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The State Of Madras Represented By The District Collector Of Madurai v. R. K. Ramakrishnan And Anr.

Madras High Court
Sep 15, 1975
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two plaintiffs sued the State of Madras (represented by the Collector of Madurai) for recovery of possession of the plaint-schedule property and for damages of Rs. 1,000 for alleged wrongful demolition of a building on that property. The facts, as presented in the opinion, are:

  • Dr. Venkatarama Iyer owned lands in R.S. Nos. 260–264 and had an existing water supply from sluice No. 4 of Sakulam fed by the Periyar system.
  • He and a relative sought direct supply from Periyar channel distributory No. 3, which required acquisition of about 6 cents in R.S. No. 286/2 in Sennagarampatti Village belonging to the plaintiffs.
  • The Government issued a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 6 December 1961. The Collector served a notice for enquiry under Section 5-A on 1 June 1962. The plaintiffs filed objections on 16 June 1962 and appeared on 18 June 1962.
  • A declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the Government on 6 February 1963 (notification dated 8 February 1963 is also noted for limitation analysis).
  • The plaintiffs had earlier filed a writ petition (Writ Petition No. 617) which was dismissed at the stage of admission. The plaintiffs' suit was filed in 1966, alleging: (i) absence of further information after filing objections, (ii) that they had constructed a building which was later demolished by authorities, and (iii) mala fides in acquisition to benefit influential persons.
  • The District Munsif dismissed the suit, holding the acquisition complied with law and denying recovery of possession and damages. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held the acquisition illegal, relying on mala fides and alleged failure to make the required enquiry under Section 5-A, and treated the Section 6(1) declaration as a nullity.
  • The Government (State of Madras) appealed to the court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation, specifically whether Article 100 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act applied to bar the suit.
  2. Whether the acquisition of the plaintiffs' land was for a public purpose (and thereby valid) or was vitiated by mala fides and intended to benefit a private individual.
  3. Whether the procedure under Section 5-A (and the Rules, particularly Rule 3 and its subparts) was mandatory and, if not followed, vitiated the acquisition proceedings and any declaration under Section 6(1).
  4. Whether Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act required submission and consideration of a report in every case before a declaration could be made, and whether any failure in that regard invalidated the declaration.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs alleged that after filing objections on 18 June 1962 there was no further information about the acquisition proposal.
  • They claimed to have constructed a building on the suit site at considerable cost and alleged that authorities demolished it, seeking damages for wrongful demolition.
  • They contended the acquisition proceedings were initiated to benefit influential private persons (notably Dr. Venkatarama Iyer), and therefore the acquisition was vitiated by mala fides; on that basis they sought recovery of the property and damages.
  • They also advanced arguments (as reported) challenging compliance with the procedural requirements of Section 5-A and the Rules framed under the Act.

