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Arumugha Gounder v. Ardhanari Mudaliar And Others.
Structured Summary of the Opinion — The Chief Justice
Factual and Procedural Background
This reference concerns whether a tenant who was let into possession of land and incidental immovable property by a Receiver appointed by the Court during the pendency of a suit is entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act.
Relevant facts, as recorded in the opinion:
- A lease in favour of the tenant was granted in 1957 and was to enure, with yearly renewals, up to 15 November 1961.
- In 1961 the Receiver was discharged, but the tenant remained in possession and continued to cultivate the land (i.e., he "held over").
- The true owner sought possession; the tenant (plaintiff) instituted a suit for a preventive injunction to restrain disturbance of his possession. A second appeal arises out of that suit.
Procedural outcome indicated in the opinion:
- The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed.
- The Second Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition were dismissed.
- No costs were awarded in any of them.
- Various miscellaneous applications (G.M.P and C.M.P numbers listed in the judgment) were disposed of as recorded in the opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person let into possession by a Receiver appointed by the Court pending a suit can be a "cultivating tenant" and thereby obtain protection from eviction under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act.
- Whether a Receiver (or acts done by a Receiver) can be treated, for the purposes of the Act, as a "land owner" or "landlord" such that a tenancy created by the Receiver attracts the statutory protection afforded to cultivating tenants.
- Whether a tenant who continues in possession and cultivates land after the determination/expiry of a tenancy created by a Receiver is covered by the inclusive part of the definition of "cultivating tenant" in the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (tenant) relied strongly on the decision in Sarang Abdul Khadir v. Rajagopala Pandarayar and argued by analogy that a tenant let into possession by a Receiver should be entitled to the protections of the (Tamil Nadu) Cultivating Tenants Protection Act.
- The appellant advanced a literal reading of the Act: the statutory definitions of "cultivating tenant" and "landlord" would, on their face, include a tenant under a Receiver (as a cultivating tenant) and the Receiver (as a landlord/land owner), including the inclusive wording that covers persons who continue in possession after determination of a tenancy.
- The appellant also directed the Court's attention to authorities on the powers of Receivers (for example, Secretary of State for India v. Janardhana Rao) to support the contention that, in some circumstances, a Receiver's acts may be treated as conferring rights analogous to ownership for present purposes.
The opinion does not present a separately detailed, itemised account of the opposing party's (the true owner's) pleadings or submissions in the same structured way; the Court addressed countervailing legal and policy considerations in its reasoning.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sarang Abdul Khadir v. Rajagopala Pandarayar | Held under the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act that a Receiver virtually represented the real owner and could be treated as "land owner" so that tenants under a Receiver could claim protection under that Act. | The appellant relied on this decision. The Court analysed Sarang but observed it related to a different statutory scheme (the Tanjore Act) and did not warrant a literal extension to the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act in a manner that would defeat the court's jurisdiction and the doctrine of custodia legis. |
| Ramaswamy Gounder v. Kalliappa Gounder | Decision under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act holding that a lessee from a property-guardian under court directions was not entitled to protection under that Act; distinguished from Sarang. | Referred to as illustrating that a lease granted under court direction (or from a guardian/receiver for limited period) may not attract statutory protection unless the court specifically confers such benefit. The Court used it to show different legislative schemes and outcomes. |
| Secretary of State for India v. Janardhana Rao | Explained that a Receiver's powers depend upon terms of appointment; where general powers are conferred, a Receiver may act as "in lawful management" and, for certain limited purposes, be regarded as a proprietor. | The Court observed this authority did not contradict its analysis; it acknowledged that in some circumstances a Receiver may be regarded as proprietor for limited, specific purposes, but emphasised that such modulation does not equate to absolute ownership or entitle a tenant under a Receiver to statutory protection that would defeat the court's function. |
| Kanhaiyalal v. Dr. D.R. Banaji | Stated that a Receiver appointed under O. 40, C.P.C. is an agent of the Court for custody and management and does not own the property or hold title. | The Court relied on this principle to support its conclusion that a Receiver is the court's agent and cannot be treated as the owner whose acts would create an indefeasible statutory tenancy immune from the court's ability to give relief to the true owner. |
| Chandrasekharan v. Kunjuvanniar and others | Held that a tenant under a usufructuary mortgage whose tenancy agreement ended but who continued in possession and cultivation would be entitled to statutory protection under the Act. | The Court distinguished this case as not involving a Receiver-appointed letting; it noted the principles there were inapposite because no doctrine of custodia legis or act of court prejudicing an ultimate successful litigant arose in that context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in two stages: (a) a textual/literal consideration of the statute and (b) a purposive and policy-based examination of the Receiver's legal status and the consequences of extending the Act's protection.
