rule (Or. 21, R. 105(4)) refers to a statutory provision that has been repealed and re-enacted, S. 18 of the General Clauses Act requires that the reference be read as a reference to the re-enacted provision (i.e., the new S. 5 should be read into the Rule).
- Alternatively, R. 105(4) is a “special law” under S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963; since R. 105(4) contains no express exclusion of the new S. 5, the new S. 5 must apply (the phrase “not expressly excluded” requires an express exclusion and nothing in R. 105(4) expressly excludes new S. 5).
- On this account, R. 105(4) cannot operate to permit condonation inconsistent with the new S. 5 and hence the executing court's order should be invalidated.
Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Padmanabhan)
- The applicable provision is the old S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 because Or. 21, R. 105(4), as framed by the High Court in 1945, expressly refers to S. 5 of the old Act; execution proceedings were not excluded from S. 5 under the old Act, so the old S. 5 applies to condonation applications in execution proceedings.
- The rule-making authority (this High Court) intended when framing R. 105(4) that those who filed applications beyond the prescribed period should be able to seek extension of time on showing sufficient cause — a purpose served by the old S. 5.
- As a subsidiary submission, he suggested that if R. 105(4) were inapplicable, Art. 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (a residuary entry providing three years) might be invoked; however, he acknowledged that this broader question was extraneous to the narrow issue before the court on the appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Manguram v. Delhi Municipality, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 105 | Authority for treating certain procedural provisions (S. 417(3) Cr.P.C. in that case) as a “special law” within the meaning of provisions limiting the application of a statute. | The court cited this case to indicate that Or. 21, R. 105 could similarly be regarded as a special or local law; but the court nonetheless held that even if R. 105 is a special law, that would not automatically bring it under the new S. 5 where the rule itself expressly refers to the old S. 5 and thus constitutes an express non-inclusion of inconsistent subsequent amendments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the dispute in two stages: first, the proper construction of Or. 21, R. 105(4) (which expressly refers to S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908) in light of the repeal and re-enactment of S. 5 in the Limitation Act, 1963; and second, the exercise of discretion on condonation of delay given the factual circumstances.
On statutory and rule construction:
- The court recognised that S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the new S. 5) expressly excludes applications arising under the execution chapter of the Civil Procedure Code, and that if the new S. 5 were held to govern, it would foreclose the auction-purchaser's remedy under R. 105(4).
- The court considered the argument under S. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act, which provides that where an enactment adopts a provision from another enactment and that other enactment is repealed and re-enacted, references are to be read as to the re-enacted provision — subject to any contrary intention. The court acknowledged the general rule but noted the rider that a contrary intention may be evidenced.
- The court focused on the intention of the rule-making authority when R. 105(4) was framed in 1945: that the reference to S. 5 of the 1908 Act was to enable those filing late applications to seek extension of time on showing sufficient cause. The court found it inconceivable that the framers intended the rule to be rendered nugatory by a later amendment of S. 5 carried out by another enactment.
- Applying the canonical principle of statutory construction that prefers an interpretation which makes a provision workable, the court concluded that the reference in Or. 21, R. 105(4) continues to refer strictly and literally to S. 5 of the old Limitation Act, 1908 notwithstanding its repeal and re-enactment in 1963.
- Regarding the contention that R. 105(4) is a “special law” under S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 so that the new S. 5 must apply unless expressly excluded: the court accepted that R. 105 might be a special/local law but rejected the appellant's strict reading of “not expressly excluded.” The court read the phrase to encompass both express exclusion and express non-inclusion. Because R. 105(4) expressly refers to S. 5 of the old Act, that express mention operates as an express non-inclusion of any subsequent amendment inconsistent with the original meaning and effect.
- Consequently, the court held that S. 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked to displace the effect of Or. 21, R. 105(4) as it expressly incorporates the old S. 5.
On the merits of condonation:
- The court examined the record and found that the auction-purchaser's counsel of record was absent when the matter was called because he had discontinued practice and effectively withdrawn from court appearances without informing the client. The client (auction-purchaser) was unaware of this development for a long time.
- The court applied equitable considerations, observing that when litigants are left in the lurch by the sudden and unexplained abandonment by their counsel, it is appropriate for the court, in the exercise of its conscience, to relieve the litigant from the consequences of the lawyer's default.
- Given these circumstances, the court found the executing court's decision to condone the delay to be proper and just and therefore upheld it on the merits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the order of the executing court condoning the delay and allowing the auction-purchaser's application is confirmed.
Implications and consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The executing court's order stands — the auction-purchaser's belated application to set aside the dismissal (and the accompanying condonation application) was properly entertained and condoned; the appellant's challenge to that order has failed.
- Procedural consequence noted in the opinion: there will be no order as to costs.
