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Kamalammal v. A.M Shanmugam Alias Gurunathan & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit under consideration originated as O.S. No. 69 of 1970 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Kancheepuram. The appellant is the first defendant in that suit; parties in this summary are referred to as in the original suit record.
Key relationships and transactions as recorded in the opinion:
- The first and second defendants are sisters. The second defendant married the third defendant. The plaintiffs are the sons of the second and third defendants.
- Rajakotilingam Chettiar (also referred to as Ghettiar) was father of defendants 1 and 2, father-in-law of the third defendant and maternal grandfather of the plaintiffs.
- After the birth of the first plaintiff (the opinion records his date of birth in the text; see note below), Rajakotilingam Chettiar filed O.P. No. 162 of 1949 under the Guardians and Wards Act and was appointed guardian of the first plaintiff.
- As guardian of the first plaintiff (and of the third defendant), Rajakotilingam Chettiar executed a sale deed on 24 September 1949 (Ex. A-2) in respect of property No. 7 Malayaperumal Street for Rs. 39,000. From that consideration, Rs. 12,000 was retained by Rajakotilingam Chettiar purportedly to discharge a pre-existing mortgage in favour of Murali Kaka Trust.
- The first plaintiff later instituted the present suit (on 1 February 1968) for himself and as guardian for his minor brother (the second plaintiff) seeking recovery of Rs. 23,216 (as pleaded in the plaint) on the ground that Rajakotilingam Chettiar did not apply the Rs. 12,000 to discharge the mortgage and allegedly furnished false accounts, with the mortgage ultimately discharged by the third defendant.
- Rajakotilingam Chettiar died on 29 December 1963. The suit sought recovery from his estate as represented in the hands of defendants 1 and 2.
Procedural history and outcome at trial:
- The first defendant (appellant) raised several defences at trial, two of which were (a) that the suit was not maintainable because on the date the plaint was presented the first plaintiff was a minor (had not completed 21 years) and was not represented by a next friend; and (b) that under Section 26 of the Guardians and Wards Act the suit required the permission of the High Court which had ordered O.P. No. 162 of 1949.
- The learned Subordinate Judge, Kancheepuram, rejected these defences and decreed the suit for Rs. 10,920.91 with interest at 6% per annum from 1 January 1962.
- The first defendant appealed from that judgment and decree, and the present opinion is the appellate decision disposing of that appeal.
Note: The opinion's text records the first plaintiff's date of birth inconsistently (the opinion at one point records 6 December 1948 and later refers to 6 December 1943). The opinion elsewhere describes that when the plaint was filed (1 February 1968) the first plaintiff had completed 18 years but had not completed 21 years. This summary reproduces the factual material as presented in the opinion without attempting to reconcile that inconsistency.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a suit instituted by the first plaintiff while he was a minor who had not completed 21 years and who was not represented by a next friend was maintainable, or whether the plaint should have been dismissed or taken off the file under Order 32 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and related provisions (including Section 3 of the Indian Majority Acts cited).
- Whether, because the guardian appointed by the court had not executed a bond, the suit (if brought on behalf of the minor against the guardian or his representatives) could be instituted only with the leave of the High Court which appointed the guardian under Section 36(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Reliance on Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act: The appellant argued that because a guardian had been appointed for the first plaintiff, the first plaintiff attained majority only upon completion of 21 years; since the plaint was presented before he had completed 21 years and without a next friend, the suit was not maintainable.
- Reliance on Section 36 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890: The appellant contended that Rajakotilingam Chettiar had not executed the bond required of a court-appointed guardian and therefore any suit against him (or his representatives) for an account should have been instituted only with the leave of the High Court which made the guardian appointment; because such leave was not obtained, the suit was incompetent.
The opinion records that the learned counsel for the appellant confined the appeal to these two legal points. The text does not set out in detail separate arguments advanced on behalf of other parties.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the two legal contentions advanced by the appellant in turn and explained its reasoning with reference to the statutory provisions and procedural rules relied upon.
