Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras-Ii. v. M.A Alagappan.

Madras High Court
Mar 16, 1976
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Delivered by V. Ramaswami, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee was a shareholder of Ajax Products Ltd., which went into voluntary liquidation on 30 October 1954. At that time the assessee held 378 and 2/3 shares of face value Rs.100 each. In February 1955 the liquidator sold some assets to a new company and, pursuant to that sale, shareholders of Ajax were allotted fully paid shares in the new company equal in number and face value to those they had held in the old company. Thereafter the liquidator made periodic distributions out of realisations of the remaining assets.

In the previous year relevant to assessment year 1965-66 the assessee received Rs.8,331 (at Rs.22 per share). The Income-tax Officer assessed this sum as capital gains under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee appealed, contending there had been no transfer of a capital asset in the previous year so as to give rise to capital gains.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held the distributions involved progressive extinguishment of shareholders' rights and, relying on the extended definition of “transfer” in section 2(47), treated each distribution as a transfer; he therefore held Rs.8,331 taxable as capital gains (subject to the dividend exclusion in section 2(22)(c)). On further appeal the Tribunal held the amount could not be charged as capital gains, reasoning that only capital gains chargeable under section 45 were referable to the definition of “income” and that section 46 alone could not authorise inclusion in total income.

The Revenue sought and obtained a reference asking whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the Rs.8,331 could not be included as capital gains in the assessee’s chargeable income for the assessment year 1965-66.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the sum of Rs.8,331 received by the assessee from the liquidator cannot be included in the chargeable income under the head “capital gains” for the relevant assessment year.
  2. Whether distribution of a company’s assets in liquidation amounts to a “transfer” of a capital asset by the shareholder within the meaning of section 45 read with section 2(47) (i.e., whether extinguishment of rights on distribution attracts capital gains taxation).
  3. Whether section 46(1) and/or section 46(2) indicate a legislative intention to treat distributions on liquidation as transfers or otherwise to make sums received by shareholders chargeable as “capital gains”.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The sum of Rs.8,331 is a profit or gain arising from extinguishment and, given the extended definition of “transfer” in section 2(47) (which includes extinguishment of rights), such gain arises from a transfer of shares within the meaning of section 45.
  • Parliament intended to treat distributions of assets on winding-up as transfers — an intention inferred from section 46(1).
  • Section 46(2) deems the amount received by the shareholder to be chargeable as capital gains (to the extent not dividend) and thereby operates as a charging provision that brings such receipts within the head “capital gains”.

Appellant's / Assessee's Arguments

  • There was no transfer of a capital asset by the assessee in the relevant previous year and therefore no capital gains arising to be assessed (argument accepted by the Tribunal).
  • Only capital gains which are chargeable under section 45 are included in the definition of “income” in section 2(24)(vi); although section 46(2) provides for taxing certain amounts under the head “capital gains” it has not been made part of the definition and thereby not included in “total income”.

Appellate Assistant Commissioner's Findings (as recorded)

  • When a company is liquidated and the liquidator distributes assets among shareholders, there is progressive extinguishment of shareholders’ rights with each distribution.
  • Section 2(47) includes extinguishment of rights within the meaning of “transfer”, so each distribution constitutes a transfer.
  • By virtue of section 46(2), sums received from the liquidator are assessable as capital gains to the extent not liable as dividends under section 2(22)(c).

Tribunal's Findings (as recorded)