1. Literal textual analysis:
- The Court acknowledged that a literal application of the definitions in the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act could support the appellant's position. Under the Act, a "cultivating tenant" includes a person who carries on personal cultivation under a tenancy agreement, express or implied; the definition also contains an inclusive portion covering those who remain in possession after determination of the tenancy. A "landlord" or "land owner" is defined by reference to entitlement to evict a cultivating tenant.
- On that literal reading, a tenant let into possession by a Receiver might prima facie appear to satisfy the definition of cultivating tenant, and the Receiver might appear to satisfy the definition of landlord, especially when the tenant continued to cultivate after the Receiver's discharge.
2. Deeper purposive analysis and public policy:
- The Court rejected a literal extension because it would be "opposed to public policy" and "unjust" to litigants. The Court illustrated the injustice by example: where a plaintiff seeks possession on a title claim and the defendant (or another party) is appointed Receiver and lets the property to a tenant, allowing that tenant to claim statutory protection would place the property beyond the court's power to give the plaintiff the remedy decreed in the action. That would defeat the ends of justice.
- The Court analysed the legal position of a Receiver under Order XL, Rule 1 C.P.C., and emphasised that a Receiver is appointed when the court deems it "just and convenient" and may be given powers of management, collection, and preservation. However, those powers are exercised as agent of the court; the Receiver acts under the court's orders and his acts are subject to the court's directions.
- The opinion relied on authorities (including Kanhaiyalal and texts such as Kerr on Receivers and Halsbury's Laws of England) to support the proposition that a Receiver is an officer or agent of the court and that property in the custody of a Receiver is effectively in custodia legis. Acts of a Receiver that interfere with the rights of the successful party would be a travesty of justice; thus, the law treats such acts as subject to the court's control and, where necessary, not capable of creating rights that defeat the court's ultimate disposition.
- The Court recognised that in some specific circumstances (as observed in Secretary of State for India v. Janardhana Rao) a Receiver may be regarded as a proprietor for limited practical purposes depending on terms of appointment; but the Court emphasised that such modulation does not amount to treating the Receiver as an owner whose acts can immunise a third-party tenant from eviction under the statutory scheme in a way that frustrates judicial relief.
- The Court invoked maxims and doctrines: actus curiae nomine non-est (an act of the court shall prejudice no man) and the doctrine of custodia legis (property in the custody of the law) to justify withholding statutory protection in the Receiver context, in order to preserve the court's capacity to vindicate the rights of the ultimate successful litigant and to uphold public policy.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appellant-tenant is not entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act when the tenancy is created by a Receiver appointed by the Court pending litigation; the Letters Patent Appeal, the Second Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition are dismissed.
Immediate consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):
- Direct effect on the parties: The tenant who was let into possession by the Receiver cannot claim statutory protection from eviction under the Act on the facts of this case; the successful owner may obtain relief as adjudicated by the court, and the acts of a Receiver do not confer an indefeasible statutory tenancy that places the property beyond the court's remedial power.
- Procedural outcomes recorded: The Letters Patent Appeal, Second Appeal and Civil Revision Petition were dismissed; no costs were awarded. Specific miscellaneous applications were disposed of as indicated in the judgment.