Issue 1 — Suit instituted while the plaintiff was a minor (Order 32 CPC and Majority Acts)
The court accepted the factual premise that when the suit was instituted (1 February 1968) the first plaintiff had completed 18 years but not 21 years and therefore, under the provisions referred to, he was a minor on that date. The court then considered the legal consequence of instituting a suit during such minority.
The court examined Order 32 CPC (suits by or against minors). It quoted the rule that "every suit by a minor shall be instituted by his next friend," and cited Order 32, Rule 2(1) which provides that where a suit is instituted by or on behalf of a minor without a next friend, the defendant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file with costs. The court noted the distinction between (a) taking the plaint off the file under that rule and (b) dismissing the suit altogether.
Applying those rules to the present case, the court observed: (i) the appellant had not applied under Order 32, Rule 2 to have the plaint taken off the file; (ii) Order 32 R.2 does not itself contemplate dismissal of the suit on this ground — dismissal has been applied in prior cases where a minor knowingly and fraudulently instituted a suit despite awareness of his incompetence; (iii) there is a recognized distinction between a minor who intentionally files a suit to deceive and a minor who files without knowledge of his incapacity. The opinion records that here there was no allegation that the first plaintiff knowingly instituted the suit with ulterior motives.
The court further reasoned that, even if the plaint could have been taken off the file, that procedural consequence could be treated in effect as having occurred because the first plaintiff attained majority during the pendency of the suit and continued the suit after attaining majority. Thus the proceedings could be treated as if the plaint had been re-presented after majority; the appellant suffered no prejudice and limitation was not an issue. On that basis the trial court's conclusion that the suit could be validly continued and disposed of after the plaintiff attained majority was held to be correct.
Issue 2 — Requirement of High Court leave under Section 36(1) Guardians and Wards Act
The court next considered Section 36(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, which the appellant relied on. The opinion reproduces the statutory provision, which contemplates that where a court-appointed guardian has not given the requisite bond, "any person, with the leave of the court may, as next friend, at any time during the continuance of the minority of ward ... institute a suit against the guardian, or, in case of his death, against his representatives, for an account ... and may recover ... such amount as may be found to be payable by the guardian or his representative."
The court concluded that Section 36(1) did not apply to the present case for two primary reasons stated in the opinion:
- The statutory language of Section 36(1) contemplates a suit brought by a person as next friend on behalf of a minor against the guardian (or his representatives). It does not expressly address a suit filed by a former minor (who has since attained majority) in his own right against an erstwhile guardian or the guardian's representatives.
- The court had already held (in addressing Issue 1) that the plaint could be treated as effectively re-presented and pursued by the plaintiff after he attained majority. In that factual-legal posture (a suit pursued by a person who has attained majority), Section 36(1) — which is framed around suits by next friends during the continuance of minority — had no application.
Hence, the appellant's contention that leave of the High Court which appointed the guardian was a jurisdictional prerequisite for the suit could not be sustained on the facts and legal form of the proceedings as they stood.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed.
Direct implications and consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):
- The trial court's judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiffs (decreeing Rs. 10,920.91 with interest at 6% per annum from 1 January 1962) stands, because the appellate court dismissed the appeal.
- The appellate court did not order costs against the appellant, citing the fair stand taken by the appellant's counsel in confining the appeal to the two specified legal points.
Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent beyond the application of established provisions (Order 32 CPC and Section 36 of the Guardians and Wards Act) to the facts of this case. The opinion contains no extended discussion of novel legal principles and does not indicate that it creates a new rule of general application.