- Broader legal implication as addressed by the court: for the purposes of Or. 21, R. 105(4) (as framed in 1945), the reference to S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 is to be treated as continuing to refer to that provision; the new S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not displace the operation of R. 105(4) where the rule expressly refers to the old S. 5. The court emphasised the interpretive principle of preferring a construction that allows a provision to operate rather than one that would render it nugatory.
- If the opinion discusses no further broader implications, the immediate consequence remains the confirmation of the executing court's order; the opinion does not undertake an inquiry into other limitation provisions (for example, Art. 137) or the appropriate period of limitation beyond the narrow question presented, and therefore does not decide those broader limitation questions in this appeal.
VCS
1. This appeal raises a point of principle about condonation of delay in execution proceedings. A question of this sort immediately sets legal minds thinking about S. 5 of the Limitation Act, almost by automatic reflex. It did so in this case too. Only its application proved far too involved and ticklish.
2. The problem arose this way. The appellant's property was sold in execution of a decree against him. The auction-purchaser obtained his sale certificate and moved the executing court for delivery. But this application was dismissed one day when it was called and nobody appeared. There was a counsel on record, but he was absent. The auction-purchaser thereupon moved the execution court for setting aside the dismissal for default. Even this application was belated, filed as it was beyond 30 days. Hence the auction-purchasers moved another application for condonation of the delay. On notice of this last application, the judgment debtor opposed it tooth and nail. The executing court, however, overruled his objection, allowed the application and condoned the delay. This appeal is against that order.
3. S. 5 of the Limitation Act very much figured in the Court below. It still dominated the discussion in this Court as well. Actually, I heard arguments on two distinct avatars of S. 5. And throughout the discussion, each side hangs on to its own favourite incarnation of the section. Mr. Chandran, for instance, for the appellant, put his faith on S. 5, as it appears in the Limitation Act, 1963, now in force. Mr. Padmanabhan for the respondent, on the other hand, held fast to the previous version of S. 5 in the old Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The question is which provision are we to apply in the present case, the old S. 5 or the new S. 5?
4. If we are to apply the new S. 5, it will, as everybody agreed, put a lid on further discussion. For, this section expressly excludes from its ambit all applications arising under the execution Chapter of the Civil Procedure Code. As Mr. Chandran pointed out, the new S. 5, far from helping the auction-purchaser, actially hinders him from getting the relief he requires.
5. Mr. Padmanabhan, however, argued that notwithstanding the repeal and re-enactment of the old Limitation Act, 1908, into the new Limitation Act, 1963, it is the old Section in the old Act to which we must resort for a decision in this case. He pointed out that under the old Act, execution proceedings were not excluded from the purview of S. 5. He urged that the old S. 5 alone would apply to execution proceedings before courts in this State, because it was that section which eyen now expressly stands incorporated in the relevant procedural rule in force in this State, namely, Or, 21, R. 105 (4) of the Code.
6. This rule, among others, was framed by this High Court, in exercise of its mandatory power under S. 122 of the Code. It came into effect on 4th September, 1945. The Rule was couched in the following terms; it has not undergone any change even after the enactment of the new Limitation Act, 1963:
“(4) The provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to applications under sub-rule (1)”.
The submission of Mr. Padmanabhan was that on a combined reading of Or. 21, R. 105 (4) and of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which the said rule expressly refers to, an application would lie for excusing the delay in seeking to set aside the dismissal of an application for delivery.
7. Mr. Chandran, however, countered with the argument that even though Or. 21, R. 105 (4), as prescribed in the local amendment in this State, refers to S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the reference to that provision must be read as a reference to the corresponding provision of S. 5 of the present Limitation Act, 1963. He said that this mode of construction was enjoined by S. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891.
8. S. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act lays down a rule of construction for legislation by reference. The rule is that where a statue refers to a provision in another enactment and adopts it, and that other enactment is subsequently repealed and re-enacted, the reference in question in the statute must thereafter be treated as a reference to the provision as so re-enacted. This general rule, however, is subject to a rider, namely, that the Legislation by reference may itself evince a contrary intention. This is made clear by S. 12 of the Madras General Clauses Act.
9. These principles, as embodied in the General Clauses Act, may call for application, in terms only to construction of legislative enactments. But there is no reason why the basic principles cannot be applied to the construction of similar provisions in Rules and other statutory instruments made by rulemaking bodies.
