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Jayarama Iyer And Others v. S. Ramanatha Iyer And Others.

Madras High Court
Sep 8, 1975
Important Paras
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1. This civil revision petition arises out of the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam on 3rd May 1975 in O.S 83 of 1974 on his file, regarding the admissibility of a document dated 1st November 1973, brought into existence by the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit.

2. The plaintiffs have come forward with the suit for declaration that the partnership business conducted by the plaintiffs and the defendants under the name and style of Visalakshi Transports has been dissolved and for directing the account of the partnership to be taken in terms of the dissolution agreement. The first plaintiff has been examined as P.W 1, and through him, the plaintiffs seek to exhibit a deed of dissolution of the partnership brought into existence by the plaintiffs and the defendants on 1st November 1973. The defendants object to the marking of the said document as an exhibit on the ground that the document now relied on by the plaintiffs is not the original dissolution agreement and since the original agreement of dissolution of the partnership has not been duly stamped, a copy of the same cannot be marked at all. The plaintiffs' counsel has argued that in the document now relied on by the plaintiffs, all the five partners have signed, and therefore, even though it is mentioned in the document that it is a copy of the original deed of dissolution of partnership, engrossed on stamp papers of the value of Rs. 2-50, it is also an original, and as such, it is admissible in evidence. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs has further stated that the duty of Rs. 30 and a penalty of Rs. 309 have also been ‘paid by the plaintiffs for exhibiting the document, and as such, the document cannot be withheld on the ground that it has not been properly stamped. The payment of stamp duty and penalty was in pursuance of the orders passed by the trial court in its administrative capacity.

3. The trial Court held that the document is not the original and is only a copy of the original and the same cannot be admitted. The trial court further held that at the most, this document, in which all the parties have signed, can only vouch for the authenticity of the copy and nothing more. Since the original has not been shown as properly stamped, the trial court held that this copy cannot be marked. With these findings the trial Court refused to admit the document. Aggrieved by the said decision, the present civil revision petition has been filed.

4. Mr. A. Sundaram Iyer, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the document is nothing but a counter-part of the original which was written on stamp papers of the value of Rs. 2.50 There is no difficulty in accepting the fact that this document has been signed by all the five partners who are parties to the suit. It is also clear that though one of the documents was written on stamps of the value of Rs. 2.50, the other four documents were written on plain white paper and were signed by all the parties concerned. It is stated by Mr. Sundaram Iyer, that each one of the partners took one such agreement and the first plaintiff in the suit got only the document which he sought to produce now. The learned counsel referred to S. 62 of the Indian Evidence Act, wherein Explanation (1) states that ‘where a document is executed in counter-part, each counter-part being executed by one or more of the parties only, each counter-part is primary evidence as against the parties executing it. “From this the learned counsel submitted that the document can be admitted in evidence and since the necessary stamp duty and penalty have been collected, there is no difficulty for the court to place reliance on this document.

5. Mr. R. Krishnamurthi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the original is with the plaintiffs, that they have not produced the same, that the document sought to be produced now is only a copy and cannot be a counter-part as envisaged in S. 62 of the Evidence Act and that the same cannot be exhibited. He also referred to the meaning given in Venkatarama Aiyah's Law Lexicon for the term ‘counterpart’ and also Art. 25 of the first Schedule to the Indian Stamp Act. As far as Art. 25 of the First Schedule to the Indian Stamp Act is concerned, it simply states that the stamp duty payable on a counter-part or a duplicate. Hence, an unstamped counterpart can be validated by payment of proper stamp duty and penalty therefor. In this case, the petitioners have paid both the stamp duty and the penalty as per the direction given by the trial court on its administrative side.

6. As regards the meaning of ‘counter part’, Venkatararma Aiyah's Law Lexicon gives it as, “duplicate”; when a deed is prepared in two or more identical forms, the part signed by the granter is the original, the other parts are counter-parts.” As far as the present case is concerned, all the five documents are signed by all the parties concerned, and the only difference is that except one document which has been written on stamp papers of the value of Rs. 2-50 the other documents have been written on plain white paper. Venkatama Aiyah's Law Lexicon defines a ‘copy’ as follows: “When a document is an accurate and full reproduction of the original it would be a copy. A counterpart will satisfy all the requirements of a copy. But, at the same time, it can be a counterpart instead of a copy, if the other conditions such as those mentioned in S. 62 of the Evidence Act are satisfied. Mr. Krishnamurthi brought to my notice S. 63 of the Evidence Act, wherein, secondary evidence is stated to include copies referred to therein. Definitely, the present document will not come under any one of the categories mentioned in S 63 of the Evidence Act in as much as this document, though a copy of the original, has been signed by every one of the partners, and has been handed over to each one of the partners to be kept as a document evidencing the agreement for dissolution. Thus, it is clear from the facts of the present case that the document now sought to be produced can be easily stated to be a counterpart coming under S. 62 of the Evidence Act and as such, the same can be admitted in evidence. The petitioners have also paid the necessary stamp duty and penalty therefor, and as such, the document can be straightaway taken in as admissible in evidence. With these findings, the civil revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

V.C.S