- Scope of precedent: The Court declined to extend statutory protection in the Receiver context. While the opinion recognises that a Receiver may be treated as proprietor for narrow, specific purposes depending on the terms of appointment, it holds that the general intention of the Act is not to encompass tenancies created by Receivers in a manner that would defeat the court's power to deliver justice. The opinion does not purport to create an overbroad rule beyond these reasons; it distinguishes earlier case law based on differing statutory schemes and facts.
No additional information beyond what is contained in the provided opinion has been added. Sections are faithful to the text of the opinion and to the rulings explicitly recorded therein.
The Chief Justice:
1. This reference raises an interesting question as to whether a tenant let into possession of land and incidental immovable property by a Receiver appointed by Court pending a suit would be entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The suit was brought by the tenant for an injunction, out of which the second appeal arises. The lease in his favour was in 1957 and it was to enure after renewal every year upto 15th November, 1961. In that year, the Receiver was discharged; but the tenant continued to hold over and cultivate the land. When the true owner sought possession, the plaintiff brought the suit for a preventive injunction from disturbance. His ground was that he having been let into possession by the Receiver as a tenant, after expiry of the term of the lease he continued to be in possession and cultivated the land, and that as such he would be a cultivating tenant by operation of law and entitled to protection from dispossession under the Act.
2. For the appellant strong reliance was placed on Sarang Abdul Khadir v. Rajagopala Pandarayar(1) which was concerned with a tenant under the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act. The lands in that case belonged to a Devasthanam. A Receiver was appointed by Court under O. XL, R. 1, C.P.C who granted a lease in favour of two persons for a certain period. The Devasthanam took possession of the lands on the expiry of the lease granted by the Receiver and cultivated the land itself. Respondents 1 to 8 before the court were sub-lessees from the original lessees. For the year 1952-1953, the Devasthanam leased out the lands to the appellant there. The question before the Court was who was entitled to the benefits of the Act—Whether it was the appellant or respondents 1 to 8. Those respondents filed an application under S. 6(2) of the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act successfully and possession was restored to them. An appeal arising out of it failed, and, thereafter, a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution came before Rajagopalan, J. The prayer there was a writ to have the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer quashed on the ground that the respondents would not be entitled to the rights conferred by the provisions of S. 6(2) of the Act. The appellant in the appeal denied that the respondents would be entitled to any such right because of two reasons. One was that they were sub-lessees under a lease from a Receiver, and a Receiver could not be deemed to be a “land owner” within the meaning of the definition of that term in S. 2(g) of the Act. The other reason was that respondents 1 to 8 were not “cultivating tenants” within the meaning of the term in S. 2(g) because they were not in possession under a tenancy agreement with the landowner, to wit, the Devasthanam, and their only agreement, was with the lessees. Rajagopalan, J. overruled these objections. The same two grounds were reiterated before the then learned Chief Justice and Panchapakesa Aiyar, J., but not without success. They were of opinion that a Receiver virtually represented the real owner of the property in his possession, and that he would, therefore, be the owner for the time being of the property and would fall within the definition of “land owner” in S. 2(g) of the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952. They referred to the definition of the word “cultivating tenant” in S. 2(d) of the Act and to the fact that a tenancy agreement, express or implied, did not indicate that such agreement must be with the landowner as defined in S. 2(g) as persons who contributed their own physical labour or that of the members of their family in the cultivation of land belonging to another and who were so cultivating under a tenancy agreement, that is to say, not as trespassers or as owners, would be within the definition of the term “cultivating tenant” Ramaswamy Gounder v. Kalliappa Gounder(2) decided by Ramachandra Iyer, C.J was directly under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. That was a case of a lease of agricultural land for one year from property-guardian of a minor under the directions of court. The learned Chief Justice was of opinion that the lessee was not entitled to protection under the Act. He distinguished Sarang Abdul Khadir v. Rajagopala Pandarayar on the ground that the Bench decision related to the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act which had a different scheme from that of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. He pointed out that a lessee from a Receiver who was authorised to lease the property for a limited period during the pendency of certain proceedings or from a guardian during the period of his guardianship subject to the directions of the Court, could not obtain the benefits of the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, unless the court by appropriate directions conferred by its order such benefit at the time of granting the lease. It was further held that the lessee would have no right to continue in possession of the land beyond the period of the lease.