Signed: V. C. S. (as recorded in the opinion)
The first defendant in O.S No. 69 of 1970, on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge, Kancheepuram, is the appellant herein. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as they were arrayed in the suit. The first defendant and second defendant are sisters and the second defendant has married the third defendant. The two plaintiff are the sons of the second and third defendants. One Rajakotilingam Ghettiar was the father of defendants 1 and 2, and, therefore, the father-in-law of the third defendant, and the maternal grandfather of the plaintiffs. It is admitted that, after the birth of the first plaintiff on 6th December 1948, Rajakotilingam Chettiar filed O.P No. 162 of 1949 on the file of this court under the Guardians and Wards Act and was appointed as the guardian of the first plaintiff. Equally, it is admitted that, after the appointment as guardian, Rajakotilingam Chettiar, as the guardian of the first plaintiff and the third defendant, executed a sale deed in favour of one Natesa Mudaliar for Rs. 39,000 an evidenced by Ex. A-2, dated 24th September, 1949 in respect of No. 7 Malayaperumal Street, belonging to the first plaintiff. Out of this consideration of Rs. 39,000, a sum of Rs, 12,000 was retained by Rajakotilingam Chettiar for the purpose of discharging a mortgage existing previously in favour of one Murali Kaka Trust. The present suit was instituted by the first plaintiff for himself and an the guardian of his minor brother the second plaintiff, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 23.216, putting forward the contention that Rajakotilingam Chettiar the erstwhile guardian of the first plaintiff, did not apply the said sum of Rs. 12.000 for the purpose of discharging the mortgage due to Murali Kaka Trust and he furnished false accounts to this court and that ultimately it was the third defendant who had to discharge the mortgage debt. Rajakotilingam Chettiar himself died on 29th December, 1963 and it was thereafter the present suit was instituted for the recovery of the moneys from the estate of Rajakotilingam Chettiar in the bands of defendants 1 and 2. Several defences were put forward by the first defendant in the suit, the second and third defendants remaining ex-parte, two of them being, that the suit was not maintainable because on the date when the suit was instituted the first plaintiff was a minor in as much as he had not completed the age of 21 and he was not represented by the next friend and secondly that the suit could have bean instituted only with the permission of the High Court which ordered O.P No. 162 of 1949, referred to already under S. 26 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The learned Subordinate Judge of Kancheepuram negatived these defences of the first defendant and decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 10,920.91 with interest at 6 percent per anoint from 1st January, 1962, ft is against this judgment and decree the first dafendan in the suit has preferred this appeal.
2. I have not referred to the other contentions as well as the facts on which the contentions were based for the simple reason that the learned counsel for the appellant advanced only two arguments before me, both of them being said to be of a legal nature. The first argument is that under S. 3 of the Indian Majority Act, a guardian having been appointed for the first plaintiff, he attained majority only on the completion of 21 years, that in this case admittedly on the date when the plaint was presented, the first plaintiff had not completed the age of 21 and he was not represented by a next friend and that therefore the suit was not maintainable. The second is that Rajakotilingam Chettiar, when he was appointed as guardian by this court, had not executed any bond and that under these circumstances under S. 36 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the suit, if at all, could have been instituted only with the leave of the High Court which appointed the guardian and that such leave not having, been obtained, the suit was incompetent.
3. I shall now deal with the two contentions. I have already referred to the fact that the first plaintiff was born on 6th December, 1943 and Rajakotilingam Chettiar was appointed an the guardian for his property in O.P 162 of 1949 by the Court, The suit itself was instituted on 1st February, 1968. Consequently, on the date when the suit was instituted, the first plaintiff had completed the age of 18, but not completed the age of 21. Therefore, under the provisions of S. 3 of the Indian Majority Act of 1875, the first plaintiff was a minor on the date when the suit was instituted. The next question for consideration is what exactly is the consequence of the first plaintiff instituting the suit daring such minority. The argument that appears to have been advanced before the trial-court was that on that ground, the suit should be dismissed. However, the learned trial Judge has pointed oat that, though this point was raised by the appellant, before that point could be decided, the first plaintiff had attained majority by completing 21 years and continued the suit and that he was competent to do so. I am of the opinion that this conclusion of the trial court is correct. Order 32 C.P.C deals with suits by or against minors and persons of unsound mind. Rule of the order states that—
“every suit by a minor shall be instituted be his same by a person who in such suit shall be called the neat friend of the minor”.