  • “Capital gains” are taxable only by specific deeming or charging provisions; such gains must be specifically referred to in the definition of “income” (section 2(24)).
  • Section 2(24) makes specific mention of capital gains chargeable under section 45 but omits reference to section 46; similarly section 19(3)(i) refers only to section 45.
  • The result, in the Tribunal’s view, is that only transfers within the terms of section 45 can be brought to tax as capital gains and section 46 by itself is insufficient to include the amounts received in total income.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1973] 89 ITR 45 (SC) Held that distribution of a company's assets in liquidation does not amount to a sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer attracting section 12B (old Act); cited for proposition that distribution is not a transfer. The court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that there is no transfer when assets are distributed on liquidation and to reject the argument that section 46(1) proves a legislative intention that distributions are transfers.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. R.M. Amin [1971] 82 ITR 194 (Guj) Held that when a shareholder receives his share on final distribution in liquidation there is no transfer under section 45; reasoning emphasised that extinguishment must be accompanied by consideration received as a result of the extinguishment to constitute a “transfer”. The court expressly agreed with and adopted the reasoning in R.M. Amin that moneys received on distribution satisfy the shareholder’s pre-existing right and are not consideration for extinguishment; this supported the view that distribution is not a transfer under section 2(47)/section 45.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vijoy Kumar Budhia [1975] 100 ITR 380 (Pat) Followed the reasoning in R.M. Amin that distribution in liquidation does not amount to a transfer attracting capital gains tax. Cited as a follow-up decision supporting the proposition that distribution does not constitute a transfer.
K.V. Al.M. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1973] 88 ITR 169 (SC) Explains scheme of the Act: although income is classified under heads, the subject-matter of tax is a single “total income” and manner of computation is integral. Used to explain that an item chargeable under a head and provided with a manner of computation will be included in total income even if not explicitly listed in the inclusive clauses of section 2(24).
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Harprasad & Co. (P.) Ltd. [1975] 99 ITR 118 (SC) Affirms that the manner of computation is an integral part of the definition of “total income”. Cited to reinforce the proposition that charging-plus-computation provisions can bring an item within total income even if not explicitly enumerated in section 2(24).
Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 26 ITR 758 (SC) Holds that the word “income” in its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning would include “capital gains”. Cited to support the conclusion that capital gains can be part of “income” and that section 46(2) can operate to make liquidation receipts chargeable under the head “capital gains”.
T.M. Rangachari v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1976] 102 ITR 50 (Mad) Referred to section 46(2) as an express provision for charging as capital gains the money or assets received by a shareholder on liquidation. Cited by the court as one of the decisions supporting the view that section 46(2) is an express charging provision making such receipts taxable under the head “capital gains”.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. The court first acknowledged the statutory framework: section 45 charges to tax profits or gains arising from transfer of a capital asset; the word “transfer” is defined in section 2(47) to include “sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset, or extinguishment of any rights therein or compulsory acquisition”.
  2. The court examined earlier authorities under the old Act (section 12B) and modern decisions, notably Commissioner v. Madurai Mills and R.M. Amin. Those authorities were taken to establish that distribution of a company’s assets in liquidation does not amount to a sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer attracting capital gains tax. The court particularly adopted the R.M. Amin analysis (Bhagwati C.J.) that the test for a transfer (even when described as extinguishment of rights) is whether consideration is received or accrues as a result of the extinguishment. In liquidation distributions the moneys represent satisfaction of a pre-existing right; they do not constitute consideration received for extinguishment of rights. Thus, there is no transfer exigible to capital gains tax under section 45.
  3. The court rejected the Revenue’s argument that section 46(1) demonstrates a legislative intention to treat distributions as transfers. The court observed that legislative assumptions are not law and that Madurai Mills had already held there is no transfer on distribution; therefore section 46(1) must be understood as a clarifying provision to make clear the company would not be liable to capital gains — it is not proof that distribution is a transfer.
  4. Turning to section 46(2), the court considered the Revenue’s argument that this subsection creates a fiction that the amounts are “arising from transfer” and thus are chargeable under section 45. The court found no wording in section 46(2) that creates a fiction of transfer. Instead, section 46(2) itself expressly provides that amounts received by the shareholder on liquidation “shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head ‘capital gains’” and further provides for computation by deeming the amount to be the full value of consideration for purposes of section 48.
  5. The court then placed the matter within the statutory scheme: sections 4 and 5 charge tax on “total income” and section 14 classifies heads of income; the scheme treats total income as a single aggregate with manner of computation integral (citing K.V. Al.M. Ramanathan Chettiar and Harprasad & Co.). Given that context, a provision that both charges an item under a head and prescribes computation (as section 46(2) does) brings that item within total income even if it is not explicitly mentioned in the inclusive clauses of section 2(24)(vi).
  6. The court concluded that section 46(2) is an independent charging provision which makes amounts received on liquidation chargeable to tax under the head “capital gains” even though they do not arise from a transfer under section 45. The court noted supporting references in earlier decisions (including Madurai Mills and T.M. Rangachari) that describe section 46(2) as an express charging provision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The reference is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue: the sum of Rs.8,331 received by the assessee from the liquidator is includible in the assessee's chargeable income under the head “capital gains”.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The amount of Rs.8,331 is taxable as capital gains in the assessee's total income for the relevant assessment year (subject to the dividend exclusion in section 2(22)(c) as applicable).
  • Costs and expenses: The Revenue is entitled to costs; counsel’s fee awarded was Rs.250.
  • Precedential scope: The court treated section 46(2) as an express charging provision making liquidation receipts taxable under the head “capital gains”. The opinion applies existing precedents (as recorded) and does not purport to state a novel principle beyond the interpretation and application of sections 45 and 46 to the facts before the court.