State / Government's Arguments

  • The State denied that the acquisition was to benefit a single individual and said the objections were considered, investigated and a report submitted to the Government which overruled the objections and made a declaration under Section 6.
  • The State argued the declaration under Section 6(1) was conclusive and final and not subject to scrutiny by the Court (and pointed to payment of compensation).
  • On limitation, the Government contended that Article 100 (one-year limitation to alter or set aside an officer's act) applied from the date of the declaration (notification on 8 February 1963), and that the plaintiffs' suit filed later was time-barred.
  • The Government further maintained the acquisition was for a public purpose (an irrigation scheme/extension of irrigation) and relied on precedent to show that initial benefit to a single individual does not negate a public purpose.
  • With respect to procedure, the Government relied upon a Bench decision (Periakkal) holding certain Rule 3(b) provisions not mandatory and argued that noncompliance with those procedural provisions did not invalidate the enquiry or acquisition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Belegal Gundachar and Anr. v. The State of Madras represented by the Collector of Bellary and Ors. (1953) 2 M.L.J. 262 That the State's power of compulsory acquisition is exercisable only for a public purpose; "public purpose" is not rigidly defined; an irrigation scheme is a public purpose and initial benefit to a single individual does not negate public purpose. The Court relied on this decision to hold that even if initially a single individual (Dr. Venkatarama Iyer) stood to benefit, aiding agriculture/extension of irrigation constitutes a public purpose and does not render the acquisition invalid.
The State of Madras v. Periakkal and Ors. (referred to as Periakkal's case) Holds that provisions of Rule 3(b) (Rules framed under Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act) in relation to enquiry under Section 5-A are not mandatory; failure to give notice to the Department initiating acquisition did not affect validity of enquiry. The Court observed that this decision indicated Rule 3(b) was not mandatory. It noted that this authority did not directly affect the present controversy but used its holding to support that failure to follow Rule 3 strictly would not necessarily vitiate the proceedings.
Sinnaiyan and Ors. v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry represented by the Undersecretary to Government, Revenue and Development Department, Pondicherry and Anr. Interpreted Rule 3 of the Rules under Section 55(1) to require that the objector must be able to know the Department's answer at the time of enquiry and that failure to do so violated mandatory provisions, thereby vitiating the enquiry. The Court noted that this decision is inconsistent with the Periakkal Bench decision. However, the Court concluded (in view of the Bench decision in Periakkal and its earlier analysis) that Rule 3 does not prescribe a mandatory procedure whose breach would automatically vitiate the acquisition proceedings in the present case. Additionally, the Court found Section 5-A was not attracted here, so the Sinnaiyan ruling did not affect the outcome.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of discrete legal steps that tracked the principal contentions raised in the appeal:

  1. Limitation:
    • The Government argued Article 100 of the Limitation Act (one year to alter or set aside an officer's act) barred the suit from February 1964 where the declaration was issued in February 1963. The respondents (plaintiffs) argued Article 100 was inapplicable because the suit sought recovery of possession, not to set aside the notification.
    • The Court agreed with the plaintiffs/respondents: given the frame of the suit (for recovery of possession), Article 100 did not apply. Instead, Article 113 (three years from the time the right to sue accrues) was relevant; possession was taken only after award and the right to sue accrued upon dispossession, so the suit was within three years and not time-barred.
  2. Public purpose / mala fides:
    • The Court examined the challenge that the acquisition was motivated by mala fides to benefit particular private persons (notably Dr. Venkatarama Iyer). The Court relied on the Belegal Gundachar precedent emphasizing that a scheme to extend irrigation is a public purpose and that initial benefit to a single person does not negate the public character of an acquisition.
    • The Court therefore found it unnecessary to decide whether the Subordinate Judge was correct in treating the benefit as confined to Dr. Venkatarama Iyer and observed there was substance in the Government's submission that the benefit was likely to enure to a number of individuals. On this basis, the Court concluded the acquisition was for a public purpose.
  3. Compliance with Section 5-A and Rule 3 (procedure):
    • The respondents contended that Section 5-A(2) procedure (and Rule 3) had not been followed and that this vitiated the acquisition. The Government relied on Periakkal to show Rule 3(b) was not mandatory.
    • The Court distinguished the present facts on timing: Section 5-A(1) required an objection within thirty days of the Section 4(1) notification (issued 6 December 1961). The plaintiffs' objections were filed on 16 June 1962 — plainly after thirty days. Therefore, Section 5-A(2) (which contemplates further enquiry if timely objections are filed) was not attracted.
    • The plaintiffs relied on Exhibits A-4 and A-5 (a notice dated 19 April 1961 and an objection of 29 April 1961) and argued those satisfied the Section 4(1) requirement; the Court rejected that, stating Section 4(1) contemplates publication in the Official Gazette and public notices, not individual notices. Accordingly, the April 1961 notices could not be treated as the statutory Section 4(1) publication.
    • Because no valid objection was filed within the statutory thirty-day period, the mandatory character (if any) of Section 5-A(2) did not arise for consideration. The Court further observed that Periakkal's holding that certain procedural rules were not mandatory meant that failure to follow Rule 3 did not necessarily invalidate proceedings; the Court also noted the inconsistency between Periakkal and Sinnaiyan but relied on the Bench authority and the facts here to find no fatal procedural breach.
  4. Requirement of a report under Section 6:
    • The Court addressed the argument that Section 6 required submission and consideration of a report (from an enquiry under Section 5-A) before a declaration could be made. The Court reasoned that Section 6(1) requires submission and consideration of a report only if there was a report (i.e., only if Section 5-A was triggered by a timely objection and an enquiry produced a report).
    • Since the Court had already found that Section 5-A was not attracted (no timely objection), there was no need for any report under Section 5-A and therefore no breach of Section 6. Consequently, the declaration under Section 6(1) was not vitiated on that ground.
  5. Conclusion of analysis:
    • On the combined analysis of limitation, public purpose, and procedural compliance, the Court concluded the acquisition was proper, the District Munsif correctly dismissed the suit, and the Subordinate Judge's finding of illegality (based on mala fides or procedural vitiation) was unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal allowed.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

