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Ramanathan (C.) v. Acting Zonal Manager, Food Corporation Of India, Madras, And Others

Madras High Court
Aug 8, 1979
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Ramaprasada Rao, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Ramaprasada Rao in a writ appeal against an order of V. Ramaswami, J., which had dismissed a writ petition by the appellant. The appellant, an employee of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) who joined service in 1955, challenged an order dated 14 July 1977 passed by the first respondent (the Acting Zonal Manager, FCI) transferring him from the Madras Division Office to Adilabad, Andhra Pradesh.

Timeline and relevant procedural points provided in the opinion:

  • The appellant's service postings included Coimbatore (start), Madras (1958), Cochin (1970), Madras (1972), Andhra Pradesh (1975), return to Madras (1976), and the transfer to Adilabad on 14 July 1977.
  • The appellant was relieved on the afternoon of 14 July 1977 but did not immediately join at Adilabad; he approached the Court and under Court orders was given joining time until 6 January 1978, when he joined at Adilabad.
  • The appellant had sought certiorarified mandamus to call for records relating to the transfer order and to direct respondents to follow the FCI transfer policy that applied to categories III and IV employees.
  • The learned single Judge (V. Ramaswami, J.) dismissed the writ petition; the present opinion addresses the appeal from that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the transfer order dated 14 July 1977 was motivated by mala fides or a collateral purpose (punitive motive) rather than bona fide administrative considerations.
  2. Whether the transfer was used to bypass or substitute for disciplinary proceedings and thereby offend principles of fair hearing and the protections envisaged under Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
  3. Whether the applicable transfer policy of the Food Corporation of India (for categories III and IV employees) was disregarded in effecting the transfer, and whether such disregard bears on the validity of the transfer.
  4. Whether the absence of joining time (and related procedural steps) supports an inference that the transfer was punitive or motivated by irrelevant considerations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The transfer order was vitiated by bad faith and was in the nature of a punishment imposed because of personal differences between the appellant and the first respondent.
  • The first respondent circumvented disciplinary proceedings by effecting the transfer as a devious method of punishment.
  • The FCI transfer guidelines (policy from 1973) — including the principle that category III and IV employees should preferably be stationed at one place for at least five years and transferred within the region thereafter — were ignored.
  • The first respondent's pleadings (counter-affidavit) effectively admitted that allegations against the appellant motivated the transfer, so no further proof of mala fides was necessary.
  • No joining time was given (or the usual joining time was denied), and the appellant was immediately relieved, which the appellant argued reflected an improper design behind the transfer.

First Respondent's (FCI/Zonal Manager) Statements and Defences

  • The transfer was made for administrative reasons; the appellant had no vested right to choose a place of posting and is bound to serve wherever posted.
  • The appellant styled himself as general secretary of a staff association, but that designation was of his own making and the association was unrecognized.
  • The appellant's work and conduct were described as dissatisfactory; departmental enquiries were said to be pending against him (a show-cause memo had been issued).
  • The first respondent denied that the transfer was motivated by vengeance or mala fides; he asserted administrative convenience and necessity as the basis and stated consultation with the Managing Director.
  • The first respondent admitted that joining time is not mandatory in every case and that in this instance no joining time was given because it was felt the appellant should be immediately relieved; he further said the appellant's leave application was presented after being relieved and that the appellant's conduct (non-joining) warranted disciplinary action.
  • The first respondent denied various specific allegations made by the appellant (e.g., interference with loans, penal transfers of others, vindictive acts) except where expressly admitted in the counter-affidavit.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court prefaced its judgment with general principles: courts are ordinarily reluctant to interfere with transfers made for bona fide administrative reasons, but they will intervene where a transfer is a colourable device to achieve a collateral, punitive purpose and thereby bypass disciplinary safeguards, including the principle of audi alteram partem and the protections of Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

The Court then examined the pleadings and counter-affidavit in detail and applied those principles to the facts:

  • The first respondent's counter-affidavit contained admissions and statements that revealed long-standing friction between the appellant and the first respondent and references to adverse reports and a show-cause memorandum. The Court treated those statements as probative of a motive to remove or punish the appellant.
  • The Court noted absence of any record that formal disciplinary proceedings were taken or were pending to deal with alleged misconduct; this suggested that transfer was being used as an alternative to disciplinary proceedings.
  • The FCI transfer policy of 1973 (produced in the record) prescribed that category III and IV employees should not be shifted as a matter of routine and that transfers should consider five-year stationing and preference for intra-region moves. The Court observed that the first respondent did not show that this policy had been considered when effecting the transfer.
  • The Court considered the lack of joining time and the circumstances of immediate relief as corroborating factors that supported the inference of improper motive, particularly because no justification or documentary basis had been produced to show that the refusal of joining time was bona fide.
  • Weighing the admissions and the context, the Court concluded that the transfer, though framed as administrative, in substance appeared to be imposed for collateral and vindicative reasons and was therefore a colourable exercise of power.
  • The Court emphasized that where a transfer amounts to punishment, the prescribed constitutional safeguards cannot be circumvented by labeling an action a transfer rather than initiating disciplinary proceedings under the statutory or constitutional scheme (specifically referring to Article 311).
  • The Court rejected the single Judge's acceptance of the explanation that a weekend (Friday followed by Saturday and Sunday) justified the denial of joining time; it held that such an explanation did not cure the substantive infirmity arising from the other circumstances pointing to mala fides.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct consequences and implications explicitly stated in the opinion:

  • The appeal was allowed by the Court. In the circumstances of the case, there was to be no order as to costs.
  • An oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by this Court because the point involved did not raise any question of law of general importance requiring consideration by the Supreme Court.

The opinion does not set out any broader statement that it intended to create a new binding precedent; its reasoning explains why, on the specific facts and admissions in the counter-affidavit, the transfer was a colourable exercise of power and thus subject to judicial interference.


This summary is strictly limited to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond those expressly set out in the text of the judgment.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Ramaprasada Rao, C.J:— This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of V. Ramsawami, J., who dismissed a writ petition filed by the appellant when he sought for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in connexion with the order, dated 14 July 1977, passed by the first respondent, as Acting Zonal Manager Food Corporation of India, in and by which the appellant-petitioner was transferred from the Madras Division Office to Adilabad, Andhra Pradesh, and to direct the respondents to give effect to an accredited policy of transfer laid down by the head office of the Food Corporation of India at New Delhi in the matter of the transfer of employees III and IV cadre of the Corporation.

2. The appellant joined the service of the Food Corporation in 1955. He started his career at Coimbatore. He was transferred to Madras in 1958. Thereafter he was transferred to Cochin in 1970 and re-transferred to Madras in 1972 and again he was sent to Andhra Pradesh in 1975 and thereafter he was brought back to Madras in 1976. On 14 July 1977, the impugned order of transfer was made by the first respondent transferring him from Madras to Adilabad and he was relieved with effect from the afternoon of that date. The appellant did not join duty but came to this Court challenging the order of transfer Under orders of this Court he was given joining time till 6 January 1978, when, it is common ground, he joined at Adilabad. On the ground that the order of transfer is vitiated by bad faith and that it was in the nature of a punishment inflicted on him due to his personal differences with the first respondent and that the first respondent circumvented the process of disciplinary proceedings and adopted the devious method of transferring the appellant and thus punishing him, he came to Court for the grant of the abovesaid relief. It was also the case of the appellant that as he was a well-known union leader he was being shifted from time to time without following the guidelines in the matter of transfer which provided that a person should be stationed at one place for at least five years and even after the expiry of such a prescribed time, he could be transferred preferably within the region. He attempted to substantiate the above contention before the learned single Judge, who considered the basis on which the appellant raised such contentions and ultimately held the view that the transfer was not motivated for the reasons stated in the affidavit and argued before him and that the circumstances did not show that it was by way of punishment that the transfer was effected. He, therefore, dismissed the writ petition. It is as against this, the writ appeal has been filed.