This summary is taken exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not contained therein.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. Ramaswami, J.:— The assessee was a shareholder of a company called “Ajax Products Ltd.” which went into voluntary liquidation on 30th October, 1954. At the time of voluntary liquidation, he held 378 and ⅔rds shares of the face value of Rs. 100 each. The liquidator who was appointed to wind up the affairs of the company, sold some of its assets in February, 1955, to a new company and in pursuance of that sale, the shareholders of Ajax Products Ltd. were allotted fully paid up shares of the new company equal in number and face value to the share they held in the old company. Thereafter, the liquidator distributed from time to time various sums to the shareholders out of realisations in respect of the remaining assets. In the year of account, relevant to the assessment year 1965-66, the assessee received a sum of Rs. 8,331 at the rate of Rs. 22 per share. Since the assessee had already received the full value of his original investment in the form of???hares in the new company at the very first distribution itself, the Income-tax Officer brought this sum of Rs. 8,331, received by the assessee, as capital gains under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, hereinafter called the Act. The assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and contended that there was no transfer of a capital asset by the appellant in the previous year relevant to the assessment year under appeal to render him liable to be assessed in respect of any capital gains. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that when a company is taken into liquidation and the liquidator starts distribution of the assets of the company among the shareholders, there is a progressive extinguishment of the rights of the shareholders with each distribution. He referred to the definition of the word “transfer” in section 2(47) of the Act which included relinquishment of the asset or the extinguishment of any rights therein also coming within the meaning of the word “transfer”. Inasmuch as the transfer in relation to a capital asset had been given an extended meaning to include an extinguishment of the rights therein, there is a transfer at each distribution. He was also of the view that by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 46, the sum which the shareholder received from the liquidator is assessable to tax as “capital gains” to the extent it is not liable to be treated as dividend under clause (c) of sub-section (22) of section 2 of the Act. In the result, he held that the sum of Rs. 8,331 is taxable as “capital gains.”

2. On a further appeal, the Tribunal held that the disputed amount could not be included in the chargeable income of the assessee under the head “capital gains”. According to the Tribunal, “capital gains” could not ordinarily be treated as a taxable income. But, by specific deeming provisions, certain kinds of gains arising from the transfer of a “capital asset” were treated as taxable income in order that such a deemed income is included in the chargeable income. According to the Tribunal, a specific mention of such dee???ed income has to be made in the definition of the word “income” under section 2(24). While there is such a specific mention of capital gains chargeable under section 45, in section 2(24), the omission of any reference to section 46 is conspicuous though both the sections had been enacted at the same time. The Tribunal also sought support for this view by a reference to section 19(3)(i) which again refers to only “capital gains” chargeable under section 45 and not section 46. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the capital asset could be brought to tax only if there is a transfer within the terms of???he provisions of section 45 and the provisions of section 46 would not by themselves give authority for including the same in the total income.

3. At the instance of the revenue the following question has been referred:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the sum of Rs. 8,331 received by the assessee from the liquidator of M/s. Ajax Products Ltd. in the year of account relevant to the assessment year 1965-66 cannot be included in the chargeable income of the assessee under the head ‘capital gains?”

4. The learned counsel for the revenue contended that the sum of Rs. 8,331 is a profit or gain arising from the extinguishment and that in view of the extended definition of the word “transfer” in section 2(47), such profits or gains arise from the transfer of the shares within the meaning of section 45 of the Act and accordingly liable to be included in the total income of the assessee. He also wanted to infer a legislative intention to treat the distribution of the asset of a company among its shareholders on its liquidation as a transfer by a reference to section 46(1) of the Act.