3. If literal application of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act is made, it may prima facie appear that a tenant let into possession by a Receiver would be entitled to statutory protection under the Act. A cultivating tenant in relation to any land has been defined to mean a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied. A “landlord” in relation to a holding or part thereof is defined to mean a person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding or part. A tenant let into possession by a Receiver appointed by court literally appears to satisfy the definition of “Cultivating Tenant”, and the Receiver, the definition of “landlord”, because the former carried on personal cultivation under a tenancy agreement with the Receiver and the latter being entitled to evict the cultivating tenant on grounds open to him, he would be a landlord within the meaning of the Act. After termination of the tenancy agreement, express or implied, the inclusive part of the definition of “cultivating tenant” would take in as a tenant any person who continues to be in possession of the land after determination of the tenancy agreement. After discharge of the Receiver in 1961, the tenant having held over and continued to cultivate the land, he would appear to fall also within the inclusive part of the definition. It is, therefore, possible, on the basis of the literal application of the provisions of the Act to the facts, to hold that the tenant of the Receiver is a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the inclusive definition of the term and entitled to statutory protection.
4. But, on a deeper consideration of the matter, we are of opinion that such literal extension of the provisions of the Act to the case of a tenant let into possession by a Receiver would not only be opposed to public policy, but also be unjust so far as litigants in the litigation are concerned. Take for instance the case of a plaintiff who claims to recover possession on the basis of title vested in him and the suit being resisted by a denial of the claim and the defendant also being in possession who, pending the litigation having been appointed as Receiver, lets out to a tenant who after the plaintiff gets a decree, claims protection under the Act. It will, at once, be obvious that by the act of the Receiver letting the tenant into possession it has been placed beyond the reach of the court to give the plaintiff the remedy he sought for which the court held he would be entitled to. In our opinion, the intention of the Act is not to cover such a case. The preamble to the Act says that it is one for the protection from eviction of cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Madras, because it is necessary to protect such tenants in these areas from unjust eviction. The legal position of a Receiver is not open to doubt. Under O. XL, R. 1 C.P.C the Court has power, when it appears to the court to be just and convenient, to appoint a Receiver of any property whether before or after decree. Under that order, the court has power to remove any person from the possession or custody of the property and commit the same to the possession, custody, or management of the Receiver. The court may confer upon the Receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits and the execution of the documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the court thinks fit. The duties of a Receiver are also listed in R. 3 of the Order. It seems to be clear from this order that, when the court appoints a Receiver to take possession of immovable property involved in a suit, the effect is that the court takes the property into its own custody and the Receiver is inducted by the Court by the appointment to act as agent of the Court. In order to enable the Receiver to manage the property, incidentally powers are conferred upon him. We are unable to consider the Receiver as owner of the property, only by reason of his appointment as Receiver to take possession and manage the property. He may have powers of management as in the case of an owner of property. But it is not the same as ownership. On account of his possession as Receiver he cannot claim that he is the owner. He acts on orders of court and his acts are subject to the directions of court. In the instance we gave, if the tenant of the Receiver is held to be entitled to statutory protection from eviction, it would in effect defeat the ends of justice and incapacitate the court from giving relief to the one who is entitled to it according to the decree of the court. The acts of a Receiver are, therefore, not intended to bring about such a result.
5. The position of a Receiver has received judicial notice in several cases. For the appellant our attention was drawn to Secretary of State for India v. Janardhana Rao. But we do not think it says anything contrary to what we have outlined above as to the position of a Receiver. In that case, it was said that the powers of a Receiver appointed by the court depended upon the terms of his appointment subject to any modification the court might from time to time make, but that, where general powers of management were conferred, though subject to the control of the court the Receiver as the person “in lawful management otherwise than as an agent, servant, mortgagee or lessee” was the proprietor and could validly exercise the power of nominating village officers vested in the “proprietor” under the Act. This is an instance where the position of a Receiver has to be modulated according to the requirements or exigencies of a particular case in order that the property in question may be effectively managed pending the litigation. It is in that sense that a Receiver could be regarded as a proprietor for purposes of the power in him to appoint a village officer. In Kanhaiyalal v. Dr. D.R Banaji the Supreme Court observed:
“A receiver appointed under O. 40, C.P.C unlike a receiver appointed under the insolvency Act, does not own the property or hold any interest therein by virtue of a title. He is only the agent of the court for the safe custody and management of the property during the time that the court exercises jurisdiction over the litigation in respect of the property.