Under R. 2(1)
“Where a suit it instituted by or on behalf of a minor, without a next friend, the defendant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file, with costs to be paid by the pleader or other parson by whom it was presented”.
Under Sub-R. (2) of R. 2.
“notice of such application shall be given to such person, and the court, after hearing his objection (if any, may make such order in the master as it thinks at.”
Admittedly, in this cage, no application under Or. 32 R. 2 has been filed by the appellant for taking the plaint off the file. The above rule itself does not contemplate a suit instituted by such a minor plaintiff being dismissed on that ground. There is a difference between a suit being dismissed and a plaint being taken off the file, and all that Or. 33 R. 2(1) contemplates is a plaint being taken off the file on an application for the said purpose being made by the defendant. It is true the courts have made a distinction between two classes of suits instituted by a minor, one knowing that he was a minor and he was incompetent to institute a suit without the nest friend and yet filing a suit with a view to deceive the court or with some ulterior purposes, and the other, a minor filing the suit without knowing or realising his minority and in the former case the suit being dismissed and in the latter cage the plaint being taken off the file. As far as the present case is concerned, it is not even the case of the appellant herein that the first plaintiff instituted the suit with the knowledge that he wag a minor and was incompetent to institute the suit without a next friend and that he did so with some ulterior purpose. As I pointed oat already, he had already completed the age of 18, but had not completed the age of 21 and the period of minority gets enlarged only under the special provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1873, in a case where the guardian has been appointed by the court. Therefore, the present is not a suit where the first plaintiff instituted the same with the full knowledge that he was a minor and he was incompetent to institute the same without a seat friend and he instituted the suit with ulterior motives. Therefore, the suit instituted by the first plaintiff could not have been dismissed. If at all, the plaint presented could have been taken off the file if the appellant had preferred an application for such a purpose under Or. 32 R. 2(1). Therefore, in this case, it is not open to the appellant to contend that the trial court should have dismissed the suit on the ground mentioned above. Assuming that even without the application on the part of the appellant herein, the plaint should have been taken off the file, since the suit was continued by the first plaintiff after his attaining majority, there is no difficulty in treating the proceedings before the trial court as if the plaint was taken off the file of the court, but subsequently represented after the first plaintiff attained majority and the suit was continued thereafter and there is no impediment to so treating the proceedings because the appellant will not be indemnified or prejudiced by such a conclusion since the question of limitation does not arise. Therefore, I am of the view that the conclusion of the trial court that because of the first plaintiff attaining majority during the pendency of the suit, the suit could be continued by hint and validly disposed of according to law, is correct.
4. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, as I pointed out already, is based upon S. 36(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. That provision states:
“Where a guardian appointed or declared by the court has not given a bend as aforesaid, any person, with the leave of the court may, as next “friend, at any time daring the continuance of the minority of ward, and upon such terms as aforesaid, institute a suit against the guardian, or, in case of his death, against his representatives, for an account of what the guardian has received in respect of the property of the ward and may recover in the suit, as trustee for the ward, such amount as may be found to be payable by the guardian or his representative, as the case may be.”
I am of the opinion that this statutory provision has no application to present case. In the first place, the said provision itself contemplates a person as next friend filing a salt on behalf of the minor against the guardian or his representatives for an account and it does not actually deal with a suit filed by a quondam minor against his erstwhile guardian or his legal representatives. I have already indicated in dealing with the first point that the plaint presented by the first plaintiff could have been considered as having been taken off the file and then represented and pursued after he attained majority. To such a situation, S. 36(1) will have no application and therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit instituted by the first plaintiff without obtaining the leave of the High Court which appointed Rajakotilingam Chettiar as the property guardian of the first plaintiff will have to fail, cannot be sustained.
5. No other point was urged before me. Accordingly the appeal fails and it is dismissed. Having regard to the fair stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellant by confining himself to the two points mentioned above, I am not ordering any costs against the appellant.
V.C.S
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