3. Sri Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the appellant, strenuously contended that on the pleadings in this case there is practically an admission on the part of the first respondent that he did have resort to the order of transfer because of the various alleged irregularities bordering on misconduct committed by the appellant. It is, therefore, contended that no more proof of mala fides is necessary.

4. The next contention is that the guidelines which are to be followed while effecting a transfer of an employee of the Corporation have been completely ignored and he would also urge that those guidelines were deliberately brushed aside because respondent 1, was willynilly bent upon transferring the appellant when he was acting as Zonal Manager so as to give an open expression, to his vendetta against the appellant. He would take us through the counter-affidavit filed by respondent 1, which, according to him, brings out the real motive behind the order of transfer and would plead that though the order of transfer appears to be a normal order, it is in effect an order vitiated by mala fides or lack of good faith.

5. His third and last contention which also elaborates the earlier contentions is that the appellant was not even given the six days joining time which was necessary; but he was immediately relieved which again reflects upon the design behind the order of transfer. In the end, therefore, he would persuasively plead that the order of transfer is really an order resulting in the punishment of the appellant and in that sense the appellant having had no opportunity to defend himself against the real purport behind the order of transfer, the challenged order should be quashed.

6. It would, of course, be necessary to go through the facts in this case, to a certain extent, in detail. But it would be convenient to preface our judgment with certain general observations.

7. Courts are chary to interfere with an order of transfer made for administrative reasons. An innocuous order of transfer which not only on the face of it appears to be one made in order to further the administrative interests of an organization, but which even on a deeper scrutiny does not pose any irregular or mala fide exercise of power by the concerned authority, is generally upheld by civil Courts, as Courts cannot substitute their own opinion and interfere with ordinary orders of transfer of employees of established organizations. But if in a given case, an order of transfer appears to be a deliberate attempt to bypass all disciplinary machinery and offend the well-known principle of audi alteram partem, if ex facie it is clear that the order of transfer was not made for administrative reasons but was made to achieve collateral purpose, then it is open to the Court to crack the shell of innocuousness which wraps the order of transfer and by piercing such a veil, find out the real purpose behind the order of transfer. No doubt, a normal order of transfer can be misunderstood as a punitive measure. But, if the circumstances surrounding such an order leads to a reasonable inference by a well-instructed mind, that such an order was made in the colourable exercise of power and intended to achieve a sinister purpose and based on irrelevant considerations, then the arm of the Court can be extended so as to decipher the intendment of the order and set it aside on the ground that it is one made with a design and motive or circumventing disciplinary action and, particularly when civil servant is involved, to avoid the stringent but mandatory procedure prescribed in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

8. The appellant being a servant of State, as an employee of the Food Corporation of India, is entitled in our view, to ask us to take into consideration the circumstances surrounding the order of transfer and find out whether it was an innocuous order of transfer or whether it was made as a substitute for a punitive measure. Therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are constrained to find out whether the order of transfer was intended or motivated to operate as a punishment, and look into the circumstances under which the order was passed.

9. At this stage, it is advantageous to refer to the counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit sworn to by the first respondent as Zonal Manager in-charge of the Food Corporation of India, it is said that the order of transfer was made for administrative reasons, that the appellant cannot question the same as he is bound to serve the Food Corporation of India wherever he is posted and that he has no vested legal right to pick and choose a place for his service. It is said that the appellant having joined Adilabad under orders of this Court, the petition has become infructuous.