  • The court held the acquisition of the suit land to be proper and upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit by the learned District Munsif (i.e., plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession or damages for alleged wrongful demolition, as pleaded).
  • The court rejected the limitations objection under Article 100 and found the suit was within the period prescribed by Article 113.
  • The court found no vitiation of the Section 6(1) declaration on grounds of procedural non-compliance because Section 5-A was not attracted (no timely objection), and therefore no report was required for the Government to make a declaration under Section 6(1).
  • No order as to costs; and the opinion records "No leave." (as given in the judgment).

Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; it applies existing authorities (as cited) to the facts and concludes that, on these facts, the acquisition was valid. The opinion explicitly notes an inconsistency between two authorities (Periakkal and Sinnaiyan) but, on the basis of Bench precedent and the absence of a timely objection under Section 5-A, found no basis to invalidate the acquisition. The text does not state that the Court intended to establish a new binding precedent beyond its fact-specific conclusion.

Show all summary ...

1. The suit, which gives rise to this second appeal by the defendant, was filed by two plaintiffs for recovery of possession, of the plaint schedule property from the State of Madras represented by the Collector of Madurai and for recovery of damages of Rs. 1,000 for alleged wrongful demolition of the building that stood on that property.

2. One Dr. Venkatarama Iyer, who owned lands in R.S. Nos. 260 to 264, had an existing source of water supply from sluice No. 4 of Sakulam fed by the Periyar system. He and his relative desired that they should get direct supply of water from the Periyar channel distributory No. 3. He therefore moved the Public Works Department for the purpose of getting the change in the water supply. This involved the acquisition of certain lands measuring about 6 cents in R.S. No. 286/2 lying in Sennagarampatti Village belonging to the plaintiffs. The Government issued the notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on the 6th of December, 1961. Section. 4(2) provides that whenever it appears to the Government that land in any locality was needed or was likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect should be published in the Official Gazette and that the Collector should cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. Section 5-A(1) of that Act contemplates that any person interested in any land which has been, notified under Section 4 Sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose may, within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land. The Collector proposed an enquiry under Section 5-A by issuing the requisite notice, which was served on the plaintiffs on 1st June, 1962. The plaintiffs filed their objections on 16th June, 1962 and appeared before him on 18th June, 1962. Thereafter as contemplated by Section 6(1) of the Act, a declaration was made by the Government. As Section 6 is somewhat material for our present purpose it is necessary to extract it here:

6(1). Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any made under Section 5-A, Sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders.