5. Under section 45 any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “capital gains”. The word “transfer” is defined in section 2(47) in relation to a capital asset as including “sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset, or extinguishment of any rights therein or compulsory acquisition thereof under any law”. The word “transfer” was not defined under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. But section 12B of that Act provided that tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head “capital gains” in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer of a capital asset. In cases arising under section 12B of the old Act, the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1973] 89 ITR 45 (SC), approving the view of this court, held that the distribution of the asset of a company in liquidation does not amount to a transaction of a sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer so as to attract section 12B of the Act

6. It is true that the present definition of the word “transfer” includes the extinguishment of any rights also as a transfer. The question, therefore, for consideration is whether there is any extinguishment of any of the rights of the assessee and whether such extinguishment of the rights will fall within the ambit of section 2(47) of the Act. A similar question directly arose for consideration in Commmissioner of Income-tax v. R.M Amin [1971] 82 ITR 194 (Guj). Bhagwati C.J, holding that when a shareholder receives his share on a final distribution of the net assets of the company in liquida???ion, there was no transfer of capital asset by him which would attract the charge of capital gains under section 45, observed at page 202:

“Section 48 says that the income chargeable to tax as “capital gains” shall be computed by deducting from the ‘full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset’ the following amounts, namely; (i) expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer; and (ii) the cost of acquisition of the capital asset and the cost of any improvement thereto. The amounts specified in clauses (i) and (ii) are to be deducted from the ‘consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset’ for the purpose of determining the profits or gains chargeable to tax. The transfer that is contemplated by section 45 read with section 2(47) is, therefore, a transfer as a result of which consideration is received by the assessee or accrues to the assessee. Substituting the words ‘extinguishment of any rights in the capital asset’ for the words ‘transfer of the capital asset’, the transaction, in order to attract the charge of tax as capital gains, must, therefore, be such that consideration is received by the assessee or accrues to the assessee as a result of the extinguishment o??? the rights in the capital asset. There must be an element of consideration for the extinguishment of the rights in the capital asset. Then only would it be a transfer exigible to capital gains tax. Now, as we have already pointed out above, when a shareholder receives moneys representing his share on distribution of the net assets of the company in liquidation, he receives such moneys in satisfaction of the right which belongs to him by virtue of his holding the share and not by way of consideration for the extinguishment of his right or rights in the share. The share merely represents the right to receive moneys on distribution of the net assets of the company in liquidation and that right is satisfied and, by satisfaction, extinguished when such moneys are received by the shareholder. Such moneys received by the shareholder do not represent any consideration received by him as a result of the extinguishment of his rights in the share. It is not the extinguishment of his rights in the share for which consideration is received by him: it is rather because moneys representing his share in the distribution are received by him that his rights in the share are extinguished.”

7. We are, respectfully, in entire agreement with this reasoning and conclusion. This decision also was followed by the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vijoy Kumar Budhia [1975] 100 ITR 380 (Pat). Thus, even under the extended definition of the word “transfer”, we are of the view that the distribution of assets of the company in liquidation, does not amount to a transfer. The learned counsel for the revenue contended that Parliament intended to treat even distribution of the assets on winding-up also as a transfer and for this argument, he relied on section 46(1), which reads as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in section 45, where the assets of a company are distributed to its shareholders on its liquidation, such distribution shall not be regarded as a transfer by the company for the purposes of section 45.”

8. According to the learned counsel, if there was no transfer, there was no need for this specific provision not to regard the distribution as a transfer by the company. We are not able to agree with this contention. First of all, legislative assumptions cannot be treated as law. It has been clearly held by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1973] 89 ITR 45 (SC) that there is no transfer when the assets of a company are distributed to its shareholders on its liquidation. There is no transfer either from the company or from the shareholder. Therefore, section 46(1) is only per curia and could not be treated as law. We are of the view that section 46(1) is intended to make clear that the company would not be liable for payment of any capital gains. We are, therefore, of the view that the sum of Rs. 8,331 could not be included in the chargeable income as capital gains under section 45.

9. The learned counsel for the revenue next relied on section 46(2) and argued that the amount received by the assessee is chargeable to income-tax under the head “capital gains” to the extent it is not liable to be treated as dividend, as if arising out of a transfer of a capital asset. In other words, according to the learned counsel, in such a case, Parliament deemed the amount received as profit or gain arising from transfer and, therefore, chargeable under section 45. This argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the revenue as one of the answers to the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee which found favour with the Tribunal that only capital gains chargeable under section 45 could be included in the total income and not all cases of capital gains. We are not able to agree with the learned counsel for the revenue that section 46(2) deems the receipt of the money or other assets on liquidation as profit or gain “arising from transfer” within the meaning of section 45. There are no words in section 46(2) which create a fiction of transfer. What all section 46(2) provides is that the amount received by the shareholder shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “capital gains” and the amount, to the extent it is not liable to be treated as dividend, shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration for purposes of section 48. It is thus an independent provision making the amounts received also chargeable to income-tax under the head “capital gains” though it did not arise from transfer of a capital asset.