10. Dealing with the merits, the first respondent, admits that the appellant is styling himself as the general secretary of the staff association but the designation is of the appellant's own making. It is said that the staff association said to be represented by the appellant is an unrecognized one. It is also not correct to state that the appellant has worked to the entire satisfaction of the superiors and in fact, his work and conduct have been most dissatisfactory and departmental enquiries are pending against him. The first respondent would deny that there was any vigilance enquiries against him and that he made the order of transfer in order to wreak vengeance. The first respondent would aver that he was not instrumental in transferring the appellant to Nizamabad and that the said transfers was manoeuvered by him. He, however, admits that he might have objected to the resposting of the appellant to Madras, but that was not due to any mala fides or ill-will. The appellant would refer to the various representations and telegrams made and given by the appellant to the Prime Minister of India, the Food Minister and other higher authorities in the Food Corporation. A specific allegation is made to the effect that the appellant is a habitual mischief monger and a most undesirable member. There is also a reference to the alleged conduct of the appellant that he would approach his co-employees as well as the officials of the Food Corporation of India for out of the way favours and if someone declines to accede to his request, he would complain against them and this course was deliberately adopted as a means to blackmail them. The first respondent concedes that because of the alleged consistent attitude of the appellant towards the officers, a show-cause memo was also issued to him as to why disciplinary action should not be taken. The first respondent would say that it is not necessary to give joining time in every case of transfer and that when a transfer is made on administrative grounds, it is left within the discretion of the authority to give joining time or not. He admits that no joining time was given to the appellant as it was felt that the appellant should be immediately relieved and he should go and join duty at his new place. According to the first respondent, the leave application presented by the appellant was after the appellant was relieved and not before and that the appellant was guilty of gross negligence and indiscipline in not joining duty for which he was liable for disciplinary action. It is said that the leave application was made on false grounds and this would show that he was not an obedient employee and that there was wilful disobedience in not having complied with the orders of transfer. The several instances referred to by the appellant to highlight the mala fides of the first respondent are expressly denied. According to the first respondent it is not correct to state that he refused leave want only or he intervened in the matter of the grant of a house-building loan or in the matter of the closure of the disciplinary proceedings against him. The first respondent would also deny that the official of the Food Corporation who appeared as a defence counsel to the appellant was singled out for penal and out of the way transfer. Finally the first respondent would say:

“It was only in the interests of the administration, that too, because of various reports levelled against this employee about the modus operandi in threatening and pressurizing the officers sending petitions after petitions against them when they do not accede to his out of the way request that this transfer had been made in consultation with the Managing Director … Moreover, administrative convenience and necessity should be given prime consideration in such transfers and as this petition had proved to be a most undesirable character in order to enforce and maintain discipline among the thousands of employees in the southern zone this transfer had been effected for administrative purposes.”

11. The other allegations are denied by the first respondent. It is in the light of such disclosures made in the pleading that this case has to be considered.