Before the declaration was made on 6th of February 1963 the plaintiffs filed Writ Petition No. 617 of plaintiffs filed dismissed even at the stage of admission. It is only thereafter that the enquiry under Section 5-A came to be made. The plaintiffs came forward with a suit in 1966. In the plaint it was alleged that after filing of the objections on 18th June, 1962 there was no further information regarding the proposal of acquisition. It was further alleged that the plaintiff's had put up a building in the suit site at considerable cost and that the authorites had demolished it. According; to the plaintiffs, the land acquisition proceedings were taken to benefit a set of influential persons so that the acquisition proceedings were vitiated by mala fides. It is on these facts that the plaintiff's prayed for recovery of the suit properties and also for damages for the demolition of the building.

3. The State of Madras, which was the defendant, denied that the acquisition proceedings were taken for a single individual. It pointed out that the objections of the plaintiff's had been considered, investigated and a report submitted thereon to the Government for a declaration. The Government overruled the objections and approved the declaration under Section 6. The Government referred to the payment of compensation and submitted that the declaration made under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was conclusive and final that it could not be scrutinised by the Court.

4. The learned District Munsif dismissed the suit holding that the acquisition had been done according to the provisions of law and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession of the property or for damages for the alleged wrongful demolition of a part of the building.

5. The plaintiffs appealed and the learned Subordinate Judge found that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the suit land were illegal and were of no effect. For this purpose he relied on the new channel having been put up only to benefit certain private individuals. He further pointed out that a declaration under Section 6 (1) would be vitiated by mala fides if it was passed by an authority without applying its mind at all, even though there was no evidence of any personal ill-will, corrupt motive or other improper purpose. He pointed out that after the filing of the objections by the plaintiffs no further enquiry had been made and no report had been submitted by the Tahsildar. Under these circumstances he held that the Department had not observed the rules under the Act which had the binding force of law in relation to the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and as such, the declaration made under Section 6(1) was a nullity.

6. The Government has appealed and on its behalf the first objection taken is that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 100 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act of 1963. Article 100 provides that in order to alter or set aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity, a period of one year would be available from the date of the act or order of the office. In the present case, the notification under Section 6 came to be issued on 8th February, 1963, and the period of one year would have lapsed by February, 1964. The objection of the Learned Counsel for the respondents was that Article 100 had no application, because the present suit was not for setting aside the notification issued under Section 6, but was for the purpose of recovery of possession. This objection has found acceptance in the hands of the learned District Munsif. This point was not agitated before the learned Subordinate Judge. I find that the Learned Counsel for the respondents is right when he says that in the light of the frame of the suit, there was no question of Article 100 applying to the present proceedings. Article 113 provides for a period of three years from the time when the right to sue accrues. It is only after the award that possession was taken. The right to sue is one that accrued on dispossession. The suit is within three years of such dispossession.

7. The next contention urged by the Learned Counsel for the Government was that the lands had been, acquired for a public purpose and not for the benefit of any private individual, as held by the learned Subordinate Judge. In this connection he brought to my notice the decision of a Bench of this Court in Belegal Gundachar and Anr. v. The State of Madras represented by the Collector of Bellary and Ors. (1953) 2 M.L.J. 262. It was pointed out in that case that the power of a state to acquire property compulsorily was a power to acquire it only for a public purpose and that the expression "public purpose" was not capable of a precise definition and had not a rigid meaning. An acquisition for carrying out an irrigation scheme would be entirely for a public purpose, which was a State purpose: In the said case it was pointed out that though initially a channel for which the land is acquired would serve only one part of land owned by a single individual, in course of time it would also serve the other lands as well, so that it must be held that the acquisition was for a public purpose namely, extension of irrigation. It was ruled that the fact that initially only one individual stood to benefit by the proposed channel would not make the acquisition any the less an acquisition for a public purpose. Having regard to this Bench decision, it would follow that even assuming that Mr. Venkatarama Iyer was a single individual proposed to be benefited still it would be a public purpose since aiding agriculture is a public purpose.

8. It is unnecessary, in this view, to go into the question whether the learned Subordinate Judge was right at all in proceeding as if the benefit was intended only for Dr. Venkatarama Iyer. It was pointed out for the Government that the benefit was likely to enure to a number of individuals, so that the learned Judge was not right in proceeding on the basis that he has done. There is substance in this submission.