10. The learned counsel for the assessee contended that only capital gains which is chargeable under section 45 is included in the definition of income in section 2(24)(vi) and that though section 46(2) provided for taxing the amount received under the head “capital gains” it had not been made part of the income or total income and that, therefore, even if section 46(2) intended to charge to income-tax the amount received on liquidation, this had not been effectuated by reason of the non-inclusion of that income in the definition. This is the argument that was accepted by the Tribunal.

11. The emphasis in section 4 on charge to income-tax is in respect of “total income” of the previous year. “Total income” is defined in section 2(45) as meaning “the total amount of income referred to in section 5 computed in the manner laid down in the Act”. Section 5 defines the range of total income of any previous year. Section 14 classifies and enumerates the heads of income for the purpose of charge of income-tax and computation of total income. Sections 15 to 59 are the computation provisions. It is now well-settled that:

“The scheme of the Act is that although income is classified under different heads and the income under each head is separately computed in accordance with the provisions dealing with that particular head of income, the income which is the subject-matter of tax under the Act is one income which is the total income.” [Vide K.V AL.M Ramanathan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1973] 88 ITR 169, 191 (SC)].

12. The provisions of sections 4 and 5 also clearly show that there is only one tax on the total income of the assessee as defined in section 2(15). As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Harprasad & Co. (P.) Ltd. [1975] 99 ITR 118 (SC) the manner of computation is also an integral part of the definition of “total income”. Thus, if an income which is includible in the total income of an assessee under section 5 and falls into a specific source and the manner of computation is provided for the same, it would be chargeable even though it does not fall under any of the enumerated clauses in the definition of income. It would also be seen that the definition of income under section 2(24)(vi) is an inclusive definition and the natural meaning of the word “income” could not be curtailed with reference to the enumerated clauses of the inclusive portion. The Supreme Court in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1954] 26 ITR 758 (SC) held that the word “income” in its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning would include “capital gains”. Section 46 had provided expressly for charging to income-tax under the head “capital gains” in respect of the money received by the shareholder from the company on liquidation. The same provision also provided for the manner of computation by stating that the sum so arrived at shall be deemed to be the full value of the consideration for the purpose of section 48. Therefore, even if capital gains of the nature falling under section 45 is only included in the definition of income in section 2(24)(vi) and not any other kinds of capital gains, section 46(2) made the amount received by the shareholder on liquidation of a company a chargeable income under the head “capital gains” and, therefore, it will have to be included in the total income of the assessee. Thus, the definition of the word “income” understood in the light of the scheme of the Act clearly included the amount chargeable to tax under section 46. Some of the decisions which had referred to the provisions of section 46(2) also support our view. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. R.M Amin [1971] 82 ITR 194 (Guj) the Uganda company which went into liquidation was not a company within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act. Therefore, the assessee was held not chargeable to tax under section 46(2) in respect of the monies received by him on liquidation of the said Uganda company. But dealing with an assessment under section 45 and meeting the argument of the revenue that section 46(2) was enacted with a view only to exclude from the money or other assets received by the assessee on liquidation of the company, the amounts assessed as dividend within the meaning of sec???ion 2(22)(c) so that the assessee may not suffer double taxation in respect of the same amount, the learned Chief Justice observed that (page 204):

“Section 46(1) carves out an exception from the general rule as to chargeability enacted in section 45 while section 46(2) brings within the net of taxation transaction which would not otherwise fall within it under section 45. One sub-section performs the function of exclusion while the other performs the function of inclusion. If the intention of the legislature were merely to provide the mode of computation in a case falling within section 46(2) so as to avoid double taxation of the same amount, the legislature need not have used words appropriate to a charging provision, namely, ‘he shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head “capital gains” in respect of the monies so received or the market value of the other assets on the date of distribution.’ It would have been sufficient for the legislature to introduce a special provision in regard to computation of capital gain in any of the succeeding sections.”

13. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1973] 89 ITR 45 (S.C) and this court in T.M Rangachari v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1976] 102 ITR 50 (Mad) referred to section 46(2) as an express provision for charging as capital gains the money or assets received by a shareholder on the liquidation of a company. We are, therefore, of the view that the amount received by the assessee, in this case, is includible in the chargeable income of the assessee under the head “capital gains”. We, accordingly, answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250.