12. In our preface to the judgment, we have referred to the salient principles which should prompt a Court to interfere with an ordinary order of transfer. Do the facts disclose in this case an inner motive or design on the part of the first respondent when the challenged order was made? In the counter-affidavit, we have seen that the first respondent admits that he might have objected on an earlier occasion to the reposting of the appellant to Madras. This appears to be the starting point for the internal bickerings between the appellant and the first respondent. The first respondent became very touchy when it is alleged that the appellant sent various telegrams to the Ministers and higher authorities of the Corporation and he would allege that a show cause memo was also issued against the appellant calling upon him to explain as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. It has not been brought to our notice that any such action has ever been taken at all against the appellant for any alleged act of misconduct on his part. He would admit that the usual joining time was not given to the appellant and that was again due to exigencies of circumstances. His leave application was rejected as it is contended that it was not in order. We do not find, however, any data produced before us to justify that the leave was properly refused and the appellant was bona fide not granted the usual joining time. The confession made by the first respondent strongly suggests that because of various reports levelled against this employee about modus operandi in threatening other officers by sending petitions, that the order of transfer has been made, though it is said that it was in the interests of the administration. The first respondent has given a certificate that the appellant has proved to be a most undesirable character in the service of the Corporation and in order to force and maintain discipline the transfer was effected. Again, it is presented that this is for administrative convenience. The first respondent is certainly aware of the transfer policy which was evolved as early as in 1973. A copy of the said policy has been produced before us. We find there that in the case of categories III and IV employees to which category the appellant belongs, transfers from one place to another should not be a matter of routine. Category III employees stationed at one station for more than five years could be considered for transfer to other places preferably within the region. The learned counsel for the first respondents is unable to say that this policy which binds the Corporation has been remembered or adverted to in the order of transfer when it was made. One has to, therefore, necessarily highlight the intentions behind the order of transfer having regard to the specific allegations made by the first respondent in the counter-affidavit. We agree with Sri Venkataswamy. On a fair reading of the counter-affidavit it is seen that the order of transfer has been made in order to bypass the disciplinary machinery and circumvent the well-accepted rule of fair hearing before an adverse order is made and that in substance and in effect the order of transfer though appears to be eo nomine a normal one, has been passed in the instant case to achieve a collateral purpose. The appellant being a public servant he ought not to have been dealt with in the manner he has been tossed from one place to another in utter disregard of the transfer policy. The allegation is that even earlier when he was about to be transferred from Nizamabad to Madras, the first respondent interfered. The allegations in the counter-affidavit as made by the first respondent is in our view a clear pointer to the effect that it was not to improve the career or responsibility of the appellant that the order was made, but on the other hand it was made because of the open maladjustment which is demonstrably visible from the record and which was present for a considerable time as between the appellant and the first respondent. It, therefore, appears to us that as soon as the first respondent became the acting Zonal Manager, he availed himself of the opportunity to effect the transfer in order to give vent to his ill-feelings which he was harbouring within himself as against the appellant. The fact that the first respondent characterized the appellant as a most undesirable character and that there were various reports levelled against the appellant for his misdemeanour acts are all vindicative and explanatory of the motive or the design behind this order of transfer. We are satisfied that the order was passed for a collateral purpose and not for administrative convenience in public interests. It is not presented that any disciplinary proceedings had been initiated though thought of by the Corporation. It is not even alleged before us that any such disciplinary proceedings are pending against him. The power of transfer in the instant case was adopted as an alternative for punishment which punishment cannot be inflicted without going through the process as prescribed under Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. We are, of course, conscious of the fact that innocuous and normal orders of transfer ought not to be interfered with by Courts if it was made for administrative exigencies or other valid reasons. But as in our view the order in question has been passed to bypass the disciplinary machinery and in order to avoid a fair opportunity being given to the appellant to explain his alleged misconduct we are constrained to interfere in the instant case. Having regard to the specific allegation made in the counter-affidavit by the first respondent we are going behind the apparent reasons given in support of the order of transfer and after appreciating all the circumstances in the case, we are of the view that the order of transfer though, apparently innocuous was meant really to impose a punishment on the officer concerned. It appears to us to be a colourable exercise of power or an exercise of power surcharged with bad faith as irrelevant considerations motivated the passing of the challenged order. Instead of taking disciplinary action against the appellant, this order of transfer has been made in order to circumvent the prescribed process in an action ordinarily undertaken against a Government servant for misconduct.

13. There are two other notable circumstances in this case which also prompt us to come to the same conclusion as above that the challenged order is not an order of transfer simpliciter. The guidelines fixed for transfer have not been followed and why there has been a deviation thereto there is no explanation at all.

14. Secondly, when the challenged order was made, no joining time was also given. But for the fact that this Court gave the appellant a breathing time, he would have suffered the greatest inconvenience. These factors also taken cumulatively along with other circumstances lend support to the conclusion that the order of transfer is not a fair order.

15. V. Ramasami, J., thought that since 15 July 1977, happened to be a Friday and as it was followed by a Saturday and Sunday, no joining time was given. He also noticed that the counsel for the first respondent admitted the mistake in not giving the joining time. This by itself would not efface the wrong done to appellant. No doubt a superior officer cannot be influenced by the subordinate officer. In the instant case the first respondent was not sure whether he did influence or not but he would say that he might have. We are unable to agree with him. This is a case in which only a slight suspicion is projected touching upon the intention of the first respondent. For the reasons already set out by us, we are of the view that the order of transfer is certainly motivated and is based on irrelevant considerations.

16. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

17. An oral application for grant of leave to appeal to Supreme Court is made against the judgment. The point involved in this appeal does not raise any question of law of general importance which has to be decided by the Supreme Court. Leave refused.