Kerr on Receivers, 12th Edition, at page 154, says:
“The receiver does not collect the rents, and profits by virtue of any estate vested in him, but by virtue of his position as an officer of the court appointed to collect property upon the title of the parties to the action.
In appointing a receiver the court deals with the possession only until the right is determined, if the right be in dispute.”
The position is more or less the same in England too. In Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edition, Volume 32, page 607 we have the observation that a Receiver is a person appointed for the collection or protection of property. Where that is the position, that is to say, when he is appointed for the collection or protection of property, it will be travesty of justice if by his act of letting out he brings about a situation where his Act ceases to be one of protection but of destruction of the rights of the successful party as declared by the Court. Again, as observed in Halsbury's Laws of England at page 384, a Receiver appointed by the court is in no sense an agent or trustee for the party at whose instance the appointment is made. He is an officer of the court appointed for the benefit of all the parties to the action. By the order for the appointment of a Receiver the court assumes control of the property affected and from that time, the parties to the action retain possession only as custodians for the court. In fact, as noticed by Halsbury, any interference with the possession of a Receiver appointed by the court is a contempt of court and renders the offending party liable to committal. Sir John Woodroffe “on Receivers” is worth quoting:
“The Receiver being the officer of the court from which he derives his appointment, his possession is exclusively the possession of the courts the property being regarded as in the custody of the law in gremio legis for the benefit of whoever may be ultimately determined to be entitled thereto.”
According to Sir John Woodroffe when the court orders a receiver to enter into a contract the contract is made with the court, the approval by the Judge of the offer made by the third party constituting the contract. Such power of enforcing subsisting contracts made by it is not affected by the fact that the court has ceased to manage the estate before such contract is carried out by reason of the dismissal of the suit.
6. So when the act of the Receiver in letting out the land in the suit is an act of the court itself and it is done on behalf of the Court the whole purpose of the court taking possession through the Receiver appointed by it is to protect the property for the benefit of the ultimate successful party. If that is the essence and purpose of appointment of a Receiver as we hold it is, it will be difficult to agree that by a liberal application of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, it could be put beyond the reach of the court to give relief to the successful party entitled to possession. Not only Actus curle nomineum gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no man) but also the doctrine of the property being in custodia legis coupled with public policy in rendition of proper justice and conservance of power therefor would be valid and effective reasons for our view that the intention of the Act is not to extend the protection to the tenant of the Receiver and thus defeat justice eventually. Actus legis nomini est domnosus, that is to say an act in law shall prejudice no man, is another aspect of public policy. Our view derives also strength from the fact that an act of the Receiver done on behalf of the court is done pendente lite and anyone who gets possession through such act can only do so subject to the directions and orders of court. That is implied from the nature and legal position relating to the appointment and powers as well as the management by the Receiver.
7. Though there are other cases which have been referred to at the Bar, we find that in none of them the approach that we have made found a place. In Chandrasekharan v. Kunjuvanniar and three others we have held that a tenant of a usufructuary mortgage with whom the tenancy agreement came to an end would be entitled to statutory protection under the Act, if he continues to be in possession and cultivates the land. Obviously, that would not be a case of a Receiver letting out and no principle of custodia legis or an act of the court prejudicing a party or public policy was involved in it.
8. In our opinion, the appellant-tenant is not entitled, for the reasons we have given, to take cover under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act and seek statutory protection. The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. So too, the Second Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition are dismissed. No costs in any of them.
G.M.P Nos. 10520 and 10522/1972 and C.M.P No. 13684/1966 dismissed.
C.M.P Nos. 10519 and 10521/1972 ordered.
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