9. The Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the whole of the proceedings under Section 5-A were vitiated because the procedure under section 5-a(2) had not been followed in this case. In The State of Madras represented by the Secretary to Government, Home Department, Madras-9 v. Periakkal and Ors. , it has been ruled that the provisions of Rule 3(b) of the Rules framed under Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in relation to the enquiry under section 5-A is not mandatory. In that case no notice had been given to the Department at whose instance the acquisition was initiated. The Court held that the failure to issue notice to the Department did not affect the validity of the enquiry. This decision relied on by the Learned Counsel for the Government does not however, affect the controversy before me. section 5-a(1) contemplates further enquiry only if objection is received from the person interested in the land notified under section 4(1) within, a period of 30 days after the issue of such notification. There is no dispute that in the present case this notification came to be issued on 6th December, 1961 and the objection came to be filed on 16th June, 1962. This objection, is wholly beyond the time provided under section 5-A so that the mandatory character of section 5-a(2), if any, would not came up for consideration. In other words, only if there was an objection within the period specified in section 5-a(1) there would be scope for making the enquiry under section 5-a(2). The Learned Counsel for the respondents, in this connection, brought to my notice Exhibits A-4 and A-5. Exhibit A-4 is a notice issued on 19th April, 1961. This was submitted to be the notice contemplated by section 4(1) to the individuals and in pursuance of it he filed the objection in Exhibit A-5 on 29th April, 1961 which is within, the period of 30 days. The notice does not say under what provision it was issued. It was obviously with a view to make some further enquiry regarding the public purpose that the notice must have been issued. The suggestion for the respondent is that when once this objection is filed within the period of thirty days, then the provisions of Section 5-A(1) are satisfied. I think there is no substance in this submission. The provisions of section 4(1) require only the issue or publication in the Official Gazette and also at convenient places in the locality. It does not contemplate any individual notice so that the notice under Exhibit A-4 cannot be taken as a notice under section 4(1). The mandatory requirements of section 5-a(2) would arise for consideration only in case there was a proper objection within the time contemplated by the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the objection of the Learned Counsel for the respondents that the mandatory provisions of section 5-a have not been complied with here.

10. The next point that was submitted was that Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act requires submission of a report to the Government and the consideration of that report by the Government. Unless such a report is received by the Government, the argument runs, the Government cannot make any declaration under Section 6. For this purpose my attention was drawn, to a decision, in Sinnaiyan and Ors v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry represented by the Undersecretary to Government, Revenue and Development Department, Pondicherry and Anr. . In that case it was pointed out that from Rule 3 of the Rules framed by the Government under Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, it was clear that the objector has got an opportunity to know, at the time of the enquiry under Section 5-A what answer, if any, the Department, for whom the acquisition was proposed, had given with regard to his objection. On coming to know at the time of the enquiry how the objections were sought to be met, the objector, it was held, got an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his objections. In the case before the Court, the petitioner had no opportunity to know the answer given by the concerned department. The mandatory provisions contained in Rule 3 were, it was held, violated as the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This decision is inconsistent with the Bench decision of this Court reported in Periakkal's case1, to which I have already referred. In that case it was held that there was nothing mandatory in Rule 3(h) which is the rule applicable to section 5-a proceedings. In view of this Bench decision, I am unable to hold that the provisions of Rule 3 require any mandatory procedure to be observed, the failure to do which would vitiate the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. But the provisions of Section 6(1) require the submission of and consideration of a report only in case there was one. As I have held, in the present proceedings the provisions of section 5-a were not attracted because there were no objection filed within the period of thirty days, there was no need for any report under Section 5-A. There is no transgression of the provisions of section 6 here. In the circumstances, the acquisition is proper and the learned District Munsif rightly dismissed the suit.

11. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. No order as to costs. No leave.