10. Turning to Or. 21, R. 105 (4), when this Court, as the Rule-making authority, made this Rule in 1945, the one and only intention for doing so must have been to enable those who file applications beyond the prescribed period to move the court for extension of time on showing sufficient cause for the delay. The specific reference to S. 5 of the old Limitation Act, 1908, is meaningful only on this interpretation. It would be wholly pointless on any other understanding of the reference to S. 5. In this context, can we mechanically apply the canon of construction under S. 18 of the General Clauses Act and hold that after the enactment of the new Limitation Act, 1963, our construction of the same Rule must yield a result which proves to be diametrically opposite to the one which was intended by this Court when they drafted the Rule in the first place?. I think there can only be one answer to this question. This Court could not possibly have intended in 1945, that the Rule they were framing should one day be rendered wholly nugatory, not by express repeal of the Rule itself, but by a side-wind of S. 5 of the Limitation Act undergoing an amendment distorting it beyond recognition. To say that R. 105 (4) evinces such an intention would be to attribute to it a wholly self-defeating legislative urge. It is a cardinal principle of construction that we must prefer that construction which makes the provision work. We cannot, in the name of statutory construction, reduce the provision to a shambles.
11. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the reference in Or. 21, R. 105 (4) to S. 5 of the Limitation Act continues to refer, strictly and literally, to S. 5 of the old Limitation Act, 1908, notwithstanding its repeal and re-enactment in the present Limitation Act, 1963. The result is that the execution Court in this case was quite right in entertaining the auction-purchaser's application for condonation of the delay in seeking to set aside the dismissal for default of the application which he filed under Or. 21, R. 103.
12. Mr. Chandran attempted another argument to nullify the effect of Or. 21, R. 105 (4). He said that this Rule was a ‘special law’ within the meaning of S. 29 (2) of the present Limitation Act, 1963. As such ‘special law’, he said, R. 105(4) cannot escape from the application of the present S. 5 of the Act. He said that the only way for R. 105 (4) to avoid S. 5 of the new Limitation Act, would be to find out if that Rule carried any provision expressly excluding S. 5 of the new Act from the ambit of the Rule, and not otherwise. He said that R. 105 (4) contains no such exclusory provision He accordingly maintained that R. 105 (4) cannot serve any purpose at all.
13. This argument of Mr. Chandran is only the other side of the coin. Learned counsel's earlier argument was that S. 5 of the new Act excluded R. 105 (4). His present argument is that R. 105 (4) does not exclude S. 5 and hence it cannot work. In my opinion, this argument of frustration is also not tenable. It may be conceded that Or. 21, R. 105 (3), C.P.C is a special law within the meaning of S. 29 (2) even as the Supreme Court regarded S. 417 (3), Criminal Procedure Code as a special law. Vide Manguram v. Delhi Municipality . A.I.R 1976. S.C 105.. Or 21, R. 105 may be regarded also as a local law, since it is peculiar to this State. But, it does not follow from these premises that S. 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963 would govern R. 105 (3) or (4).
14. Mr. Chandran however relied on the following words in S. 29 (2)—
“……provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
The argument was that there is nothing in R. 105 (4) which ‘expressly excluded’ S. 5 of the new Limitatiotion Act from applying. In my view, this is not the way to construe the words in question. The phrase ‘not expressly excluded’ does not mean or imply that exclusion must be in express terms. In my view, the phrase not expressly excluded’ would take note of express exclusion as well as express non-inclusion. In Or, 21, R. 105, this Court framed the rule expressly refering to S. 5 of the Indian Limition Act, 1908. This express mention of S. 5 of the old Act amounted to an express non-inclusion of any subsequent amendment inconsistent with it originl meaning and effect. In this view, therefore, I am satisfied that S. 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be invoked in the present case.
15. Mr. Padmanabhan urged a broader line of argument for his client when he said that if Or. 21, R. 105 (4) were held inapplicable to this case, resort may be had to the residuary Art. 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would offer a larger period of three years for such an application. I however, think that the reference to Art. 137 is foreign to the scope of this appeal. The limited question both before the execution court and in this appeal is whether the application filed by the auction-purchaser under Or. 21, R. 105 (4) read with S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was maintainable We are not concerned with the determination of the appropriate period of limitation, whether it is 30 days or 3 years. Nor are we concerned with the particular provision for limitation whether it is Or. 21, R. 105 (1) of the Code, or Art. 137 of the Limitation Act 1963?
16. On the merits of the order passed by the court below condoning the delay, I am satisfied that the court did the right thing when it ordered the application. The record shows that learned counsel who had entered appearance for the auction-purchaser was absent in court when the case was called. It subsequently transpired that he had discontinued his profession and had put his decision into effect by making himelf scarce from all law courts. Apparently, the client was not aware of these developments until long afterwards.
17. I like to imagine that lawyers practising in courts may have excellent reasons of their own for turning their back on their profession, renouncing their robes and shunning the Courts at any given moment. But where the clients are not informed of their decision beforehand so as to enable them to make alternative arrangements, the result might well be to leave them in the lurch, and where parties find themselves in a quandary on such occasions, it would be a proper exercise of the court's good conscience to redeem the litigants from the faults of the lawyers. I am glad to find that this has been the approach of the court below in this case. I must uphold the order, accordingly as a just order.
18. In the result the appeal is dismissed and the order of the executing court is confirmed. There will be no order as to costs.
VCS
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